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PROBLEMS OF MILITARY PROFESSION

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Problems Of The Military Profession

By its very nature the military profession remains continually exposed to an irksome climate of challenge — whether in the form of an external military threat or in that of internal turmoil. In countries with less developed civilian systems to control or channellise the various collective threats into collective problems and tasks, the burden is to be borne mainly by the armed forces.

There is nothing extraordinary about this since the armed forces are prepared and trained precisely for this purpose: to tackle effectively the extreme national emergencies. Their utility and effectiveness would be judged largely by their ability to handle a dire crisis when it comes.

Priding in sheer professionalism, the military establishment, as a class, would normally prefer cold reasoning to philosophical free-wheeling; harsh facts to tranquillizing fantasy. In the control and management of violence for which the armed forces are trained, there is no room for trading reason for emotion except as a last resort when emotional appeal might seem to have acquired the lethality of a weapon of war. However, this may happen only at the time of an *offensive a outrance* when a battle is being fought to the bitter end.

LESSONS TO LEARN

Conflict is the acid test of the professional soundness of a military establishment and of its devotion to duty. Irrespective of the results achieved by it in the conduct of the conflict—good, bad or indifferent—a military establishment would do well to collect and collate the lessons learnt in the process.

The satisfactory conduct and conclusion of a national crisis is by itself a reward. There is, however, more to it in terms of the knowledge thus gained.

A thorough post-mortem or critique of the crisis is essential, therefore, to turn an apparent catastrophe into real wisdom.

Defence Journal invites and would welcome professional studies on the role of the armed forces in a national crisis and the lessons learnt therefrom.

Editor.

Otherwise, rationality at various levels of command is as important for a professional military establishment as the size and quality of its arsenals. Oversensitivity to the dictates of reason and the deductions flowing from them, could be indulged in only at the cost of much professional soundness. However, rationality is pursued either to the bitter end or becomes a casualty to the allurements of unreason. It cannot be absolute though being relative to the situation the armed forces are supposed to handle.

Professional textbooks are based on stock situations and provide stock answers. In the actual conduct of operations, textbook solutions do not always hold the key to ultimate success. It is here that a commander has to find an answer to the big question: whether to toe the mark or use his own judgement in proportion to the nature and size of the challenge confronting him. The intellectual agility of the commander and his quick grasp of the situation could tip the balance in his favour. An unimaginative, textbook approach to the problem on the contrary, may wholly defy the solution.

Strategy is nothing but the ability to manoeuvre and act according to one's own calculated moves and careful assessment of the given situation within one's own resources. Military manuals, for successful commanders, are only a guide rather than the determining factor behind their various moves and manoeuvres in the thick of action.

The growth of the destructive power of war flowing from a fast-expanding and complex technology, has greatly enhanced the intellectual burden and responsibility of the professional soldier. He can longer behave recklessly merely to show off the hero in him. An ill-fated action like the charge of the Light Brigade, based on sheer bravado, would do little credit to a modern commander and his ability to calculate the cost of his action before launching it.

Mature reflection rather than precipitate action is crucial to the satisfactory outcome of a plan. Within his limits as a disciplined soldier, the commander has to exercise his discretionary responsibility while handling a given situation. Obedience to lawful command will always be relevant to the basic character and discipline of military establishment. The question is whether the soldier should always be confronted with Hobson's choice by the superior authority: whether or not, as a trained professional, should he be treated with as much respect as a scientist or a technician.

The modern soldier is nothing if not a technician and once the essential technicalities of his craft have been fully considered, he cannot easily change his mind in regard to his own technical job. He would sooner abandon the business in hand rather than make untenable compromises on how to get about it. If he behaves differently, the danger is that in the end he would neither succeed in satisfying his superiors nor himself.

Soldiers are not supposed to question authority: should they, however, also stop questioning themselves? Should or shouldn't they reason why, when faced with an extraordinary situation? Military discipline is absolute; but in view of the ever-increasing frictions of the military profession, discipline means much more today than the conditioned response of a war horse to the call of the trumpet. At their military academies, staff and war colleges, cadets and officers are drilled in academies for a fuller understanding of their profession in the context of their national and international environments. They are taught humanities and sciences — social and physical — to get to the level of enlightenment at one time associated with the civilian professions only.

Since World War II, more particularly since the nuclear-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there has been a bridging of the gap between the civil and the military. The soldier is trained in crisis-management through peace and war. Modern art of war at the highest level consists more in a skilful procrastination rather than in its hastily-conceived and heroically-oriented prosecution of war. The soldier is not just a rough-and-ready fighter but also an adviser to his government on the vital questions of peace and war.

Hence the evolution of the joint chiefs of staff system and high-powered defence committees to bring about a wholesome fusion of the supreme civil and military goals at the level of grand strategy.

High-ranking military commanders associated with the deliberations of these organizations, are no politicians; just the same they are supposed to be politically-conscious and knowledgeable in order to make their contribution a worth-while one. They are not there only to get orders, but to help the civil authority with the formulation of correct and cogent orders. At the highest policy-making level, civil authority and military command can hardly do without comparable functional equivalence in order to produce satisfactory results.

The chiefs of staff system, in plain language, is a system of checks and balances. The system means the extinction of the commander-in-chief of the seniormost and largest service (the army, normally) as virtually the supreme commander of the three services—the army, navy and the air force. The acceptance of the top commander as the *de facto* supreme commander would render the will of one man as the law and create situations most conducive to the imposition of martial law and *coups d'état*. The replacement of supreme military command through the joint chiefs system strikes at the root of Cromwellian, Bonapartic and MacArthuresque (General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the Allied occupation forces after the Japanese surrender in 1945) tendencies on the part of the supreme military commander. It ensures, on the one hand, the assertion of civilian supremacy and, on the other, provides the military the opportunity for a free expression of their professional opinion. In other words, it paves the way for an intermingling of political sovereignty and professional autarky — delicately balancing the two.

A completely free hand to the military establishment in the formulation of state policies concerning war and peace, could produce a kind of prussianism placing the military above the government. This would certainly not be very desirable. Such an unbalanced civil-military relationship could increase rather than decrease the threat of conflict in its external manifestation. Internally, it could prepare the ground for forcible seizure of state authority by the military through an excessive accretion of power to it.

Nevertheless, if civilian control is stretched to a point where independent decision-making by the military is seriously handicapped, it cannot but adversely affect its professional quality and character. Once erosion occurs in the professional soundness and objectivity of a military establishment, it becomes vulnerable to political influence and manipulation without even being politically involved. Its fighting doctrine, operational strategy, tactics, training and structure may be so tied to the political apron-string, that its professionalism gets badly retarded if not wholly undermined. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that chiefs of staff system should be used ingeniously to strike a happy balance between the civilian control and the professional freedom of the military.

The military can no longer be isolated from the mainstream of the society. The cantonments which once used to be the exclusive preserve of the military now hold large civilian populations. They have in effect been municipalized. The foreign idiom, way of living and looking at things borrowed from the colonial ruler of the past, are now giving way to a new kind of vernacularism. The 'general spirit of the nation' to quote De Tocqueville, is now 'penetrating' the armed forces. The drift towards localization is unmistakable — almost too strong to resist.

The process has also gained momentum through the 'narrowing skill differential' between the civil and the military. There has been an increasing transferability of skills as more and more

of the military personnel continue to acquire managerial training and experience and more and more civilian personnel continue to master the science and technology the military machine needs. In fact, while an increasingly larger number of civilian experts is being militarized, military men are in effect being civilianized. But for the distinctiveness of the uniform, it might in fact be impossible to draw a line between a military commander and corporation manager, military and civilian doctors, engineers, various kind of technical experts and teachers. Even special-to-arms experts like gunners, tankmen, infantry soldiers get absorbed in matching civilian jobs without much difficulty. Absorption of professional soldiers in civilian fields has never been easier and more natural than now. For all the expertise that they invariably acquire while negotiating big commercial deals for their establishments, a large number of military officers make excellent businessmen on retirement. Similarly, for all the knowledge and experience of foreign countries gained during the course of foreign training and postings, a number of military men also acquire diplomatic skills and make excellent diplomats.

The civilians for their part are finding their way into the military establishment not only as technical experts but also as strategic thinkers, planners and historians. The term 'military intellectual' gained wide currency after the publication of Edward Meade Earle's 'The Makers of Modern Strategy'. A whole body of military thought and intellectuals dominated by such formidable civilian writers as Robert E. Osgood, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter, Oskar Morgenstern, Raymond Aron, Thomas C. Schelling, etc., came into evidence.

They had originally been scholars, professors, economists, political thinkers and social scientists. None of them had been a career military man or been through an actual war; but they evolved theories of peace and war deeply influencing the general staff thinking and planning in their own countries and outside. In fact, there has been such a plethora of military writings that the past 30 years have been rightly described as the 'era of overthink' in the field of strategic studies. To quote Harry L. Coles: 'strategic studies since 1945 have been over-subsidized and over-cultivated....'

Increasing civilian participation in military affairs has consequently produced a blurring if not an obliteration of the dividing line between the civil and military spheres. It has quite inevitably impinged on the exclusiveness of the military profession. While the military profession remains a distinctive field of activity, it no longer is off limits to the civilian scholar, writer, scientist and strategic thinker. The traditional image of the civilian as an outsider in the domain of military affairs is practically outdated since the civilian is now closely associated with the military profession in various capacities.

Here arises once again the question whether the military profession is a thing apart from the rest of the society or an integral part of it. After the military this question can be asked with equal force and relevance about the other apparatus of state authority and, in particular, about the judiciary. The administration of justice is a fundamentally vital function of the state and the government discharged through a free and impartial judiciary unencumbered by the authority of the executive. Within the framework of the state's constitution, the judiciary administers justice on the merit of the case regardless of all other considerations. Justice being blind may often come into open clash with state power and authority — even hurt it in the process. A judge while discharging his duties has no likes or dislikes of his own: for him the weight of evidence matters more than the weight of executive power. He is a widely respected member of the society and yet he is severely alone insofar as the administration of justice is concerned.

Like judiciary, the military also stands aloof from the society: it is also equally non-political and non-partisan. However, as the principal repository of lethal power and being infinitely more numerous than the judiciary, the military establishment has a much wider sphere of influence, and in grave emergencies, of activity, than any other organ of the state and government. The outcome of its actions and reactions may affect the entire geo-strategic character and size of the state more deeply than anything else in the realm.

Also as the custodians of the physical integrity of state, the armed forces acquire an incomparably superior place in the society: hence the awesome magnitude of their task and responsibility. A constant state of peace and harmony between the military establishment and the society is the essential concomitant of their tasks to defend the state against physical threats—whether internal or external. The military, no matter, how big and strong, can hardly defend a people against their own will. The two must, therefore, fully integrate to ensure the defence of the realm.

Here arises another question of a basic importance: that is, whether a military establishment can be purely professional regardless of all other motivations—patriotic, emotional, historical, ideological and moral. What distinguishes a national-professional military establishment from a purely professional one, is the former's sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the aspirations of the broad masses of the people.

It is not easily understood how a military establishment wholly indigenous in nature could remain uninfluenced by national events outside the fortified sphere of the profession. A national army, no matter how professional and aloof, cannot but be an integral part of the organic social whole.

It is one thing to be politically/ideologically involved and quite another to be politically/ideologically conscious. In states with a strong ideological base, the matter acquires all the more poignancy. The armed forces of such countries are not supposed to fight for a piece of territory only, but also for their ideology: perhaps even more for the protection of their ideology inasmuch as the collapse or conquest of the ideology might leave the state without its moorings. States whose very existence (the communist states for instance) is synonymous with a certain ideology will be reduced to mere territorial units without their basic ideology.

Hence the supreme duty of the armed forces to ensure the physical defence of the realm together with the protection of its basic ideology: its *raison d'être*, in other words. It is a question to be considered and handled with the utmost delicacy. The danger lies in the misplacing of the emphasis.

While total aloofness of the armed forces to national aspirations (politico-ideological) may generate a psychological gap between nation and the armed forces, too deep a politico-ideological involvement, cannot but grievously impair their professional quality and character. A balance must be struck, therefore, between the professional compulsions and ideological imperatives to produce a military establishment neither wholly concerned with the one nor supremely indifferent to the other.

It looks like a terrible dichotomy. The colonial power would not touch the question of ideology (which to its mind would be synonymous with politics) so long as the soldiery obeyed the orders without flinching. The regiment had, in effect, replaced religion in the professional

sphere; and regimental honour (*izzat*) took the place of ideology. The man served for a prescribed period after which he was pensioned off to spend the rest of his life on his land in his village without making any worthwhile contribution to nation-building. The officer retired either to his pension and horse-farm or a civilian vocation, paid or honorary, matching his rank and status in the army. It had been the regiment and the regiment alone for the better part of his active life: the remainder was dominated by nostalgia about the good old days. Such was the physical and psychological character of the professional military establishment under the colonial rule.

It had been a much easier life altogether: the orders were clear and their execution strictly according to the book. Everything followed a stable, almost unvarying system of reward (*jaza*) and punishment (*saza*). There was always a gong waiting even for a coincidental presence during a certain emergency, campaign or event of a military significance (the coronation medal!) For every deed of valour performed in action there would be a cross and an acre. An abiding place in the regimental rolls of honour would be there to boot. Anything contrary to the book and the regimental code of honour was severely censured and dealt with. The soldier rose to the reveille and retired with the retreat in distant cantonments at home and abroad. He was drilled so thoroughly in the strict regimental regimen that he neither had questions nor looked for answers about things extra-regimental. The satisfaction of doing the professional duty well and according to orders would be the soldier's biggest reward.

That was until the soldier served the colonial master in a closed-in system of regimental drills, and *darbars* and *bara khana*s and local wars nearer home or in distant lands strictly according to orders. Then came the first world war followed by another within a space of a little more than two decades. The world wars brought the regimental soldier in contact with many extra-regimental influences thrown up by political changes in the wake of a sweeping anti-colonial or nationalist upsurge. Mass recruitment during the wars and massive demobilization afterwards shook the soldier's faith in the security of his job. Demobbed soldiers became a constant source of much bickering and disgruntlement. They, as also their more fortunate comrades-in-arms, still in service, saw the invincible colonial power being shaken to its foundations despite its victory. Right in the middle of the second war whole units of a highly-disciplined force—that magnificent instrument of peace and war—deserted to form the rebel Indian National Army. The surviving ring leaders of the INA were court-martialled after the war but released under political pressure: a serious dent was thus made in the purely professional character of the military establishment.

Soldiers faced for the first time, a crisis of identity and conscience. Who were they and on whose side ought they to have been? Old, time-honoured regimental ties which had transcended religion, race and class were put to severe strain. Obedience to orders on the basis of unbroken professional/regimental tradition and loyalty were called into question under the mounting weight of national/political compulsions. The mere fact that the deserters were in the end honoured as heroes, put the rank and file to thinking. As a disciplined body, they would still not question the lawful command and obey it like good soldier—but hardly without a clear conscience.

For the British the INA affair had been a rude awakening from their golden dream of a disciplined force that would always stand by them regardless of everything else. The rebellion of 1857 was something different in that it had pertained to levies, which though trained had, at best, been a loosely-integrated force: the revolt of the INA, on the contrary, had concerned

units disciplined and integrated through years of regimentation. The making of the Indian army had been a source of enormous pride—even of arrogance—to the British. On a sudden their finest achievement seemed standing on the verge of collapse.

The INA revolt followed by the naval mutiny in the closing stages of war contributed as much to the British withdrawal from India as the bitter political strife. Had they been only certain of the continued loyalty of the armed forces, they could have prolonged their rule.

The state of armed forces in the years immediately preceding the birth of India and Pakistan, was marked by a weakening of the traditional regimental ties and strengthening of the nationalist sentiment amongst the armed forces. Except for a small hard core of the Sandhurst (proto) types somewhat excessively—even absurdly—conscious of their largely mess-and-club-based superiority as a class, the rest of the rank and file could not help being swayed by the burgeoning nationalist sentiment. They did not exactly abhor their British colleagues; nevertheless they would have them a pack up and go home sooner than later. The charisma of the British melted away to make them look like strangers and usurpers rather than masters in a land where their writ had run for so long without ever being seriously questioned.

As if that was not enough, soldiers both officers and men began to take sides in favour of the countries (yet to be born) of their choice and origin. India stood already divided in their minds; and long before the two countries actually came into being there had been *Indians* and *Pakistanis* in the army of British India. Mixed regiments still held together but much of the mess and cook-house talk pertained to India and Pakistan—which by itself was nothing short of a heresy; a flagrant departure from the unyielding custom of 'No Politics' within the precincts of the unit—whether in the mess or in the lines.

The establishment of India and Pakistan as two independent countries—with dominion status—threw up the question of the ultimate control of the armed forces. As the C-in-C and supreme commander, India, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck remained the supreme commander of the armed forces of India and Pakistan. The army chiefs of India and Pakistan, were under his direct operational command and reported to him. Hence General Gracey's close contact with the supreme commander's (F.M. Auchinleck's) headquarters in New Delhi before and during the early stages of the Kashmir fighting. It was most extraordinary that the C-in-C (Pak.) reported simultaneously to his Pakistani governor-general, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and defence minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and the supreme commander based in the New Delhi—the capital city of India—the hostile country.

As regards the civilian control of the armed forces, the Quaid-e-Azam refused either to share it with the Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, or transfer it to him even as an interim arrangement. He retained it in his hands for all practical purposes although in theory the supreme civilian control of the armed forces of the dominion of Pakistan still vested in the British crown. A number of army arms and services carried the prefix royal. These were the Royal Pakistan Artillery (RPA), the Royal Pakistan Engineers (RPE) the Royal Pakistan Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RPEME), the Royal Pakistan Army Service Corps (RPASC) and so on. Armoured regiments carried such hallowed names as Duke of Connaught's Own, Prince Albert's Own, etc. The navy and the air force were known respectively as the Royal Pakistan Navy (RPN) and the Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF). A Pakistani Prime Minister when removed from office by his governor-general in the early 50's, appealed to the Queen for

intervention as the legal sovereign and constitutional head of the Commonwealth and of the state.

The oath of loyalty and allegiance administered to officers after independence significantly made no mention of the head of state or of the government at all. As reproduced in a national daily (*Dawn*, Karachi, dated 11-6-77) it read as follows:

'I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the Constitution and the Dominion of Pakistan (mark the words Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan) and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan Forces ' Etcetera, etcetera.

The Quaid-e-Azam while addressing officers at the Staff College, Quetta, on June 14, 1948, himself explained the true import and the meaning of the oath in the following words:

" Of course an oath is only a matter of form; what is more important is the true spirit and the heart. . . . I want you to remember, and if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adopted for use in Pakistan, which is our present constitution, that the executive authority flows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General, and therefore any command or orders that may come to you, cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position. . . . '

Quaid-i-Azam's description of an oath (the soldier's in the relevant context) as 'a matter of form' and his emphasis on the 'true spirit and the heart' are noteworthy. ' . . . the spirit is what really matters ' he declared. The soldier was thus faced, for the first time perhaps, with a choice between his formal and true allegiance, between the spirit and the matter.

Wasn't that only germane to the dictates of the newly-won freedom? The end of the foreign rule threw up its own challenges and contradictions. More than other institutions, they applied to the armed forces. In addition to being the professional custodians of the physical frontiers of the country, they also became the defenders of its ideology which had been the principal motivation behind the making of the new state. Hence, the stress on the spirit rather than the form of an oath laid by the Quaid-e-Azam.

Of the role of the armed forces, before and since independence, Mr. Aminul Islam in a recent article (*Defence Forces and the Present Crisis—Morning News*, Karachi, dated 2-6-1977) wrote: 'In the pre-independence era the armed forces functioned as the most coercive wing of the colonial ruler and their assistance to civil power could be, and indeed often was, contrary to the interests of the country as symbolised by the aspirations of the people. *After independence, the functions of the armed forces underwent a radical change. They were no longer an ordinary component of the government machinery which could be used by men in authority for their personal or factional ends. They became the defenders of the state's integrity and its people. They had to be loyal to the causes, that transcended the limited and passing interests of the changing regimes and the men who led them.* What it meant and still means is that the armed forces could not be called upon to ease narrow problems of the civil regimes; they could not be asked to join in efforts to safeguard the interests of the state, the country and the people.

In two other revealing paragraphs, Mr. Islam observes: 'In what begins as essentially a quarrel between a section of the people and the government, the biggest losers become the state and the common people. In such situations the armed forces have to be called in not, one

must again emphasise, to bail the administration out of its trouble, but to protect the higher and more precious interests of the community.

'... The calling in of troops amounts to an admission that the ordinary law and ordinary machine cannot cope with the situation at a reasonable cost in life and property. Civil authorities are not unnecessarily fond of losing face. If they call in the troops for help, without visible justification, they would lose credibility with both the armed forces and the people.'

Another writer Mr. Hanif Malik, in his article 'Options for the Armed Forces' appearing earlier (*Dawn*, Karachi, dated 29-5-77) analysed the position of the armed forces *vis-a-vis* the government. Here are some excerpts:

'What kind of a government should govern the country is no business of the armed forces. That's the citizens' larger duty and privilege to bring into existence a government of their choice, or, change it if they do not like it—in accordance with given procedure. Armed Forces *qua* armed forces, have no say or locus in the matter....'

'... They have to act as a body under the orders of their superiors and as for the totality of the armed forces, the superior authority is, in point of simple fact, the government.'

'But, still can it be any government? No armed forces can or should go deep into the question. Ordinary work-a-day criteria are available; the most vital is if its formation has not violated or subverted the constitution in force. This is about all that can be theoretically granted to the armed forces perception....'

'Has the army high command thus pre-judged the main political question which is at the root of the present agitation (in Pakistan)? No, it has merely left the larger political issue to be tackled somehow by the public at large. The army, in acting the way it should have been expected to do, was only doing its duty in the only manner it knows how. And that is by obeying a government without reasoning why.'

'... To ask the army to exercise political judgement in a rapidly changing situation is to invite it into the political field and to shower in the path countless temptations....'

Admittedly, armed forces of countries winning their freedom after long periods of foreign rule, have been hard put to re-defining their role and identity in a fundamentally changed environment. It is fair to assume that nobody in the rank and file welcomes and enjoys extra-professional involvement. Indeed, the majority remains generally averse to overt political involvement.

Military life in its very nature is prone to a kind of exclusivism: a professional soldier is essentially shy of exposure and social contact except in his own limited circle. He is generally mistrustful of the civilian and his subtle styles of living and thinking. He gives an order knowing that it will be carried out and when he gets his, carries it out unhesitatingly.

The question is whether in a national, post-independence environment plagued by never-ending problems and crises, could the soldier live and act according to his traditional code of neutrality and non-involvement?

The colonial power ensured the 'political sterilization/neutralization' of the military establishment through objective control. In other words, it maximized its professional proficiency only to fight its wars without the participation of the people at large.

The advent of political freedom, however, transformed the civil control of the military into something national and subjective. The soldier shared with the government and the people a common ideology in which he got himself equally involved. Pure professionalism either yielded place to or was deeply influenced by ideological compulsions. Furthermore the growth and sweep of modern education and technology, now integral to the profession of arms, made a more thinking being out of a soldier than he had ever been. As part of a national military establishment the soldier is supposed to show a livelier awareness of the social factor and environment in the performance of his professional duties. He is at once more responsive to the collective national aspirations and more responsible for satisfying them with greater perception and sympathy than might have been expected of him in the pre-independence era.

It would be rewarding to study and assess the role of the military as the 'school and crucible of citizenship'.

Brigadier A. R. Siddiqi (Retd.)

The Future Of The Military Profession

Major-General Robert G. Gard, Jr., US Army

The article analyses the problems of soldiering in the American, British and French armed forces arising out of sweeping economic, social, psychological and financial changes. It suggests certain solutions to make the military profession more satisfying than it had been in the past.

The elitism of the glorious, hoary past has mellowed under the impact of the rising cost of living and inflationary trends in the economy of many countries. With modern means of communications, industrial and technological growth has paved the way for the inter-mingling of populations, which could once afford to live in splendid isolation or in divided social compartments. Economic factors have brought the soldier closer to general society; cantonments have been engulfed by civilian areas thus influencing the mental behaviour of the soldier. He no longer can just shrug off the 'civilian' influence and forget about it. He feels the impact of wider responsibility and likes his military carrier to be more satisfying.

He is no more like a small and insignificant cog in the wheel. "No longer can he abstain from or minimize participation in policy formulation; nor can he limit himself to traditionally narrow considerations. The military profession cannot escape the requirement to attain high levels of capability in analytical, technical and managerial skills not considered until recently to be primary military responsibilities. And in applying military resources, the military professional must learn to integrate operations more effectively with political, economic, social and psychological measures. Military force must be employed in a manner consistent with societal values; for, in modern democracies, legitimacy of means has become a paramount factor".

It has become conventional wisdom to acknowledge that the advent of the nuclear era has had a revolutionary impact on the military profession. There are, of course, obvious implications for strategic deterrence, superpower confrontation and general war; but the claim seems exaggerated otherwise,

particularly in a period of effective nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the growing nuclear capability of China. To a significant degree, these developments have neutralized the utility of nuclear weapons except for their deterrent role. Recent social and political

changes appear to have greater implications for the profession of arms in democratic societies.

We know little more today about the functions of power than did Hobbes or Machiavelli, but we think differently about its use. Along with other factors, modern communications in combination with a new emphasis on human values have brought about widespread questioning of the morality of the use of force, especially as it affects non-combatants. The military appears to many as a blunt, insensitive and immoral instrument; to some this not only invalidates the employment of armed forces, but it raises questions concerning the legitimacy of military service and even the maintenance of an active military capability in a period of growing belief in the termination of the cold war.

In the minds of relatively large and influential segments of the populations of Western democracies, there also are fundamental doubts concerning the effectiveness of military power in achieving political objectives. This is related not only to the potential destructiveness of general war, but also to the loss of ability of modern nations to exercise relatively easy control of less-developed entities through selective, but potentially unlimited, application of power. In addition to the lack of domestic support for 'colonialism', and concern for the indigenous population, developments have improved significantly the ability of 'Third World' countries to resist. The growth of nationalism and the spread of modern medicine and public health, with the consequent multiplication of youth sufficiently healthy to bear arms, make it possible for an under-developed society to stalemate the armed forces of more advanced nation-states. A relatively primitive military force armed with light but modern weapons, often supplied by a third party, can inflict on modern formations a level of casualties unacceptable for sustained involvement, given contemporary Western

cultural values. Various combinations of these factors apparently were operative in the cases of the Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indo-China and Algeria and in the 1956 Suez affair, as well as the more recent conflict in Vietnam.

Changes within modern Western societies, while by no means uniform, have been so rapid and pronounced that the term 'social revolution' often is used to describe the composite effect. Although it may be too soon to identify longer-term trends with certainty, it seems clear that at least for the immediate future the effects will place the style as well as the functions of the military profession under general attack, as mass media spread these views throughout the social structure.

There are deep-seated doubts, especially among youth, concerning the effectiveness of our larger institutions to respond to individual and social needs. Many are disenchanted with what they regard as outmoded practices and insensitive, and even dishonest, officials; and they perceive a wide gap between declaration and performance. This, in turn, leads not only to a cynicism concerning bureaucracies but also to a tendency to challenge the very concept of authority, especially when it is perceived as arbitrary.

Anti-establishment Outlook. In the relatively affluent 'post-industrial' societies, particularly in the United States but probably increasingly elsewhere, employment and income are regarded by youth to a much greater extent than ever before as means rather than ends. As larger economic enterprise is well aware, young people are generally hostile to being regarded principally as factors of production. Also, there is a prevalent desire for more privacy and less formality, and for greater personal identity, freedom and opportunity for self-expression.

By no means is this 'anti-establishment' outlook focused exclusively on the military

institution; but combined with other anti-military attitudes, both traditional and more recent, it presents a unique challenge to the military profession. Whereas earlier military service was regarded generally as a somewhat disagreeable but necessary and wholesome occupation, its current standing is significantly lower. Many perceive the military not only as reactionary and oppressive but also as a wasteful, unproductive drain of substantial resources better used to meet pressing social problems. It has become popular to criticize the military institution, and those who are members of it, as the personification of what is wrong with society.

Despite these political and social developments, however, the world situation will require modern Western societies to maintain substantial active military capabilities for the foreseeable future. Interdependence in a variety of forms clearly is increasing; but international society has not yet become a community, and force remains the final arbiter in the absence of a general consensus on the means of achieving peaceful change. World politics is becoming in some ways more dangerous and certainly more complex. Along with greater equality between the two superpowers, greater disparity is developing among nations regionally. Also, in an increasingly multipolar world, it is important to recognize that there are differences in forms and amounts of power.

General war appears extremely unlikely in an era of nuclear parity, and the Vietnam experience has reinforced strong inhibitions against unilateral commitment by Western democracies of military force in situations with a high degree of political, economic and social instability. But there remains a wide range in between. It is imprudent either to assume that states will abandon the threat or use of military force, or to ignore the essential relationship between military capability and international politics in an era of negotiation.

It is apparent that the Soviet Union is enhancing her sea and land power globally, and that recent increases in Soviet strength in Central Europe provide significantly more than enough military capability in amount and kind for continued domination of Warsaw Pact countries, or defence against NATO forces. The principal issue is not the current likelihood of aggression, but rather the need during periods of crisis for a military posture adequate to deter by confronting an opponent with risks he is unwilling to incur. Disregarding this requirement could undermine the very basis for optimism concerning *detente*, for moderation may be a product of deterrence, and intentions may be born of opportunity.

Concerning strategic forces, there is little dispute about the need, at the least, for retaliatory capability that is survivable and adequate to ensure unacceptable destruction of potential enemies after absorbing a surprise attack. There is less agreement, however, on the strategic forces that are needed to preclude the Soviet Union from perceiving such a sense of superiority as might encourage attempts to coerce the United States or her allies. But even more controversial is the requirement for general-purpose forces. It has become popular to discredit the validity of conventional deterrence because the concept, evolved as the handmaiden of a containment policy is now considered to be outdated.

Counter-intervention Capability. Yet international relationships are increasingly important for the survival of nation-states, and world security in general depends upon a reasonably orderly and peaceful environment. Beyond the need to deter direct attacks on the United States and her allies, it remains essential to prevent a major hostile power obtaining by military aggression exclusive domination over areas vital to our national interests. This requires what Samuel Huntington recently called a 'counter-intervention' capability. To perform this task, credible counter-forces must be maintained in addition

to those committed to the NATO defence. Assurance to allies, as well as deterrence of potential enemies, requires that such forces must be capable of controlled response to meet threats on the level posed in order to permit a conventional defence at least for enough time to indicate resolve, and to produce a substantial pause without resort to nuclear weapons. In discussing the need for local military equilibrium, Professor Shulman reluctantly concluded: 'If we wish to move toward a world in which force does not dominate politics, we cannot escape the painful conclusion that a balance of conventional forces is needed.'

Tasks Of Military Profession. The fundamental task of the military profession has not changed. In general terms, that task is to provide the nation with a trained armed forces, skilled in applying military resources in support of national policy. But now, and for the foreseeable future, it is essential that members of the military profession develop a greater appreciation of the relationship between means and objectives. In the nuclear era, deterrence of military aggression is a more important objective than ever before; and if deterrence fails, the conduct of military operations calls for containing outbreaks of violence and controlling, not exploiting, force.

Although the generalization may not apply to the same degree to the armed forces of nations with a history of extensive colonial involvement, or to those with experience in peace-keeping functions, until recently the expertise of the military profession was focused principally on preparations for, and the conduct of, combat operations, to include the administrative and logistic functions required for support. The criterion, although never easy, was simple: destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist, in the shortest possible time with the fewest possible friendly casualties. There was a more or less well understood division of labour between civilian

authority, responsible for politics and diplomacy, and the military professional who fought wars with minimal interference from his political superiors. But events following World War II forced an intertwining of what had formerly been essentially separate military and civilian functions. Conceived in the early cold-war period, and born during the Korean conflict, a concept of national security policy and strategy replaced the less complicated arrangements for national defence. There was a new requirement in both peace and war to orchestrate the military with other instruments of statecraft.

It is essential that the military professional appreciates the implications of Clausewitz' admonitions that war is a continuation of politics, not a substitute for it, and that war has its own grammar, but not its own logic. Yet, it must be emphasized that the grammar of war continues to be the conduct of combat operations. The 'management of violence' in inter-state relations is the uniquely military function that is central to the concept of the military profession. Ensuring proficiency in this skill, therefore, remains a primary obligation of the military profession to the society it serves. Nor has this mission changed in the nuclear era, with its required emphasis on deterrence and control of combat operations, although it has become more difficult. To be credible, a deterrent force must be capable of performing the military task for which it is designed; and in the current international configuration, it must be ready for immediate employment. Developing a flexible, responsive and effective combat-capability calls for extensive and precise training that remains a continuing challenge to the military professional.

But is more important than ever before to ensure that armed conflict does not create its own logic. The battlefield has lost its virtual autonomy. The traditional concept of military victory must be redefined as the achievement of a satisfactory political

outcome. This significant change must be fully understood and accepted by military professionals, including those at the lowest tactical level.

Involvement In Policy Formation. Moreover, the demands of national security preclude the military professional from restricting his peacetime activity to preparation for war. No longer can he abstain from, or minimize participation in policy formulation; nor can he limit himself to traditionally narrow considerations. The military profession cannot escape the requirement to attain high-levels of capability in analytical, technical and managerial skills not considered until recently to be primary military responsibilities. And in applying military resources, the military professional must learn to integrate operations more effectively with political, economic, social and psychological measures. Military force must be employed in a manner consistent with societal values; for in modern democracies, legitimacy of means has become a paramount factor.

Probably the most challenging task of the military profession is ensuring sensitivity and responsiveness to societal change, while retaining values essential to success in combat. At the very time the popularity of the military is at a low ebb. Western societies are increasingly relying on volunteers and reducing terms of conscription, or in some cases eliminating compulsory service altogether. Periods of compulsory service are being cut to the point at which little more than individual training can be accomplished; for example, Denmark and Belgium are requiring only six months. The United States recently embarked on an uncharted course; maintaining both substantial active forces and a sizeable reserve and national guard on a volunteer basis. Some in the US military believe that by simply restoring stability in command positions and re-emphasizing discipline, law and order will be sufficient. But the experience of other Western democracies is instructive; attracting volunteers has

proved a most difficult task even without the negative effects of direct involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This is not to imply that essential discipline should be sacrificed for the sake of recruiting, but rather to recognize that the gap between values held by a large percentage of youth in Western democracies, and those essential for effective functioning of military units is probably larger today than ever before.

Vital to combat operations, and, therefore, essential to the military profession itself, is a set of precepts, often summarized as 'Duty, Honour, Country', which are somewhat different in essence, and certainly in degree, from those held by liberal civilian society. Military organization is hierarchical, not egalitarian, and is more oriented to the group, or unit, than to the individual. The stress is on discipline and obedience, rather than freedom of expression, because military operations often require immediate decision and prompt action, not thorough analysis and extensive debate. The military, therefore, must rely more on training, simplification and predictable behaviour, and less on education, nuance and empiricism. United relatively recently, civilian society generally was inclined to tolerate, and even support, the syndrome of corporate values of the military profession as necessary to the combat function. Yet these precepts have come under attack as a result of societal changes and disillusionment with the results of military operations, exacerbated by unpopular conscription and frustration with large military budgets.

Leaders in the armed forces of modern democratic societies must understand better the nature of individual, group and institutional behaviour. No longer can primary reliance be placed on authority and command. Positive motivation, job satisfaction and self-discipline are increasingly important for the effective functioning of military units. Leaders at all echelons must be sensitive to the impact on their personnel of policies and

procedures. This involves matters such as the elimination of unnecessary sources of dissatisfaction and frustration, or the mitigation of effects of those measures that are required; distinguishing between what is important and what is pressing, then allocating time and other resources between them; and trying to see to it that activities are pointed toward useful ends, rather than being ends in themselves.

Incentives For New Soldiers. The military profession can be made highly challenging to those in positions of leadership; but under current and foreseeable circumstances, the professional rewards of military service alone are unlikely to counter disincentives sufficiently to attract the volunteers necessary for the ranks of a substantial peacetime active or reserve force. Military organizations, therefore, must place increased emphasis on recognizing each soldier as an individual and as the possessor of both immediate and ultimate potential. His legitimate expectations now go beyond minimum physical requirements to higher rungs, than ever before, on the ladder of satisfaction. Placing too great an emphasis on short-term low priority organizational goals and ignoring or short-changing the desire for personal development will preclude attainment of the fundamental long-term, high priority institutional goal of a viable armed force. The best recruiting device is not the cleverest advertisement in the media, but soldiers who return to their communities with the conviction that they have found in their military service a personally rewarding experience that they can endorse to others.

The nature of many military positions ensures that the serviceman will have an opportunity to learn a skill that he can afterwards use in a civilian occupation. This has proved to be a strong incentive for enlistments in the US Air Force and to a lesser extent the Navy. But there are also many functions, particularly concerning the ground forces, that do not provide this

advantage. Even the offer of generous cash bonuses has failed so far to attract a sufficient number of high school graduates into the ground combat arms of the US Army.

Given the likely source of the majority of enlisted recruits for low-skill military occupational specialties, there should be an explicit commitment to provide the opportunity for remedial education and technical training especially for those who volunteer for a long enough term to make such investment worthwhile. According to reports, Britain has found it profitable to permit selected young enlistees to continue their education under military sponsorship, and France has enjoyed considerable success in guaranteeing technical training to volunteers. The US armed forces currently offer general education development and the opportunity to learn a marketable skill before discharge from the service; but the effort is sporadic and subject to local decision. The potential of a more extensive, systematic and integrated programme is evident from the polls and samplings of American soldiers who invariably list the opportunities for education and training as their principal incentive for joining the army.

Essential to the maintenance of sizeable active forces is the question of re-enlistment. Whatever the initial motivation for entering the armed forces, a satisfying experience should promote organizational commitment and a positive motivation for dedicated service. This should ensure an adequate number who desire to elect prefer to take advantage of an option for a more limited term. Personnel policies must be developed to cope with important questions of tenure. Cadre organizations, designed to accept fillers in times of emergency, can accommodate a proportionately larger number of higher ranks, and therefore, provide greater opportunities for a life-time career for the military professional. But in any event, to prevent stagnation and allow reasonable prospects for promotion, there must be

adequate provision for shorter terms of service without discouraging enlistments beyond the minimum period. This requires providing opportunities for a second career. Tying in transition to a civilian governmental position following a certain period of voluntary service in the armed forces, as has been instituted by the Federal Republic of Germany and France, is one example. Similar arrangements could be made with other governmental, or even private, agencies. The point is that military service will be far more attractive to short-term professionals, as well as potential enlistees, when they can be assured of an opportunity to lay the groundwork for continued employment if their services are no longer required, or if they choose not to continue with a military career. Careful and flexible management of such programmes with proper structuring of incentives should be effective in encouraging the necessary spectrum of terms of service.

In the armed forces of relatively affluent democratic societies, wage structures are unlikely to be set high enough to provide the primary incentive for required enlistments or re-enlistments. Nevertheless, adequate financial compensation and living standards are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions to attract volunteers. Military institutions must keep pace with the new emphasis in civilian communities on life-style and human welfare by furnishing a wide variety of personal and community services to care adequately for servicemen and their dependents. A far higher proportion than ever before of those serving in the military are married and, therefore, expect to be able to provide a decent living for their families.

To summarize, the military profession in modern democratic societies is faced with a set of conditions that make it more difficult than ever before to fulfil its obligations. The nuclear era has not eliminated the traditional mission of combat operations; in fact, in addition to broadening the military

mandate, the current and foreseeable international situation places an even greater premium on ready forces which must be more highly skilled in the application of military resources. But at the same time, Western societies have evolved in ways that complicate the ability of the military to accommodate social change with the requirements for effective military forces.

The challenge is greater for the army than for the more technically-oriented services, the air force and the navy. Within the US Army, limited experience to date in relying on volunteers indicates that the combat arms present the most serious difficulty. Sustained inability to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified personnel could have implications for deterrent strategy, to include forward deployments. It does seem clear that the combined active military forces of Western democracies will be significantly smaller than those of our potential adversaries. Adequate national and collective security will depend upon higher quality to offset superiority in numbers. Military professionals have a major share of the responsibility in ensuring that service in the armed forces is the sort of rewarding experience which will attract and retain the necessary personnel. But in a democracy, much depends on active participation in the dialogue by the influential public in the clarifying of issues and the prompting of necessary action by executive and legislative leadership.

Despite the difficulties, the military profession has much to offer. War is rarely an ennobling experience, but preparation for it requires the development of diverse and interesting skills along with physical, mental and moral attributes. The current situation provides an opportunity to revitalize the military profession by capitalizing on the positive values of human dignity, sub-group identity and personal and social development held by an increasing proportion of our youth, and by accepting as a constructive

challenge their calling institutions of democratic societies to account to fulfill the ideals we long have espoused.

Air Vice-Marshal F.B. Sowrey comments:

I propose to develop three aspects of this subject. These are: the changes that are occurring in the military profession of their own volition; the prospects of attracting men to join the armed forces in the future; and the way in which armed forces must, in my view, develop if they are to maintain the confidence and support of the social communities that they serve. One difficulty is that the title 'The military profession' is itself a generalization—it embraces the three elements of operating on land, sea or air and the wide spread of executive, leadership and technical functions within each of them.

Spontaneous Changes. The first point to make is that the military profession is not a growth industry in developed societies—although there have been exceptions in Germany and Japan. Over the past 20 years the total armed forces of the United States, Soviet Union, France and Britain have declined from a figure of 2.6 per cent of their population down to a figure of 1.3 per cent. The Armed Services are thus in a state of change and the fact, that this is recognized and accepted, is at least a major step in the right direction. It is generally accepted that repressive discipline is counter-productive in societies where acceptance of hierarchical patterns of authority is now no longer the norm. One extreme example of this is the appearance amongst some conscript armies of a form of Trades Union. In parallel with this is the fact that money spent on military objectives has virtually stabilized world-wide. Even if it is broadly pegged to a proportion of the Gross National Product, inflationary pressures and the need to improve the quality of human life have resulted in a rising proportion of defence moneys being spent on personnel—their pay, allowances, housing, clothing and the like. In Britain this has increased from

under 30 per cent of the Defence Vote 20 years ago to about 50 per cent and a number of countries are around this figure. It can go even higher—notably I gather in Canada. (One wonders how long the Soviet Union can keep hers at the reported rate of 30 per cent.) Part of this, of course, is a measure of the penalty one pays in financial terms for all-regular forces and the need to make the profession financially attractive in comparison with others in society. In addition, there is the rising cost and complexity of equipment, and the pressures of personnel and equipment costs on defence moneys is one of the major management problems.

Although the military do not in fact have a profit motive, they are nonetheless deeply concerned with costs and this is perhaps one of the greatest changes that has occurred. Attitude surveys carried out by D.J. James in the British Services showed that officers have long since ceased to regard themselves as gentlemen retained to be prepared to fight, but tend to see themselves as being individuals engaged by the State to do professional tasks at appropriate rates of pay. The attitudinal and managerial changes that this is beginning to bring about are considerable. The modern serving officer is more and more required to have a financial knowledge of what he does—to contribute to the choice between various defence options which may be offered in terms of cost benefit or cost effectiveness. This pre-supposes a knowledge of economics, a familiarity with the tools of modern industrial management in financial terms, and an organization within the Services to enable those with the ability to put this into effect.

Social Pressures. The armed forces themselves are broadly sensitive to changes occurring in society around them. They are aware that decisions on defence in the future are going to be increasingly complex, because of the practical military aspects of defence and because of the wider purview required of current military leaders. In political and

sciological terms, the increasing world-wide trend towards higher educational standards, particularly at university level, may mean that armed forces are attracting a greater proportion of the well-educated to their ranks. Currently all three British Services are recruiting over 400 men and women graduates annually as officers, and graduates below this level are not unknown. A university graduate entering the service of his country at 22 with contacts and friends outside the service and his formative years spent in a heterogeneous society is less likely to perpetuate a form of organization where the means have become ends in themselves, and the end product has been lost to view. Moreover, a greater proportion of modern society is orientated towards supplying services rather than production, and the armed forces increasingly see themselves as suppliers of a service even though they may never perform the ultimate service in practice. In fact, to be ready to fight so as not to have to fight.

Inflationary Pressure. A further facet of inflationary pressure is certainly producing changes in the pattern of British Services. For instance, the unlikely case of the forces becoming largely introspective and living apart from the remainder of the community in garrison areas has already been eroded by rising house prices. The young serviceman has realized that he must pay for his house throughout his working life rather than leave it until retirement to be bought with the terminal grant or savings from a military career. A recent small but significant sample in one of our Services showed that of the 35 per cent of officers and servicemen who owned their own homes the majority were under 49 years old. The effect of such developments as this is that progressively greater numbers of British servicemen are living as part of the community and identifying themselves with local problems. However, this presents problems in providing the 'round-the-clock' management that is part of the military structure.

In parallel has been the erosion of the traditional 'family cohesion' of military life. Before the advent of the Welfare State, the military community provided medical, dental and hospital facilities free as of right to servicemen and their dependents as well as low-cost housing and a wide range of welfare facilities. Although this underlying paternalism is still of great worth, particularly when the husband may be away from home for long periods of time, it is less necessary as the intelligence levels of service families improve and more of these facilities are taken for granted as being state-provided. Thus the character of armed services will change as their own members and their families become less dependent and more inclined to exercise freedom of what is now a very wide choice in many fields. Furthermore, the British serviceman can in effect decide on the length of his own voluntary engagement by giving 18 months notice at, virtually, any time.

Attracting Recruits. Having mentioned some of the changes and pressures which are with us, what are the prospects of developed industrialized societies attracting sufficient men to join the armed forces? I have purposely avoided any mention of quality because one of the major contributions that armed forces can make is in the training of military manpower and in bridging the gap between the enthusiasm of the recruit and the skills he needs in productive service. Demographic trends in Britain over the next 10 years and forecast needs for the Services show that, depending on the assumptions we make, between one in every 7 and one in every 11 young men at some stage between the ages of 16-24 has to join the armed forces for some period if we are to meet our requirements. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have been attracting something like the right proportion of people in this age group, but the Army's 'extraction rate' (as it is termed) is not at present good enough. The Services are the largest employers in many countries and if a significant part of the forces is made up of volunteers, they

need a fairly highly developed understanding of what is wanted to attract the young men to join. Attitude Surveys in Britain have shown that the conscious motivation is principally a chance to learn a trade and the career opportunity that this brings, with a chance to travel and an exciting life as next in order. The negative motivations may well be that a man is dissatisfied with his present situation either at home or in his job. Certainly in Britain a desire to join the forces usually results from a conscious wish on the part of the individual to change his life-style fairly radically.

General Gard mentioned the difficulty that the officers academy at Sandhurst faces in attracting the right men but to put this into perspective the current short-fall numbers 15 per cent and organizational changes in training are expected to redress this.

The diminishing returns from the greater use of civilians was mentioned. However, possibly Western attitudes may change to the jobs that women can undertake in the armed forces and this may be a way of partially redressing any man-power shortage.

Place Of Soldier In Society. If the existence of the state is threatened there is seldom any difficulty in raising citizen armies. However, the aim is to avoid reaching this crisis position. How then are volunteer armed forces to find a meaningful place in a society whose attitudes may well be antagonistic and who may regard the values and trappings of the Services as being socially irrelevant? Ideally, armed forces should represent a complete cross-section of the spectrum of the society in the same proportions. This means avoidance of such things as an officer caste and a conscious effort to develop the potential of leaders of the future from all levels of society as well as the insistence of advancement on professional merit alone. Leaders are born but they can also be made—modern management techniques can be taught; a knowledge of human psychology can partially

redress a lack of charisma; the methods of the successful are by analysis available to all—and the spread of recruitment should draw on the widest cross-section of the community that are intellectually able to meet the challenges of the profession.

Pride in professional performance is a form of elitism that is compatible with armed forces remaining the servants of society. Public opinion does not take kindly to what it might regard as irrelevances and to bickering amongst the armed forces of a country over traditional service roles. However, the problem of allocation of money and development effort between weapons systems of three services is very real. By accepting, for example, a new generation of combat aircraft you may well be denying the army the battlefield weapon they hoped to get, and the Navy a developed anti-submarine weapon in the same time-scale because the resources will not run to all three. There is challenge enough in relevant problems such as this for the most skilled practitioner.

The individual joining the armed forces will expect to find flexible organizations without rigidity of discipline and with participative management to the extent that decision-making is delegated to the lowest level at which all the information is available or the financial authority or judgment lies. Many of the more complex decisions in defence depend upon the knowledge and expertise of a number of officers at varying staff-levels in the preparation of the arguments leading to any particular choice. Non-conformity, at least of thought, makes a useful contribution to this process. The difficulty is that whereas force-levels for defence are capable of quantification, the forces required for deterrence, particularly conventional forces and their manpower, are far less amenable to this.

However, one can make two observations; the first is that the force-levels for deterrence

must be sufficient to have the confidence of the forces themselves, and must be consistently stated by governments of the countries concerned to be able to achieve the avoidance of war. Secondly, governmental attitudes will have an effect on social attitudes towards the military profession—if they are lukewarm, apathetic or the armed forces are involved in discreditable or derisory operations, public opinion will react accordingly.

Military and Society. The active aspect of the future could be a greater identification of the services with society—in disaster relief such as flood, fire and earthquake; in life saving in mountains, at sea or under-water; in providing the control and organizational needs which require their particular skills, such as crowd control and communications at the 1972 Munich Olympics; in engineering in non-profitable or hazardous areas, such as has been the work of the US Corps of Engineers. British military engineers have also been engaged in a programme of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) which is a new definition of an old theme. However, one must be careful here that one does not give the appearance of making work for those who would otherwise be unemployable and giving the impression that this civil involvement is the primary role of armed forces. And here it is worthwhile making the point that armed forces have long realized the need of lifelong education and learning and offer considerable opportunities for this, not only in the professional but also in academic fields. At present 2.5 per cent of the students enrolled at the British Open University are servicemen and women.

There are always likely to be individuals who seek an ordered, authoritarian existence that the services provide and a report by Sir James Grigg concluded that this number were not unduly sensitive to minor changes,

up or down, in conditions of service though these should not discourage those who want to join. However, this group is never likely to be sufficient for the services' needs and this is the reason why current recruiting advertising stresses such aspects as job satisfaction and service to the community, and more material rewards as well as the lifelong training and education that the services offer. There will also be those attracted by a high degree of professionalism. It is natural to want the organization you belong to, to be a good one and to feel that you have to be good to be in it. To avoid the unfortunate connotations of elitism it is important though, that it is not a closed shop but open to all to join. I would make the point that although the task of armed forces is to serve the community, they need not necessarily mirror the whims and fancies of society at any one time, in order to attract its members. It is interesting that the medical, dental, legal and similar professions hold to codes of behaviour which are considerably more restrictive than many members of society would tolerate, and can also prevent those who transgress from earning a livelihood—something armed forces do not do. I would also see a military career as being less an end in itself than part of a two-tier system such as already exists in the United States. For this to be successful, transition from civil to military employment and *vice versa* will have to be considerably easier than it is at present. The way the military are moving makes this possible, as many of the military support functions come closer to those of civil corporations. The experience is good for both sides. Civilians we once were—civilians we will also be again one day, and the transition in both directions should be painless. (COURTESY :—*I.I.S.S., London, Adelphi Papers, Number One Hundred and Three.*)

Force Application In Civil Affairs

D. Shah Khan

Pakistan is not the only Third World country where the army has had to come to the help of the ruling party on more than one occasion. In neighbouring India the army was used extensively in crushing the revolutionary movement in Telegana in the south and the Naxalite movement in West Bengal, as well on numerous occasions when the government faced a serious crisis caused by striking workers.

Similarly many other Asian and Third World states have had to frequently resort to use their armed forces for saving tottering governments. This endemic nature of such intervention therefore suggests, that while the armed forces, might at times be interfering in civilian affairs at their own initiative, they also do so at the behest of the civilian governments. While the first form of intervention is considered extra-constitutional, the latter is garbed in a sort of legitimacy—the orders having come from the government. This use of the armed forces as super policemen, suggests that there has been a great transformation in the nature of the profession of the defence services. They have progressed beyond their conventional role to defend the country against foreign aggression.

The spectre of impatient generals waiting in the wings to have a go at "putting the country back on the rails" is a phenomenon that is increasingly beginning to haunt many of the Third World countries. In fact there are few developing states left where armed forces' involvement in the internal affairs has not taken place in one form or the other.

Not long ago a military putsch in a country would make headlines: today, it is reported as a routine affair. Foreign observers of the political scene in Third World countries now tend to bracket the armed forces as a third political force — the other two being the ruling party and the opposition. Even in Pakistan, where both the government and opposition

parties swear by democracy and constitutionalism, the foreign press and radio spoke openly of a possible take-over by the armed forces during the recent militant government-opposition confrontation. Interference by the military, it appears, has become a part of the scene in the Third World states and the people will have to come to live with it as long as the states do not build necessary immunity to such a development.

In countries which have pretensions of democracy, armed forces' involvement is of a more traumatic nature. It leaves in shambles the delicately structured power institutions and unhinges the balance between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive by smothering

the first, emasculating the second and controlling the third.

Force Application. This is only inevitable when a powerful and palpably non-political institution replaces another less powerful political institution. The practitioners of the martial profession who "control the instruments of violence" undertake an exercise in an alien field by the sheer strength of the physical power. The late President Allende of Chile, in his dying moments, as he resisted the bloody coup by the armed forces had written of the armymen "they have the strength but not the reason". The lesson to be learnt is that whatever may be said of military interference, in any form, it is based on the show or use of force and most Third World countries lack the necessary institutional wherewithal to resist it.

Till now most military takeovers have been "peaceful", specially where the leaders of the coup command the confidence of the forces, and of the population. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan recalls in his book *Friends Not Masters*: "Revolutions take long and painstaking preparation, detailed planning, clandestine meetings, and country-wide movement of troops. In our case there was very little preparation. It was handled as a military operation." Likewise, General Yahya Khan's take-over, too, had been generally "peaceful".

In countries, where the existing system has not been specially noted for upholding the virtues of good governance, the changeover to a military rule hardly affects the masses. It merely amounts to a change of managements, hopefully to a better one. Peter C. Lloyd writes in his book *Classes, Crises and Coups*: "The popular reaction to military coup is generally one of mass support. The army leaders justify their extra-constitutional action in claiming that they acted to preserve the integrity of the state. In Latin America many of the national heroes of the 19th century

were military men and the army consequently has high prestige. In Africa a greater emphasis is placed upon elimination of corruption in public life. The army so recently under expatriate leadership was seen as being largely above suspicion in contrast to other spheres...."

Civil/Military Leaderships. Ayub Khan tried to play this theme of the army being of a vastly superior character as compared to the civilian leadership and administration. He writes feelingly in his book: "Not infrequently they (army officers and men) would be told: 'You *armywallas*, you should be true to your salt. While the country is going to the dogs you are enjoying yourselves.' Not only was I blamed: everybody in uniform was being blamed. Perfectly respectable people would come to me and say: 'You can save the situation but you are not prepared to take any risk'."

A little further on he says: "The sense of demoralisation had seeped down to the masses and they started saying openly, 'Let somebody save this country'. The implication was obvious: it was the army alone that could step into the breach."

As he warms up to the idea he writes: "The general belief is emerging that even I and the army are failing to do our duty by not saving the people from these tyrants."

The attempt it seems is at playing up the armed forces as "being largely above suspicion in contrast to other spheres" with the result that "the popular reaction to military coup is generally one of mass support." But in the case of Pakistan even if there was no "mass support", it is doubtful if the imposition of the first martial law could have run into snags. Both the martial laws were inducted by the presiding supreme power in the country. The first one for reasons that are still obscure, was later on dubbed as a "revolution".

However, in Pakistan, the two martial laws were not the only occasion when the army

was involved in some way or the other in civil affairs, specially in the political sphere. There had been occasions in the past, mostly associated with Ayub Khan, when the military establishment played a role above and beyond its normal duty. Referring to one incident, Herbert Feldman wrote in his book *Revolution in Pakistan*: "From all accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Mohammad's plan to dismiss the Constituent Assembly once and for all to start again, was worked out with General Ayub's prior knowledge. It is, moreover, probable that without the assurance of the Army's support, Ghulam Mohammad might have hesitated. The presence of General Ayub in the cabinet was intimation enough that this was no time for nonsense."

Keith Callard holds a similar view regarding the influence-role played by the army in civil affairs. He comments in his book *Pakistan — A Political Study*: "When the nation was faced with the crisis of 1954, the army commander-in-chief, General Ayub Khan, entered the cabinet as defence minister. This was to show the people and the outside world that the forces were behind the government."

Ayub & Politicians. Such accounts tend to show that the army's commander-in-chief had at times been playing a key role in civil affairs. Whether such duties were normal to the functions of a military head is a different matter but it does suggest that Pakistan has not been without some form of interference ever since independence. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan recounts several occasions in his autobiography when he acted as a mediator, adviser on political affairs and such like to several successive governments. He describes in-depth his part in patching up the differences between the ailing Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and the Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra.

Ayub's biographer Colonel Mohammad Ahmad, in his book *My Chief* gives an account of the Field Marshal dealing with politicians: "I came to know that, while he

(Ayub Khan) was at Karachi, he got hold of Messrs. Suhrawardy and Iskander Mirza and told them sternly and in definite terms, what may be called in simple and unorthodox language, 'to behave'."

Possibly the earliest case of intervention by the army was undertaken by Ayub Khan when he was G.O.C. in East Pakistan in 1948. He recalls: "On another occasion, too, I had to act in aid of civil power. I was called by Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister, who told me that he had a precarious majority of four in the Assembly. He was worried that he would soon lose support as Fazlul Huq had mobilised the students, who were intimidating his followers. He wanted me to prevent the students from attacking the Assembly Hall. I should have declined to intervene as it was essentially a task for the police, but I was worried that if there was a breakdown of the government it might lead to widespread agitation and lawlessness. So I deputed an Infantry Company under Major Peerzada to be available to the police force near the Assembly Hall, should the need arise."

Although it is claimed that the intervention was undertaken "in aid of civil power", but the little episode seems to suggest that the initiative came from the G.O.C. himself who was "worried" about the possible consequences of "widespread agitation and lawlessness". It could be stated, therefore, that while inducting the armed forces in aid of civil power might be a tangible legal cover required to meet a law and order situation, the motivation for such an action could also come from the forces. If one were to be influenced by all that Ayub Khan wrote in his book regarding his appreciation of the situation on the civilian side, then it is apparent that the suggestion for aid to civil power in crisis times mostly came from the worried General himself.

On the other hand, there had been far too many occasions when the army was called out in aid to civil power. If wholly at the initiat-

ive of the government, all these are taken into account, it would seem that the government had come to over-rely on the services of the armed forces in pulling its chestnuts out of the fire. Lawrence Ziring writes in his book *The Ayub Khan Era*: "While playing a major role in rebuilding the Pakistan Army, Ayub also devoted considerable attention to the political system. The period 1953-58 was turbulent and on numerous occasions the Army was called upon to restore order."

Military Overused. Colonel Mohammad Ahmad too holds the same view when he writes in his book: "These calls (aid to civil power) were becoming too frequent with the increase in general inefficiency and instability of the government. In the beginning it was only at a very critical situation of some natural calamity like a flood that the Army was asked to lend a helping hand to the civilians and this service to the people General Ayub never begrudged. Our Army rescued the marooned and repaired damaged roads and bridges on a number of occasions. But soon it became too much of a joke and, in spite of his resisting such requests to rush troops at the slightest pretext to help the civil power, he often had to despatch the Army lest the situation should be mishandled and deteriorate, which was a natural apprehension in view of the prevailing all round inefficiency. He even feared that in the event of the Army not going to help the civil administration, the politicians were quite capable of putting the blame on the Service in that it did not co-operate in a time of emergency."

Too frequent use of the armed forces in fields that are largely political in nature does not augur well for democracy. The civilian leaders who were eventually ousted from the political field by the 1958 martial law can possibly be held partly responsible for the take-over. Their over-reliance on the army and use of its services "became too much of a joke". According to Hasan Askari Rizvi (*The Military and Nation-building in the*

Third World) (*Defence Journal*, Jan.-Feb. 1976) "during the period of relative political chaos in Pakistan (1953-58) the military support to the government was crucial for the survival and smooth working of administration". Martial law which followed this "period of relative political chaos" could therefore in one way be nothing more than merely moving from the wings to the centre of the stage.

First Coup. The first military coup, which later became famous as the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy', occurred in Pakistan barely four years after independence. Much of what the conspiracy really was is still veiled in secrecy. Ayub Khan does not say much about the motivation and planning of the conspiracy except to analyse the events if the plot had succeeded. "I shudder to think what would have happened to the army and the country if the conspiracy had succeeded", he writes, and earlier observes "the whole affair came as a great shock to me and to all right thinking people in the army". Feldman appears to treat it as a bloomer by a few officers: "From such scraps of information as are here and there available, the correct conclusion probably is that the Prime Minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) gave undue significance to an affair which, it seems, was amateurish and unreal."

In his book, however, Ayub Khan also appears sympathetic and understanding about the conspiracy and those involved in it. ".... I think the main reason for this discontent was that we had a government which failed to discharge its functions properly. When Akbar Khan's papers were seized we found among them a thesis in which he had accused the Prime Minister and everybody else in the government of inefficiency and inability to give decisions. Akbar Khan's *aim was to establish a tidier form of government.*" (italics added). Seven years later we see the spectacle of the Army chief taking over total power palpably for similar reasons.

In Aid Of Civil Power. In Pakistan, even the present government had to resort to

the employment of the army on more than one occasion. Hasan Askari Rizvi gives five such occasions: "During 1972-75, the military was called out only on five occasions: (i) language riots in Sind (1972); (ii) labour trouble in Landhi and Korangi (1972); (iii) trouble by the Marri tribesmen in the Pat-feeder area of Baluchistan (1972); (iv) tribal troubles in Baluchistan (1973-74); (v) anti-Ahmadi riots (1974) during which the military patrolled the streets of major cities but did not have to take any action."

Another occasion that needs to be mentioned was the trouble over forest lands in Dir when the use of army was made. Besides, we recently saw the army playing a major role in aid of civil power in the government-opposition contradiction. This even led to the imposition of martial law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore, apart from the curfew and street patrolling in various other cities.

Pakistan is not the only Third World country where the army has had to come to the help of the ruling party on more than one occasion. In neighbouring India the army was used extensively in crushing the revolutionary movement in Telegana in the south and the Naxalite movement in West Bengal, as well on numerous occasions when the government faced a serious crisis caused by striking workers.

Similarly many other Asian and Third World states have had to frequently resort to use their armed forces for saving tottering governments. This endemic nature of such intervention, therefore, suggests that while the armed forces might at times be interfering in civilian affairs at their own initiative, they also do so at the behest of the civilian governments. While the first form of intervention is considered extra-constitutional, the latter one is garbed in a sort of legitimacy — the orders having come from the government. This use of the armed forces as super policemen, suggests that there has been a great transformation in the nature of the profession of the defence services. They have progressed beyond their

conventional role to defend the country against foreign aggression.

One might well be inclined to accept intervention by armed forces as a natural corollary to the tendency of the civilian apparatus to over-use their services. This unfortunately has been the case in Pakistan, and Ayub Khan might have possibly been influenced in taking over the reins of the government, after having been thoroughly acclimatized to the political atmosphere by his frequent contacts with the civilian leaders. The slightest crisis, be it floods or striking mill workers — the army has been called out by a nervous, hand-wringing civilian administration. And after the trouble is over, the government sends the soldiers back to the barracks, leaving it alone to hopefully to continue enjoying "the full confidence of the people and the loyalty of the armed forces. A time could come when the soldiers tire of this shuttle between their barracks and the trouble spots and decide to stay on.

Reasons For Coups. Another factor that also needs to be studied is the motivation behind the intervention by the armed forces. There can be a variety of reasons for a coup d'état, ranging from providing a reformist and honest administration to protecting the integrity of the state: Such a general who sees what he considers an impending collapse of the country, must be realising in the first place that such a calamitous development could mean the collapse of the armed forces also. It is not merely that a general feels that he can run a country better than the civilian leaders, but that in doing so he guarantees the continued existence of the armed forces.

Thus when the military replaces a civilian government, it does so in the first instance for reasons that are dictated by its own requirements. Lawrence Ziring believes that "martial law is a byproduct of the permanent services. Their survival remains synonymous with the national survival. But this too has little to do

with the national unity." A crumbling administration, or a ruling class favoured by the army, which is being threatened by another class, whose credentials might not satisfy the army generals, could motivate a coup. A chaotic civilian apparatus or a new political system which might not have the same concept of the armed forces which its predecessor had, can hardly be beneficial to the permanent services, which like everybody else, have their material needs apart from their professional requirements. According to Peter C. Lloyd the army "has well defined interests of its own, and is liable to preserve these when they are threatened".

Thus Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan was giving vent to his feelings when he observed that "their (the politicians') conscience is so dead that in order to obtain some political advantage they will not stop at destroying the army....which is the only shield they have." He visualised in the politicians a direct threat to the army and the country. The survival of the army therefore depended on saving the country from the clutches of these "tyrants". The armed forces' leaders in naturally preserving the interests of their institutions have to act even if it means resorting to extra-constitutional measures.

Coups Not The Answer. It might be pointed out, however, that a corrupt, inefficient administration does not always mean that it will lead to the disintegration of the country. This belief, though widely held in Pakistan, has not been proved by events. A decaying system is eventually overthrown and replaced by a better system if the process of political evolution is allowed its natural course. The political development of a country has to pass through this process if it has to ultimately emerge in a successful, viable form. Good, viable systems are never known to have been imposed from the top — Ayub Khan's martial law was inducted on the basis of a host of promises to eradicate corruption and improve the quality of life. Yet when he finally surrendered power, his

regime was no better than the one he had replaced. Similarly Yahya Khan's administration went through the same purification exercises, but his exit from power led to widespread charges of corruption in his government during his tenure in power. In this context it might be pointed out that very surprisingly the two martial laws, although both were different in nature and context, took place at the starting phase of the evolution of popular movements, and did much to restrict the natural political progress of the state.

But in studying the intervention by the armed forces in civilian affairs, it is necessary to point out that the action of the military is essentially the diktat of the man who commands it, rather than what may be called a group effort. As the "military organization is rigidly stratified and authoritarian because of the necessities of command and the possibilities of war", the decision-making and orders for the execution of the decision must come from a very small nucleus, and more so from one single individual. The rest of the army obeys the orders and executes the decision. Thus an army take-over in the real sense is not so much an usurpation of civilian authority by the entire army, but the total control of power by a single individual, or in some rare cases a revolutionary council. Since the army is not a democratic institution with a system for seeking popular opinion, any actions by it, must naturally be at the command of the person who heads the army.

Coups — Act Of Individuals. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Fazal Muqeem Khan clarifies this point in his book *Pakistan's Crises in Leadership*: "The question who ruled Pakistan during that grim period still besets us. On the surfaces it was the armed forces. Within the country and outside everyone maintained that it was a military rule. The military had taken over the country on the orders of a constitutionally elected President. In fact the military as such had not

taken over and this was its misfortune. Only the Commander-in-Chief had moved in the President's House and was gradually cut off from the Armed Forces. Like his predecessor, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, who, within the first week of becoming the CMLA and President, had completely cut himself off from the Armed Forces and ruled through the institutions of civil government, General Yahya Khan also kept the Armed Forces out of the government institutions. But unlike the previous President, he surrounded himself with a few senior army officers having no responsibility to, or for, the army, and cut himself off from the Armed Forces and gradually also from most civil institutions. It is a misnomer therefore, to call it a military rule."

The writer then goes on to describe in detail the "coterie" of General Yahya Khan: "Gradually the Armed Forces officers contemptuously referred to the few army officers around the President as the 'coterie'."

It is possible that the ethos of a professional army does not have any place for dabbling in politics. Feldman is of the view: "No one, who had any contact with the Armed Forces of Pakistan, can doubt that both officers and men did desire to remain aloof and any suggestion that political considerations might sway them simply aroused denial and the thought of it, dismay."

Stationed in cantonments, mostly isolated from the rest of the population, with little intercourse with the civilians, and brought up in the tradition of keeping the military and civilians separate, the Pakistan Army has at most times echoed Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan's words "...we solemnly decided to build a true national army free from politics.... we kept severely aloof...." (Broadcast on October 8, 1958). The probability of the majority of officers and men of such an army prescribing political solutions to political problems of the country seems remote. Therefore to suppose

that such a body of men participates in an exercise which has wholly political ramifications is beyond credulity. It is true that Ayub Khan took over the reins of power in his capacity as chief of the armed forces, as the proclamation of martial law in the *Gazette of Pakistan*, Notification No. 977/58, dated 7 Oct., 1958 and *Gazette Extraordinary*, 15 October 1958, begins: "1. Whereas I adjudge it essential for national requirements to exercise jurisdiction within the international boundaries of Pakistan, I, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, do hereby give notice as follows...." The proclamation was signed by General Mohammad Ayub Khan. But then he had to take over power on the basis of some authority, and he therefore utilised his position as the "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan". Even Ayub Khan admits: "A well-organised, trained and disciplined army would find it extremely distasteful to be turned into an instrument for securing political power. But as conditions were, the Army alone could act as a corrective force and restore normalcy." He, therefore did the best thing possible in the circumstances. He utilised the "well-organised, trained and disciplined army" for "securing political power" and then relieved it of this "distasteful" task.

Army Had Little To Do With ML. The position that thus obtains shows that the Pakistan Army as an institution has had little to do with the two martial laws, except that in these cases it was acting in aid of civil power on the commands of the Army chiefs, who had assumed civil authority.

The army as a professional defence service is not fitted out temperamentally to run the affairs of the state. The army is well organised with an approach to administration which is vastly different from that of the civilians. But this does not suggest that in performing civilian tasks, an army officer could be immeasurably better. Barring a few rare cases, the induction

of military officers into civilian posts has not produced results that satisfy such a claim.

It is true that during the martial law period there is a general all round improvement in administration and that decisions are quickly taken. But then this is possible only because of the terror factor that is associated with the martial law. A civilian administration which is burdened by a variety of legal and bureaucratic restraints can hardly be expected to produce the same results. Besides there are a variety of pressure groups and political interests the civil government servant has to contend with. A military officer, working under the dynamic atmosphere of a martial law regime can take short cuts, expect his orders to be instantly obeyed and put up a general show of efficiency. But once the umbrella of the military rule is lifted, it is doubtful if the same army officer can continue with his customary zeal. The solution to a sluggish bureaucracy possibly is not military therapy but a total reorganization of organizational and administrative methods. Ayub Khan's regime is a case in point. Even before the martial law was lifted in 1962, there were reports that corruption and bureaucratic paralysis were gradually eroding the administration.

Apart from such end results, a prolonged rule under a general also tends to weaken the political institutions, restrict the process of economic and social development and destroy democracy. The dichotomy between the "military mind" of a professional general and a civilian administration cannot be bridged easily. If the general remains unbending in his approach, he is either excluded from power or destroys the system he is trying to build. According to Samuel P. Huntington the "military ethic and fascism are similar in some respects, but they have one fundamental difference." Although Ayub Khan often spoke

about his love for democracy and such like, but during his regime some of the most oppressive laws designed to restrict individual freedom were introduced.

P. Spear (*The Political Evolution of Pakistan*) says: "To believe, however, that Army's action was salutary and its administration so far in many ways constructive, is not to conclude that it should go on for ever. The army provides too narrow a base for permanent exercise of authority and it may be suggested, too small a head for permanent direction. An army *raj* could be maintained at the price of the officers becoming politicians, and unless they unexpectedly become philosophers as well the danger of a descent to the Middle Eastern type of military revolutions would be great..."

The shadow of possible military intervention which permanently haunts many of the third world countries cannot be easily wished away. It has become almost a fact of life, and there is little the politicians can do to buttress their governments against such a possibility. Whatever few steps the government leaders have taken so far to keep the army out of politics, are either in the form of constitutional safeguards (making abrogation of a constitution a serious offence) or to introduce the element of in-service politics within the armed forces. Neville Maxwell describes in detail in his book *India's China War* about the factions within the Indian army and the efforts of the Congress leaders to look for a trusted protege. The general idea of the politicians at best of times is either to keep the general staff involved in endless in-fighting so as to divert their attention from the temptation of taking over power from the civilians, or to ensure that the services are headed by men, who even if found wanting in their professional expertise and capability however prove faithful yes-men to the civilian leaders. It is a dangerous course the politicians tread as it is pregnant with the possibility of weakening the armed forces.

The Military And Politics In Pakistan

(EXCERPTS)

Hasan Askari Rizvi

Pakistan's first martial law came with a messianic message and appeal. Even in his first broadcast to the nation, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the Army C-in-C and the Chief Martial Law Administrator, struck a strident moralistic tone. Condemning the politicians for their 'baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation', General Ayub said: 'In the process, all ideals and high sense of values inherent in our religion and culture had been destroyed. The result is total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos in the country which cannot be tolerated in these dangerous times.'

Despite the fact that the martial law of 1958-1962 was generally welcomed by the public and it also succeeded in producing a number of administrative and political reforms, it had little to show for it in the end. It ended exactly where it had begun: after his ten years of undisputed rule and experiment with his own brand of (basic) democracy, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan handed political power back to the army commander, General A. M. Yahya Khan. Martial Law was imposed again throughout the country in March, 1969.

The *coup d'etat* in Pakistan in 1958 was the most striking example of how a non-political military could slowly be drawn into the political field due to the failure of the political leaders to run liberal democratic institutions. The military which had the tradition of aloofness from politics, took no part in the attainment of independence, remained loyal to civil authority after independence and helped every government to maintain law and order, slowly became an important factor in the decision-making process of Pakistan and ultimately displaced the civil authority. The *coup d'etat* did not challenge any assumption of the preceding government, nor modify their objectives. The goal of modernization, industrialization and democracy continued to be the objective of the new regime, but the approach to these goals was altered.

It was not until 1957 that the army high command started seriously thinking in terms of overthrowing the civil government in order to put an end to political malpractices. There were two instances which indicated that General Ayub Khan had realised that the army would have to assume power in the country. During 1957, he toured both East and West Pakistan extensively and met the officers and men of the army. Second, during his tour of East Pakistan in 1957, Major-General Umrao Khan (G.O.C., East Pakistan) arranged interviews with some of the political and local leaders to inform him about the political conditions prevailing in the country. General Ayub Khan was reported to have said: "If the people want me, I shall not shirk my duty." General Ayub Khan and other generals never wanted to be accused of overthrowing the civil government without

justification. They watched the political situation closely and expressed grave concern over the growing degeneration of politics, which they considered a great threat to national integrity. Sometimes in early 1958, a few correspondents referred to political conditions and asked General Ayub Khan how he proposed to defend Pakistan under such conditions if some hostile neighbour suddenly attacked? He replied, "Do not you worry about the defence of the country. That is my business. Attend to your leaders who are wrecking the country. Do not talk of external dangers. The real danger is within the country. Can't you see it?"

According to the *Middle East Journal*: "Pakistan was very much like Hobbes' state of nature where every political or provincial group fought against every other group. It was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power. Most of the leaders thought of themselves, their families, or at best their provincial groups and did not give a second thought to Pakistan. Pakistan needed a desperate remedy for this malady."

The impotence of the political leadership and general corruption in the society as compared with the well-integrated and disciplined organization of the armed forces and their role in the maintenance of law and order, led to a perception amongst the higher military command that it was they who had to maintain law and order and keep the state intact. General Ayub Khan was under constant pressure from different circles in the army to do something to check political turmoil in the country. He came to know that "a *coup d'etat* of the kind which had brought Colonel Kasim into control of Iraq, was being prepared". The danger at this stage was that if the senior commanders did not react to the worsening of political situation, the younger officers might become impatient and attempt a *coup* or take sides with some politicians. The politicians were aware of the fact that the armed forces were the only institution free of intrigues which had charac-

terized the political system of Pakistan. They had started establishing contacts with the officers and issuing statements to bring the armed forces into the political arena. The government issued an ordinance to deal with actions and statements tending to impair the discipline of the armed forces to check the attempts of the politicians to win support in the armed forces.

Declaration of Martial Law. It was in the last week of September 1958, after the death of the deputy speaker of the East Pakistan provincial assembly as a result of violence in the House that the army finally made up its mind to displace the civil government. The Chief of the General Staff was asked by the C-in-C of the Army to prepare the plan for the takeover of the civil administration. By 3rd October the plan was ready. The plan envisaged the take-over in the middle of October but the political conditions changed so rapidly that the C-in-C of the army decided to advance the date.

In the first week of October, the Muslim League threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement. Its national guards had started parading the streets of many cities in defiance of the government ban on the maintenance of military and para-military organizations. On 6th October the Muslim League organised such a big demonstration in Karachi on the arrival of its President, that the police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd. Another serious crisis developed when the former ruler of Kalat State, in view of the political confusion in the country, announced the secession of Kalat from Pakistan. He refused to visit Karachi on the invitation of the President to discuss the constitutional position of Kalat. He also got the Pakistan flag removed from the Miri Fort (Kalat) and hoisted his old Kalat State flag. The army moved in swiftly and arrested the former ruler of Kalat.

The whole affair was conducted with great caution and secrecy. Only the President,

the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services and a few senior generals knew about it. The prime minister and his cabinet did not know anything. A few hours earlier, the prime minister had redistributed portfolios and included new ministers in the cabinet. On the next morning the news about the declaration of martial law and the re-allocation of portfolios and new appointments could be seen side by side in the newspapers. The decision to impose martial law was taken by the President on the initiative of General Ayub Khan. The prime minister was communicated the decision by a letter of the president to him on the same night. Other ministers and political leaders came to know about it when they looked at the morning newspapers on 8th October, 1958. Troops which had been kept at the outskirts of Karachi to help the civil administration to maintain law and order in the city moved in to take the control of the government buildings and key points in the city.

Twenty days later, the second phase started when the army generals in Ayub's cabinet forced Iskander Mirza to resign the office of the President. The nature of the relationship between the President and the chief martial law administrator during these days (7th to 27th October 1958), was difficult to determine. With the abrogation of the constitution and the declaration of martial law, the real political power had slipped into the hands of the army. The army commanders made it explicitly clear that the authority rested with them and not with the President. President Iskander Mirza himself realized that he could not continue as the head of the state for a long period of time as his post had become meaningless. General Ayub Khan and his generals became convinced that Iskander Mirza will have to go so that the new regime could dissociate themselves from a person who had been closely connected with the conditions which led to such political confusion in the country.

Three generals went to see the president, on behalf of General Ayub Khan, on the night of 27th October, 1958, and asked him to resign. Iskander Mirza silently resigned. He was moved to Quetta the next day. Later he was flown to London 'on his own request'. General Ayub Khan combined in himself the offices of the President and the chief martial law administrator. Thus he became the undisputed leader of the country. He relinquished the office of the C-in-C of the Army and appointed General Mohammad Musa as the C-in-C of the army on the same day.

Nature of Military Regime. The military authorities did not face opposition in consolidating their position. Not a single shot was fired and not a single person lost his life at the time of the military take-over. The people were worried about the future; but there were few who shed tears on the replacement of the parliamentary system by the military regime except those whose interests were directly threatened. In fact, there was a feeling of relief amongst the general public with the hope that the army might succeed in providing clear and stable government of the people.

The chief martial law administrator issued the (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, which declared that till the promulgation of a new constitution, 'Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as possible in accordance with the abrogated Constitution. Supreme court, high courts, and the lower courts were allowed to function but fundamental rights were suspended and no order of martial law and no decision of the military courts could be challenged in any court of law. The courts also did not come in the way of the 'New Regime'. On 27th October 1958, the Supreme Court of Pakistan put its stamp of approval on the Military Regime. In a judgement, the Chief Justice of Pakistan observed:

"... If the attempt to break the Constitution fails those who sponsor or organize it, are judged by the existing Constitution

as guilty of the crime of treason. But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the person assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the New Regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success. . . . Thus a victorious revolution or a successful *coup d'etat* is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a constitution."

Only in the first few weeks of Martial Law the army showed its strength to the people. Junior Commissioned Officers searched private houses for hidden gold and extracted information about black marketeers and hoarders with threats of arrest or fines. Some of the prominent politicians were arrested on the charges of corruption and misuse of office. Ayub Khan soon realized that excessive display of force by the army officers might cause the loss of the goodwill that existed between the armed forces and the public. In the second week of November, 1958, the troops were withdrawn from all over Pakistan as the civil administration was "now functioning effectively".

Later, Ayub Khan decided to hold a referendum by the Basic Democrats to make known their confidence in him and to authorise him to formulate a new Constitution. The referendum was held on 14 February 1960. The voters could express their opinion by marking 'Yes' or 'No' on the ballot papers. Out of 78,720 votes cast, 75,282 expressed their confidence in him. Three days later he was sworn in as the President of Pakistan.

Guided Democracy. The political system introduced by the military leaders (headed by Ayub Khan) established an authoritarian system with guided democracy in Pakistan, which ensured stability and continuity rather than people's participation in the affairs of

the state in the western sense of the word. There was concentration of powers in the hands of the President, indirectly elected for a period of five years. Ayub Khan enjoyed the support of the bureaucracy and the military. He had introduced the system of Basic Democracies to encourage local development and create public support for his system. It was believed that it would produce a cadre of new leaders who could serve as the base for the new political system and a link between the people and the government. Therefore, the dependence of the new political system on the bureaucracy and the military continued.

But when the public support grows fragile, the fate of the regime entirely depends on the wishes of the bureaucracy in general and the military in particular. The role of the military is very crucial at this stage, especially where the military had, in the past, intervened in politics. If they withdraw their support, the future of the regime becomes uncertain. (And this was what happened to Ayub Khan's regime when it started losing public support; agitation, turmoil and trouble erupted in East Pakistan with sympathetic responses in the West. An idea of what agitated the peoples mind can be had from a number of demands put forward by various political groups and leaders in the country on the eve of general elections which Ayub Khan intended to hold through the Basic Democracy system.)

Political Demands. The National Executive of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (The P.D.M.) announced its decision to participate in the elections only if five conditions were fulfilled. These conditions were:

- (a) Direct elections held under adult franchise.
- (b) Full powers to the directly elected parliament and provincial legislatures.
- (c) Immediate removal of the state of emergency and the repeal of all black laws.

- (d) Immediate restoration of full fundamental civic rights and freedoms and their complete justiciability.
- (e) Immediate release of all political prisoners and detenus and withdrawal of cases and actions against them.

Opposition Parties Unite. Eight opposition parties formed a united front, known as Democratic Action Committee (D.A.C.) with the object of establishing full and complete democracy and restoration of complete sovereignty to the people of Pakistan. Among other demands, they asked for release of all political detenus and prisoners, students, workers, journalists including Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Khan Wali Khan and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto.

The political talks failed and the agitation grew violent and became widespread, specially in East Pakistan where murders, arson, loot and lawlessness became so rampant that the police could not control the situation. Even police stations came under determined attacks by unruly crowds. On 25 March, 1969, Ayub Khan addressed the nation over the radio for the last time as the President of Pakistan. He announced his decision to step down and handed over power to General Yahya Khan, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army. He said: "Except the armed forces, there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation".

The Second Martial Law. General Yahya Khan took over and abrogated the 1962 constitution, banned all political activity (not political parties), dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, dissolved central and provincial cabinets and declared Martial Law throughout the country. He assumed the supreme command of the armed forces and on 31 March, 1969, proclaimed himself

President of Pakistan. He said in a broadcast:

".... The armed forces could not remain idle spectators to this state of near anarchy (administrative laxity, strikes and violence). They have to do their duty and save the country from disaster.... It is my firm belief that sound, clean and honest administration is a pre-requisite for sane and constructive political life and for a smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people, elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise."

Opposition political leaders had succeeded in forcing Ayub Khan out of office, but failed to produce an alternate leadership. The failure of Round Table talks clearly demonstrated that the political leaders had not learnt any lesson from the events of 1947-58. They were not fighting against the Ayub Regime, but also with each other. Once again conditions were created, where, except the armed forces, the society was fragmented and all the political issues since 1947 had been re-opened. The armed forces demonstrated their ability to maintain a cohesive organization which facilitated a smooth transfer of power.

The Yahya Khan era was the most turbulent period in the history of Pakistan. He assumed the office of the President as the head of a care-taker government but his inept handling of the political situation exposed his inability to understand the gravity of the political situation in Pakistan. The military rule in Pakistan (1969-71) showed that it might not be very difficult for a disciplined army to take over the levers of political powers in a country like Pakistan which lacked stable political institutions. The military leadership, however, finds it impossible to solve basic political problems without involving itself into political controversy.

Armed Forces In Aid Of Civil Power: Chronology Of Events

(Pakistan : March 19 to July 5, 1977)

March 19: A press note issued by Commissioner, Karachi, said: "Peace in the city of Karachi was disrupted early in the morning yesterday when a violent mob set fire to Orangi Bus Depot, damaging a number of vehicles. Another mob attacked the Republic Motors and set fire to bus chassis-crates with the result that the state-owned enterprise suffered a heavy loss. Three cinemas were also attacked and set on fire. Even fire brigades were set upon and their vehicles damaged. A house in Pathan Colony was put on fire and its inmates killed. Army had to be called in to assist the civil administration in all the three districts of Karachi to restore law and order." Curfew was imposed in certain parts of the city. The press note further said: "Any person found violating the curfew will be liable to be shot at sight". Processions taken out earlier in Lahore were lathi-charged by the police. Processions were taken out by the opposition in a number of cities and towns.

March 20: Curfew was strictly enforced in Karachi division. Processions in defiance of Section 144, Cr. P.C., were taken out in Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Multan, Hyderabad, Lala Musa, Jhang, Rahimyarkhan, Khanewal and other towns. Police arrested a number of persons for violation of the curfew and the ban on assembly of persons.

March 21: Despite strict enforcement of Curfew in Karachi, there were three violations and the law-enforcing agencies had to open fire. The injured persons were sent to hospital. In Lahore a cracker was thrown on a police

jeep. A brickbatting crowd was dispersed by police lathi-charge. City lawyers also took out a procession. In Sargodha, the police had to use lathi-charge against an opposition procession taken out to defy Section 144 and to court arrest. Opposition leaders defied Section 144 in Multan, Lala Musa, Chishtian and Rahimyarkhan by taking out processions and offering themselves for arrest.

March 22: Two persons were injured by firing by the law-enforcing agencies when they defied curfew which had been strictly enforced in Karachi division. One of the injured succumbed to his injuries later in the hospital. Processions led by opposition leaders were tear-gassed when the crowd threw brickbats on the police in Sargodha and Lahore. In Multan, Lyallpur, Muzaffargarh and Peshawar processions were taken out and people arrested for defying Section 144. Some *ulemas* also took out processions from various mosques in Rawalpindi.

March 23: Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) the opposition group, continued defying imposition of Section 144 in various cities.

March 25: Chief Minister of Sind said in a statement issued on 24 March: "... Notwithstanding repeated warnings by the Government of Sind, it is noticed that the disruptive elements continue to incite people to violence and encourage them to break the law of the land, damaging private and public property and cause fear and panic

among the peace-loving citizens of this province.

"In order to put an effective end to such destructive activities, orders have been issued to the armed forces as well as to police that any person attempting any of the following activities should be shot at sight: arson, looting, sabotage, disrupting means of transport and communications, causing damage to public or private property and violence."

April 9: Eight persons were killed and 77 injured in public-police clashes which continued throughout the day in Lahore. Official sources said that as a result of brickbatting by the public, 89 police officers were injured. People were protesting against holding of the Punjab Assembly session and defying Section 144. In Leiah one person was killed and one injured due to police firing on the mob which had attacked the office of the local Assistant Commissioner.

April 10: Five persons were killed in various clashes between the public and the police in Karachi. They were protesting against police firing in Lahore where the death toll had gone up to 37.

April 11: One person was killed and another injured by police firing on a procession in Lahore. The General Council of PNA called upon people to put off paying duties and taxes to the present government. Police had to disperse processionists with lathi-charge in Rawalpindi. Clashes took place between various political groups during the strike observed by PNA followers in Karachi. Two persons died in the clashes and several people with bullet, knife and stoning injuries were received in hospitals. Police opened fire in Hyderabad and resorted to tear-gassing to disperse a violent mob; four policemen were hurt. Shots were exchanged between the processionists and some other people in Multan injuring two persons. Police lathi-charged and dispersed a crowd in Rawalpindi. As a result of heavy stoning

by the public in Lahore, 2 sub-inspectors, one assistant sub-inspector and 6 constables were injured. Police fired in self-defence and one person was killed.

April 12: 13 persons were admitted in Mayo Hospital, four of them with bullet injuries, while 35 policemen, with grenade injuries were taken to police hospital in Lahore.

Prime Minister Bhutto told BBC that he would not hesitate calling in the army to restore normalcy in the country. Asked if in that case the loyalty of an ordinary armyman might not be divided, Mr. Bhutto replied: if one gets himself involved in this intellectual debate then the game will be over. In that situation, he said, the elections will be unnecessary, and the arguments being put forward over the issue of rigging the elections will be reduced to an ideological one, and added "you and I know fully well the consequences". Mr. Bhutto said contacts have been established with the opposition, but no well-wishers had come forward to bridge the gulf between the two parties.

Chief Minister, Sind, said that the economy has suffered a loss of nearly one hundred crore of rupees as a result of stoppage of production during disturbances in Karachi alone.

April 15: According to a government press note a procession set fire to a local cinema and some houses on McLeod Road in Lahore; fire was exchanged between the inmates of the houses and the crowd as a result of which a few persons were reported to have been injured. Three persons were reported killed and 91 injured. In Karachi a clash took place between two groups; one person was killed.

Two constitutional petitions, challenging the imposition of Section 144, were admitted by the Lahore High Court.

April 19: Rival groups again clashed in many cities of Pakistan.

April 20: Law and order situation in Karachi took a turn for the worse when rival political groups in various *mohallas* fought with brickbats, daggers, *lathis* and knives; firearms were freely used. Nine persons lost their lives and at least 70 received injuries. Arson and looting was widespread. Private vehicles were extensively damaged and public utility organizations were not permitted to attend emergency calls. City was completely paralysed by strike called by the opposition. A train was set on fire and one person was crushed under its wheels. Cinemas, banks and wine shops were attacked and set on fire. Strike was observed in many towns, including Hyderabad, Lahore, Multan, Lyallpur, Sukkur, Chishtian and Peshawar.

April 21: Karachi was placed under indefinite curfew.

April 22 Lt. Gen. Jehanzeb Arbab, Military Administrator for Karachi Division and Hyderabad district, issued Military Administrative Orders for strict compliance with immediate effect. All meetings and processions were banned. Carrying of arms or weapons of offence was forbidden including use of loudspeakers except for *Azan*. Curfew violators and those indulging in loot, arson and stoning to be shot at sight and all arms deposited with the nearest military sector headquarters within 24 hours.

The second military order said: The army authorities have taken over the control of situation in Karachi division and Hyderabad district with a view to:

- (a) restoring law and order,
- (b) providing security to law-abiding people,
- (c) weeding out anti-social elements and
- (d) improving the administration and removing the complaints of citizens.

The Federal government said in a press note that the provincial governments of Sind and Punjab have placed Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore areas under the control of the armed forces who will exercise exclusive jurisdiction and authority in these areas for enforcement of law and maintenance of public order. The press note added that the federal government, exercising its constitutional powers, has directed the armed forces of Pakistan to act in aid of civil power. Consequently Martial Law has been imposed in these areas.

(b) Five persons were shot dead for violations of curfew in Karachi. *Hartal*, rallies and clashes were reported from a number of towns as opposite groups took out processions. Curfew was also imposed in Lahore. Due to unsettled conditions, mail and express trains ran behind schedule.

April 23: Army authorities in Lahore banned all kinds of strike, lockouts of factories and mills, union activities, keeping of arms, explosives and inflammable material; non-compliance will render the defaulters for action under section 59 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Another army press release said: 'Whosoever is found obstructing, harassing and preventing any member of the essential services of Pakistan in the discharge of his official duty, will be prosecuted under the provision of Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The maximum punishment for such offence is death. Spreading rumours relating to the acts of the law-enforcing agencies in the discharge of their official duties and also distorting the facts and figures intentionally will be severely dealt with.'

Federal government issued an order under Defence of Pakistan Rules, that no matter, connected with the current PNA agitation, can be published without scrutiny by the provincial Home Secretary concerned.

PPP Party ticket was awarded to General Tikka Khan (retd.), for election to the Senate.

The President amended Pakistan Army Act on 21 April and Pakistan Army (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, was issued.

April 25: M.L. authorities, Zone A, announced setting-up of military courts for trial of offenders under Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Complaint Centres were set up in various M.L. headquarters and public was requested to report cases of exorbitant price hikes, complaints against military, civil and police officials, etc. M.L.A., Zone A, issued M.L. instructions 7 and 8 specifying offences to be considered and treated and offences committed under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952.

April 26: Official circles emphasised that the imposition of Martial Law in three towns was under specific constitutional provisions, empowering the federal government to call upon the armed forces to assist local administration in the maintenance of law and order. The step had been taken under Article 245 of the Constitution. Official circles pointed out that there was no parallel between the present step and the imposition of Martial Law in the past when, on two occasions, the Constitution was abrogated and Martial Law imposed throughout the country.

April 27: Retired General Tikka Khan, who was recently elected to the Senate, was sworn in as Minister of State, with Cabinet Minister's rank, in charge of Defence and National Security.

Services of retired Lt.-General Gul Hasan, terminated for gross misconduct. Some of his utterances came under mischief of the law and the whole matter is being examined in proper quarters, the reports added. General Gul Hasan's resignation as Pakistan's ambassador in Greece was examined in the Foreign Office and it was rejected and his services have been terminated. Likewise, the resignation of retired Air Marshal Abdur Rahim as ambassador in Spain was also rejected by the

Foreign Office and his services also terminated. (The two ambassadors were reported to have expressed their dissatisfaction with the events in Pakistan and resigned in protest.)

M.L.A., Zone A, took a serious view of news items and political statements which tended to create ill-will and hatred between various sections of the people, appearing in Karachi newspapers and warned that no such matter should appear in the press or issued to it.

April 28: Prime Minister Bhutto said in the National Assembly that there has been a "massive and colossal intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan" and added that PNA leadership did not have the brains and organization to plan what had happened in the country since elections. He said this was not a '*desi*' conspiracy, but an international conspiracy. He said he did not want to name the country and spoil Pakistan relations with it.

All the seven writ petitions challenging the validity of the imposition of Martial Law, the Presidential Proclamation, the Army Act amending Ordinance, imposition and censorship were admitted for regular hearing by a full bench of the Lahore High Court.

Following the announcement of the Long March by the Opposition, Government of Punjab banned entry into Islamabad/Rawalpindi area and transit through it for all goods traffic by road and all passenger buses with effect from 4 p.m. on April 29 till 8 p.m. on April 30. Through traffic was advised to take alternative routes and bypass the Rawalpindi/Islamabad area.

United Emirate Foreign Minister brought a special message from UAE President for Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

A spokesman of the Defence Ministry said:

The armed forces of the country are totally united to discharge their constitutional

obligations in support of the present legally constituted government, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chiefs of Staff of the Three Services made it absolutely clear. He said that the Pakistan army, navy and air force were also united to fulfil the pledge their officers and men have taken to defend the country's independence even to the peril of their lives. . . . "The defence personnel have watched with deep anguish the events of the last six weeks. While the military code prohibits the soldiers, sailors and airmen to have anything to do with politics the armed forces have to remain on call to safeguard country's integrity when threatened on account of external aggression or internal subversion. . . ."

National Assembly adopted Pakistan Army (Amendment) Bill, amending further the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. Defence of Pakistan (Amendment) Bill, 1977, was also passed by the Assembly.

Federal government banned processions, holding of meetings within the limits of the federal capital of Islamabad. Curfew was further relaxed in Karachi and situation was reported normal in Lahore and other cities.

M.L.A., Zone A, advised workers to be punctual in their work and pay attention to their duties for which suitable adjustments were made in the curfew timing. Relaxation was allowed for industrial workers during night shifts. Martial Law authorities extended the date of repairing of the excessive smoke-emitting and worn-out buses, public service vehicles and other transport.

M.L.A., Zone A, appointed 3 inspection teams, each headed by a Brigadier, for inspecting and checking of government, semi-government and autonomous departments in Karachi and Hyderabad M.L. areas.

April 30: Military courts were constituted in Karachi for trial of persons subject to the provision of Pakistan Army Act of 1952. In Lahore sale of arms was banned by the

M.L. authorities and all arms and ammunition shops were sealed. M.L.A., Zone A, constituted Martial Law teams to inspect public utility services and offices of civil administration in Karachi and Hyderabad to identify administrative weaknesses, irregularities and corruption in these services and recommend measures for improvement. They also decided to return certain categories of arms taken away from the public earlier.

May 4: M.L.A., Zone A, launched a campaign against anti-social and *goonda* elements in the areas under their control and appealed to the public to assist them by providing necessary information about such elements. The M.L. administration noted with satisfaction that reopened schools are functioning smoothly. Anti-social elements were warned once again that use of children as a tool to create law and order situation would not be tolerated. Parents were directed to advise their wards to attend to their studies and avoid participation in activities banned under M.L. Instructions.

A spokesman of the Ministry of Defence in Rawalpindi accused retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan of sedition and attempting to subvert the loyalty of the armed forces of Pakistan. The statement issued said that Asghar Khan's messages to the Service Chiefs urging them not to obey the government was tantamount to subverting the loyalties of the armed forces. The spokesman said, "It is all the more surprising that a former air force chief should be preaching sedition in the armed forces, who owe their allegiance to the Constitution and are loyal to it and not to any individual."

The spokesman said that it was the duty of the armed forces to come to the aid of civil power whenever called upon to do so. The federal government was at liberty to invoke Article 245 of the Constitution. Their action was legal and it was the duty of the armed forces to protect the life and honour of the people whenever called upon to do so without any qualms of conscience.

An official handout issued in this connection said: "Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan has, in a signed message, addressed to the Chiefs of Staff and officers of the Defence Services of Pakistan, urged upon them that whilst it was their duty to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan, they should distinguish between lawful and unlawful commands, and that they should not support, what he calls, the illegal government of the day. He goes on to say that the rigging during the elections was so blatant that it negated the principle of hiring and firing of government by the electorates and, as such, the army action was tantamount to supporting and protecting the person of one individual—Mr. Bhutto. He has appealed to the officers to be only guided by their conscience and to display sufficient moral fibre in the discharge of their duty. In his message he has decried the army action in East Pakistan, Baluchistan and Dir in the recent past, as also their coming to the aid of civil power during the recent disturbances.

An official statement said that the Karakoram Highway has been cleared of road-blocks created by subversive elements and that 57 persons suspected to have organised the sabotage between Besham and Pattan have been held along with their weapons.

The traffic is now flowing uninterrupted. ... On receipt of information, the government moved security forces to the area to remove road-blocks and keep the road open to the traffic. Certain elements obstructed the road flow and the operation by the security forces and in the process suffered casualties including five killed. The security forces also suffered casualties, including one killed and two wounded.

May 4: M.L.A., Zone A, ordered the closure of all schools in Karachi and Hyderabad areas under their control and extended curfew hours in view of the likelihood of processions being taken out involving women and children.

May 6: Processions were taken out when curfew was relaxed for offering prayers in Lahore. Despite repeated warnings, a procession in Anarkali continued to press forward towards the picquet which showed lot of restraint inspite of brickbattling by the crowd. It repeatedly withdrew to avoid the processionists surging forward. When they came dangerously close to the picquet, the commander ordered the picquet to open fire which resulted in two killed and nine wounded.

May 7: M.L.A., Zone A, called a conference of vegetable and fruit dealers and civil administration representatives and arranged agreement on stabilising prices of fruits and vegetables.

May 9: A spokesman of the Ministry of Defence refuted a BBC story alleging sacrilege of mosques and other places of worship by the troops. There had been no incident of such a nature in any part of the country, the spokesman added.

May 10: A statement by the M.L.A., Zone A, said: the M.L. authorities have shown satisfaction over the fact that the general public recognises the need of maintaining law and order so essential for bringing about normalcy. It has, however, been noted with concern that certain anti-social elements and disruptionists are planning to indulge in activities which are likely to disturb peace and tranquillity. The law-enforcing agencies are, therefore, determined to perform their duty with a heavy hand irrespective of the fact whether the agitators are women and children.

May 12: Speaking on an adjournment motion in the National Assembly on retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan's recent appeal to the Chiefs of Staff and other officers of the armed forces, Prime Minister Bhutto said that such an act would be high treason under the constitution besides being a serious offence under other laws. He said that the

country would be in danger if the institution of the armed forces was dragged into political matters. Referring to the imposition of Martial Law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore he said that up to the end his government tried not to bring in the armed forces. But finally it became inescapable to call in the armed forces in aid of civil power so that these three cities could be saved from anarchy and being reduced to ashes. To do so was not only moral, but also legal and constitutional duty of the government. The armed forces are governed by certain laws and are not above laws. The government did not issue any illegal orders, he added.

Minister of State, retired General Tikka Khan, said in the National Assembly that it (Asghar Khan's letter) was an attempt to subvert the loyalties of the armed forces. He said that the letter was nothing but outright treason which can be tried under the Defence of Pakistan Rules and other laws.

May 13: According to a M.L. Zone A press release, attempts were made to take out small processions in different parts of Karachi today after *Juma* prayers during curfew relaxation period. In one case, police had to use tear gas to disperse the crowd near Aisha Bawany Academy. In another case, the law enforcing agencies had to fire one round in self-defence when a crowd in Liaquatabad resorted to stonning. One person was injured. Earlier on Thursday, May 12, some persons in Liaqatabad hurled stones on the patrols of law enforcing agencies who showed extreme restraint in controlling the situation. When the crowd became violent, the law enforcing agencies had to open fire. One person was killed and five injured. Six persons were arrested in Lahore for assembling unlawfully in Lahori Gate.

May 14: Some mischievous elements in Multan city, who had opened fire on police yesterday without provocation, again clashed

with the law enforcing agencies today. They barricaded the old city lanes opening into the main streets with sandbags and took positions behind these fortifications armed with fire-arms. Sniping all passersby started early in the day; the law-enforcing agencies were obliged to tackle the situation with force. Heavy teargassing and firing had to be resorted to remove the barricades, resulting in two deaths and injury to ten persons including five belonging to the law-enforcing agencies. The condition of five injured was reported to be serious. District Magistrate ultimately had to call the army in aid of civil power and curfew was imposed in the affected areas. Walled city was handed over to the army. Anybody found violating the curfew was liable to be shot at sight without warning.

Situation remained perfectly normal throughout Karachi division and Hyderabad district.

M.L.A., Zone A, advised the public to bring to its notice fraudulent practices of recruiting agencies with relevant proofs for redressing genuine grievances against them.

May 16: According to a Martial Law press release, curfew in Lahore was relaxed for 14 hours, longest duration since May 6. Life in city and cantonment returned to normal. A Summary Military Court awarded rigorous imprisonment to a Khatib for delivering an objectionable speech. M.L. authorities announced reopening of schools in the Karachi division and Hyderabad district on May 15. No untoward incident was reported anywhere.

May 17: M.L.A., Zone A, banned meetings, processions, assembly of political nature or otherwise by any association, union or group to be held in Karachi division without prior written permission from the Deputy Martial Law Administrator. Situation in Lahore and Multan improved. In Sanghar, processionists attacked law-enforcing agencies who had to use force to disperse them.

19 miscreants were arrested and the situation brought fully under control. 19 persons were convicted by various Summary Military Courts. Two persons were given one year R.I. for distributing subversive literature and stoning vehicles.

May 18: 23 persons were convicted by military courts in Karachi division and Hyderabad district for committing various offences such as violating curfew, stoning and burning public and private vehicles, taking out processions, etc. The punishments ranged from rigorous imprisonment to fines.

May 18: Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Vice President of the Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara Group) at a press conference strongly criticised attempts to discredit the armed forces and instigate people to violate curfew and martial law....

The armed forces he said, were the "last instrument in a country to protect life and property and to guard against chaos."

May 19: Martial Law authorities in Karachi fined several shopkeepers for dishonest and unfair practices in transacting business with the public. The shopkeepers were found using sub-standard scales and weights and selling rotten vegetables. The Martial Law authorities also fixed rates of vegetables in consultations with the whole-sale dealers earlier. The M.L. authorities appealed to the public to report dishonest dealings of shop-keepers for appropriate action.

May 20: A procession in Sialkot became unruly and indulged in arson and looting. First the police resorted to lathi-charge and teargas and when shots were fired from the crowd, they returned the fire in self-defence, resulting in the death of four persons. Curfew was imposed on the city. Attempts to take out processions after *Juma* prayers were foiled by the law-enforcing agencies in Lahore where a ban on the movement of all kind of vehicles continued during the relaxation of curfew hours. M.L. authorities

advised all citizens of Lahore to offer *Juma* prayers in the nearest *mohalla* mosques and thereafter disperse peacefully.

The Sind Government in a press note said that partial strike was observed in Tandojam, Shahdadpur, Mirpurkhas and Sanghar. In Sanghar town, road-blocks were put up by some miscreants which were later removed by the law-enforcing agencies. There was also an exchange of fire with the miscreants resulting in injuries to five persons. Attempts to take out processions from various places in Karachi were foiled by the law-enforcing agencies. A crowd assembled near Ghausia mosque and stoned vehicles of law-enforcing agencies and did not disperse despite repeated warnings. After a lot of restraint, force was used without any casualty to anybody. A number of persons were taken in custody. A procession in Hyderabad was tackled in the same manner.

May 21: The full bench of Sind High Court, announcing their short decision on a writ petition challenging the legality of Martial Law and the validity of the Seventh Constitutional Amendment, have held that the Sind High Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction in relation to the areas of Karachi division and the Revenue district of Hyderabad in view of the Amendment. The Court have also ordered that the petition shall remain suspended for the period during which the armed forces are acting in aid of civil power in Karachi division and the Revenue district of Hyderabad.

May 22: Major-General (Retd.) Sher Ali Khan who recently joined *Jamaat-i-Islami* was arrested under the Defence of Pakistan Rules and detained for 3 months.

May 24: In order to protect the life and property of the people, Martial Law authorities re-imposed curfew in Liaquatabad and Federal B Area for major part of the day while other areas of Karachi remained without curfew as usual. This was done to forestal processions in these *mohallas*.

M.L. authorities asked the people to clear government dues, failing which action may be taken against them under Rule 49 of Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971. The M.L. authorities expected that the citizens of Lahore will honour their moral and legal obligations by clearing the outstanding government dues at the earliest. This appeal followed an earlier directive by certain elements asking people not to pay government taxes.

May 25: Opening his argument before the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court the Attorney General of Pakistan said that there was a difference between judiciary and jurisdiction. The function of the judiciary was to interpret law and Constitution whereas jurisdiction meant the sphere of action of the judiciary. . . . Quoting examples of certain areas that had remained outside the jurisdiction of the High Courts such as tribal areas etc., he said there was nothing wrong if the jurisdiction of the High Court had been taken away in respect of the area where the armed forces were operating in aid of civil power. He elaborated that under article 148 of the Constitution, it was the duty of the federal government to protect a province or a part thereof from external aggression, insurgency and internal disturbances. The Punjab Chief Minister was actually acting as a functionary of the federal government as provided in article 140 of the Constitution. The armed forces have been called by the Chief Minister, who, being in charge of law and order, was the best judge as to when and where they are to be called. . . .

May 26: The Attorney General further argued that the Seventh Constitutional Amendment was based on the rules of Prudence incorporated in the British Common Law according to which the civil courts would not interfere when the armed forces were called in to quell internal insurgency or to control situation as state of war. . . . He further said that in the event of emergency

proclaimed by the President under article 232 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the Courts could be curtailed. The Seventh Amendment has not been brought about arbitrarily. The position is that where there is Martial Law the courts will not interfere and after it they can, he said.

May 31: Attorney General of Pakistan, arguing before the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, hearing writ petitions challenging imposition of Martial Law and the Seventh Constitutional Amendment, orders of the Martial Law authorities, the amendments in the Army Act and the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, argued that the army had been called in aid of civil power under article 245 of the Constitution in Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi and that the army was functioning subject to the Army Acts amended and that the term Martial Law has been used in the common parlance in order to make the common man understand the gravity of the situation. He said that Martial Law could be imposed in the country though there was no provision for the same in the Constitution.

M.L.A., Zone A, issued a warning that publication and distribution of pamphlets and posters on political issues was forbidden and those violating this order will be liable for punishment. The M.L. authorities also appealed to the public to identify anti-social elements committing thefts of manholes so that action might be taken against them. Public was advised to contact K.M.C. for covering the open manholes.

June 2: The Full Bench of the Lahore High Court announced unanimous decision that the High Court had the powers to hear those writ petitions and that the imposition of Martial Law was contrary to the present Constitution of Pakistan. The Court observed: "Despite the fact that the government insist on describing the operation being carried out by the armed forces at present in the district of Lahore, as Martial Law, it is not Martial

Law in any of the recognized meaning of the term". The Court also struck down the latest amendment in the Army Act as invalid being contrary to and beyond the scope of Article 245 of the Constitution. Through this amendment civilians who were not previously subject to the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Army Act had been made subject thereto, and could be tried for a large number of offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and other penal enactment mentioned therein. As the Act X, 1977, amending the Pakistan Army Act has been declared *ultra vires* of Article 245 of the Constitution, the offences under the DPR and other penal enactments mentioned therein shall not be tried by the military courts.

Touching the issue of Martial Law, Their Lordships held that while in all the previous Constitutions of Pakistan and also in the Indian Constitution, the word "Martial Law" occurred, but it was conspicuous by its absence in the present Constitution, this, Their Lordships observed, clearly shows that the framers of the present Constitution intended to bury Martial Law. Apart from this, the judgement read, the present Constitution neither envisaged the imposition of Martial Law nor the exercise by the armed forces of any judicial function assumed by them at present.

The learned judges turned down the request of the counsel for the federal government that the High Court order be suspended till the government filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Request for appeal in the Supreme Court was granted.

(Please include Mustafa Khan's statement vindicating the armed forces.)

June 3: Talks for a political settlement began at Rawalpindi between the opposition represented by Maulana Mufti Mahmud, Prof. Ghaffoor Ahmad and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and the government represented by Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada.

(On 31 May, the Prime Minister had presided over a special meeting of Service officers to review the law and order situation in the country. Held in the Prime Minister's House, the meeting lasted for three hours. It was attended by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the three Services Chiefs and other senior officers.)

June 5: A Foreign Office spokesman described as totally without foundation PNA leader Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan's claim that he had negotiated the proposal for the opening of Karakoram Highway and thereby helped to bring Pakistan and China closer to each other.

Supreme Court started hearing government's appeal against Lahore High Court's judgement which had declared that Army was not acting in aid of the civil power in Lahore district and that the Constitution did not provide for imposition of Martial Law in any form in any part of the country.

M.L.A., Zone A, fixed the prices of sweetmeats in Karachi. A Martial Law press note said that the situation in Karachi and Hyderabad remained peaceful and no untoward incident was reported from anywhere.

June 7: Martial Law lifted from Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore with immediate effect. The federal government by a notification rescinded their direction issued on April 21 asking the armed forces to act in aid of civil power when called upon by a provincial chief minister in areas specified by the latter. (This direction by the federal government was issued under Article 245 of the Constitution.)

JULY 5: The armed forces of Pakistan have taken over the administration of the country and the situation is normal. A spokesman announced this morning, according to Radio Pakistan.

The Spokesman said, the former Prime Minister Bhutto, other top leaders of the Peoples Party and Pakistan National Alliance have been taken into protective custody. The armed forces have been posted to guard important installations all over the country.

Book Review

Pakistan's Experiment With Martial Law

Sultan A. Geelani

Feldman's Revolution in Pakistan is a book that should also command an interest among those who want to find an answer to the question, why military coups occur. The question is of a great deal of interest when we consider that between 1958 and 1969 as many as eighty-eight military coups occurred in fifty two countries. In Africa twenty two of the thirty eight independent countries suffered at least one military coup; of the twenty six Asian countries fourteen experienced military take-overs; among the twenty three Latin American countries eleven were affected. Even in Europe, France, Greece and Czechoslovakia have had their own military intervene in the civil affairs.

His other work 'From Crisis to Crisis' tells us the story of Ayub's shallow political ideas, of his lack of penetrative political insight which resulted in his espousing ideas such as the one of setting up Basic Democracies, and making them the main vehicle on which the momentum of Pakistan politics was to depend. But the shallowness of his ideas could only be exposed when they had been in practice.

National information media in Pakistan are not famous for informing and educating us about the state of the nation. But they exist. And to justify their existence they do dish out information of a sort; an objective approach to news enriched by reflective minds is, for various reasons, not their hallmark. Journalists, broadcasters and public relations men do their bit to make a living, but nobody has to make a living by writing books on the affairs and problems of the nation. The compulsion to write books is, therefore, felt only in proportion to the possibility of being able to project a point of view without falling foul of the powers that be. This is probably why there are not as many books on political, constitutional and other developments in Pakistan as one would

wish. Herbert Feldman's books should be a welcome addition to the meager list of such books.

Herbert Feldman, an Englishman, has not in the manner of other foreign writers just visited Pakistan for an extended stay, he lived in Pakistan since its very inception. He had had a wide circle of friends in this country with journalists, government officials and businessmen among them. He has three other books besides the two (mentioned at the end of this Article), and at least one more is in the offing. The number of books he has written on subjects connected with this country, makes one think that systematic collection of facts and information was his main pre-occupation while he was in Pakistan. He has certainly made a considerable use of it.

Revolution in Pakistan gives an account of the events leading to the military *coup*, the imposition of martial law in Pakistan in 1958, and the basic reforms that were introduced under the cover of martial law, for future development and consolidation, under a constitution which was to come later. Broad detail of the whole sweep of reforms is presented with considerable lucidity and circumspection. And subjects such as foreign policy and relations with India, have a chapter each. Both books have copious appendices giving considerable background material. The chapters on Basic Democracies and constitution indicate the likely shape of politics and political institutions in the immediate future, which Feldman covers in his next book, *From Crisis to Crisis*. *Revolution in Pakistan* fairly describes the political ideas that guided Ayub's thinking and action, and makes ample reference to the dangers that Ayub's compromising nature invited, and which finally caused the undoing of his power and the constitution on which he had said he had sweated blood.

Revolution in Pakistan was published while Feldman had been here for some twenty years. The claim that he had the "objective eye" of an outsider needs examination. Foreign editors of major world newspapers worry about the "objective eye" of their correspondents, posted abroad in excess of a few years. Long residence brings about contacts with individuals of the host country at a deeper level of the psyche and the resultant modification of attitude of the outsider is not always contributory to a cold assessment of events in the host environment. Leading western newspapers, because of this consideration, feel reluctant to keep their correspondents in one country for more than three years, especially in Russia. On the same principle officials posted abroad in embassies are rotated at definite intervals. But writers and artists perhaps belong to a different category.

Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan* is a book that should also command an interest among those who want to find an answer to the question, why military *coups* occur. The question is of a great deal of interest when we consider that between 1958 and 1969 as many as eighty-eight military *coups* occurred in fifty two countries. In Africa twenty two of the thirty eight independent countries suffered at least one military *coup*; of the twenty six Asian countries fourteen experienced military take-overs; among the twenty three Latin American countries eleven were affected. Even in Europe France, Greece and Czechoslovakia have had their own military intervene in the civil affairs.

Feldman notes a number of distinct points in time when the army in Pakistan had to be asked to redress the political-administrative balance. The anti-Quadiani movement in the Punjab was one of several such occasions. Even more significant was Ayub's participation in government as defence minister after Ghulam Muhammad had dissolved the constituent assembly. It is a fair deduction that before dissolving the assembly Ghulam Muhammad had managed to obtain Ayub's assent to participate in the government that was to be formed afterwards.

The relationship between Ghulam Muhammad, the civilian governor-general, and Ayub Khan the army C-in-C (as he then was) is also of interest during that time. Ayub was British-trained and because of it regarded himself as non-political. Ghulam Mohammad's blandishments to Ayub to take over the country were, therefore, resisted by Ayub. Ayub is on record that he and Musa had to firmly tell Ghulam Mohammad that if he persisted in asking them to take over the government, he might be put under arrest. This, and the fact that Ayub did not stay in the government after the new Constituent Assembly had been elected, shows that Ayub was none too eager to continue in a political role. It is clear that continued feuding and the fragmentation of the body politic during

the period of the second Constituent Assembly in Pakistan gave Iskander Mirza a chance to persuade Ayub on lines that his predecessor had unsuccessfully tried earlier. The military *coup* thus became inevitable in 1958.

It can, therefore, be said that Ayub was not politically ambitious in the manner of some military men in Asia and Africa. The difference between the *coup* leaders elsewhere and Ayub was that the typical *coup* leader begins by converting to his side a necessary number of fellow officers, the conspiratorial group having thus formed and consolidated they proceed to execute the desired *coup*. Ayub did nothing of the sort. He even shrugged away from several attempts at involving him in such a venture, as noted above. But he did look askance at the antics of politicians and their corrupt practices. And so, finally, when Mirza broached the subject he must have found Ayub a ready listener.

From Crisis to Crisis tells us the story of Ayub's shallow political ideas, of his lack of penetrative political insight which resulted in his espousing ideas such as the one of setting up Basic Democracies, and making them the main vehicle on which the momentum of Pakistan politics was to depend. But the shallowness of his ideas could only be exposed when they had been in practice. This took time. Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan's words, recorded in the book, show the kind of comment Ayub drew as the moment of truth approached. Asghar Khan said: "The rejection of President Ayub Khan is utter and complete. In his person, President Ayub Khan, rightly or wrongly, symbolises in the eyes of the people all that is evil in our society".

Feldman points to the inadequacy of Ayub's ideas more than once, in both of his books quoted below. Doubtless, Ayub's distrust of the parliamentary system can be ascribed to his own observation of its misuse in Pakistan, the vulgarity of election campaigns

and the unseemly manoeuvres in which politicians indulged. It may be said that it was healthy and desirable that new forms of political institutions be given a trial. In this connection he is reported to have said: "People ask me in which book can one find our system. My reply is . . . in the book of Pakistan." So far so good. Abolishing parliamentary system was one thing but Ayub also attempted to abolish the party system of politics. He made firm and categorical pronouncements, but soon, thereafter, proceeded to engender party political activity and became the leader of the Convention Muslim League!

He showed similar inconsistency in his attitude to the Constitution, which *From Crisis to Crisis* describes. The constitution was drafted at Ayub's behest by a constitution commission. Justice Shahabuddin, the chairman of the commission, Feldman says, disapproved of the final shape the constitution was given by others, after its submission. The constitution gave little power to the elected representatives of the people. The President and indeed the ministers appointed by him were not responsible to the national assembly. Nor could the assembly exercise financial powers on national expenditure, though it could debate financial issues. So the whole claptrap of constitution was designed to keep Ayub in power, without being accountable to anyone. Despite these advantages the constitution was amended time and again.

Economic progress during Ayub's regime, many people still maintain, was good and significant. The chapter on economic growth in *From Crisis to Crisis* is most disappointing and ridden with contradictions. For example on page 41 Feldman says: "it is, therefore, to Ayub's credit that compared with trifling and sometimes negative growth rates experienced during the years that preceded his administration, the years that followed witnessed a steady expansion in the economy with a growth rate that averaged 4.7% for the decade that ended in 1967-68". This

statement is followed on page 42 by the observation that: "industry started long before Ayub Khan, and in some instances the rate of growth was greater prior to his administration than during it."

Discussing the concentration of wealth in fewer hands, Feldman says: "... it had much to do with his policy ... industry, banking, insurance and commerce were concentrated within a comparatively small group". But further on he observes: "... the 'robber barons' certainly had their origin before 1958". Origin or no origin the latter statement is quite meaningless in the light of the facts enumerated by the author himself.

The other disappointing feature in the second book is the treatment of Pakistan's foreign policy. Feldman does not look with sympathy upon Pakistan's relations with China and rather than forthrightly advance reasoned argument, he makes uncalled for

reservations. He also, without offering any justification, questions our endeavours to have deep and enduring relations with Arabs. This rather contrasts with the favourable light in which he mentions Israel. He even reproduces some laudatory remarks made by Dr. Usmani about Israel.

However, shortcomings are part of many good books, and Herbert Feldman's two books *Revolution in Pakistan* and *From Crisis to Crisis* are no exceptions to this rule. He has certainly presented with sympathy and circumspection an excellent account of Ayub's ten years in power. Anyone keen to learn about that decade of Pakistan's history, should not miss reading the two books.

Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of Martial Law Administration. From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969. Both by Herbert Feldman, published by Oxford University Press, London.

THE SINGLAUB AFFAIR

Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, 55, chief of staff of the Eighth Army in South Korea, had criticized the President's plan to pull out U.S. combat troops from South Korea. "If we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested, it will lead to war", the general said. The story touched off the noisiest clash over civilian control of the military since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur. "The President was stomping mad," reported a Defence Department hand.

Carter ordered Singlaub to return to Washington immediately; when the two-star general, accompanied by Defence Secretary Harold Brown, appeared at the Oval Office. Carter relieved him of his Command, pending reassignment to another post. "The message to the military is clear," observed one Pentagon Officer. "Shut-up—or ship out."

Those who know him call him a super patriot and a soldier—hardly a publicityseeker or a trouble maker. En route home, he offered to apologize for the disturbance, but not for his views. He believed that final U.S. policy had not been formulated and that he had been exercising his right to speak out before the final orders were issued. Many of his military colleagues agreed. Why can't Army generals have the same right as Andy Young to say what he really believes? Asked one Young Turk at the Pentagon.

Under the Carter plan, 32,000 of the 40,000 U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn (from South Korea) over the next five years. Once a decision is made by higher authority, declared one top civilian hand at the Pentagon, it is his duty to carry it out or turn in his suit and voice his dissent from the outside. If Singlaub turns in his suit to resign and fight on, he will collect a \$30,000 annual pension. At the very least, Carter's action means that the troop-withdrawal issue will now receive much closer Congressional scrutiny.

Newsweek, May 30, 1977

Research And Development

RAF Chief and Minister Stress Importance of Tornado. Air Chief Marshal Sir Neil Cameron, RAF Chief of Air Staff and Mr. James Wellbeloved, Under-Secretary of State for the RAF, have emphasised that both versions of the Tornado, the strike and air defence variants, were vital to European defence.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Neil Cameron, addressing the annual RAF Association Conference at Blackpool recently said that the Tornado would give the RAF "a capability we have never had in our 59 years of history".

"In terms of equipment, we are at last moving into an entirely new generation of aircraft and weapons. I am thinking particularly of the Tornado...and this may be a good opportunity to put the record straight about this strikingly successful aircraft and the progress we are making with it.

"Tornado is going to form the core of the Royal Air Force front line from 1980 until at least the year 2000. First of all, it will replace, in its variants, five different types of aircraft and I don't have to tell this audience the difference this makes in the cost of training, in numbers of personnel, and of logistics.

"Tornado is now well into its trials and has clocked up just under 1,000 hours of development flying. It has already exceeded Mach 1.9 and shortly will go Mach 2, and later achieve its full specification of Mach 2.2. Its handling is even better than predicted. My colleagues from Germany and Italy and I meet shortly to put in train the order for the next 110 aircraft.

"Its very advanced low-level navigation system will give us, not only a real night/all-weather capability for the first time in our history, but also we have got the extremes of precision and reliability that are called for in the aircraft's demanding strike/attack role.

"When I say low-level, I mean 200 ft. (61 m.), and should there be obstacles in its path in excess of that height, then its terrain-following radar will see factory chimney and the like and guide the aircraft automatically above the obstacle.

"It will have the most advanced Electronic Counter Measure pods, both active and passive, to deal with enemy defences. In terms of weapon delivery, we are talking about maximum errors the size of a tennis court. Additionally, the aircraft will carry a wide variety of weapons—from guns, through bombs and rockets to the most advanced missiles.

"As you know, there will be two versions—one for offensive support and reconnaissance and the other for air defence. Both variants have really excellent radars, and the one for the Air Defence version is of British design.

"The weapons are coming along equally well. They include a new and revolutionary type of airfield attack weapon developed entirely in this country. This weapon can also deal with tanks and logistic targets.

"Then for the air defence version of Tornado we will have the Skyflash air-to-air missile with its outstanding British-designed homing head giving an excellent performance

even in intense electronic interference. The Tornado air defence aircraft will give us a tremendously improved capability to intercept enemy aircraft approaching this country or the naval forces or shipping around this country.

"I would call the air defence Tornado a bomber destroyer. It is not a dog-fighting aircraft as we have known them in the past because, as I have said, a Tornado at 30,000 ft. (9,150 m.) can detect and destroy an enemy aircraft at 250 ft. (76 m.) some 25 miles (40 km.) away. This is a combination of a splendid British radar and an advanced missile.

"In short, I am sure that in Tornado we have got a real winner. . . . I say, as head of the Royal Air Force, one of the three Air Forces that will use it—I am convinced it will be an outstanding offensive support and reconnaissance aircraft giving us a capability we have never had in our 59 years of history: and I am convinced that our partners in Germany and Italy know that this aircraft will do exactly what it was designed for."

Mr. James Wellbeloved, Under-Secretary of State for the RAF, stressed the importance of the air defence variant of the Tornado to the defence of the United Kingdom, when speaking in a UK House of Commons debate on the Royal Air Force.

He said: "Because we are committed to the air defence, not only of the United Kingdom base, but also of the naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic channel areas, we have a very large area to cover. That fact and the diversity of tactics open to the enemy mean that our air defence system must be as flexible and as adaptable as we can make it. Our concept of operations would broadly be to make the greatest possible use of Continental and United Kingdom early warning—supplemented by airborne early warning to give the essential low-level cover—and to inflict the maximum

attrition on incoming raids using both fighter and SAM systems.

"A fighter with a high chance of destroying enemy aircraft, even in heavy electronic jamming conditions, is needed. It must have long range, a first-class radar, good air-to-air weapons and a capability to stay on patrol for long enough to make early interceptions. These requirements have led us to select the Tornado ADV after exhaustive consideration of many contenders. Its range, aerodynamic performance and very advanced avionics add up to the most flexible and effective system for the job. It will carry the excellent new, medium-range missile called Skyflash, a British derivation of the American Sparrow which has impressed the Americans very much in trial firings in the United States of America.

Mr. Wellbeloved concluded: "In combination with its advanced radar, we consider that this will provide a formidable weapons combination and we look to this aircraft to provide our night, all-weather, long-range interception capability for the foreseeable future."

Marconi Satcom Terminal for Anti-Submarine Cruiser. H.M.S. Invincible, a new anti-submarine cruiser is to be equipped with SCOT 2, the Western World's most powerful shipborne communications terminal manufactured by MARCONI SPACE AND DEFENCE SYSTEMS LIMITED, a GEC-MARCONI ELECTRONICS COMPANY.

The terminal, which has been delivered to the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, will operate world-wide through US, NATO and British satellites and will provide Invincible with reliable fade-free communications.

Two versions of SCOT have been produced. SCOT.1 has a 3.5 ft. (1.1m) antenna for installation on all classes of Royal Navy ships from frigate size upwards and SCOT 2

which has a 6 ft. (2m) antenna is designed to provide the additional communication facilities, including one voice channel, required by command ships.

So far a total of 15 SCOT-ls have been delivered and the delivery of the first SCOT-2 marks the end of the second production contract for the system. A further production order for seven SCOT-ls and one SCOT-2 is expected shortly.

The original concept of the SCOT system was formulated in the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, Portsmouth, and the first production contract was awarded to MARCONI SPACE AND DEFENCE SYSTEMS LIMITED in 1971.

Since then the SCOT terminals have excited world interest and successful trials with the French Navy have been completed recently.

The Jaguar International. took its place at the Paris Air Show in the flying display, backed up by a single-seat RAF Jaguar GR.1 in the static park.

The Jaguar low-level strike aircraft, built jointly by DASSAULT-BREGUET of France and BAC, has brought a new capability to the defence of Western Europe. RAF Jaguars have proved the accuracy of the Navigation and Weapon Aiming Sub-System (NAVWASS) by winning the RAF-Germany Navigation and Bombing Competition on each occasion they have entered. The aircraft is also meeting the design expectations in regard to reliability and ease of servicing.

The new Jaguar International's air combat and maritime capabilities are illustrated on the Main Stand in model form. Jaguar International has uprated Adour Mk. 804 engines which give an increase in thrust of some 27% compared with the standard Mk. 102 version, and can carry 'dog-fight' missiles such as the R. 550 'Magic' on either its underwing or overwing pylons. Initial Magic firing trials from the overwing stations

have been completed, which will allow the full complement (10,000 lb.—4,545 kg.) of offensive weapons to be carried on the underwing pylons. Further engine development to 'Dash 58' standard, will give a thrust increase of 40% compared with the Mk. 102, and is currently under test.

A number of anti-shiping missiles are available in an advanced state of development, including the AEROSPATIALE AM39 Exocet, the MBB Kormoran and the McDonnell Douglas Harpoon. Jaguar International's flexible NAVWASS provides a satisfactory interface for these missile systems and would search for the enemy using the THOMSON/CSF Agave radar in the anti-shiping role on which initial flight trials have been completed. The Agave radar, which will be mounted in the nose of the aircraft, will, in addition, give Jaguar International an air-to-ground mapping and ranging capability and an air-to-air search and look-on mode.

The BAC Strikemaster, is a versatile and economic strike/trainer currently fulfilling the requirements of a number of overseas air forces. The aircraft on display is destined for delivery to an overseas customer. With its ability to perform four important roles—pilot and weapons training, strike and reconnaissance—the Strikemaster is equally effectively used operationally as well as for training. In the operational ground/attack role, Strikemaster carries up to 3,000 lb. (1,360 kg.) of weapons and two 7.62 mm. FN machine guns. Range varies according to load and type of sortie, but a hi-lo-hi radius of action of 640 nautical miles (1,200 km.) is typical.

An RAF Jet Provost, from which the Strikemaster was developed, will be on display in the static park.

Guided Weapons. The *Rapier* ultra-low-level air defence system shown in the Guided Weapons Park at the Paris Air Show include the standard launcher with missiles, the optical tracker and 'blindfire' radar.

Rapier is the first system of its kind to become fully operational—with the British Army, the RAF Regiment, the Iranian Defence Services and an undisclosed African country. It is also in service with the Defence Services of Oman and Abu Dhabi and has been ordered by the Australian Army. Export orders now total over £600 million.

The latest Rapier development—Tracked Rapier—will also be displayed. This is a production standard system as built for Iran and mounted on an FMC M548 tracked cargo carrier.

Alongside the Rapier systems is the Swingfire long-range anti-tank guided weapon which has a range of 4,000 metres (4,400 yd.) and a warhead that can penetrate all known armour.

Swingfire. The new Striker CVRT (Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance Tracked) carries ten Swingfire missiles, five ready to fire in the launcher bins and five for reloading in the rear of the vehicle. Striker is fast and highly manoeuvrable and can outrange heavier and slower tanks, both in speed and fire power. The Belgian Army has ordered Striker and deliveries have begun both to Belgium and to the British Army. Striker's light weight enables two vehicles to be carried in the C130 Hercules transport aircraft and it can also be dropped by parachute.

With Striker will be the Swingfire/Argocat development, a lightweight amphibious vehicle with good cross-country performance over most types of terrain including deep snow and soft sand. The launcher is an adaptation of the transportable Swingfire Pallet (*Infantry Swingfire*) which carries four missiles; this latter Swingfire variant will also be on display.

Infantry-transportable Swingfire for use in desert and open country is a further Swingfire development on show. A typical system would consist of four missile launcher/trolleys with a further two trolleys, one carrying the sight and the other the operational ground equipment.

BAC GW's two Naval Systems are featured in model form. The Seawolf/GWS25 naval anti-missile system is now in the final stages of sea trials in the frigate HMS *Penelope* culminating in missile firings which are currently in progress and will end later this year. Trials to date have confirmed that Seawolf can intercept and destroy small supersonic missile targets and the Seawolf display will include the tracking radar, the surveillance radar, the missile and its launcher.

The helicopter-borne Sea Skua anti-ship missile system, which currently has no counterpart, will initially operate from the Royal Navy's frigate-borne Lynx helicopters in the early 1980s.

A further exhibit in model form will be the drone version of the Series 2 Tailwind light aircraft being developed by BAC GW in conjunction with AJEP Ltd.

Seawolf Firing Successes at Sea. The Seawolf/GWS25 Naval Defence System has emerged with flying colours from a series of firing trials aboard the British frigate HMS *Penelope*. These trials are part of a programme which will complete Seawolf's sea trials later this year.

The recent firings were designed to check a wide spectrum of system capability. Targets varied from the towed Rushton, only some 2.25 metres long by 13 centimetres diameter, to the supersonic Petrel rocket.

A variety of target flight profiles and speeds were used. The system's capability against glinting targets was verified. A successful salvo firing against the Mach 2+ Petrel was achieved, at the first attempt.

These uniformly good results were obtained using both TV and radar missile guidance. Launch conditions included severe ship motion.

The firings from HMS *Penelope* fully confirmed the excellent results achieved earlier during land firings at Woomera in Australia.

and Aberporth in Wales. In particular they demonstrated yet again Seawolf's unique capability against small supersonic missile targets. They also revalidated Seawolf's claim to be effective against a greater variety of anti-ship missiles and aircraft than any known comparable system in production today.

Background Information. Seawolf/GWS25 is suitable for fitting in frigates or larger ships which, in addition, will be able to carry full offensive armament.

To cater for cases where warship size precludes fitting Seawolf/ GWS25, and where some reduction in system performance is acceptable, lighter 'blindfire', 'darkfire' and visual-only variants have been studied. Designated respectively Seawolf/Psi, Seawolf/Delta and Seawolf/Omega, these variants are suitable for ships of about 2,000 tons down to 400 tons.

All these variants incorporate major proven parts of Seawolf/GWS25, thus eliminating the need for costly development. They are easily adaptable to meet customer ship requirements, and modular packaging is a design feature.

Lightweight missile launchers are also offered to meet specific requirements.

Seawolf/GWS25 is now in the final stages of development for service with the Royal Navy—initially in Type 22 anti-submarine frigates and later retrospectively in some Leander-class frigates in which it would replace Seacat. The possibility of retro-fitting the system in some Type 21 frigates is being studied.

S-3 Test Fired. On 3 December, 1976, the Landes firing-range in south-western France was the scene of the first test launch of the S-3 strategic ballistic missile. The test, which was successful, despite foul weather conditions and a wind blowing at nearly 70 kph, was carried out ahead of the contractual deadline, on the date set in 1973 at the inception of the programme.

This test marks an important stage in the new S-3 weapon system's development programme, for which prime contractorship was awarded to AEROSPATIALE's space and ballistic system's division in 1973 by the government's missile engineering directorate.

The S-3 represents the second generation of the French SSBS silo-launched strategic ballistic missile system, the original S-2 version of which has been operational since 1971 on the Albion plateau in the Haute Provence region of France.

The solid-fuelled, two-stage S-3 missile features inertial guidance, weighs 26 tons, has a range of more than 3,000 km and carries a 1-megaton thermonuclear warhead derived from that of the M-20 submarine-launched missile which has been operational since early this year. The S-3 also carries new equipment in the upper part of the warhead for greater hardening and improved penetration capability. The first-stage motor is the P 16-902, already used on the previous S-2. This booster has a metal structure and is steered by four swivelling nozzles, each giving a thrust of 55,000 daN. The P-6-Rita-II second-stage motor employs a glass filament-wound structure and is steered by deflection of the jet (freon gas is injected into the divergent section of the nozzle). This upper stage develops 31,000 daN. The guidance, steering and sequential systems use equipment based on the latest technology. Individual units are interconnected *via* a digital bus, a similar type of link being used for dialoguing with the ground-based check-out and automatic testing equipment. The S-3 missile also has many pyrotechnic components, most of them developed by AEROSPATIALE.

The experimental S-3 missile differs from the operational S-3 version only in the addition of a large telemetry post code module (PCM) and monitors more than 450 parameters and includes four 15W. transmitters. The radars on the Landes test-range and the Henri Poincare receiver vessel, operating in

liaison with three onboard transponders, permit accurate reconstruction of the missile's complete trajectory.

AEROSPATIALE's space and ballistic systems division is acting as industrial architect for this weapon system (except for the nuclear warhead, for which prime contractorship is assumed by the French atomic energy commission). Design and production work on the main sub-systems has been apportioned as follows among the division's plants:

System subdivision: prime contractors, project management.

Aquitaine plant: rocket stages, re-entry body, penetration aids module, missile

integration, 2nd-stage motor structure, experimental check-out and test installation.

Cannes plant: instrumentation pack, guidance and steering sequence simulation, using real components, penetration aids.

Les Mureaux plant: jettisonable nosecone protecting the useful load, structures for the first-stage motor, rear skirt, interstage ring.

In all more than six hundred production specialists, technicians and executives are currently cooperating on the development of the S-3 missile at AEROSPATIALE's space and ballistic systems division.

THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY OF THE INDO-PAKISTAN SUBCONTINENT

(610 - 1947)

by

Dr. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi

This book has been highly praised by all authorities on Indo-Muslim history both in the West and the Subcontinent itself.

The first edition was received enthusiastically by competent reviewers, who called it 'erudite', 'authoritative' 'illuminating' and 'interesting'.

Dr. Qureshi has rescued Indo-Muslim history from the courts of monarchs and made the growth of the community, its ideals and successes, its woes and trials the real concern of the historians.



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