MIND IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON

Defence JOURNAL

A MONTHLY MIRROR & DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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Professor Robert G. Wirsing
On

PAKISTAN'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT

India-Pakistan: Myth Of Military Balance



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India-Pakistan: Myth of Military Balance

Since the traumatic events of 1971 and, consequent upon India's armed intervention, the loss of its eastern half to Pakistan, a statistical evaluation of the comparative force levels of India and Pakistan, must draw its rationale more from fancy than fact. In truth, it would be more of a myth-maker's delight than an analyst's problem for the sheer unbridgeable gap that exists in the military mights, actual and potential, of the two countries.

The picture, prior to December 1971 when the Indian army marched into Dacca, East Pakistan's capital city, had not been much different statistically. India had enjoyed, all along, an overall 4:1 superiority practically in all departments of war-making. Pakistan did, however, have several other advantages then that it no longer has. It had been more than double its present size demographically and had over 1,50,000 square miles more to its territory. As a member of Seato and Cento under the overall umbrella of the United States of America it had been much better placed strategically. Additionally it enjoyed a close bilateral security relationship with the US; was looked upon as the "most allied ally" and had been one of the top recipients of the US military assistance unencumbered by the obligations it now has and respects as a member of the Non-aligned Movement (Nam). Pakistan also had a definite edge over India in training and the quality of its striking elements — armour, artillery and the air force (the three Ayes!)—and above all had been an unbeaten country yet.

Pakistan's inherent quantitative disadvantage until 1971 was more than effset by its many qualitative attributes — a high morale, youthful vigour, inborn optimism and an achievement-oriented robust psychology. The making of Pakistan itself had been a great historic achievement that had electrified its people with a rare energy and euphoria that lasted much in its pristine form until the 1971 disaster.

Pakistan's military posture until 1971 had been vigorously responsive to an outside threat—based on the quick and effective deployment of its land and air forces for strategic penetration into the attacker's territory. For a country with its vital communication lines running from north to south and with very little strategic depth only such a positive posture would be meaningful. It made its neighbours — India and Afghanistan — treat it with respect militarily. While India never had any reason to be afraid of Pakistan for the constant weight of numbers being on its side, it did, nevertheless betray an awe of Pakistan and thought several times over before actually coming to grips with it.

The long period of gestation and actual fighting (Rann of Kutch, Kashmir etc.) preceding

the Indian invasion of Pakistan on September 6, 1965, should illustrate the point quite eloquently. Between January (when things in the Rann of Kutch started moving) right upto the D-day on 6 September, Pakistan's positive military posture kept India at bay despite the latter's undisguised aggressive posture and many an express threat. Pakistan managed to pin India down on its side mainly on account of its own tactical superiority flowing from its considerable, (though largely borrowed and hence not easily replaceable) fire-power and first-line mobility. India would not attack Lahore until its frontline forces in southern Kashmir were routed and its military honour was put at stake.

It is extremely doubtful if, in a scenario of long wait similar to the one preceding the '65 war, India would still be as patient with Pakistan as before. Besides other factors favouring India (infinitely larger stocks of sophisticated arms, more men under arms and a higher morale etc.) it can also concentrate more forces in less time all along the (West) Pakistan border unlike the past when there was also the eastern front to reckon with. East Pakistan, even while it seemed just to sit and watch as in 1965, did nevertheless play an active role in tieing up India's land, air and naval forces in substantial strength. In 1971 it even took the main brunt until the surrender pinning down some ten Indian divisions, around 16 of its air combat squadrons (or practically one third of its force) and an equal portion of its naval arm. That advantage is no longer available to Pakistan. In a future conflict, therefore it will have to take the full brunt of the three-dimensional Indian land, air and naval attack. The geostrategic situation, following the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan, has also altered greatly to India's advantage. At a time of its own choosing, India could seek and provoke a military encounter with Pakistan in collaboration with Soviet Union either in an undisguised mode or in the garb of Afghanistan.

What operational role the Soviet Union (or its surrogate Afghanistan) assigns itself would depend on its own strategic convenience. It could nonetheless confront Pakistan with a two-theatre situation without the advantage of a diversionary or an alternative home base as in East Pakistan and with a different and bigger adversary to face in each theatre. In other words, it would be virtually in a nutcracker with little room for tactical or strategic manoeuvre.

Even with powerful foreign friends like the United States and its own ability to absorb the immediate shock of the invasion, Pakistan's military power is expressly not designed to sustain prolonged operation simultaneously on its eastern and western fronts. Physical US intervention can be hopefully looked forward to; but its actual materialization would depend entirely on the strategic interest and the convenience of the US itself. Besides, it would not be without a heavy price tag attaching to it in terms of Pakistan's own security as well as in the context of world peace. What damage Pakistan would have already suffered by the time the US comes physically to its rescue, is also difficult to foretell. Neither could any definite prediction be made about the nature and extent of the Soviet reaction to a US involvement on Pakistan side. The grass nonetheless bleeds when elephants fight.

The threats that Pakistan faces along its eastern and western borders are indeed too big to be squarely and effectively tackled by military means alone. Critics of Pakistan's arms modernization programme often use this as an argument against the US military

sales to Pakistan. The argument certainly has a weight. The question is: what then Pakistan must do? Should it disarm and disband its military forces and turn a blind eye to the on-going arms build-ups in and around the subcontinent? Or should it tailor its threat perception according to the strategic formulations of India and Soviet Union, in other words, agree to play the second or the third fiddle to its powerful neighbours?

Even the harshest Indian critics of Pakistan's force modernization programme concede that ever since 1971, Pakistan's military forces had been in a state of non-modernization. These forces must stay reasonably well-armed and well-trained if they have to stay at all. One could perhaps make a case for total disarmament or mutual and balanced force reductions in South Asia with greater logic and justification than for a one-sided exercise in this behalf. However, only the stronger party could initiate such a process. There is no such thing as unilateral disarmament except through a military defeat.

The Soviet Union itself had been Pakistan's principal armourer, after China, since the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966. At the height of the Soviet-Pakistan friendly relations in the first half of 1969, the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grecko officially visited Pakistan at the head of a high-powered military delegation. He was reported as saying that Pakistan should be strengthened against its "enemies". In response to Indian questioning, wrote Robert C. Horn in his *Soviet-Indian Relations:* (Praeger, p. 31) the Soviet Embassy in Pakistan confirmed that Grecko had said those words.

During the same visit, according to Horn, the deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Navy, Vice-Admiral N.I. Smirnov, stated at an official dinner that a strong Pakistan Navy "would be a powerful precondition for peace in this part of the Indian Ocean." One could turn round and ask if as a major Indian Ocean littoral, Pakistan is still a "precondition"—even if not as powerful as before — for peace in the Indian Ocean? And if it is, as by the blunt fact of geography it is, must it not be armed to ensure its own defence and make its due contribution to regional security. An inadequately armed Pakistan would be an inadequately-defended Pakistan in a region accounting for the bulk of the global arms trade. The whole of the Middle East is arming; the Gulf states are arming themselves to the teeth with some of the costliest Western hardware; Iran and Iraq—the latter particularly—keep refuelling the engines of war with some of the latest weapons from everywhere and anywhere; Afghanistan is being flooded with the most advanced Soviet conventional arms. India itself is shopping around feverishly for sophisticated weapons in addition to license-producing such advanced weapons as the Soviet T. 72 tanks, MiGs-23 and -27, French Alouette helicopters, the Anglo-French Jaguar, *Leander*-class frigates and *Osa*-class fast attack craft each fitted with four surface-to-surface Styx missiles—to name just a few from the long list of such weapons.

According to the *SIPRI Yearbook 1983*, India stands fourth in a rank ordering of 20 largest Third World major-weapons importing countries for the years 1978 to 1982 (the picture remains materially unchanged to-date — parenthesis added) accounting for 6.5% of total Third World arms imports. Pakistan with the world's ninth largest population and tenth largest armed force (1983) did not appear on the list at all.

A publication of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980* (pp. 93-104) estimates India's arms

imports during this period at $3.76 billion almost two-and-a-half times greater than Pakistan's arms imports valued at $1.54 billion.

Among other countries of the region Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, UAE, and Kuwait are noted for the highest per capita spending on defence. On the whole the Middle East, including the Gulf countries, are the main recipient of arms receiving 42% of all arms transfers and 51% of the total transfers to developing countries. This then is a broad-brush picture of the security environment of the region and Pakistan is right in the middle of the turbulent scene. A certain amount of defence preparedness — even if the threats be too big to tackle effectively — would be absolutely unavoidable therefore and consistent with the military demands of national security and self-respect. The magnitude of a looming strategic threat cannot be used as an argument for an abject surrender before a good fight — simply because it is too big.

While the adverse Indian reaction to the limited inflow of US arms into Pakistan is not at all difficult to understand in a historical perspective it is hard to appreciate in the contemporary context. Foreign arms to Pakistan have always been India's bugbear. They have been grist to the mills of its top politicians who would use it endlessly in their public statements to conjure up grave imaginary threats of a Pakistani invasion.

Viewed in the context of the Pakistan's foreign arms supply connections, India-Pakistan equation might have been the same as it was in the mid 50's and the late 60's. In the 50's it had been the US arms while in the 60's Soviet arms for Pakistan that provoked much anger and frustration on the Indian side.

The Nehru-Bogra (Mohammad Ali, prime minister of Pakistan, 1953-55) correspondence makes many a pointed reference to the extension of US military aid to Pakistan. In one of his letters (S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 220) Nehru poignantly observed: "An expansion of Pakistan's war resources can only be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger. Such a step is not compatible with true independence. It imperils the freedom of Asian countries and brings in the intervention of a foreign power in Asia. . ."

Addressing the Lok Sabha on 23 December (1953), Nehru said that, if a Western country gives military aid to an Eastern country, the past history of Asia comes up before him, "the history of colonial domination creeping here and establishing itself". US military aid to Pakistan, he said, would upset the existing 'equilibrium' and the whole of Pakistan becomes a military base. He also regarded United States military aid to Pakistan as a form of intervention in Indo-Pakistani problems. On 2 January 1954 the Indian leader went so far as to describe American aid to Pakistan as a step toward war, even world war!"

Coming events showed how wrong Nehru was. Neither Pakistan turned into an American base nor the US military aid led to a world war. Though a man of vision, Nehru, like most Indian leaders, would often let political prejudice and animus colour his sobre judgement of Pakistan. As for the fear of "creeping colonialism," Nehru had to eat his words when, during and immediately after the Sino-Indian conflict he welcomed not only western military assistance but the actual participation of some of its technical military personnel, US air force pilots in particular, in a number of operations.

That was Nehru in the 50's. In the late 60's when the Soviet-Pakistan relations touched a level of friendly understanding quite unprecedented before or since, India reacted once again much in the same manner. What annoyed India especially in the budding Soviet-Pakistan relationship was the selfsame element of arms supplies to Pakistan.

By then Nehru's daughter Mrs. Indira Gandhi had donned her father's mantle as the prime minister of India. She also took a leaf from her father's political handbook and reacted to the Soviet arms supply programme for Pakistan much in the same way as her father and predecessor had in the case of the US military aid to Pakistan some fifteen years ago. Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly warned that an "unavoidable consequence" of the Soviet arms aid to Pakistan "would be to accentuate tension in the subcontinent to add to our responsibility in regard to defence and security of our country." (*The Statesman*, July 3, 1980).

Mrs. Gandhi noted a "shift in the Soviet thinking ever since the Tashkent Declaration" and sounded quite alarmed by the development. She was joined by other leaders of the major rightwing opposition parties in an orchestrated campaign against Soviet-Pakistan arms supply connection. The Swantantra and the Jan Sangh, rejected Soviet assurances and denounced Moscow's creation of a cold war atmosphere in South Asia.

"When the US could not stop Pakistan from using American arms against India," remarked Jan Sangh leader A.B. Vajpayee, "what was the guarantee that Russia would be able to. . .?"

Mrs. Gandhi herself delivered a sharply worded statement on the floor of the house that, among other things, stated:

"In these circumstances, we cannot but view with concern this further accretion of armed strength to Pakistan. The unavoidable consequence would be to accentuate tension in the subcontinent and to add to our responsibilities in regard to the defence and security of our country. It will make Pakistan even more intransigent than it has been.

"The Soviet Union, like any other country, is entitled to form its own judgement as to where its interests lie and how to promote them. But we are bound to express our misgivings and apprehensions to the Soviet leaders in all frankness. We do not question either the motives or the good faith of the Soviet Union, but we are convinced that this development (arms supply to Pakistan—emphasis added) cannot promote the cause of peace and stability in the subcontinent".

India has shown a remarkable continuity and persistence in its opposition to any arms supply relationship between Pakistan and a foreign power. Its sensitivity on this score acquires an almost pathological obsessiveness and an impassioned intensity permitting of little or no compromise even with such time-tested, traditional and reliable friends as the Soviet Union. A well-defended Pakistan in the Indian strategic formulations is an offensively-poised Pakistan and therefore a standing threat to India.

Twelve years later in the early 80's a similar situation arose after the announcement of $3.2 billion dollar loan package to Pakistan. There had been a spate of strongly

worded statements from the top Indian leaders led by Mrs. Gandhi herself denouncing the US arms agreements with Pakistan. Days before her brutal assassination on 31 October 1984, Mrs. Gandhi, while addressing her military top brass in New Delhi, talked pointedly of the US arms supplies to Pakistan despite India's express concern over that. At another occasion, about the same time, she harped on her favourite "war clouds" theme. She said: "War clouds were looming large on the country's horizon and there was talk of war in the air."

In an obvious reference to Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact, the late prime minister complained: "People who profess to extend a hand of peace are making war preparations and building up stockpiles of sophisticated weapons."

Her son and successor Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi echoed her faithfully in his aggressive campaign against sophisticated weapons being transferred "in our region". Deliveries of sophisticated arms, he argued "leads to several new local and regional tensions which sooner or later, are bound to result in physical conflict. This is not mere speculation. It has immediate relevance to the situation in our region..."

While in Washington on his first official visit as India's prime minister, Mr. Gandhi reportedly talked more of US arms supplies to Pakistan than of any other single subject. He was worried about the matter because "we have to counter it by spending more money by diverting our resources from development." He thought that much of the arms Pakistan got were not of the type that could be used against Afghanistan. In this connection he referred to sea-skimming missile *Harpoon* which he said could not be used in mountains. The subject figured prominently in the various rounds of talks he had with President Reagan.

His defence minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao had been even louder and more blunt in denouncing the US arms sales to Pakistan. To him the policy of 'some' powers in South Asia appeared to be: "Arm Pakistan to bleed India" or "weaken India to strengthen Pakistan."

He asked: "Why has Pakistan been supplied with *Harpoon* missiles?" And then himself went on to answer the question rhetorically: "In my view they really had no answer to it and we will not receive any reply." This implied that India must be in a state of preparedness and could not shut its eyes of its immediate neighbour was being provided with sophisticated weapons beyond its *legitimate* requirements.

Now who is to determine Pakistan's *legitimate* defence requirements? One could easily emotionalize the issue by asking who on earth is India or any other country to decide what is legitimate for Pakistan and what is not to ensure its security according to its own threat perceptions? Such a question, even if rhetorically raised, would be hardly consistent with the sovereignty of Pakistan that would be totally inconceivable without its right to fend for itself in whatever manner it deems fit and at whatever price it can afford. It is simply unfortunate that India should have chosen to remain so absurdly unreasonable in its attitude towards Pakistan's defence preparedness. How can a sawed-off and traumatised Pakistan be greater threat to India than it might ever have been in the past as a united and materially much stronger entity? To what extent in the past did the US and other foreign weaponry help Pakistan in meeting the military challenge except as a

part of a purely defensive effort? The '65 war was a draw, the '71 war an unmixed disaster for Pakistan. The results of the two armed conflicts wholly disproved the Nehruian and Gandhian fears of a successful Pakistani blitzkrieg. One does, however, shudder to think of the shattering impact of a sudden Indian invasion of Pakistan (as of the western wing in 1965 and of the eastern wing in 1971) without the level of defence-preparedness that Pakistan could manage to achieve with the help of foreign arms alone.

As for Pakistan leading the way in the so-called arms race, nothing could be more arbitrarily conjectural and hypothetical than this of-repeated observation. It was never true, wrote Prof. Robert G. Wirsing (The Arms Race in South Asia: Implications For the United States — *Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 3, March 1985*) that Pakistan held all of the initiative in the acquisition of arms and, "it is certainly true that for more than a decade its ability to set the pace has been steadily declining."

Quoting other independent defence analysts, Wirsing wrote: "Admittedly, Pakistan once may have been able to wield the initiative in South Asia's arms rivalry. It is very likely that some major Indian weapon purchases between 1954 and 1958 — British B-58 Canberra bombers and F-56 Hunter fighter aircraft, for example — were made largely in response to reports that Pakistan was to acquire F-86 Sabre fighters and B-57 Canberra bombers from its new US ally. It is certainly true that India's current purchases — such as the Soviet T-72 tank and late-generation MiG fighters — have been made with at least one eye on Pakistan's weapon inventory. . ."

Some Indian defence analysts, Wirsing went on to comment, have sought to *blur* the reality of India's own exercise of the *arms initiative* with the suggestion that (and here he quotes Harpreet Mahajan) "India's arms acquisitions have been to balance the Chinese and Pakistani arms build-up (and to maintain) and equilibrium with its neighbours who possess more sophisticated weaponry.... India's arms acquisitions have been made not with a view to become a military power but sufficiently well equipped to protect its political and economic interests and its long border and coast line."

This does not, however, resolve the question whether India's leaders harbour the wish that India become and is accepted as a military power. According to Wirsing, the argument that the Indian arms purchases of more advanced weaponry by its putative adversaries "does not square very well with the record". New Delhi's negotiations with Moscow in the first half of the 1960s that led to the direct purchase and/or licensed production of literally hundreds of MiG-21 and Su-7B fighter aircraft in the second half of the decade were officially and consistently justified by reference to Pakistan's own new acquisition. In the early and mid 60s they consisted essentially of 12 F-104 Starfighters (nicknamed the widow-maker by the West German pilots for the large number of crashes due to technical failure) and one (loaned) submarine from the US (sunk in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war) and two to three squadrons of the first generation China-made MiG-19 (F-6) fighter-interceptors.

New Delhi began its quest for advanced, offensive weapons while Pakistan had barely recovered from its defeat in 1971. It first finalized the Jaguar (DPSA) deal with Great Britain and then started negotiations with the France for the purchase and subsequent co-production of the high performance Mirage-2000. There is "compelling evidence"

to prove that negotiations for the Mirage-2000 deal were initiated long before the supply of the US F-16 to Pakistan was even heard of. In November 1981 a *New York Times* story datelined Paris reported that Indian officials themselves had "explicitly rejected" any link between the Mirage negotiations—begun in 1979 when Pakistan was again under the cloud of a US arms embargo — and F-16. "Indian diplomats", the *NYT* (November 13, 1981) "said, strongly deny that their interest in buying an advanced combat aircraft has any connection with the Reagan administration's decision to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, India's traditional rival. They say that the Indian Air Force needs the new plane to replace its ageing British-built Hunters and Canberras, and they point out that negotiations with France opened long before the American-Pakistani deal was envisioned".

On 5 April 1983 former Indian Defence Minister R. Venkataraman assured his country's parliament that "the Mirage-2000 being acquired by India was the answer to Pakistan's F-16. The Mirage-2000 was being bought to give confidence to the Indian Air Force 'that we have something which a match to what others have'."

India raised a lot of hue and cry against the sale of F-16 to Pakistan projecting it as a sort of doomsday weapon much in the same fashion as it had, more than 20 years ago, in the case of the transfer of F-104 Starfighter to Pakistan. "The reputedly destabilizing effects of the sale on the Indo-Pakistan military balance," write Rodney W. Jones and Brad Roberts (*Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. VI, No. 3, Spring 1983*), "were questioned by independent defence experts who pointed out that even with F-16 acquisition by Pakistan, Indian air combat superiority would rise from its current ratio of 3:1 to a ratio of 5:1 by 1990."

Now a brief examination of the India-Soviet arms relationship. Moscow "typically" offered its weapons to New Delhi on "exceptionally liberal" terms. They generally consisted of deferred payment in local rupee currency spread over 12 to 17 years with a three- to five- year grace period and at a nominal interest of 2% to 2.5%. *SIPRI Yearbook 1983* also records that Moscow has often treated India as a "privileged" client, on occasion even providing it with weapons in advance of its East European allies. For example it supplied New Delhi with T-72 tank in early 1979 and with the MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft in 1981, in both cases before they had been received by any of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Inclusion of the new multirole MiG-29 Soviet fighter in India's latest arms deal with Moscow further underscores the most-favoured-nation treatment being meted out to India by the Soviet Union. According to the Indian press reports, Moscow agreed in late 1984 to speed up delivery of arms supplies to India including reputedly the world's most advanced combat aircraft MiG-29. That "struck some Indians as particularly eloquent testimony to the growing Soviet strategic stake in the Indian military strength."

In March 1984 (the late) Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Dimitri Ustinov paid an official visit to India as the head of a high-powered military delegation. This prompted the *Times of India* to editorialize that "never before in their dealings with a friendly country, including India, have the Russians ever agreed to the transfer of equipment still being developed within the Soviet Union itself".

In contrast, the US-Pakistan $3.2 billion package agreement of military sales and

economic aid would look a rather sedate and modest affair. It was hammered out in such a way as to exclude the concessional credit element from military sales. The loans obtained for the purpose had been at the market-related rate of 14% with a grace period of seven to 10 years. The repayment period would span over 30 years. It is also to be noted that the new US-Pakistan security equation is not aid-oriented as in the past but based on a cash sale, and long-term credits for these sales.

The sale of some 40 F-16's, over and above the package, would be on a cash-and-carry basis. Besides, the entire package would be subject to annual congressional review and approval for the release of funds for each fiscal year against which arms purchases could be made. In addition to F-16's the FMS (foreign military sales) credits available each year would enable Pakistan to purchase howitzers, TOW missiles, tanks (mostly first generation uprated M-48s), helicopters and other military equipment. The rationale of the military suply relationship is to raise the cost of the potential aggression and to demonstrate that a "strong security relationship exists between the United States and Pakistan that the Soviet Union must take into account in its calculations."

"The projected military assistance levels and provision of F-16's to Pakistan", remarked James L. Buckley, "will not upset the overwhelming *qualitative and quantitative* superiority which India enjoys in the region." For relative force levels one could draw upon the IISS figures (see *Documentation*) that speak for themselves. These however, do not cover the technological lead that India enjoys over Pakistan and which puts India way ahead of the latter and hard to overtake. This is the one Indian weapon to which Pakistan has no ready answer. Pakistan is also outclassed by India in so far as the indigenization of weapons production is concerned. By 1980 there were more than 40 defence plants and some 34 R & D (research and development) units in India to support its drive for military self-sufficiency. India is producing an extensive range of conventional weapons, including practically all of country's requirements for small arms and ammunition plus howitzers, mortars, armoured tanks, transport and high performance fighter aircraft, helicopters, missiles, electronics, communication equipment and a variety of naval warships. In contrast with Pakistan, whose entirely foreign-supplied navy did not include one major surface combatant not considered obsolete by western standards, India's Mazagaon Dockyard at Bombay completed its sixth British-licensed *Leander*-class frigate in 1980, and in 1981 demonstrated its growing maturity in the building of warships by launching the first of three indigenously designed *Godavari*-class guided missile frigates. In 1984, "in yet another display of verstality", the Mazagaon Dockyard was tooling up to produce under German license two or more patrol submarines.

Under the auspices the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), India has made significant progress in rocket and satellite technology, including a successful launch in July 1980 of the Rohini I satellite with an indigeneously produced launch vehicle (SLV). Though New Delhi, officially disclaims any intent to translate rocket and satellite technology into military capability, knowledgeable analysts have concluded that in such areas as reconnaissance, command and control weather forecasting and intermediate range ballistic missiles, India's accomplishment have direct military applicability.

Although the Soviet Union remains India's principal armourer, it has persistently sought to diversify its arms procurement sources — buying only best from whenever and at

whatever price available. Its latest acquisition from France, Britain and West Germany include Mirage-2000, Sea Harriers (to replace the ageing Sea Hawks and Alizes) for its British *Majestic*-class carrier Vikrant and submarines from West Germany in addition to the 8 Soviet *F*-class submarines already in service. It has also recently renewed its bid to persuade US to sell it certain advanced arms. During his recent official visit to US, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, among other things, also carried a long inventory containing such US arms as 155-mm howitzers, .50 caliber heavy machine guns, an improved version of TOW anti-tank missile and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. According to the *Times of India* (14.6.85) India showed interest in anti-submarine sonar systems, sophisticated electronic equipment to be mounted on Indian-made tanks; "sensitive" weapons technologies for its high combat aircraft (LCA) scheduled to be made in Bangalore by 1990. The emphasis in the Indian quest for arms remains on weapon technologies and co-production and not just on outright purchase. Co-production has always figured as the one essential condition in all of India's arms negotiations and deals with foreign countries.

Outnumbering Pakistan in every combat dimension—land—air—and sea—India can seek a comparison with Pakistan only at the risk of looking utterly absurd or quite needlessly uppish. With its existing arsenals of sophisticated weaponry it can hit every single economic and military target in Pakistan. And given Pakistan's size, says Giri Deshingkar (*The Illustrated Weekly of India*, August 5, 1984), each target there is ten times as valuable as an equivalent target in India. As for Pakistan's attack capability it can only be 'miniscule'. It only wishes to live in a "secure environment where its continued survival is ensured and varied threats along its borders are contained".

Nothing could be farther from the mind of the Pakistan strategic planners than the thought of ever competing with India militarily. As for its defence-preparedness, Pakistan alone is to decide what is legitimate for it and what is not.

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Pakistan's Security Predicament

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This paper examines the debate over Pakistan's current security situation. It takes the view that events in Southwest Asia in recent years have created a geopolitical environment exceptional not only for the dangers it poses for Pakistani security decision-making but also for its great instability, complexity and unpredictability. It is an environment in which a deliberately ambiguous, quasi-neutralist policy of conflict avoidance and controlled cooperation with neighbours, potential allies and adversaries, inevitably appeal as an alternative to the leaders of a weak and vulnerable state. Neither the Internalist nor the Externalist camp has taken sufficient account of the pressures exerted on Islamabad to avoid unqualified commitment to either *of them. Accordingly, analysis too faithful to one or the other of these two reigning perspectives, both of which rest on relatively inflexible geopolitical understandings, may not be much help in assessing Islamabad's perception of the threats to Pakistan's security or in recommending the steps Pakistan's leaders (military or civilian) should take to meet them. The purpose of this paper is to argue the need for a new perspective. Two general problems are considered: (1) How severe is the threat to Pakistan's security and what is its source? and (2) What is the best remedy for Pakistan's security predicament, and to whom should it turn for support?*

Prof. Wirsing wrote his paper in 1982. Excerpt for minor statistical variations, however, some of his formulations are still as fresh and thought-provoking as at the time of writing. The paper appears in a collective study: **The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985).**

The author's views are not necessarily those of *Defence Journal.*

Providing for Pakistan's security has always been a formidable challenge for the country's policymakers. Until the loss of Bangladesh in 1971, they lived uneasily with the militarily perplexing fact that Pakistan's geographically-separated eastern wing was virtually indefensible. Even in what remains of Pakistan, efforts to

unify its disparate peoples and to consolidate its hold over Muslim-majority areas have been frustrated by Afghan rejection of the boundary inherited from the British in the northwest, by the separatist demands of the Baluch tribal minority resident in the southwest, and, above all, by the denial of Pakistan's own claim on the Indian-held portion of Kashmir in the northeast. Having won independence against the will of the subcontinent's Hindu majority, Pakistan's over-whelmingly Muslim population lives with the nagging suspicion that a revanchist India conspires, if not at Pakistan's *dismemberment*, at least at its *disablement*. Pakistanis look back upon three wars with India, the last of them a humiliating catastrophe, and a major tribal rebellion in Baluchistan. Soviet combat forces are now positioned on their northwestern border; Soviet-equipped Indian combat forces are deployed along their entire eastern border. In view of all this, they would appear to have continuing reason to feel apprehensive in regard to the future.

Although it is generally accepted that Pakistan's security situation is not without worrisome aspects, there has been very little agreement among analysis, in fact, as to just how threatened Pakistan really is or as to the precise nature of the threat. As a result, there has been little uniformity in the remedies proposed. Instead, we have seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of Islamabad's situation, each predicated on dissimilar assumptions about the threats facing Pakistan and about the proper way to meet them. No tidy categorization can do full justice to these rival analytic perspectives, for their logic is generally complex and they sometimes overlap one another.

'Internalists' *V.* 'Externalists'. One way to look at them, however, is to distinguish between those analysts who hold that Pakistan's problem is basically *internal*, i.e., that its vulnerability is mainly a reflection of unresolved domestic political and socio-economic problems, and those convinced that the difficulty is largely *external* i.e., that Pakistan's vulnerability is a reflection of powerful outside pressures on the country which cannot be alleviated without aid of countervailing pressures also from the outside. At bottom, the Internalist perspective places major responsibility for the country's security dilemmas on Pakistan itself, to a large extent on its military elite, which has from an early point in the country's history frustrated development of stable parliamentary political institutions and instead served as guardian of a highly inequitable social and political order. In the rulers' strident militarism lies much of the blame for Pakistan's implacable resistance to an accommodation with India, whose own military expansion, according to this perspective, is a reluctant reaction to Pakistan's Interalists typically maximize the importance of domestic reforms, of the restoration of civilian political institutions, and of the accommodation of the country's religious, ethno-linguistic and tribal minorities, and customarily plead that the external threat is exaggerated by Islamabad to pacify the military constituency and to divert attention from internal decay. An *intraregional* and *bilateral* (i.e., India-Pakistan) framework for resolving disputes is preferred by advocates of this point of view over one involving *extraregional* (i.e., superpower) forces in affairs of the subcontinental and Indian Ocean area. The Externalist perspective, in contrast, places the larger burden of responsibility for Pakistan's predicament on Pakistan's foreign adversaries (or on its unreliable allies). It tends to minimize the urgency, utility or feasibility of domestic reforms while maximizing both the severity of the external threat to Pakistan represented by the Soviet Union and, at least in some analyses, also by India as well as the degree to which external (*extraregional*)

assistance, especially military assistance, may help to assure Pakistan's security. Pakistan's Islamic identity, its ties to the Middle East and, ultimately, its "Washington connection" are important elements in this perspective.

Unavoidably, these perspectives on Pakistan's particular predicament have become entangled in Partisan policy debates over global strategic issues. In the United States, the Internalist orientation has generally been associated with political doves, the Externalist perspective with their hawkish adversaries. The Externalist point of view has had the official backing of the Reagan administration, but the Internalist position has commanded considerable influence among academics and clearly has had strong allies in Congress and throughout the bureaucracy. The Externalist perspective, for obvious reasons, has been the one publicly favored in governing circles in Islamabad; the Internalist position has naturally been more strongly supported in New Delhi.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

"Most of Pakistan's security problems, and the haunting sense of insecurity of the country's rulers," according to K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, "are inherent in the nature of the Pakistani state and the relationship between rulers and ruled. India, he claims, "can do nothing about it."[1] In an essay on the subcontinent's growing nuclear rivalry, Onkar Marwah advances essentially the same thesis. "The real dangers to the continuance of the Pakistani state are internally generated." he writes, "and they seem to possess a life of their own irrespective of any malicious Indian intent."[2] The "dangers" Marwah points to are the "strong disintegrative forces" at work in Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province, and the Sind, areas which "comprise 70 percent of the territory of Pakistan and 40 percent of its population." Militarized and lacking political institutions routinely responsive to political protest. Pakistan cannot cope with these forces as well as India. With the Soviet Union now opportunely positioned on the Pakistan border, the probability grows that it "may soon arrogate the incentive to stoke the resentments of strongly disaffected minority communities in Pakistan, beginning with the Baluchis and the Pasthuns." According to Marwah, "India remains, at least territorially with respect to Pakistan, a *status quo* power." In contrast, "a nuclear-armed Pakistan threatened with disintegration, led by a fundamentalist military leadership, fearful of collusive action by the Soviet Union and India, and suspicious of the staying power of western states in the region, would be a very unpredictable and therefore a dangerous Pakistan."[3]

Both of these authors appear to be taking the position that Pakistan is itself the greatest threat to its own security. This argument, characteristic of the Internalist point of view, implies that whatever *external* threat there is to Pakistan can be significantly controlled by taking steps towards *internal* political liberalization. Selig Harrison, one of the most forceful exponents of the Internalist orientation, is especially adamant on this point. He argues that Islamabad could significantly reduce the Soviet threat on its borders by accommodating the demands of disaffected elements of its population, most especially by granting greater autonomy to the tribal inhabitants of its vast province of Baluchistan. The "steady growth of Baluch discontent in Pakistan and Iran," he reasons,

> —offers the Soviet Union an increasingly attractive opportunity. Though not yet disposed to act, Moscow might be tempted to manipulate Baluch national-

ism if an anti-Soviet leadership comes to power in Tehran or if Islamabad continues to upgrade its military ties to Beijing and Washington. Moscow can afford to bide its time in deciding whether to play its Baluch card as long as Pakistani and Iranian leaders fail to make meaningful moves toward political settlements with the Baluch. Conversely, should Baluch leaders reach an accommodation with either Islamabad or Tehran or both, the Baluch issue would no longer tempt Moscow, since the Soviet Union would find it difficult to organize an effective insurgency and legitimate an independent Baluchistan in the absence of strong Baluch nationalist support.[4]

Externalists take a different view of the situation since, for them, the Soviet appetite for expansion exists independently of conditions within neighboring states (indeed, Moscow *creates* the conditions suited to its strategic goals where they do not already exist). W. Scott Thompson, an outspoken advocate of the Externalist perspective, takes the position, for example, that Moscow, whether or not it has a "master plan" for territorial aggrandizement, is clearly expansionist and "that it is basic Soviet strategy to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean."[5] That being the case, the real question, for him, is not *if* but *how* the Soviets intend to get there. As is commonly supposed, they could choose to lunge directly through Iran. Alternatively, Thompson suggests,

> perhaps the Soviets would conclude that it was less dangerous—and in some ways more promising—to move south by way of Baluchistan. That region of Pakistan is now isolated, between a sullen India and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. As long as so much of Pakistan's armor is facing eastward, she cannot promise enough of a fight to deter a Soviet invasion even briefly. Military conquest of Baluchistan—the irredentist Pakistani region lying between Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean—would not be overwhelmingly complicated.[6]

Islamabad's offer of an olive branch to the Baluch nationalists, if "it is Soviet policy," as Lawrence Ziring maintains, "to destroy Zia, to pacify Afghanistan, and ultimately to rearrange the political geography of the region,"[7] would hardly suffice to stem the haemorrhaging in Pakistan's security situation.

Very few observers, including those basically sympathetic to Pakistan, would disagree with the judgment that Pakistan is weakened by distrust among its ethnic minorities, or that some of its leaders since 1947 have responded to demands for liberal reforms at times with studies indifference, at other times (clearly in Bangladesh) with savage repression, and at still other times with sheer incompetence. And there is no doubt a relationship of some magnitude between Pakistan's domestic political malaise and its external security. There is no denying, therefore, that there is substance in the Internalist argument that Islamabad's security problem is in some measure of Islamabad's making. No matter how deeply ingrained in the modern Soviet mentality may be the ancient Russian imperialist urge to the sea,[8] there is no denying, either, that Soviet-baiting Externalists have sometimes squeezed more than the evidence warranted from the "warm water" thesis. On the other hand, the possibility exists that Pakistan's security may be made excessively contingent on internal as opposed to external threats. One wonders, for example, whether the "Baluch card"—the direct or indirect manipulation of Baluch nationalism by Moscow to achieve Soviet strategic objectives—is given more emphasis in the

analyses of Internalists than it gets in Soviet strategic planning.

Baluch Card: Cantours. Baluchistan, a region of roughly 200,000 square miles overlapping parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, has obvious potential as a Soviet corridor to the Arabian Sea. Occupying the 300 or so miles lying between Soviet-dominated Afghanistan and the Makran coast, Baluchistan possesses several natural (though undeveloped) harbours, a 700 mile long coastline overlooking the vital maritime approaches to the Persian Gulf, and—of equal importance perhaps—a small but to some extent politically alienated population of semi-nomadic tribals.[9] The Pakistani Baluch, the most numerous and politically mobilized element, have mounted at least three insurrections against the central government of Pakistan, the last one (1973-1977) by far the longest, the most widespread, and the costliest, for both the Baluch and Islamabad.[10] The Baluch have deep grievances against the Punjabi elite which rules Pakistan; and there are today several thousand armed and trained Baluch guerrillas based in southern Afghanistan which could presumably be used by Moscow to create trouble for the Pakistanis.

As a resource available for Moscow's manipulation, Baluch nationalism is considerably less useful, I think, than is often argued. The nationalist movement is of recent origin, hardly antedating the late 1950s, and it remains organizationally weak and fragmented. A sense of common Baluch identity seems to exist, but it cannot be said that the fifteen or twenty major Baluch tribes of Pakistan—some of which have engaged in long and violent blood feuds[11]—have been welded into a common political instrument. Two key nationalist leaders are in exile; others have been executed, imprisoned or harassed into submission. With a great deal of foreign assistance, Islamabad has provided handsome economic incentives (along with titles and political appointments) to those willing to go along with Islamabad. Regular and paramilitary forces are deployed in Baluchistan at a level considerably greater than a decade ago. Almost a half million Afghan (mainly Pashtun) refugees, by tradition, religion and recent experience friendly neither to the Soviets nor to Baluch nationalism, have joined their already numerous co-ethnics in the northern districts of Baluchistan, forming a rather substantial phalanx against Soviet manipulation of Baluch disaffection. The thesis that Pakistan's internal ethnic discord supplies Moscow with a potent "Baluch card" suffers the additional defect that a significant element of its putative Baluch force—the seasoned Baluch guerrillas located in southern Afghanistan—is highly vulnerable to reprisal from the Afghan *mujahideen*.

Baluch nationalists continue to send out signals that another armed Baluch uprising is imminent, and to hint that this time it will have the support of the Soviet Union.[12] So far, however, we have no more than unconfirmed reports of Soviet-aided activity in Pakistani Baluchistan. The escalation of such activity, especially as a device for relieving the situation in Afghanistan, remains a distinct possibility, of course. Unfortunately, so long as the possibility for Soviet interference exists, the concession of greater autonomy for the Baluch seems very remote. Ironically, the truth of the matter may be that the Baluch are more threatened by Islamabad than a threat to it.

If Pakistan's internal situation seems to me to be relatively *less* dangerous (to Islamabad) than it appears to others, Pakistan's external environment seems a bit *more* dangerous. The explanation for this is to be found in the profound

political and military transformation of Pakistan's regional environment occurring since the loss of Bangladesh. One aspect of this transformation, the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty at the end of 1978, had at least two negative implications for Pakistan. Firstly, it meant the loss of its former Cento and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) partner, an old ally who had buttressed Pakistan with material and moral support in its 1965 war with India and in its struggle against the Baluch guerrillas in the 1970s.[13] Secondly, it created a vast area of uncertainty to the immediate west of Pakistan, placing in jeopardy what had been the country's most secure border and, in general, posing a new threat to Pakistan's security. On the one hand, the turmoil in Iran raised the possibility of a potentially Soviet-backed leftist takeover in Teheran, on the other, of religious upheaval spreading to Pakistan's own right-wing Islamic militants.[14]

The Communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 and subsequent Soviet military intervention in December 1979 had even more traumatic consequences for Pakistan's external security environment. On the positive side, from Islamabad's standpoint, it meant that whatever reservations the United States had with respect to reviving its former close security relationship with Pakistan were soon to be set aside. That meant, in turn, that Pakistan would qualify for major assistance in the modernization of its armed forces. An unwelcome and immediately threatening consequence, on the other hand, has been the introduction of Soviet armed forces into the area adjacent to Pakistan, and, stemming from that, frequent violations of Pakistani air and ground space by Soviet/Afghan forces.[15] Of greatest significance for Pakistan, however, is the fact that Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gives every indication of becoming a permanent feature in Pakistan's security environment. Pakistanis can only guess at Moscow's long range intentions in the area; the fact is, however, that the Soviets have deployed roughly 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and are backing them up with some of the most sophisticated weapons in their arsenal.[16] Like India, Pakistan now has powerful and arguably hostile forces on two of its borders and, since those forces are allied by a treaty with potential defense implications, a war on two fronts to worry about.

A third aspect of the transformation in Pakistan's security environment stems from London's decision in the late 1960s to relinquish responsibility for guarding the maritime approaches to the Persian Gulf. Its decision sparked a competition for naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both now have large and growing naval squadrons permanently on station in the area; both have invested enormously in a whole range of diplomatic, economic and military initiatives throughout the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asian region designed to acquire naval and air staging bases and support facilities; and both appear to be well along in their efforts to integrate the Indian Ocean region into their global strategic-military planning.[17] US undertakings probably provoke an ambivalent response among the men who rule Pakistan, giving comfort while at the same time reminding them of their country's dependence on and vulnerability to American power. But the fact that Moscow's naval power might one day be used to augment the naval forces of its South Asian ally India naturally evokes even stronger misgivings in Islamabad.[18]

Few would dispute that these developments to the north, west and south of Pakistan pose extraordinary challenges to its security planners. Few would dispute,

either, that the military power of Pakistan's large neighbor to the east also contributes to its security problems. About the precise dimensions, dynamics and trends in the military balance between Pakistan and India there is, however, enormous controversy. How one resolves that controversy, I suspect, is the real key to one's definition of Pakistan's security predicament.

Indian Formulations. In an article published in May 1982, Professor Mohammed Ayoob, taking a basically Internalist position, argues that New Delhi's arms acquisitions have mainly been a reaction to Islamabad's, and that Pakistan, in fact, has much less to fear from India than is sometimes alleged. The claim that India has radically altered the balance of power with Pakistan is, according to Ayoob, a myth. While conceding that Indian armed forces have maintained a qualitative edge over Pakistan during the past decade, in the same period, he argues, Pakistan has expanded its forces quantitatively much more rapidly than India. Given that India has a far longer border to defend, and much greater distances to cover to move troops to wartime stations, "the actual deployable capacity in terms of ground forces of the two sides at the beginning of another round of Indo-Pakistani hostilities," he asserts, "would be roughly equivalent. Therefore, New Delhi's current self-image as the preeminent power in the subcontinent and the defender of the *status quo* in the region," in Ayoob's judgment, "is based on little more than the modest, although fast-eroding, qualitative edge that it possesses over Pakistan in terms of military equipment, and particularly aircraft."[19]

Externalists draw rather different conclusions from their reading of the comparative arms tables. For one thing, they judge India's arms build-up of the past two decades to have been far less reactive, motivated more by India's own ambitions than by any threat from Pakistan. "It is quite apparent," observes Leo Rose in a recent article on Pakistan's regional outlook, "that India is already involved in a substantial military modernization program of its own that has little or nothing to do with developments in Pakistan."[20] For another, and in contrast to Professor Ayoob's assessment, they find Pakistan quite vulnerable indeed to Indian power. "Indian superiority in conventional arms is unquestioned," writes Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "and Pakistanis believe that in 1981 it stood at approximately fifteen-to-one in India's favour." While she concedes that "a more accurate ratio, that can be gleaned from third-party estimates of Indo-Pakistani armaments, is approximately half that, i.e., eight-to-one in India's favour,"[21] Tahir-Kheli leaves no doubt that India, in her view, holds far more than a "modest" edge over Pakistan.

Given the variety and complexity of modern weapons systems; the secrecy and ambiguity which surround weapons capabilities, transfers and deployments; the frequent changes in arms inventories; the fact that arms drawn from different foreign suppliers are in many instances not readily comparable; the broad range of variables, extending from weather and terrain characteristics to the availability of spare parts, influencing military capabilities; and the enormous policy implications of even a slight shift in the perception of a rival's military capability, it is no wonder that estimates of the arms balance in South Asia are invariably controversial. Any number of military and non-military factors, quantitative and qualitative, can plausibly be introduced into the equation either to increase or decrease the magnitude of the disparity between overall Indian and Pakistani military strength.[22]

TABLE 1—Armed Forces of India and Pakistan, 1983-84

	India	Pakistan
Population ..	723,500,000	89,500,000
Total armed forces ..	1,120,000	478,600
GDP (est., 1981-82) ..	$160.6 billion	$31.0 billion
Defence expend. (est., 1982/83) ..	$5.55 billion	$1.80 billion
Army ..	960,000	450,000
Divisions ..	31	18
Infantry ..	18	16
Armored ..	2	2
Mechanized ..	1	
Mountain ..	10	
Indep infantry brigades ..	7	5
Indep armored brigades ..	5	4
Medium tanks ..	2,100	1,321
Navy ..	47,000	11,000
Major surface combatants ..	44	12
Submarines ..	8	11
Naval combat aircraft ..	36 (plus 26 combat hel)	3 (plus 10 combat hel)
Air Force ..	113,000	17,600
Combat aircraft ..	727	259

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1983-1984* (London, 1983).

Though very few would accept Tahir-Kheli's 8:1 ratio, professional analysts do not really contest the fact that in most categories India at the moment holds an overall *quantitative* lead in conventional arms. The simple numerical ratio of Indian to Pakistani forces, according to the reasonably authoritative estimate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, stands at about 2.5:1 in total military manpower, almost 2:1 in medium tanks, over 3:1 in surface warships, and between 2.5:1 and 3:1 in combat aircraft.[23]

Looming over these figures, however, is the vast uncertainty which arises not only from differences in the assessment of standard capabilities but from the rapid introduction into the arsenals of *both* India and Pakistan of large quantities of new weapons, many of them technologically highly advanced. This dynamic and destabilizing element of the military balance is apparent in practically every category of the two countries' armed forces. It is especially apparent in respect to tactical aircraft.

India's Arms Acquisitions. India's acquisition in 1978 of the low-flying Anglo-French deep penetration strike aircraft, the Jaguar, meant that virtually every significant military target in Pakistan was, for the first time, made vulnerable to Indian bomber aircraft.[24] That acquisition has been countered, of course, by Islamabad's purchase of 40 US-manufactured F-16 fighter-bombers which, with their speed, manoeuvrability, advanced avionics and long range capability, clearly give Islamabad an effective reply to the Jaguar. The opinion is widely shared that "on an aircraft-for-aircraft basis," the F-16s are "qualitatively superior to any in the Indian inventory."[25] At the same time, Pakistan is also considerably enlarging its Mirage fleet. In late December 1982, Islamabad announced that it had added 32 more Mirage 5s to its combat aircraft inventory, these equipped with the air-to-surface Exocet missiles that had proven devastating against British warships in the Falklands war.[26]

On balance, however, Islamabad appears in spite of all these acquisitions to have purchased only modest increments to its security. India promply responded to Pakistan's F-16 purchase by closing a deal with France to acquire an equal number of Mirage 2000s, an aircraft with perhaps equally impressive performance characteristics. Moreover, by the end of 1982 India was in possession of several squadrons of freshly-minted MiG-23 fighter-bombers. Thirty-six of these were reportedly deployed in Rajasthan on the border with Pakistan, adding measurably to India's already formidable deep-strike capability.[27] No less distrubing, from Islamabad's point of view, was the announcement in April 1983 that India was acquiring the MiG-27, the most sophisticated fighter-ground attack aircraft in the Soviet arsenal.[28]

The tit-for-tat race for qualitative advantage in weapons is equally evident in ground force procurements, with both countries busily upgrading their armor, artillery, and helicopter assault/attack capabilities. It is evident, too, in regard to naval acquisitions, where increasing numbers of modern, long-range missile-equipped surface combatants and attack submarines promise to give both navies enhanced credibility.

A significant aspect of all this is that India and Pakistan are rapidly moving beyond the point where revealing comparisons of military capability could be made on the basis of a simple count of military manpower or any other readily quantifiable indicator. They both have entered the enchanted and somewhat uncharted world of high-technology weaponry in a major way, considerably clouding the military balance now prevailing between them. Nevertheless, in a technology-oriented race India, with its growing experience in the manufacture and assembly of sophisticated weapons and weapons-components, has some obvious advantages. Under a variety of licensing agreements with foreign governments, it is already producing or is scheduled to produce high-performance combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks, frigates and submarines. The $1.6 billion Soviet military assistance package agreed to with India in 1980 reportedly included co-production rights to the MiG-23; and the Soviets are said to have offered to give India license to produce indigenously the MiG-27.[29] In October 1982, the Indian Defence Ministry made the portentous announcement that the first Indian-assembled Jaguar had joined the Indian Air Force.[30] Pakistan, with a comparatively very small domestic arms production industry, can keep pace with India only by importing equally sophisticated weapons, at great cost, from abroad. Its determination in this regard shows no signs of slackening. In November 1982,

Islamabad gave a rather stunning display of its intent to contest for each inch of technical advantage when it startled Washington with its much-publicized refusal to take delivery of the first six F-16s until they were equipped with the vital ALR-69 electronics counter-measure package routinely installed in the Nato-class version of the aircraft.[31]

Intensified Arms Race. What, then, can one safely conclude about the military balance in South Asia? In the first place, there can be no doubt that we are witnessing an intensified arms race between India and Pakistan, and that it involves the acquisition of weapons enabling these ancient and predominantly agrarian societies to fight a very modern and lethal species of warfare. At the moment, the competition is largely confined to conventional weapons; but India's detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, its progress in the mastery of missile technology,[32] and Pakistan's almost frantic efforts to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability,[33] all point to the further "nuclearization" and even more radical transformation of the military situation in South Asia.[34] In the second place, while India, with its far greater resources and natural advantages, would seem destined to come out ahead, for the moment there can be no precise reckoning of the magnitude of its preponderance. In recent years, the opinion has been widely shared among professional observers that "the overall India-Pakistan military balance has grown progressively adverse from Pakistan's point of view since the 1965 conflict, . . .," that "on the whole India's forces are better equipped and employ more modern technology, . . .," and that, in spite of some qualitative advantages in Pakistan's favour, India currently "seems to be moving towards a qualitative and quantitative break out."[35] Washington's approval of a $3.2 billion force modernization package for Pakistan late in 1981 has raised some doubt about this judgment, for it is quite apparent that Pakistan, in spite of its weaker position, is determined to resist the trend. Indeed, the realization in Islamabad that Pakistan may be losing ground militarily undoubtedly feeds long-held suspicion of Indian intentions and prompts Pakistan's leaders to take even bolder steps to forestall further deterioration in the balance.

None of the foregoing discussion should be understood to imply that Pakistan's security situation might not be benefited by domestic political reforms. One thing seems clear, however: Pakistan's *external* environment has too many patently unhealthy symptoms for it to be judged anything but dangerous. On its northwestern borders, Pakistan houses the world's largest refugee population, the catastrophic result of a long and deadly war to which there is no forseeable end. Its neighbor to the west, engaged in a vicious war of its own with Iraq seems to teeter on the brink of political chaos. To the east, the military might of nuclear-capable India seems to be edging towards unchallengeable supremacy. Even the ocean, to the south, presents Pakistan with the spectre of increasing — and potentially unfriendly — militarization. Against all this, internal political reforms, though unquestionably desirable in their own right, might not go very far to reduce the danger.

The danger to Pakistan cannot be waved away, either, by the assertion, so often a part of Internalist arguments, that India is a status quo *power and that, in spite of the size of its armed forces, it poses no military threat to Pakistan.*[36] *The unpleasant truth is that* status quo *regimes, when their interests are at stake, do not hesitate to interfere with and, if necessary, to attack their smaller neighbors. Defensive motivations may find aggressive outlets.*

A government should not be considered irrational if it steels itself against that possibility.

THE REMEDY

When it comes to a remedy for Pakistan's security predicament, Internalists differ with Externalists basically in the emphasis placed on the possibility and desirability of insulating South Asia from global strategic rivalries. Accordingly, while Internalists attach great virtue to the quest for genuine non-alignment and for an autonomous and concerted South Asian role in international politics, Externalists profess skepticism for these objectives, seeing in the pattern of Indian policy over the years less a quest for regional *autonomy* than a drive for regional *hegemony*. One side sees India and Pakistan as natural allies, with exaggerated Muslim suspicion of Hindus having temporarily retarded an accommodation between them; the other, given Pakistan's position in "the sensitive transitional zone which links the Middle East with South Asia,"[37] sees them as almost certain to be competitive. For Internalists, the enormous superiority which India enjoys in size, population, resources and industrial capacity; the extraordinary receptivity which India has displayed in both its domestic and foreign policy to the interests of its large Muslim minority and the Muslim Middle East; and the absence of any effort by India, in spite of several opportunities, to recover territory "lost" in the formation of Pakistan in 1947 are all facts favoring a remedy for Pakistan's predicament based on reconciliation between Islamabad and New Delhi. Pakistan's contrary adoption of a confrontationist policy with India, as Internalists are prone to see it, frustrates restoration of the natural and historically rooted economic, social and cultural bonds between them and threatens to reduce them both to the status of dependent pawns in the US-Soviet global strategic competition. As for the danger of Pakistan's losing its freedom through an accommodation with its much larger neighbor, Mohammed Ayoob argues that Pakistan's effort to "borrow power" from external (meaning *extraregional*) sources, far from enlarging its range of options, "has, paradoxically, ended up in curtailing Pakistan's freedom and manoeuvrability in the international sphere—except for brief periods as in the second half of the 1960s —and has hitched its star too firmly to one major power or another—which has usually failed to come to its rescue in times of dire need, as, for instance, during the events of 1965 and 1971."[38]

From the Internalist perspective, Pakistan's leaders are misguided in attempting to orient Pakistan strategically away from India and toward the Middle East. "Attractive and logical as it may seem at first glance," observes Selig Harrison, "the idea of including Islamabad in a Middle East-Persian Gulf strategic consensus is fundamentally flawed because it ignores the ethnic, cultural, historical, and geopolitical ties that orient Pakistan to South Asia...Despite their division into sovereign states, India and Pakistan constitute an interdependent geopolitical and strategic whole, especially in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan."[39] Naturally, Externalists have a rather different view of Pakistan's Middle East connection. While some Externalists would hesitate to accept in full the statement that "since 1972, Pakistan has virtually ceased to be a South Asian Power and her orientation has increasingly been towards the Middle East,"[40] few would dispute the judgment that Pakistan's interests — political, military, psychological and especially economic — have converged with those of Middle Eastern states in recent years, with important implications for Pakistan's security situation.[41]

Even more damaging to prospects for improved India-Pakistan relations, Internalists reason, is indiscriminate *extraregional* (especially US) reinforcement of the Pakistani military. *In South Asian Security after Afghanistan*, one of the most recent and thorough Internalist examinations of subcontinental security issues, G.S. Bhargava argues that the crux of India's security problem and a formidable barrier to a more compromising attitude in Islamabad is Pakistan's unwarranted amassing of military muscle with the assistance of the United States, France, China and others. "Devoid of external military aid and free of involvement by outsiders," he avers, "Pakistan would be more likely to settle all disputes, including Kashmir, on a realistic basis of give and take."[42] The US interest, Selig Harrison states, "lies in a scrupulous detachment from the Indo-Pakistani rivalry." US military aid should be "limited and selective," and "for defensive purposes," lest it alienate irretrievably Pakistan's domestic political opposition, provoke an incendiary Indo-Pakistani arms race, and increase Indian dependence on Moscow.[43] Carrying the argument a step further, Mohammad Ayoob suggests that US military assistance may actually *increase* Pakistan's vulnerability to Soviet pressures, for it places in jeopardy what is, in fact, the most effective barrier to Soviet support for Baluch nationalism — New Delhi's opposition to *any* superpower interference in the affairs of the subcontinent.[44]

Internalists see the superpowers' apparent disregard for the UN General Assembly's 1971 "zone of peace" resolution, which sought to enhance the security of all littoral states by excluding superpower rivalries and competition for military bases from the Indian Ocean, looming as yet one more unwelcome intrusion on the natural evolution of a regional security system. Arguing that the projection of military capability is, in the last analysis, a poor palliative for the internal weakness and instability characteristic of most littoral states, Bhargava, for example, points out that neither of the superpowers had "major economic and strategic interests to be served by involvement in the affairs of the region" at the time the zone of peace resolution was first advanced in 1971, and that neither has any clear strategic justification for *major* military presence in the region today.[45] "It was not inadequacy of naval strength or paucity of facilities at bases like Diego Garcia," says Bhargava, "that prevented US action to save the shah or to preempt the Soviet invasion," since "an impressive US armada was stationed in the Arabian Sea" at the time those events occurred.[46] Add to this the fact that the military presence of the superpowers, while welcomed by some of the littoral states in the past, has today very few supporters. As mounting opposition to US presence on Diego Garcia attests, the *political* costs are steadily rising while the *military* benefits remain limited and uncertain. "Shorn of rhetoric and subject to some changes," observes Bhargava, the zone of peace proposal remains "eminently practical and even necessary."[47] Since progress towards demilitarization of the Indian Ocean is contingent on its acceptance by both superpowers, a formula has to be found whereby the basic security interests of each are protected. Thus, one means for de-escalating the situation, suggests Bhargava, would be to accept the concept of linkage between Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and militarization of the Indian Ocean, and on that basis seek to restore the *status quo* ante in the area, "including Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan and abandonment of its facilities in South Yemen and Ethiopia, in return for the return of Diego Garcia to its original position as a communications facility, coupled with reversal of the series of military

measures undertaken [by the United States] during 1980-1981 in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman."[48] In this context, even more certain to poison the South Asian security climate, from the Internalist point of view, would be the acquisition by the United States of strategic bases or other facilities in Pakistan itself.[49]

For Externalists, the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal is "an exercise in futility."[50] It mistakenly tries "to detach the Indian Ocean from the global strategic map, unmindful of the Indian Ocean's strategic importance to global security, and accord it separate treatment."[51] As Vivekanandan puts it, "the massive Soviet naval program and the ever-increasing politico-military activity of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region have made it abundantly clear that the aim of the Soviet Union in the region is to dominate it."[52] That being the case, a more realistic approach would be to forestall any *single* power from dominating the region, by inviting a *balance* of naval forces as opposed to their *withdrawal*.

It has been apparent all along in this discussion that the existence of a Soviet invasion force in Afghanistan, requiring a substantial redefinition of Pakistan's security situation, has complicated fashioning a remedy that would be consistent with Internalist arguments tailored to India-Pakistan reconciliation. Internalists are willing enough to concede that Pakistan's security predicament has been worsened by Soviet action in the neighboring state; and they generally support external military assistance to Islamabad to the extent it fills what they can accept as Pakistan's "legitimate defence requirements."[53] But they do not accept the idea that Pakistan's military modernization program should form the centerpiece of Pakistan's response. Indeed, it is their insistence on the urgency and possible fruitfulness of a negotiated *political* settlement to the Afghan crisis that distinguishes their analysis most clearly from its rivals.

The settlement Internalists prescribe for the crisis offers a guarantee to the Soviets for the security of their border with Afghanistan in return for the promise of Soviet military withdrawal from that country. Soviet security is to be assured through the neutralization or "Finlandization" of Afghanistan, a proposal which, as articulated by Selig Harrison, Jagat Mehta, G. S. Bhargava and others, rests on assumptions which may be summarized as follows:[54]

(1) Soviet intervention was largely the result of unforeseen developments in Afghanistan and the southwest Asian region rather than part of a premeditated grand design for global conquest carefully orchestrated by Moscow;

(2) Since Moscow now recognizes its intervention to have been reckless and counterproductive, it would welcome the opportunity to extricate itself from an increasingly costly misadventure;

(3) The price of Soviet withdrawal is the restoration of a genuinely nonaligned Afghanistan, neutralized against superpower competition, that will not serve as a hostile base for anti-Soviet forces and that will be sensitive to Soviet interests;

(4) The United States, having misread Soviet intervention as a threat to its broad strategic interests, threatens to torpedo the Finlandization remedy by pressing ahead with its plans for the military containment of the Soviet Union in the area; and finally

(5) Finlandization requires the active collaboration of neighboring states, of Pakistan in particular, in bringing an end to the Afghan insurgency. On this point, some Internalists (Harrison and Mehta) go so far as to argue that Afghanistan's neutralization can only succeed if it is part of a larger regional settlement, i.e., if it is accompanied by a reassertion of true non-alignment (what Mehta calls "Swedenization," or "an agreement by which all countries reaffirm their neutrality and detachment from military blocs, ..."[55] in the states located on Afghanistan's southern borders. Others (such as Bhargava), while conceding the long term desirability of Pakistan's neutralization, suggest that at this stage it would be unrealistic to set it as a precondition for resolution of the Afghan crisis.[56] All seem agreed, however, that present US plans for rearming Pakistan, since they appear bound to invite Soviet retaliation, pose a direct threat to a political solution of any kind.

For those analysts arguing essentially from Externalist premises, Islamabad would have little to gain from neutralization. Given Pakistan's great geopolitical vulnerability to Soviet intervention, the unlikelihood that the USSR would actually be inhibited by such an accommodation in its dealings with Pakistan, and the enormous internal political costs which Islamabad would have to pay to force compliance with such an adjustment by the millions of Afghan refugees, Pathan and Baluch tribesmen, "there is no question", argues Leo Rose, "but that the critics of the 'Finlandization' proposal are correct from almost any definition of Pakistan's interests."[57] In place of Internalist judgments that "the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan is the result of misadventures and misjudgments, compounded by internal mishandling and international misperceptions," that Moscow "acted impetuously to tide up a situation that had deteriorated unexpectedly," and that "the USSR probably recognizes that a genuinely non-aligned Afghanistan pursuing non-radical policies was a better guardian of Soviet interests,"[58] Externalists observe that "it is questionable whether Moscow's intervention arose out of purely defensive motives in the first place, and that the Soviets would be willing to give up the clearcut strategic advantages toward the Persian Gulf conferred on them by their invasion,"[59] that "Soviet policy in Afghanistan has so far been a success,"[60] and that "the war at its present level is well worth the price being paid as far as Moscow is concerned, ... Soviet objectives would appear to be well served by keeping the fighting at its present level, ... the prospects for peace in Afghanistan are remote."[61] From the Externalist perspective, Pakistan's neutralization would simply assure more rapid realization of Soviet expansionist ambitions. What is needed to stem the Soviet tide, from this perspective, is a counter-threat of superior force, which Pakistan can only acquire from *extraregional* sources.

Point Counterpoint. Where do these analyses of the remedy go astray? Internalist arguments, it seems to me, consistently understate the obstacles to what is clearly the centerpiece of their remedy—normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and a unified approach to regional security issues. To be sure, bilateral and multilateral developments towards South Asian regional cooperation have recently been gaining surprising momentum. Early in June 1982, in an effort that seemed intended to revive the moribund spirit of the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan presented India with a

draft non-aggression pact. Later that month, India replied with its own draft of a treaty on the establishment of a permanent joint ministerial commission that would seek to improve ties in economic, commercial, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields; and then, in mid-August, dramatically enlarged its offer to include a comprehensive draft treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. Movement toward India-Pakistan reconciliation appeared to gain even greater impetus when, on November 1, President Zia-ul-Haq visited New Delhi, a visit that smoothed the way for the signing of the agreement, on the occasion of the Non-Aligned summit in New Delhi in March 1983, setting up the joint ministerial commission.[62] Paralleling and offering at least some reinforcement of these tentative steps towards India-Pakistan rapprochement was the ongoing series of meetings of the foreign secretaries of seven South Asian countries (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives), beginning in Colombo in April 1981, aimed at creating an ASEAN-styled forum of South Asian regional development cooperation.[63] Though these events should certainly not be dismissed as irrelevant, Pakistan's reported inability to have military and political issues included among the tasks of the joint commission, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's remarks on the eve of the Non-Aligned summit demeaning the significance of her meeting in November with President Zia-ul-Haq, were two of many indications that the process of reconciliation was likely to be drawn out and difficult and held no certain promise of success.[64]

The Mideast Connection. Externalist arguments, on the other hand, tend to understate Pakistan's international isolation and, in particular, count too heavily on Islamabad's Middle East connection to alleviate its security predicament. Of course, its Middle East ties, whether bilateral or multilateral through the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), are of immense importance to Pakistan. Since the early 1970s, its relations with Iran and the Arab states have grown from little more than professions of friendship and communal brotherhood into a substantial and many-faceted relationship. The Middle East's share of Pakistan's agricultural and industrial export trade, for the nine-month period ending in March 1982, stood at 30.5 percent, a share greater than that of any other global region. For the same period, Pakistan's imports from the Middle East, reflecting its dependence on imported oil for over 90 percent of its domestic consumption, stood at 28.6 percent of total imports, ranking the Middle East second in this category among all world regions. Moreover, Middle Eastern countries have become major sources of loans, credits and investment funds for Islamabad. For the period July 1973 to March 1982, total Middle Eastern economic assistance to Pakistan was officially reported at over $2.16 billion.[65] Saudi credits for arms purchases abroad would considerably enlarge this figure.[66] Also to be taken into account are the huge remittances sent by the 2 million or so Pakistanis working abroad (about 1.5 million in the Persian Gulf region) by the end of 1982. These remittances, amounting officially to over $2.1 billion (unofficially, closer to $3.5 billion) in 1981-82, have become a crucial source of foreign exchange, comparing favourably with Pakistan's export earnings ($2.9 billion in 1980-81) and the amount paid (estimated at $728 million in 1981-82, a figure roughly 26.6 percent of the country's export earnings) to service its foreign debt.[67] In terms of military ties, Pakistan had become "the third world's leading supplier of military manpower after Cuba."[68] It was providing

military assistance in 1982 to 22 countries, most of them in the Middle East, and had anywhere from 10,000—15,000 members of its armed forces posted abroad.

Impressive as are Pakistan's links with the Middle East, it would be unwarranted to read too much into them, especially in so far as they concern Pakistan's security situation. One reason for this is that Pakistan's *economic* relations with the Middle East are highly vulnerable to world market conditions and may prove less durable than they now seem. Rice and cotton (raw, yarn, and finished cloth) dominate Pakistan's export trade. While its rice trade with the Middle East is relatively secure, Pakistan's cotton goods have many competitors, not the least of them India. The demand for Pakistani workers, which unquestionably helps to relieve the country's foreign exchange shortage, depends on a steady rate of increase in the ability of the oil-producing states to absorb them. Moreover, the trade relationship between Pakistan and the Middle East is at best lopsidedly slanted in favor of the latter: the current trade balance is weighted more than 2 to 1 sgainst Pakistan. Pakistan does gain strength from its Middle East connection, but the actual substance of this connection may be as much a sign of Pakistan's economic weakness and dependence as of its power and prestige.

A second reason is that whatever role Pakistan plays in Persian Gulf, security is going to be sharply limited both by Pakistan's own political weakness and by the suspicion and animosity which mark intraregional relations in Southwest Asia. There are proposals afoot for some form of Islamic "collective security" system.[69] And some analysts envision Pakistan assuming a major role in the defence of Saudi Arabia.[70] If Pakistan's painfully impotent efforts to bring about a ceasefire between Iraq and Iran supply any clue to the future, however, Islamabad is simply not prepared to bear the political burden of "policing" the Middle East, and the Middle Eastern states, deeply divided amongst themselves, are in no position to come to Pakistan's rescue. The continued cooperation of none of these states is guaranteed. While one can agree that the Middle Eastern connection is vastly greater today than it was a decade ago, one must hesitate to endorse fully Weinbaum and Sen's conclusion, drawn in the more salubrious climate of 1978, that "the Middle Eastern connection, so remarkably strengthened during the 1970s, will not dissolve: it offers Pakistan its best hope for a viable economy and new insurance of territorial integrity,"[71] or another, reached in 1977 before the collapse of the RCD, that Iran-Pakistan relations "have been the one constant factor in the otherwise fluctuating international and regional events influencing the countries of the Persian Gulf, West Asia, and South Asia."[72]

As we have already seen, Internalists reject outright a remedy for Pakistan's security predicament resting on an enlarged security relationship with the United States. Some such relationship seems, however, to be under development. A *formal* security alliance would entail upgrading the 1959 Executive Agreement reached between the Eisenhower administration and the government of Ayub Khan. Though given at least passing consideration in the early stages of the Reagan administration's negotiations with Islamabad, the latter's conscious disassociation from Cento and Seato and disinclination to jeopardize its status in the OIC and Nam, coupled with Washington's reluctance to press for an agreement that would inevitably arouse strong opposition in both countries, at least temporarily eliminated it as a live option.

In reality, what we may be witnessing is the development of an *informal* security guarantee, given initial moral force by the Carter doctrine and increasing material substance by the steady buildup in US military forces in the Indian Ocean and southwest Asian region. Long range planning in the Pentagon appears committed to the view that the United States must rebuild the alliance system which existed in the 1960s in order to attain a realistic global war-fighting capability and that it must increase its military presence in areas of strategic interest.[73] From a security standpoint, Islamabad may see advantage in the fact that the situation today is vastly changed from that which prevailed during Washington's earlier courtship of Islamabad in the 1950s and early 1960s. Then, Pakistan's key ally had no more than token military presence in the Indian Ocean and little interest in acquiring more. It now has a large and steadily growing strategic interest that will require close collaboration with friendly — even if not furmally allied — regional powers. In spite of all the issues which divide the United States and Pakistan,[74] and in spite of the profound distrust *both* countries understandably feel for one another,[75] the emergence of a new US "security regime" in the Indian Ocean[76] may give a surprising attractiveness and durability to what has unquestionably been a very troubled relationship.[77]

Just as Internalists, in my view, tend to exaggerate the negative consequences for Pakistan's security which would flow from strengthened military ties with the United States, Externalists seem to me to be overly wedded to the thesis that no good for Islamabad can come from accommodation of the Soviets in Afghanistan. According to Zalmay Khalilzad, for example, the lesson which all small states contiguous to the Soviet Union should learn from the Afghan tragedy is "that the more they accommodate Moscow, the less likely it is that they will maintain their independence."[78] For Pakistan to abandon the Afghan resistance movement would be an act of appeasement that would only whet the Soviet appetite for further encroachment in the region. While "in the shortrun accommodation might decrease Soviet pressure, in the long run it would increase substantially Soviet ability to influence and threaten Pakistan."[79]

Pakistanis are of course not blind to the risks (alienation of their allies is not the least of them) implicit in negotiating a political settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. Neither are they blind, however, to the substantial risks inherent in continued support of the Afghan resistance — or to the possible benefits of a negotiated settlement. These latter could inlcude amelioration of the refugee burden, reduced threat of reprisal along Pakistan's vulnerable border with Afghanistan, assurances of noninterference in Pakistan's troublesome tribal nationalist movements and, by no means least, the promise of very considerable Soviet economic and military assistance. The fact that the Soviet Union may have moved into the neighborhood to stay is certainly an incentive for Pakistan to move in the direction of a settlement.[80] One can hardly speak of a consensus on these matters among Pakistanis; but to many of them one thing is clear: Pakistan has more options available to it than either Internalists (who basically counsel Islamabad to declare its neutrality and embrace India) or Externalists (who exhort Islamabad to supply the manpower for the Free World's defence against Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia) seem willing to concede. It would be a remarkable accomplishment, to say the least, but the remedy for Pakistan's security predicament towards which Islamabad may now be inching might reject *both* of these alternatives in favour of a strategy that pursued *limited* collabora-

tion with the United States while at the same time offering *limited* accommodation of the Soviets in Afghanistan. If successful, it would enable Pakistan to maintain its independence of New Delhi's dictates, the objective for which the country was founded and to which most of its leaders remain thoroughly committed today.

TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Regardless of anything done or not done by Islamabad's current leaders, Pakistan is part of a region that is now and shall remain for many years deeply troubled by a whole range of destabilizing and disintegrative forces — Islamic fundamentalism, class antagonisms, nationalism, separatism — all together rendering the entire area highly vulnerable to internal collapse as well as to external interference and subversion. Early hopes that South Asia could somehow be insulated from superpower contention have not been realized. The Soviets are now positioned militarily in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean is increasingly a zone of conflict. No amount of genuflection to more tranquil alternatives will bring them into being. Sudden and violent changes are likely to occur in practically all of the states with which Pakistan shares the southern rim of Asia; and these drastic changes are likely to spill over existing borders and threaten governments with disturbing frequency. It is terms of this great volatility and uncertainty of the environment (internal *and* external) that Pakistan's security predicament is basically to be understood.

Lacking adequate indigenous capability to guarantee its security against any and all potential enemies, Pakistan naturally seeks firm assurances from external allies. The Peoples Republic of China, while more reliable than most, has simply not been able to provide a strong guarantee. The Soviet Union, for over a decade closely aligned with India, has up until now failed to win the confidence of the men who rule Pakistan.[81] Unfortunately, from Islamabad's perspective, the United States has itself proven a very uncertain ally. With strategic interests of its own and a much larger global arena in which to pursue them, the United States has obviously not been willing to underwrite all of Islamabad's concerns or to assume permanent obligation in regard to them. No matter how much US interests may today converge with those of Pakistan, the inescapable truth is that the overlap could diminish at some point in the near or more distant future. Pakistan has no choice but to seek the friendship of the United States, but at the ame time there are great pressures to keep other options alive.

One of those options, as Amaury de Riencourt has recently urged, is that Pakistan join with India in an effort "to achieve a final and historic reconciliation between the two countries."[82] While it is a most desirable option, it is not, I think, very realistic. Confronted with the immediate and very tangible fact of powerful (and Soviet-equipped) Indian armed forces on their eastern border, Pakistanis cannot be as confident as de Riencourt that they are "facing a non-existent threat of Indian aggression instead of a much more plausible one coming from Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.."[83] They are likely to see their predicament as more complex and uncertain, and hence to pursue a more complex and multipronged remedy. This is likely to include efforts to normalize India-Pakistan relations; but it is not likely to exclude simultaneous efforts to keep alive the possibility for compromise with Moscow over Afghanistan, to strengthen the commitment to Islamabad of the United States and the People's Republic of China, to remain faithful to

Pakistan's Arab, Islamic and Non-Aligned allies, to strengthen substantially its own conventional military forces, and — not least — to create a nuclear weapons capability.

For Pakistan's diplomats, as for its military leaders, the assumption of such tasks poses an evident, some would say impossible, challenge. One wonders for how long Islamabad will be able or willing to avoid decisions that would commit it, unambiguously, to one side or another in the struggle for dominance in South-, west Asia and the Indian Ocean. Crafty diplomacy may not be enough to rescue Islamabad from the antagonistic forces of its internal and external environments. For analysts, framing an analytic perspective that responds to the uncertainties and contradictions of Pakistan's security predicament will be an equally difficult project. But as Pakistan strives to cope with the dangerous security dilemmas that clearly lie ahead, it needs to be served (as do all of its neighbors) by a perspective that can be detached from those Internalist and Externalist premises which time and changed circumstances have rendered inadequate.

ENDNOTES

1. K. Subrahmanyam, *Indian Security Perspectives* (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982), p. 178.

2. Onkar Marwah, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear Rivals in South Asia," *International Organization* 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981): 179.

3. *Ibid.*, 176-77, 179.

4. Selig S. Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia," *Foreign Policy* No. 45 (Winter 1981-82): 89-90. Emphasis added.

5. W. Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," *International Security* 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982): 159.

6. *Ibid.*, 176. For alternative views on the Soviet military threat in South West Asia, see Keith A. Dunn, "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis," *Orbis* 25, No. 3 (Fall 1981): 607-629; and Thomas L. McNaugher, "The Soviet Military Threat to the Gulf: The Operational Dimension," prepared for the Biennial Conference of the Section on Military Studies, International Studies Association, University of New Hampshire, November 5-7, 1981, especially pp. 12-13, 29.

7. Lawrence Ziring, "Soviet Policy on the Rim of Asia: Scenarios and Projections," *Asian Affairs* 9, No. 3 (January/February 1982): 141.

8. For an argument that it is deeply ingrained, indeed, see Rebecca V. Strode and Colin S. Gray, "The Imperial Dimension of Soviet Military Power," *Problems of Communism* 30, No. 6 (November-December 1981): 1-15.

9. For additional discussion of the Baluch situation, see Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981); Robert G. Wirsing and James M. Roherty, "The United States and Pakistan," *International Affairs* (London) 58, No. 4 (Autumn 1982): 588-609; Robert G. Wirsing, *The Baluchis and Pathans*, Report No. 48 (London: Minority Rights Group, March 1981); and Robert G. Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan," in *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives*, Wirsing, editor (New York: Pergamon, 1981), pp. 277-312.

10. According to one estimate, in addition to noncombatants, at least 3,300 Pakistani troops and 5,300 Baluch guerrillas were killed in the four-year conflict. Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy* No. 32 (Fall 1978): 137.

11. The Karachi daily *Dawn* reported recently that one of the longer running and bloodiest feuds — that between the large Marri and Bugti tribes — had formally been brought to an end. If true, it would

represent a major development in the history of the Baluch nationalist movement. Karachi, September 19, 1982, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, South Asia Series, 1982, No. 184, p. F4 (*FBIS*-SAS-82-184: F4).

12. See Anthony Mascarenhas' interview in London of Sardar Ataullah Menghal in *Times of India*, Bombay, August 29, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-176: F2-4.

13. See Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an Area of Conflict," *Asian Survey* 17, No. 5 (May 1977): 474-490.

14. From Islamabad's standpoint, another and perhaps equally important consequence of the Shah's collapse was to raise the possibility that Pakistan, in spite of its professed nonalignment, might substitute for Iran as the West's principal *military* ally in the Persian Gulf region.

15. Islamabad has reported over 400 violations of its air space since April 1978.

16. These appear to include the MiG-27 long-range fighter-bomber, the advanced SAM-8 missile, and the SU-25, the Soviet reply to the American A-10 close support plane. See *New York Times*, September 26, 1982, p. 13Y, for report on the SU-25. On other weapons developments, see Gordon Brook-Shepherd's comments in *Sunday Telegraph*, London, August 8, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-154:C1.

17. For one discussion, see the article by M. V. Pradhan, "Indian Ocean and the Superpowers," in *Indian Express*, New Delhi, September 15-17, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-185:E1-4.

18. For background on the Indian naval buildup, see Raju G. C. Thomas, "The Politics of Indian Naval Re-Armament, 1962-1974," *Pacific Community* (April 1975): 452-474.

19. Mohammed Ayoob, "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry," *The World Today* 38, No. 5 (May 1982): 196.

20. Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan's Role and Interests in South and Southwest Asia," *Asian Affairs* 9, No. 1 (September/October 1981): 64.

21. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 137.

22. For a more extensive discussion of the India-Pakistan arms balance, see Robert G. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South Asia," forthcoming.

23. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1981-1982* (London, 1981).

24. On the Jaguar purchase, see Raju Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," *Orbis* 24, No. 1 (Spring 1980): 85-101.

25. Richard P. Cronin and Douglas D. Mitchell, *Issues Concerning Pakistan's Possible Acquisition of the U.S. F-16 Fighter Bomber Aircraft*, Report No. 81-225F (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, October 5, 1981), p. 14. The F-16, according to this study, "is admirably suited to provide a qualitative edge over the numerically superior and highly effective aircraft that can be deployed against it by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, or by the Indian Air Force." (p. 27). This report contains a useful comparison of aircraft performance characteristics and an excellent discussion of the air balance in South Asia.

26. Karachi, December 28, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-250:F4.

27. *Strategy Week* VIII, No. 18 (May 10-16, 1982): 5. The MiG-23s are part of the $1.6 billion arms package promised India by the Soviet Union in 1980.

28. New Delhi, April 20, 1983, in *FBIS*-SAS-83-078:E1.

29. It has apparently not been finally decided, but the Mirage 2000 agreement with the French in late 1982 may be expanded to include assembly under license of an additional 120 aircraft. New Delhi, October 18, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-201:E1.

30. New Delhi, October 2, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-192:E3.

31. *New York Times*, November 30, 1982, p. 1Y. See also *FEER*, February 3, 1983: 30.

32. India's space program, which has important military implications, has already accomplished indigenous launchings of space satellites and is, without question, the most advanced in the Third World. *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (June 29, 1981): 18-19. For background, see Onkar Marwah, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy," *International Security* 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977): 96-121.

33. See David K. Willis, "On the Trail of the A-Bomb Makers," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 30 — December 4, 1981. See also *FEER*, December 4, 1981: 21-22.

34. See Onkar Marwah, "India and Pakistan," 165-179.

35. Cronin and Mitchell, *Pakistan's Possible Acquisition of the F-16*, p. 5.

36. Subrahmanyam, *Indian Security Perspectives*, p. 213.

37. Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle East," *Pacific Community* (July 1976): 608.

38. Ayoob, "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry," 199.

39. Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia," 98-99.

40. Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle East," 619.

41. M. G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," *Orbis* 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978): 595-96.

42. G. S. Bhargava, *South Asian Security after Afghanistan* (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 123.

43. Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia," 95.

44. Ayoob, "India, Pakistan and Super-Power Rivalry," 201.

45. Bhargava, *South Asian Security*, pp. 149-168.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

50. B. Vivekanandan, "The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects," *Asian Survey* 21, No. 12 (December 1981): 1248.

51. *Ibid.*, 1244.

52. *Ibid.*, 1243.

53. Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 60, No. 2 (Winter 1981/82): 279.

54. See, for example, Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy* No. 41 (Winter 1980-81): 163-187; Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," *Foreign Policy* No. 47 (Summer 1982): 139-153; and Bhargava, *South Asian Security*, pp. 169-185.

55. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," 148-149.

56. Bhargava, *South Asian Security*, p. 183.

57. Rose, "Pakistan's Role and Interests," 60-61.

58. Mehta, "A Neutral Solution," 139, 140-141, 144.

59. Francis Fukuyama, *The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report*, RAND/N-1579-RC (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, September 1980), p. 25.

60. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: Benefits and Costs," in *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures*, Robert H. Donaldson, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 229. "Soviet objectives," Professor Tahir-Kheli writes,"—to keep Afghanistan out of the Western orbit, to use the country to legitimize Soviet concern with Asia, to demonstrate to Pakistan the need for Soviet friendship—have now largely been realized."

61. Nearby Observer (pseud), "The Afghan-Soviet War: Stalemate or Evolution?" *The Middle East Journal* 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 160-161, 163.

62. For the text of the agreement, see *FBIS*-SAS-83-049:E1-2, New Delhi, March 11, 1983.

63. Karachi/New Delhi, August 5-8, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-153:A1-3. See also the illuminating interview with President Zia-ul-Haq in the *Bangkok Post*, September 26, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-188:F1-7, September 28, 1982.

64. *New York Times*, December 24, 1982, p. 3Y. In an interview with the London *Financial Times*, Mrs. Gandhi dismissed the meeting as "a drawing room chat." London, February 25, 1983, in *FBIS*-SAS-83-041: Annex 2-3.

65. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey 1981-82* (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1982), p. 121.

66. But the report that Saudi Arabia had alone contributed a total of $7.5 billion to Pakistan by fall 1980 and was committed for some $5.0 billion more is almost certainly exaggerated. *The Economist*, September 13, 1980, 40.

67. *Pakistan Economic Survey 1981-82*, p. 116.

68. *New York Times*, February 6, 1981, p. 4Y.

69. Karachi, August 31, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-169:F1.

70. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William O. Staudenmaier, "The Saudi-Pakistani Military Relationship: Implications for U.S. Policy," *Orbis* 26, No. 1 (Spring 1983): 155-171.

71. Weinbaum and Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East," 612.

72. Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and Pakistan," 490.

73. *New York Times*, November 1, 1982, p. 11Y.

74. For an illuminating discussion of these issues, see Thomas P. Thornton, "Between the Stools?: U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan During the Carter Administration," *Asian Survey* 22, No. 10 (October 1982): 959:977.

75. The suspect nature of US intentions in the region is a common media topic in Pakistan. For example, see the editorial comments in *The Muslim*, published in Islamabad, on establishment of the new US Central Command, January 4, 1983, in *FBIS*-SAS-83-009:F1-2.

76. For a discussion of the significance of this emergent regime for US-Pakistan relations, see Wirsing and Roherty, "The United States and Pakistan."

77. For a thorough exploration of this relationship, see Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*.

78. Zalmay Khalilzad, in statement to the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, *Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan*, September 23, 1981, p. 268.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 233. See also Khalilzad's comments in letter to *New York Times*, December 16, 1982, p. 28Y.

80. Bhabani Sen Gupta reports the judgment of a Pakistani strategic expert who mused that " 'it is absolutely necessary for Pakistan to find working relationships with its neighbours, who, acting in collusion, can once again dismember Pakistan. . . . Like it or not, the Soviet Union is a next door neighbour, after what has happened to Afghanistan. This is the supreme reality that Pakistan's external and even internal policies must reckon, and I cannot say that this has happened yet.' " *The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live With Soviet Power* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), p. 159.

81. In a rather candid interview which appeared in *The Guardian* (London) on October 22, 1982, President Zia-ul-Haq is reported to have said that the Soviets had invited Pakistan to join them in a security pact, to which he says he replied "nothing doing, not so long as I am living, over my dead body." Islamabad, October 26, 1982, in *FBIS*-SAS-82-207: Annex 2-3. For a suggestion that a Soviet-Pakistan alliance is not so farfetched, see Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, *India: Emergent Power?* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, for the National Strategy Information Center, 1978), pp. 68-70.

82. Amaury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/83): 437.

83. *Ibid.*, 433.

Full Circle Tashkent

Ibnul Hasan

But there is no doubt that the troubles of India and Pakistan are basically of the making of the leadership in these countries. In the last 37 years this leadership has consistently fanned popular hatred and suspicion and pursued it as an instrument of policy. The maintenance of sizeable military power by both India and Pakistan at the cost of the basic needs of the people and the co-existence of increasing power and expanding poverty in these countries have led them to a state of dependence for ever increasing military supplies from either of the two superpowers and their involvement in the bi-polar international politics. It is amazing how rapid the Soviet Union has made progress in South Asia after the major military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965. It has been far more astounding than either the goodwill which Britain could secure by voluntarily granting independence to the subcontinent in 1947 or the economic and development assistance which the United States of America extended to the countries of South Asia in the last 30 years ever since Tashkent the role of the Soviet Union in this region has also not been any less intriguing. The results too have been far more rewarding for the Soviet Union, with much less investment and in far shorter a period.

In any discussion of the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia it is often overlooked how the military rivalry between the two main adversaries of the region — India and Pakistan — has provided opportunity to the Soviet Union to have gained a dominating position in the region. It is ironical that while for almost two decades, following the end of World War II, organised efforts were made by the West to keep USSR away from this region and indeed the entire decade of 1950's was a period of the building up of a strong alliance system against the possible advance of Soviet Union as an imperialist power in Asia, yet today, within thirty years, not only the alliance system is abandoned and dissolved, the Soviet Union has almost subjugated South Asia — part of it physically, part of it materially and the whole of it psychologically.

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan has virtually brought the Soviet frontiers from Oxus to Khyber. There is no Baghdad Pact or Cento to face her today. The US aided Iranian

military build up has disintegrated. All the national energies of Iran are engaged to fight a war imposed on her by Iraq. This most pathetic exercise in attrition has been continuing now for almost seven years.

The non-aligned India is now, for all intent and purposes, an ally of the USSR, her biggest trade partner, and the top recipient of Soviet military hardware and technology. Pakistan is a member of Non-Aligned Movement. Now she only purchases her military requirements from USA and is no more a US client. The two have long since extricated themselves from their alliance commitments. Pakistan today is only obliged to pursue policies which should consolidate her non-aligned status.

Two Pro-Soviet Factors. Two factors have helped USSR in acquiring the present dominating position in South Asia. First, the access which Kabul allowed her and which Moscow used for over thirty years in steadily gaining control of the entire managerial structure of Afghanistan. Her military system especially became completely dependent on USSR for training and supplies. Second was the opportunity which the Indo-Pakistan military adventurism offered to Soviet Union for securing entrance in the subcontinent, initially as an economic collaborator, then as a mediator and finally as a defence ally of India.

The September 1965 war between India and Pakistan, within a matter of just a fortnight or so, brought USSR right in the middle of the subcontinental game. The same war demolished what looked a formidable military alliance system which USA had set up in this region and in which the United States had occupied the status of the protector of the free world interests in Asia. She is now regarded an outsider and, by some countries, even an intruder.

The mediator's role which the Soviet Union played in Tashkent to bring an end to the hostilities in 1965 between India and Pakistan led to the opening of relations between Pakistan and USSR for economic cooperation as well as some military supplies for a while to the Pakistan armed forces. These military supplies were not very substantial, but the fact that the unilateral decision by USA to snap, in the midst of war, all defence commitments with Pakistan had left Pakistan defence forces high and dry, the opening of this new source of supply from USSR proved a most welcome development for the policy makers in Rawalpindi. It softened political attitudes of the Pakistanis in respect of USSR. It helped the USSR to enter the country through the front door and removed the necessity of maintaining a low profile presence. Large scale undertakings such as the Karachi Steel, the Guddu Power Project and the oil and gas exploration in Sind yielded the Soviet Union a new avenue with political opportunities. All her projects were located in the southern region of Pakistan. It is in the southern region that she feels now most confident to operate.

Kosygin's Big Gamble. When in September 1965 Kosygin sent to the late President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri his offer of mediation in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and proposed the two to meet in Tashkent it looked as if he was taking a very big risk. He was involving the prestige of Soviet Union in an ugly situation. This step for a country such as USSR, not accustomed to this kind of international role, specially where the parties involved were by virtue of their training generally suspicious of Soviet Union, could well prove quite onerous. Kosygin could have burnt his fingers.

His offer which he said was dictated "by one thing and one thing only, a sincere desire to contribute to the earliest restoration of peace" could embroil him in a very bitter and a very complex situation. But by the time the conference was convened on January 4, 1966 the stage had been set in such a fashion that the Soviet Union had already gained a status of trust internationally in the ugly and cantankerous subcontinental scene. The objectives, as stated at that time and which prompted the Soviet initiative, were to restore peace in South Asia, to rid South Asia of 'external' influences and 'chauvinist' and 'reactionary' forces and to protect the Soviet economic investments in South Asia. Whether these objectives were achieved or not is not a material issue any more. The gains which Tashkent yielded to the Soviet Union had been so outstanding that whatever was intended to be the purpose of Tashkent originally has now become insignificant and practically inconsequential.

On the fourth anniversary of the Tashkent Conference it was stated by *New Times* (The Tashkent Declaration, *New Times*, No. 3, 1970, p. 4) that although the course outlined by the Declaration had been correct and had had a beneficial influence on the political climate in South Asia, relations were, unfortunately, "still somewhat strained between India and Pakistan". The Soviet Union blames the colonial powers for this situation in the subcontinent and feels that years of colonial rule in South Asia had created conditions in which 'chauvinistic' and 'reactionary' elements have taken hold of the masses and conflicts within these societies have become irredeemable. So far as blaming the people of the subcontinent — the leadership particularly — for conflicts and hostilities in South Asia, the Soviet Union is not far wrong, nor is it unfairly holding the colonial powers, meaning Britain and USA, responsible for much of what has gone wrong with the politics in this region.

But there is no doubt that the troubles of India and Pakistan are basically of the making of the leadership in these countries. In the last 37 years this leadership has consistently fanned popular hatred and suspicion and pursued it as an instrument of policy. The maintenance of sizeable military power by both India and Pakistan at the cost of the basic needs of the people and the co-existence of increasing power and expanding poverty in these countries have led them to a state of dependence for ever increasing military supplies from either of the two super powers and thus their involvement in the bi-polar international politics. It is amazing how rapid the Soviet Union has made progress in South Asia after the major military conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965. It has been far more astounding than either the goodwill which Britain could secure by voluntarily granting independence to the subcontinent in 1947 or the economic and development assistance which the United States of America extended to the countries of South Asia in the last 30 years ever since Tashkent the role of the Soviet Union in this region has also not been any less intriguing. The results too have been far more rewarding for the Soviet Union with much less investment and in far shorter a period.

US Withdraws. When the United States extricated herself from her military commitments to Pakistan in 1965 Washington must have believed that it had taken a very wise step. Policymakers in the United States must have taken a sigh of relief — having got rid of their country's self-defeating involvement with the two ever fighting and permanently feuding countries far flung and almost remote for USA to get embroiled with their

affairs. Already the United States had started feeling the pains of Vietnam war. The pressures of public opinion against the Vietnam war were by then on the increase in USA. The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war came as a windfall opportunity for USA and she lost no time to seize it.

It is strange why in Washington it was not realised that for India already there existed an alternate source of military supplies — Soviet Union — which with the United States withdrawing, would step in more actively and would forge a military alliance with India. Indeed on August 9, 1971 such an alliance was accomplished when a 20-year Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed. Negotiations of the Treaty had been going on for almost three years before it was signed in 1971. The conflict between India and Pakistan in that year and the civil war in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) facilitated the signing of this Treaty.

Pakistan's Dependence. It would be a good study for any student of the affairs of South Asia and the Soviet Union to examine the volume of trade and military supplies which increased soon after the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. The military aid and supplies from USA to Pakistan having ben suspended, Pakistan did not have the same advantage which India had, of switching over to USSR as her new military supplier. Whereas India already had the required military infrastructure conducive to absorption and adoption of Soviet military equipment, technology, armaments and methods of production and whereas she could go for an all-out military supplies arrangement with USSR, the same was not possible for Pakistan. By 1965 Pakistan had so standardized its military characteristics that the entire orientation had become "Americanised". She could not have demolished her painstakingly developed defence structure whose new looks were acquired over a period of ten years of planning and reorganization. She had no choice but to maintain it somehow and wait for a change of heart in Washington. With whatever experience she had of USA it was well worth hoping that a more favourable policy change in Washington would soon take place — a change which might at least ensure the upkeep of the characteristics of the equipment and training of the Pakistan armed forces.

In 1967 sales of spare parts to Pakistan were resumed by USA but the arms sales remained suspended. In October 1970 it was perhaps felt in USA that five years (1965—1970) was too long a time to leave the defence structure of Pakistan unattended and thus reduce an otherwise dependable and friendly country to a state of utter vulnerability; her armed forces suffering from imbalance and shortages in equipment. For this reason, perhaps, it was decided to partially help Pakistan in updating her military compliments to some extent. The Nixon Government was known to have been sympathetic towards Pakistan. It released the supply of a limited volume of military equipment on the basis of sales and on the principle of one time, limited withdrawal of the embargo.

The important thing to note was that, although Pakistan had always been an ally of USA and a member of two security pacts with that country which continued operative for almost two decades yet the United States' relations with Pakistan could never be free of some very serious reservations emanating from Washington's all time concern of New Delhi's sensitivity in this respect. This concern had constantly inhibited an all-out assistance to Pakistan and the development of a really upto date and well balanced fighting force in Pakistan. The United States had no doubt that in

its region Pakistan armed forces were potentially the best material for developing into a really effective and modern fighting force. She also knew that economically Pakistan had such inherent natural advantages that she could promptly pick up an excellent growth rate provided she received the required capital support and technology. But in every assistance arrangement with Pakistan the United States tended to drag its feet for fear of the pro-Indian lobby within the American political system and because of some futile hopes of winning over India as an ally somehow and some day. Consequently the American sales were suspended again in 1971 although by that time the US-Indian relations had sharply deteriorated and the Indo-Soviet relations had already developed into an alliance backed by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

Post-Tashkent Period. An important development which often goes unnoticed in the post-Tashkent years is that soon after the conference Pakistan received a limited supply of some military equipment from the Soviet Union. It appeared as if a beginning was being made for Pakistan to treat USSR as an alternate source of military supplies. This experiment could not last long. For Pakistan such an experiment was not possible without radical changes in the makeup and orientation of her armed forces and thus disturbing the standardized equipment and weapons they were used to. And yet when in 1968 the Soviet Union decided to supply India with one hundred SU-7 fighter-bombers, in addition to about as many MiG-21 and some 500 tanks which had been received earlier, Pakistan protested against this deal. The protest brought the Soviet Premier Kosygin to Rawalpindi for talks with President Ayub Khan. Within three months of these talks President Ayub Khan served a notice on Washington to close down its surveillance base in Budaber near Peshawar.

Meanwhile it was reported that Pakistan had entered an arms deal with the Soviet Union. The news generated protest against Soviet Union in New Delhi where riots broke out in front of the Soviet Embassy. The opposition legislators in the Indian Parliament also strongly criticised Soviet Union and their own Government's pro-Soviet policies. The situation was thus no different for the Soviet Union in respect of her relations with India as it used to be with USA in her relations with Pakistan. Thus the Tashkent Conference, it can be said, was able to so quickly bring Pakistan and Soviet Union in their bilateral relations parallel with the US-Pakistan relations which had a history of nearly 20 years of close cooperation and mutual assistance.

This development illustrates that there existed some natural advantages for the Soviet Union as against the United States of America to get close to the countries of South Asia with comparatively far less efforts and expenditure. This was perhaps realised at the conference table at Tashkent by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto where he appeared glum and lost, a feature which some observers noticed at that time and which he and his supporters subsequently used to good effect for his political build up against Ayub Khan. Mr. Bhutto was undoubtedly not pro-Soviet. He was young and ambitious and had powerful patrons in USA. He belonged to that category of the third world politicians for whom exhibitionist radicalism was an instrument which could be exploited for career opportunities. Basically these leaders remain wedded to the West — United States of America to be precise.

At the Tashkent Conference Mr. Bhutto could have noticed how rapidly the Soviet Union was making progress with Pakistan so that as an intelligent participant in the

proceedings of that fateful meeting he must have foreseen what the shape of things were going to be in the region. The two adversaries of South Asia — India and Pakistan — were facing each other at the summit level under the patronage of Mr. Alexi Kosygin who was representing Soviet Union, the new mediator for the sub-continent. Mr. Bhutto could not have missed the obvious: South Asia was beginning to slip into the hands of USSR. But then he also knew that he was virtually the architect of the 1965 war. The Tashkent Conference was ushering in the new honest broker of the region, the Soviet Union. He could have been contemplating on matters of more personal and intimate bearing than those which the delegates were discussing at the conference. Hence his widely noted pensiveness.

By 1960 India's economic situation had seriously deteriorated. She had to replace her ambitious Fourth Five Year Plan by a comparatively modest one. A new and enhanced economic assistance programme was started by USSR to help India increase the capacity utilization of her state enterprises. The Soviet Union had been already assisting India with as many as seventy major projects in her heavy industry sector through as much as $ 1.4 billion in credits. By then Soviet Union was India's second leading trading partner. By 1970 trade with Moscow had risen to eleven per cent.

Soviet Aid to Pak. In the meantime, the Soviet aid commitments to Pakistan had also been increased. By 1970 it had amounted to 265 million dollars. Another 207 million dollars were offered for the construction of Karachi Steel. It was a twelve-year credit at two and a half per cent interest. It was signed in January, 1971, a year before Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power. He must have by then got over his depression over the increasing influence of Soviet Union in South Asia. He had already seen the progress which the Soviet Union had made both with Afghanistan and India. And there was going to be Bangladesh, the product of Islamabad's monumental mismanagement, political bankruptcy of the leadership in Pakistan with Mujibur Rehman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the main actors, the American penchant for destabilisation and the Indo-Soviet collaboration.

It is evident that the Soviet diplomatic activity in the period following the Tashkent Conference could not have been successful to such an extent had the polity in South Asia not been so related with and dependent on the state of the military balance between the countries of this region. For whatever reasons Washington had treated Pakistan always with a degree of discrimination. As has been mentioned earlier the flow of armaments and equipment from USA had never been in keeping with the capacity and needs of Pakistan. On the other hand the arrangement provided an alibi to both India and Afghanistan to look for increased military assistance from and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Besides the competitive nature of the polity of South Asian countries the military adventures in which they had been frequently indulging reduced them again and again to a position where they needed to make up for their military losses, shortages and gaps. Wars for them had been short but always very costly.

Even Afghanistan without fighting a war with her neighbour Pakistan and without really needing to pursue a policy of military preparedness, got somehow so embroiled in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry that she had been constantly seeking strategic and military assistance from USSR. The result was that by the end of the 1960's the Afghan armed forces had

been completely Russified. Thus by 1979 it became possible for the Soviet Union to send its army to Afghanistan and occupy the country. It couldn't be a coincidence that the military siege of Afghanistan by USSR was timed with the return of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to power in India. This time she came as an open and active ally of the Soviet Union. The Indo-Soviet cooperation became closer. The military supplies to India increased to staggering volume. Their status was now highly sophisticated. The collaboration between India and the Soviet Union against the western (American) interests in the region became sharp, deliberate and aggressive. The overall influence of Moscow on New Delhi became so dominating that at the Seventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in New Delhi in 1983 India as a host country and as the new chairman so conducted the proceedings that it looked as if the Nam Summit was called primarily to censure USA. This was notwithstanding the bias of the majority of the Nam participants against the Soviet role in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

Dream Coming True! What seems to be materialising at last in South Asia now is the long cherished dream of Russia — of bringing the region under her total subjugation. In 1908 Lenin had written: "In India too the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle and, that being the case, the Russian-style British regime in India is doomed." (V.I. Lenin, *Inflammable Material in World Politics*, pages 14 and 15.)

The military understanding in Russia had traditionally subscribed to the belief that India suffered from such social discontentment that even a semblance of a military expedition in her vicinity would create conditions favourable for her subjugation. One of the most vociferous observers among the early Russian experts of Indian affairs. K.A. Troianovsky wrote in 1918 that India was to serve as the vanguard of revolution in the east, as Russia had in the West. Troianovsky regarded Persia and Turkey as the gates to the Indian citadel. (K.A. Troianovsky, *The East and the Revolution*, as quoted in X.J. Eudin and R.C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East. 1920-1927:* A Documentary Survey, Stanford, 1957, p. 92.)

Ironically it was in 1920 that M.N. Roy organised at Tashkent the training of an army of Indian revolutionaries. He had planned that an armed Indo-Soviet force sould pass through Afghanistan to the North Western Indian Frontier followed by proclamation of a revolutionary government aiming to topple the British power and the Indian bourgeoisie. The scheme failed. Among many reasons for its failure was the reluctance of Afghanistan to allow its land to be used for this expedition. Twenty seven years afer the failure of this expedition the British had themselves vacated the region. Thirty two years after their exit when the combined military force of the countries of South Asia is now several times bigger and stronger than ever under the British *Raj* and when from Far East to Europe the bulk of the land mass is poised against the Soviet Union one finds that USSR has already entered Afghanistan, is now dominating India and menacing the entire South Asian region including the Indian Ocean littoral states. What could not be achieved at Tashkent in 1920 seems to have been accomplished by a clever initiative in 1966 when Kosygin brought India and Pakistan at the conference table at Tashkent. The South Asian game of military competition and acrimony continues; and, with it continues the consolidation of Soviet domination in the region.

India-Pakistan: Military Balance

INDIA

Population: 743,300,000.
Military service: voluntary.
Total armed forces: 1,120,000.
Est GDP 1982/3: Rs. 1,665.0 bn ($172.924 bn), 1983/4: 1,815.0 bn ($176.0 bn)
Est def exp 1983/4: Rs. 58.620 bn ($5.684 bn), Def budget 1984/5: 68.0 bn ($6.326 bn).
GDP growth: 5.0% (1982), 2.0% (1983).
Inflation: 9.0% (1982), 7.0% (1983).
Debt: $23 bn (1982).
$1 = rupees 9.6285 (1982/3), 10.3123 (1983/4), 10.750 (1984).

Army: 960,000.
5 Regional Commands.
8 corps HQ.
2 armd divs.
1 mech div.
18 inf divs.
10 mountain divs.
5 indep armd bdes.
7 indep inf bdes.
1 para bde.
17 indep arty bdes, incl about 20 AD regts.
AFV: 700 T-54/-55, 300T-72, 1,900 *Vijayanta* MBT, 250 BMP-1 MICV; 500 OT-62/-64, BTR-60 APC.
Arty: Yug M-48 76mm, 25-pdr (88mm) (retiring), 100 100mm, 200 105mm, 550 M-46 130mm (some SP), 5.5-in, (140mm) (retiring), S-23 180mm guns; 75/24, 75mm mountain, 105mm (incl M-56 pack, *Abbot* SP), D-20 152mm how; 81mm, 500 120mm, 20 160mm mor.
ATK: M-18 57mm, *Carl Gustav* 84mm, M-40 106mm RCL; 6-pdr (57mm) ATK guns: SS-11-B1, *Milan*, AT-3 *Sagger* ATGW.
AD: 20mm, 40mm, L/60mm, L/70mm, 500 3.7-in. (94mm) towed, ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns: SA-6/-7/-9, 40 *Tigercat* SAM.
(On order: T-72M MBT, BRDM recce, BMP-1/-2/BMD MICV, *Milan* ATGW launchers, 3,700 msls.)

RESERVES: 200,000. Territorial Army 50,000

Navy: 47,000, incl naval air force.
8 Sov F-class submarines.
1 Br *Majestic* aircraft carrier (capacity 18 attack, 4 ASW ac, ASW hel).
1 Br *Fiji* cruiser (trg).
3 Sov *Kashin* II GW destroyers with 4 *Styx* SSM, 2×2 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 hel.
23 frigates: 2 *Godavari* with 2 *Styx* SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM, 2 *Sea King* hel; 6 *Leander* with 2×4 *Seacat* SAM, 1 hel; 2 Br *Whitby* with 3 *Styx* SSM; 10 Sov *Petya* 11; 3 Br *Leopard* (trg).
3 Sov *Nanuchka* corvettes with 4 SS-N-2 SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM.
8 Sov *Osa*-1 (6 FAC (G) 2 FAC), 8 *Osa*-II with 4 *Styx* SSM.
1 *Abhay*, 6 SDB-2 large patrol craft.
6 Sov *Natya* ocean, 4 Br *Ham* mine-sweepers; 6 Sov *Yevgenya* inshore mine-hunters.
6 Sov *Polnocny* LCT, 4 LCU.
(On order: Sov *T*-class, 4 Type 1500 subs,

2 *Kashin* GW destroyers, 4 *Gadavori* (mod *Leander*) FFG, 2 *Nanuchka* corvettes, 6 *Polnocny* LCT, *Exocet* SSM.)

Bases: Western Fleet: Bombay, Goa. Southern Fleet: Cochin. Eastern Fleet: Vishakapatnam, Port Blair.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000): some 37 combat ac, 23 combat hel.

1 attack sqn with 15 *Sea Hawk* FGA-6 (being retired), 8 *Sea Harrier* FRS Mk-51 (2 T-60 trg (10 ac in carrier).

1 ASW sqn with 5 *Alize* 1050 (4 in carrier).

2 MR sqns with 4 L-1049 *Super Constellation*, 3 II-38 *May*.

1 comms sqn with 18 *Defender* (some MR).

4 ASW hel sqns with 10 *Sea King* (carrier, frigates): 5 Ka-25 *Hormone* (in *Kashins*); 8 *Alouette* III (in frigates).

1 SAR/liaison hel sqn with 10 *Alouette* III.

2 trg sqns with 6 HJT-16 *Kiran*, 2 *Sea Hawk* FB-5 ac: 3 *Alouette* III, 4 Hughes 269 hel.

(On order: 10 *Sea Harrier* Mk 51, 1 T-60; 3 II-38 MR ac; 12 *Sea King* Mk 42B hel: *Sea Eagle* SSM; *Exocet* AM-39 ASM.)

Air Force: 113,000; some 920 combat ac: some 60 armed hel.

4 Air Commands.

3 lt bbr sqns (1 maritime role); 35 *Canberra* B(I)58/B(I)12 (to be replaced); 18 *Jaguar*.

15 FGA sqns: 1 with some 18 *Hunter* F-56A (*Jaguar* to replace); 3 with 50 *Jaguar* GR-1, 6 T-2; 2 with 36 Su-7BM; 1 with 18 HF-24 *Marut* (MiG-23BN to replace); 4 with 72 MiG-23BN *Flogger* H; 4 with 72 *Ajeet*.

21 AD sqns: 19 with 400 MiG-21/FL/PFMA/MF/bis; 2 with 45 MiG-23MF *Flogger* B.

2 recce sqns: 1 with 8 *Canberra* PR-57, 4 HS-748; 1 with 12 MiG-25R, 1 MiG-25U.

9 tpt sqns: 3 with 90 An-32; 2 with 30 An-12B; 2 with 20 DHC-3; 1 with 12 DHC-4: 1 with 9 HS-748M.

1 HQ comms sqn with 7 HS-748M, 2 Boeing 737-248 (leased).

Liaison flts and dets with 15 HS-748, C-47.

6 tpt hel sqns with 72 MiG-8.

8 liaison hel sqns with 100 SA-316B *Chetak* (*Alouette* III), some 60 SA-315B *Cheetah* (*Lama*); some with 4 AS-11B ATGW.

Trg Comd: 3 trg and conversion sqns with 12 *Canberra* T-4/-13/-67, 30 *Hunter* F-56/T-66, 40 MiG-21U, 16 Su-7U; MiG-21, Su-7, 13 MiG-23UM *Flogger* CL; 60 HT-2, 83 HJT-16 *Kiran*, 15 *Marut* Mk 1T, some HPT-32 (replacing HT-2), 44 TS-11 *Iskra*, 27 HS-748 ac; *Chetak* hel.

AAM: R-23R/T *Apex*, R-60 *Aphid*, R-550.

ASM: AS-30; AS-11B (ATGW).

30 SAM sqns with 180 *Divina* V 750VK, SA-2, SA-3.

Air Defence Ground Environment System.

(On order: 36 *Mirage* 2000H, 4 TH, 115 *Jaguar* (to be locally assembled), some 100 MiG-27M *Flogger* D/J, MiG-21 bis, 20 *Ajeet* ftrs; 6 An-32, Do-228, 20 II-76, 10 HS-748 tpts; 90 *Kiran* Mk 2, 140 HPT-32, 171 *Hawk* trg ac; Mi-8, Mi-24, 45 *Chetak* hel; R-23R *Apex*, R-60 *Aphid* AAM.)

Para-Military Forces: Border Security Force 85,000; 175,000 in other organizations. Coastguard 2,000; 2 Br Type 14 frigates, 2 FAC(P), 5 *Poluchat* large patrol craft, 2 air sqns with 2 F-27, 5 *Defender* ac, 4 *Chetak* hel.

(On order: 3 offshore, 9 inshore patrol vessels, 9 lt tpt ac, 6 hel.)

PAKISTAN

Population: 92,450,000 (excl Afghan refugees).

Military service: voluntary.

Total armed forces: 478,600

GDP 1982/3: Rs. 366.15 bn ($28.831 bn). Est 1983/4: 415.41 bn ($30.859 bn).

Def exp 1982/3: Rs. 23.224 bn ($1,829 bn).
Est 1983/4: 25.219 bn ($1.873 bn).
GDP growth: 6.6% (1982), 4.5% (1983).
Inflation: 12% (1982), 9.0% (1983).
FMA: $1.6 bn (1983).*
Debt: $10.4 bn (1983).
$1 = rupees 12.6998 (1982/3), 13.4616 (1983/4).

Army: 450,000.
7 Corps HQ; 1 Territorial Command.
2 armd divs.
16 inf divs.
4 indep armd bdes.
5 indep inf bdes.
7 arty bdes.
2 AA arty bdes.
6 armd recce regts.
6 SAM btys with 6 *Crotale* (each 4 msls).
1 special services group.
AFV: 370 M-47/-48 (incl A5), 51 T-54/-55, 1,000 Type-59 MBT; 500 M-113, 50 UR-416 APC.
ARTY: some 1,000 25-pdr (88mm), Type-59 100mm, 130mm, 5.5-in. (140mm) and 155mm guns and M-116 75mm pack, 105mm incl pack, 12 M-7 SP, 155mm towed, M-109 SP, M-115 203mm how; 122mm MRL; 107mm, 120mm mor.
ATK: 75mm, 3.5-in. (89mm) RL; Type 52 75mm, 106mm RCL; *Cobra* 200 *TOW* ATGW.
AD: 14.5mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm AA guns; 6 *Crotale* SAM.
Aviation:
1 liaison sqn with 20 *Supporter* ac.
4 hel sqns.
Indep army observation flts.
45 O-1E, Cessna 421, 50 *Mashshaq* (Saab *Safari*), *Turbo Commander*, *Queen Air* ac; some 15 Bell AH-1S, 16 Mi-8; 35 *Puma*, 23 *Alouette* III, 13 Bell 47G hel.
(On order: M-113 APC; 75 M-198 towed, 100 M-109A2 SP 155mm, 40 M-110 SP 203mm how; *TOW* ATGW launchers (incl 24 M-901 *Improved TOW* SP, 1,000 msls); some 5 AH-1S hel; 144 RBS-70 SAM launchers, 400 msls.)

RESERVES: 500,000.

Navy: 11,000.
11 subs: 2 *Agosta*, 4 *Daphne*, 5 SX-404 midget.
8 destroyers: 1 Br *County*, 2 × 4 *Seacat* SAM, 1 *Alouette* hel; 6 US *Gearing* with 1 × 8 *ASROC* ASW; 1 Br *Battle*.
4 Ch *Hainan* FAC(P), 1 *Town* patrol craft.
4 Ch *Hoku* FAC(G) (2 msls).
12 Ch *Shanghai*-II FAC.
4 Ch *Huchwan* hydrofoil FAC(T).
19 coastal patrol craft: 1 *Spear*, 18 MC-55 Type.
3 US *Adjutant* and MSC-268 coastal MCM.
1 US *Mission* underway replenishment tanker.
1 Br *Dido* cruiser (cadet trg/AA ship; non-operational).
NAVAL AIR: 3 combat ac, 6 combat hel.
1 ASW/MR sqn with 3 *Atlantic* with *Exocet* ASM.
2 ASW/SAR hel sqns with 6 *Sea King* ASW with *Exocet* AM-39, 4 *Alouette* III.
ASM: AM-39 *Exocet*.

Base: Karachi.

RESERVES: 5,000.

Air Force: 17,600; 314 combat ac.
9 FGA sqns: 1 with 17 *Mirage* IIIEP; 4 with 50 *Mirage* 5PA3; 4 with 52 Ch Q-5.
9 interceptor/FGA sqns with 170 Ch F-6; (1 converting to F-16 (6)).
1 recce sqn with 13 *Mirage* IIIRP.
1 OCU with some 6 F-16.
2 tpt sqns: 1 with 13 C-130B/E, 1 L-100; 1 with 1 *Falcon* 20, 1 F-27 200 (with Navy), 1 *Super King Air*, 1 *Bonanza*.
1 SAR hel sqn with 6 HH-43B, 4 *Alouette* III.
1 utility hel sqn with 4 *Super Frelon*, 12 Bell 47G.
1 trg sqn with 20 T-33A, 4 MiG-15UTI.

*FMA commitment 1983/7.

Other trainers incl 2 *Mirage* 5DPA2, 3 *Mirage* IIIDP, 25 *Mashshaq* (Saab *Supporter*), 35 T-37C, 45 Ch FT-5 (MiG-17U), 12 CJ-6, 24 Reims FTB-337.

AAM: *Sidewinder*, R-530, R-550 *Magic*.

(On order: 28 F-16, 14 Ch Q-5 FGA.)

RESERVES: 8,000.

Forces Abroad: 30,000 contract personnel: Saudi Arabia (20,000); Jordan, Libya, Oman, UAE.

Para-Military Forces: 109,100: National Guard (22,000); Frontier Corps (65,000); Pakistan Rangers (15,000); Coast Guard (2,000); Frontier Constabulary (5,100).

Source: The Military Balance 1983-84 International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Newsletter

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

MIRAGES Inducted into IAF

The first batch of the Mirages just inducted into the IAF are fitted with Snecma M-53 trubo fan jet engine, but the subsequent ones, according to air force officials, are likely to have even more powerful M-53 P-2 engines for better thrust-to-weight ratio.

The Mirages which India received are fitted with two super Matra Magic 530-D air-to-air missiles as well as two Matra 550 missiles under the wings. The missiles have a longer range, more than any other comparable weapon in the subcontinent.

Other armaments of the Indian Mirage include — two 30 mm DFFA cannons, and the only one of its kind in the world, a terrain following and navigation updating radar, the Antilope-5 jointly developed by the Electronique Serge Dassault and Thomson CSE, two Sagem intertial navigation platforms, two Thomsons-CSE multi-mode colour head-down displays and extensive ECM means.

The airforce officials said the precise navigation obtained by the two INS platforms after a long penetration flight provides for operational advantage for actual terrain masked high profile, the required safety for all weather radar terrain following and high system reliability.

Thanks to nine attachment points, the Mirages can operate an exceptionally wide range of armaments including laser guided weapons, anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, sub-munitions bombs and reconnaissance sensors.

Additional Systems: The Mirages also have additional attachments and systems to carry any nuclear air-to-ground missiles. The advanced Mirage 2000 N of the French air force carries the ASMP-air-to-ground missile.

India has purchased 40 Mirage-2000 jet fighters under a contract signed in 1983

and the IAF pilots have been training in France for the past several months to fly the sophisticated aircraft.

The remaining Mirages, air force officials said, would be flown to India in batches under a delivery schedule to be completed by the middle of next year. While India has decided not to exercise the option to manufacture the plane, it is likely to buy a few more Mirages from France in addition the 40 already contracted for.

the speed of sound) or at very low altitude within four minutes after brake release.

The Mirage 2000 has a normal speed level of over Mach 2.2 compared to Mach 2.0 of U.S. built F-16A nicknamed the "Fighting Falcon", acquired by Pakistan. At low level the aircraft can fly over 1,110 km per hour.

The Mirage acquired by India has also higher service ceiling than the U.S. fighter

MIRAGE 2000

Single-seat interceptor and air superiority fighter.

Max level speed	Over Mach 2.3
Max continuous speed	Mach 2.2 (800 knots IAS)
Max speed at low altitude without afterburning, carrying eight 250 kg bombs and two Magic missiles.	(1,110 km/h; 690 mph)
Approach speed	140 knots (260 km/h; 162 mph)
Min speed in stable flight	90 knots (167 km/h; 104 mph)
Rate of climb at S/L	15,000 m (49,200 ft)/min
Service ceiling	18,000 m (59,000 ft)
Range with four 250 kg bombs	More than 800 nm (1,480 km; 920 miles)

French Version: The French air force version of the Mirages called 2000 N are twin seaters with the front pilot responsible for mission decisions, flying and immediate safety measures and the rear pilot responsible for navigation and weapon management. The Mirage 2000 is single-seater.

India is the second country after France to acquire the Mirage 2000 which, according to its manufacturers, is capable of destroying any known type of hostile aircraft flying even at Mach 3 (three times

and the aircraft is able to fly up to 20,000 metres (65,000 feet) compared to the F-16 service ceiling of 15,240 metres (50,000 feet). The aircraft has also longer range and can fly up to 1,480 kms with a bomb load of 250 kg, but with additional two 1,700 litre drop tanks the aircraft can fly up to 1,800 km.

The US made "Fighting Falcons" have a range of just 925 km with a bomb load of 250 kg, but with much larger drop tanks of 2,100 litres the aircraft has a long range of 3,890 km.

MIRAGE 2000: Manufacturers' Version

According to the manufacturers, the versatile Mirage 2000 is made to operate in the following four major roles: To *intercept* a supersonic hostile, at very high or low altitude, *fight* and *destroy* enemy fighters, to ensure air superiority, carry out long range *attacks* against pin-point or widespread targets, *detect* at high speed enemy electromagnetic means or surface targets, in all weathers. The on-board counter-measure system informs the pilot of all threats, after having analysed and classified them: if necessary, such threats are jammed or decoyed.

Survival, during an air-to-air mission, as in an air-to-ground one, in hostile environment, is guaranteed by the aircraft's inherent qualities (low visual and radar signatures, manoeuvrability, high speed), but also by its own internal and highly elaborated electronic counter-measure means providing highly flexible detection and jamming programmes for use against the enemy's radar and fire control systems. Evidently, this constitutes a further technical achievement on a small sized aircraft.

The Mirage 2000 displays remarkable combat qualities: capacity to make 9-g turns at the highest instantaneous rates and very quickly take up a position from which it can fire its Magic 2 missiles or 30 mm automatic guns most effectively.

Let us dwell a while on these qualities, because the evolution of modern air combat gives primordial advantage to the aircraft which can manoeuvre rapidly in order to make the best use of its weapons.

Due to the aerodynamic and fly-by-wire characteristics of the Mirage 2000, its pilot no longer needs to keep a watch on its structural or aerodynamic limitations (no more stalling, loss of control, or spinning). Limitations are automatically applied to the electric commands fed to the control surfaces. Better still, it possesses the most highly developed kind of automatism: for example, by simply moving the stick "fullback", the aircraft is automatically put in the highest possible rate of turn, in full safety.

Furthermore, the Mirage 2000 has an afterburning fuel consumption (often used in combat) relatively lower than that of most of its rivals. Although the French engines burn more fuel than US ones during normal use, they use considerably less in the afterburning mode. They are therefore less suited for long range (the Hexagon is small) but better suited for air-to-air interception or combat: this proves to be a fundamental advantage.

Another distinctive characteristic of the Mirage 2000, and indeed of all Mirages, is its excellent ability to intercept targets detected late by ground radar systems, due to the high speeds made possible by its aerodynamism and the adaptability of its air intakes and engine to high Mach numbers. US aircraft such as the F-16 or F-18 have fixed geometry air intakes because they are not high altitude/high speed interception aircraft. Like its predecessors, the Mirage 2000 has air intakes whose geometry is automatically adapted to the Mach number, to increase engine thrust at high speed and high altitude.

Let us now consider the weapon systems used to intercept difficult targets. The Mirage family (Mirage 3s, Mirage F-1s and now Mirage 2000) uses two types of Matra missiles specially designed for it: one for dog-fighting, the other for interception. The Magic 2 and Super 530 D of the Mirage 2000 are certainly the most

effective air-to-air missiles of their category in the world.

Both in the domain of interception and in the domains of ground strike and reconnaissance, we again find one of the primordial qualities of the Mirage 2000: the versatility of a weapon system achieved through a close combination, desired from the onset, of the aircraft, its engine, its radar system and its weapons.

It must be recalled that the Super 530 D missile can intercept targets flying at speeds of up to M 3 and at an altitude exceeding 24,000 m, as well as trans-sonic targets flying at low altitude. This is an asset that not many machines possess, even when specialized in air defence and, therefore, without an air-to-ground capability.

Against land targets, the Mirage 2000 with its nine attachment points offers extremely varied and effective capacities, since they are matched to each type of targets (thanks to the very rich panoply of French air-to-ground weapons). All of these capacities have been the object of contracts and are, therefore, available.

The weapons mainly used are:

- against airfield runways, BAP 100 or "Durandal" bombs,
- against buildings, smooth, or retarded bombs,
- against vehicle convoys (including tanks), BAT 120 bombs, 68 or 100 mm rockets (specially those of the sub-munition type), and 30 mm automatic guns,
- against troop concentrations, "Beluga" bombs (area saturation, anti-personnel and anti-armoured vehicle), or modular bombs (three-in-one),
- against bridges, 1000 GL type laser guided bombs,
- against casemates and dug-in command posts, AS 30 L type laser guided bombs,
- against ships, Exocet AM 39 air-to-surface missiles,
- against radar installations, ARMAT anti-radar missiles.

It must be noted that to each specialized weapon correspond several firing or launching modes, in particular by night and "all-weather", and various flight profiles adapted to each type of mission.

Only the Mirage 2000 can offer such mission capacities, and this is due to the fact that, as we have already mentioned it, each type of weaponry has been adapted to the aircraft from the design modes, the pilot selecting his weapons and his options. Dialogues, between all these items of equipment and weapons, is by means of a digital link: the *Digibus*, which enables such a quick dialogue between all weapon system components and provides a great flexibility of adaptation for future weapons or, even, for foreign weapons which may be selected by a customer. During air-to-ground missions other Mirage 2000 qualities were evidenced. We have retained six of them:

- perfect aircraft behaviour during high speed/low altitude flight, due to its aerodynamism (delta wing) and fly-by-wire system,
- high penetration speed, without afterburning, even when the aircraft is heavily armed or in hot atmosphere, due to the design of both aircraft and engine,
- possible "all-weather" low altitude flight, due to the radar air-to-ground modes,
- high accuracy in navigation and attack modes, due to the inertial reference unit and suitable resetting means, and to the continuous, precise calculations of firing envelopes, gun firing and bomb releasing data,
- low visual and radar signatures, due to the shape of the machine and the absence of a tailplane (the radar signature of the Mirage 2000 is, for similar dimensions, only two thirds that of the F-16),

— **long range and large store capacity, which may be increased through flight refuelling.**

In addition to ground strike missions, reconnaissance missions are of great importance in the development of operations. These missions are very varied since the Mirage 2000 can carry four different types of specific pods, each specially suited to a type of information, and this in addition to the internal recording of other data picked up and stored by other sensors (HUD, radio, inertial reference unit, laser designation container, FLIR, radar, etc....)

The reconnaissance means used on the Mirage 2000 provide:

— **high definition, vertical oblique or panoramic photos, taken at high speed and low attitude with the COR 2 pod,**

— **very high definition side photos, taken at high speed, with the Harold pod and a specially stabilized, long focal length camera (electric posts located 100km away are visible on the pictures: such a photographic quality is normally obtainable only with highly specialized photo-reconnaissance aircraft).**

The Mirage 2000 can also record and possibly, transmit the infra-red images of the OR 2 Scanner, the electronic signals picked up by the Syrel container, or the long range radar side views taken by the Raphael container.

Following this rapid analysis of the main missions which the Mirage 2000 can carry out, let us draw up a list of assets which this complete, homogenous and fully integrated system presents.

It must be emphasized that an essential point of the system resides in the fact that its various elements, particularly the fully integrated pre- and post-mission support, were planned from the very beginning of the project: they were not "afterthoughts" which were included during the development phase. This is the fruit of a close cooperation between official services, equipment and weapon system manufacturers, and the prime contractor which, in addition, had a wide experience of the problem raised.

The flight plan combines computerized weapon system software loading techniques (swiftness accuracy, error elimination) with the necessary mission data: navigation, threats, etc....Similarly, and as already mentioned, after the mission, the Mirage 2000 is "emptied" of all the data gathered either for maintenance purpose, or to upkeep the data bank of the information system. The detailed, fine and swift analysis of the missions leads to high operational efficiency, more economical and more effective maintenance, etc...

During flight, the pilot has at his disposal, on the various screens provided, information concerning armament, avionics or aircraft system states, as well as the procedures to apply in various possible cases.

An important point concerns maintenance. The Mirage 2000 was designed to require only a limited maintenance force, an advantage where small air forces are involved. Similarly, instruction means have been adapted to meet such requirement.

Thus, the numerous operational capacities offered by the Mirage 2000 resulted from a right choice of technical features as, for example, the combination of the M 53 engine with variable geometry air intakes which, as compared with rival aircraft, enables a much greater thrust increase when speed and altitude increase. Contrary to "hasty" and obviously far from "innocent" comparisons, a study of

the operational concept shows many advantages over foreign solutions.

The Mirage 2000 is a concentration of these leading techniques for which AMD aircraft are famed:

- aerodynamism (Delta solution, now used for most future aircraft projects),
- optimized airframes,
- computer aided design and production,
- composite materials (carbon fibres),
- electric flight controls (fly-by-wire system),
- operational analysis.

An international class versatile aircraft, the Mirage 2000 — already selected by numerous Air Forces — will cover all types of missions which can be foreseen well beyond the weapon systems which will appear as and when technologies will progress.