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
Defence JOURNAL

MIND IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON



A MONTHLY MIRROR & DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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MYSTERY FIGHTER OF GULF WAR



After Desert Storm



Defence JOURNAL

MIND IN THE GULF WAR & AFTER

A MONTHLY MIRROR & DISCUSS OF GULF STRATEGY, AFFAIRS

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After the Desert Storm

The desert storm has blown over leaving behind an enormous wreckage of many an illusory castle built on sand. Saddam Hussein overstretched his luck and carried his 'strategic defiance' to the point where physical survival becomes worse than suicide and, audacity overdrawn on rhetoric, is reduced to mock-heroics. He allowed the odds turn so heavily against his field army as to leave it little chance even for an orderly withdrawal let alone room for strategic or operational manoeuvre. Tens of thousands of his elite Republic Guard Corps fell like flies to unrelenting Allied bombardment during their disorderly retreat.

When the Iraqi soldiers emerged from their trenches after the prolonged *sitzkrieg* they were too broken in body and spirit to stand up and fight. The 'enemy' had already "shaped" the battlefield for the land battle according to his plan. It might have been transformed into a veritable killing zone for men and a graveyard for much of their armour and artillery knocked out during the aerial bombardment.

Iraq's much-publicized air force hardly ever took off to interdict or engage the intruders. The only time it would come into view was during its several escape missions eastward into Iran for sanctuary. What might have been Saddam's strategy in letting his air force fly out of the Iraq when it was needed most to defend its air space and provide close support to the land forces, remains an enigma difficult to explain. Why would a reckless supreme commander like Saddam, who had staked the lives of ten of thousands of his countrymen—soldiers and civilians—together with the security of the country itself have shown such pathetic concern for the safety of his air force? It leaves one looking for an answer. Even with his mind closed to sane counsel Saddam would have known the fleeing aircraft would never return to their home base.

Allied forces C-in-C, General Norman Schwarzkopf embarked upon the land war only after having pulverized the Iraqi land forces, command/control centres and rear echelons for five long weeks. The ground phase was the most-dreaded operational phase in terms of heavy human casualties feared through this phase. Allies sought to keep the casualties to the absolute minimum. Saddam Hussein had threatened to make the Americans "swim in their blood". Gen. Schwarzkopf saw to it that before he launched the ground war, he imposed such deadly attrition on Iraqi men and war machine as to leave them unfit for action even before the battle would be joined. Only Saddam, encaged in his Baghdad hide-out, won't realize that.

He launched his "Mother of All Battles" on the delirious note of certain victory. Barely a hundred hours after the "Mother of All Battles" would end as the "Father of All Defeats". Kuwait was 'liberated' over the dead bodies of Iraqis; and Saddam on the verge of making history ended up in history's trash can—villain or victim—time alone would decide. His determined stand through six long months collapsed suddenly like Solomon's Staff—structurally in one piece foundationally moth-eaten.

Western media, its latest fetish, CNN, in particular would have the world believe in Iraq's status as the world's fourth largest military power. A million-strong army, an air force with nearly thousand advanced aircraft, over four thousand tanks, as many artillery pieces, piles of missiles, chemical and nonconventional (nuclear?) weapons. Nearly all military experts and analysts would forecast a long and costly war against a battle-tested and well-armed force. That battle-tested army is also a battle-weary army; and that no well-armed army could possibly be better-armed than the US-led coalition forces, was conveniently forgotten or underplayed.

The war as a whole might have been the most one-sided in all history in terms of the vast disparities in the fighting potential of the contending forces. The number of casualties alone suffered underscored the one-sidedness of the conflict. Allies' casualties for full 43 days between January 15 and February 28—included 149 killed and 513 wounded as against over 100,000 deaths and injuries among the Iraqis. It was military history's first technological slaughter.

From the day the Allies mounted their air offensive—a virtual *danse macabre*—the outcome of the conflict had never been in doubt. Only Saddam was taken in by his own high-sounding rhetoric.

What encouraged Saddam's admirers and supporters to have faith in him, among other things, had been the apparent pusillanimity of the Americans, their deep fear and horror of the land war so unreservedly expressed. It helped Saddam's military image to wax beyond its physical reality and that of the Allies plunge to a level where it would generate all sorts of misgivings about the Allies' military prowess. America was portrayed and dismissed as a paper tiger waiting for yet another Vietnam.

Hooked on illusions, the Muslim psyche invested Saddam Hussein with the trappings of a Messiah, a knight in shining armour equipped with superhuman spiritual and physical powers. Newspapers carried on their front-pages the picture of a dour-looking Saddam Hussein and a bearded, saintly old man behind him as his guardian angel. The caption said the hoary apparition stayed with Saddam Hussein all the time and was the prime source of his strength.

The doctored portrait together with the mounting Western folklore deduced from the quatrains of Nostradamus reinforced the popular belief in the emergence of a blue-turbaned hero of Islam in West Asia. And who would answer to the description better than Saddam Hussein.

A confirmed Ba'athist and secularist, Saddam was portrayed as a Mujahid and an Islamic warrior. A press photographer showed him with bended knees on his prayer carpet in the correct text-book attitude of Namaz. The picture was reproduced in colour and circulated widely. Such was the force of mass imagination, anchored to the archetypal symbols of heroism, that admiration for Saddam turned into unquestioned hero-worship. The utter horror of Saddam Hussein seen after his rape of Kuwait and the deep sympathy felt for Kuwait gradually gave way to unreserved support for Saddam. The custodian of Islam's holiest places, Saudi Arabia, was openly criticized for inviting U.S. to come to its rescue against fraternal Iraq—the only Islamic country to stand upto a superpower and its allies.

Whether Saddam was lured into the war by his own blinding ambition or by America's make-believe posture of positive neutrality in the event of dire contingency arising between Iraq and Kuwait, is essentially an academic question. Before Kuwait, Saddam had invaded Iran in spite of the Algiers Treaty of 1975 settling the Shatt-el-Arab dispute.

The popular story of Saddam being tacitly assured by U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, Ms. April Glaspie of her country's detachment from Iraq's economic war with Kuwait even if partially correct, would only serve to underscore his pathetic gullibility more than anything else. How could a diplomat, even one as strongly-placed as the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, be ever taken at his/her word on matters of peace or war with a third country. At any rate, heads of state and government do not confide to foreign envoys their grand military designs before launching them. In fact, it was Saddam's own overinflated self-image of his military power aggravated by his pressing economic compulsions that lured him into his adventurist trap. US had indeed actively encouraged and supported Saddam in the war he had imposed upon Iran. That would not, however, guarantee similar support and encouragement in a totally changed situation. The odds, moral, diplomatic, economic and geo-strategic, in the case of Kuwait had been materially different from those in the case of the Iraq-Iran war. For one thing U.S. had an adversarial relationship with Iran and, for other, no other neighbouring country felt threatened by Iraq in the same way as Saudi Arabia had to compell it ask for the U.S. support.

Saddam Hussein invaded and stayed in Kuwait entirely at his own initiative and has himself to blame for the disaster he brought upon his land and people in consequence.

For six long months he would persist in the criminal folly of defying the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union and the rest world by rejecting out of hand his best opportunities offered to him to leave Kuwait honourably. He could have got away with all the loot even with a piece of vital real estate — the *pied -a- terre* — he wanted. Between November 29, 1990 when UN Security Council adopted 678 sanctioning, in principle, the use of force, to get Iraq out of Kuwait and January 15, 1991 the deadline set for his immediate and unconditional withdrawal, he remained impervious to all sane counsel. On January 16/17, the Allies launched their aerial blitz with a concentration of firepower quite unprecedented in military history. It was hell let loose, all the pinpoint targeting the Allies claimed to reduce "collateral" damage to the minimum, notwithstanding.

The U.S. forces used the air-land doctrine with telling effect. Said Gen. Colin Powell at a Pentagon briefing: "First we are going to *cut* it and then we are going to *kill* it." In simpler language, it meant hitting the enemy's rear echelons, his command and control centres, supply lines, munition depots, the entire combat infra-structure, that is, before luring him into land battles to kill him. The Iraqis took the punishment with an almost bewildering calm but without a coherent riposte. The Iraqi tactic to provoke the Allies into precipitate ground action all but misfired. The attack and occupation of Khafji, a small Saudi border town by the Iraqis was a flash in the pan. It was their first and last effort to wrest initiative collapsing after an Allied counter attack.

Within three days of the land war Gen. Schwarzkopf at a press briefing said that Iraq had lost more than two third of its tank force in the Kuwait theatre and a proportionate percentage of other armoured vehicles, artillery and trucks. Whatever was still left of the Iraqi war machine was a jumbled mass of hardware scattered allover the battlefield in penny packets and isolated positions without the capacity to operate as a coordinated force.

Time for Saddam to sue for peace: to surrender unconditionally. But he would continue to hedge his bets and drive a hard bargain. In a final bid to help Saddam save his face, President Michael Gorbachev sent his personal adviser, Yevgeni Primikov out to Baghdad to tell Saddam to call it a day. Primikov met with Saddam on February 12, less than a fortnight before the ground war began. He told him that the Americans were "determined" to launch a large-scale operation to "crush" the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Saddam was responsive but unrepentent. He and his foreign minister Tariq Aziz argued and argued in the hope of clinching a deal to their satisfaction.

His archenemy, George Bush, poised for the final kill had no patience left for diplomatic niceties. He would settle for nothing less than the total humiliation of Saddam and destruction of his war machine.

As an eminent American historian, James MacGregor would put it Bush "personalized" the issue with all his talk of "kick the ass". In his opinion economic sanctions were a "very appropriate response". One reason why the economic sanctions failed to produce the desired result was Bush's one magnificent or morbid obsession to kick the Vietnam syndrome. And the land war was the shortest cut and after the devastating and wholly unopposed air war, the safest way to it. Saddam's much-vaunted Republican Guards sat through the war without joining the battle. Western media had projected a larger-than-life image of this body of men (a) to underscore the odds the coalition forces would be up against and (b) to prove to the world their own prowess against overwhelmingly superior odds. Allied commanders had consistently warned against overoptimistic assessments of an early and successful conclusion of the ground war until it was all over. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the 100-hour ground war was the total inaction on the part of Saddam Hussein and his military high command. They just sat in their bunkers hoping against hope for a miracle to happen to crown the "Mother of All Battles" with ultimate victory. They would sit it out as their beaten soldiers wended their way home under mounting Allied bombardment.

The Allied high command pounded the fleeing Iraqis mercilessly. Young pilots vied with each other

for missions to make easy kills without running calculated risk to their life or limb. They lived fully upto Clausewitzian description of war as an 'inescapably bloody business'. The 18th century German soldier-philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz remains one of the greatest military writers and historians of all times. The following quotation from his classical work "On War" is significant:

"The fact that a bloody slaughter is a horrifying act must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms".

The celebrated military historian and strategic thinker Sir Basil Liddell Hart called Clausewitz "Mehdi of mass massacre". Gen. Schwarzkopf took a leaf from Clausewitz's 'On War' and turned the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait into "bloody slaughter". He won't worry about such moralistic time-worn cliches as "In victory, magnanimity". He subjected the retreating Iraqis to the incessant bombing — easily the fiercest of his aerial blitz. Gen. Schwarzkopf's unrestrained use of the massive firepower at his command against a demoralised enemy on the run would, however, be debated in military academies for its moral and material implications and impact on the art of war.

Would he have used the same brutal tactic in the face of proportionate if not exactly equal hostile riposte? One wonders!

When war is pursued as a tribal vendetta in an environment of uncontrolled violence it loses much of its political rationale and moral justification, if any. Waged for the "liberation" of Kuwait the Gulf war progressively developed into a Bush-Saddam war; a bloody clash between presidential vanities. Gen. Schwarzkopf would not care where to hold his horses.

Whether the Gulf war was *just another war* or a *just war* is yet another question waiting for an answer. As a riposte to Iraq's treacherous invasion and annexation of Kuwait, its moral rationale cannot be exaggerated. It would be equally hard, however, to overlook or belittle its ulterior motivation. What goaded the United States into action, among other factors, had been its own ambition to project its military power far away from its own shores and its ability to underwrite the security of Israel against an Arab military threat. Through a judicious combination of diplomacy and militarism, US played the pied piper and also called the tune while others paid the bulk of the cost of war. Out of an estimated \$ 70 billion U.S. share would be a mere \$ 15—16 billion. Fielding the largest number of men and women, U.S. would also be main beneficiary of total pool. All the 450,000 American soldiers would be re-imbursed from the common monetary pool called the Defence Cooperation Fund (DCF). Of the principal donors Saudi Arabia and Kuwait top the list, with a promised share of \$14 billion each. Japan (\$ 9 billion) and Germany (\$ 1 billion) follow. An additional \$ 8 billion is expected from other mainly Britain and France.

A former British prime minister Edward Heath denounced British attempts to get "other nations" to help finance its Gulf War efforts. He said: "We are becoming mercenaries." Britain had some 42,000 military personnel deployed in the Gulf. Strong feelings had existed in U.S. itself against the deployment of American soldiers in the defence of despotic and reactionary Arab regimes. No blood-for-oil had been the principal slogan of the anti-war protestors. It must be left to the Americans themselves to decide whether they acted as mercenaries or crusaders in the Gulf.

Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, in one of his major public statements observed that the Allied forces were "counting their gains" in terms of dollars. "Those who defeated Hitler never counted their dollars. Rather they paid in blood and sweat to achieve the objective."

What would be the shape of things to come in the Gulf would depend largely on the US perceptions and policies at least in the foreseeable future. The Gulf and the Middle East (less Iran) lies at America's feet today. Much as America would proclaim its intent and resolve to see territorial status quo and political stability in Iraq, without Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains in the grip of a bitter civil war with

Saddam still in the saddle. He must either collapse or be liquidated soon. There is little hope, however, for a stable Iraq emerging from the ashes of war. 'Lebanization' division of the country into disparate spheres of influence appears to be a near possibility.

Iran's role in the process of Iraq's destabilization (even if less than feared) would be substantial and natural in view of the bitter memories of the long deadly war. In military terms, Israel is the only gainer. It stands today as the unchallenged military behemoth in the region, and the massive infusion of US arms would make it practically invincible. Syria and Egypt stand next to Israel as material gainers mainly as U.S. allies or surrogates. They have been admitted to the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council to participate in the regional security arrangement. There seems little or no likelihood, however, for Syria and Egypt to develop and stabilize their relations on a purely bilateral basis. The chronic intra-Arab animus would continue to shadow their relations. Iran is not admitted yet into GCC and is not too happy about it. It shows an uneasy consciousness of its status as the biggest country of the region and remains as a sort of square peg in the Arab circle. Restoration of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties is a welcome sign. How far it goes to help establish a firm base for future Arab-Iran collaboration remains to be seen, however.

Except for mounting anarchy and looming destabilization of Iraq and de-urbanization and devastation of Kuwait, status quo prevails, by and large, in the Gulf. All the other Arab Gulf states Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman stay as before and there seems to be no immediate threat to their security. Israel continues to remain in occupation of Syria's Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza and Al-Quds. And American forces stay put in the region apparently for a long haul.

After Iraq and Kuwait the Palestinians - more definitively the PLO — and Jordan are the biggest losers. They "backed on the wrong horse" and lost. Jordan's King Hussein tried to play the honest broker while leaning too heavily on Iraq's side to incur the displeasure of the Americans — his old friends and the mainstay of his country's economy and defence. The King has a common fate to share with his Arab peers.

Saudi Arabia is rightly annoyed with King Hussein and would not look at Yasser Arafat for their support to Saddam Hussein. It must be said to King Hussein's favour that he categorically denounced the use of military force for solving political and economic problems. He stood all along for an Arab solution of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute to the exclusion of Western powers. In Saudi Arabia's perception that was as bad as outright support of Saddam Hussein. A notorious survivor King Hussein is still there, despite the great upheaval. Riyadh discreetly suggests to unite the West Bank and Gaza with a Greater Jordan minus King Hussein.

The Gulf emirates, sheikhdoms and the solitary kingdom have apparently absorbed the shocks of the region's worst ever crisis. What will be the shape of things to come under President Bush's 'new order' and its impact on the Gulf's geo-politics?

"Absolute Arab monarchies are on the downside of history's curve". Says Murray Gart, an American commentator.

As for Pakistan, the Gulf crisis underscored the fragility of the political process and a staggering gap between the popular and the official civil-military perceptions. Apparently not enough homework had been done to measure the dimensions of the crisis and its likely impact on the internal situation. Hence the plethora of conflicting views and voices when it did occur.

—Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi (Retd).

Reflections on Gulf War and crisis

By

TURGUT OZAL

President of Turkey

HASAN BIN TALAL

Crown Prince of Jordan

YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM

Arab Intellectual

NOAM CHOMSKY

US Academic

An Unwanted War 'Became Unavoidable'

The invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq were in direct violation of all norms of international order and the fundamental principles of the United Nations charter. Iraq's act destroyed the peace and was the first serious challenge to the new world order. In standing together to confront this crisis, the international community has proved its determination not to permit aggression.

What we have witnessed since Aug. 2 is remarkable: the United Nations and its

After all these diplomatic efforts were exhausted, it was obvious that the Iraqi leadership was unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait.

Security Council exercising their peacekeeping function in the name of the international community to enforce international law.

Turkey follows the motto "Peace at home, peace in the world" in its foreign policy, and has continually advocated respect for international law. From the first day of the crisis, Turkey has taken a determined stand, insisting on the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwaiti independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and reinstatement of its legitimate government. When the Security Council mandated sanctions against Iraq, Turkey responded immediately.

We cut off the two oil pipelines that cross our country and sealed off our borders with one of our major trading partners. Even though we realized the sacrifice involved, compensation was not a consideration, nor self-interest a

motivation. I emphasize that our stand has been and remains one of principle.

By immediately implementing the sanctions, Turkey played a significant role in the formation of the international coalition. The cost of halting all trade with Iraq has been steep, especially when calculated in terms of our relations with the Iraqi people, with whom we enjoyed close and friendly relations, and of Turkey's developing economy. The international community should carefully consider the equitable sharing of the burden that Turkey willingly shouldered for peace.

President George Bush's efforts in bringing together the international coalition to respond to this aggression are commendable, as were the many attempts made by the United States and other coalition members to resolve this conflict through diplomacy. After all these diplomatic efforts were exhausted, it was obvious that the Iraqi leadership was unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait. The international community has moved to fulfill the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions. I very much regret that the Iraqi leadership did not have the common sense to abide by the will of the United Nations. No one wanted this war. Nevertheless, in the interest of securing peace it became unavoidable.

Turkey supports the actions taken by the multinational forces to meet the objectives set by the United States. To this end, the Turkish parliament authorized the government to send Turkish armed forces to foreign countries and to host and use foreign forces in Turkey. The scope, timing and necessity of these actions are to be determined by the government.

In light of this authorization, and in accordance with Resolution 678, we have decided to extend additional support to our coalition partners in the multinational

operation by approving wider use of the joint military installations in Turkey. This is in addition to the increased deployment of the Turkish army along our border with Iraq, where we have been pinning down eight or more Iraqi divisions.

The parliamentary authorization to send Turkish troops outside our borders is a precautionary measure. I emphasize that Turkish armed forces will not engage in operations against Iraq unless we are attacked. We do not covet Iraq's nor any other country's, soil, nor is a single inch of our own territory negotiable.

The Turkish government greatly hopes that the operation initiated against the Iraqi leadership will be short, incur minimal casualties and secure the objectives set by the United Nations. We cannot fail; we can only hope that Saddam Hussein will soon see that he cannot possibly win. Turkey has nothing against the Iraqi people, and hopes that once the crisis is over we will again enjoy close relations.

Now that the liberation of Kuwait has begun, the international community must start thinking about ways to stabilize the region after the conflict. There is no question but that the crisis has had, and will have, repercussions in the Middle East.

Once the Gulf crisis is behind us, the Arab-Israeli conflict must be addressed at the most fundamental level and resolved. Turkish policy on this conflict has always been clear, consistent and balanced. We recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including the right to establish their own state, as well as the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized boundaries. Lasting peace in the region requires the initiation of a process aiming at eco-

nomic interdependence among the nations of the Middle East. This would help establish a firm conviction among the region's peoples for protecting common interests, the destruction of which would harm all.

We believe that there exist vast opportunities to achieve this goal. In fact, several years ago I suggested building a "peace water pipeline" to carry water from

changes would consolidate economic interdependence. Tourism will be another important area where we could concentrate our efforts. Cooperation along these lines will not only create an atmosphere of understanding and goodwill but will also serve the well-being of all the nations in the region and help narrow the income gap between them, which may well be the

Once the Gulf crisis is behind us, the Arab-Israeli conflict must be addressed at the most fundamental level and resolved...We recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including the right to establish their own state, as well as the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized boundaries.

two Turkish rivers down to the Arabian Peninsula. I believe that, as water is such a critical resource (it may become even more precious than oil), such a pipeline would benefit all countries involved and offer a

I have invited regional leaders to Istanbul in November of this year for a summit conference on trans-boundary waters in the Middle East. These water pipelines may run parallel to oil and gas pipelines to cross the countries in the region.

real opportunity for regional cooperation. The region's water needs have not been given enough attention. To change this, I have invited regional leaders to Istanbul in November of this year for a summit conference on trans-boundary waters in the Middle East. These water pipelines may run parallel to oil and gas pipelines to cross the countries in the region.

We can collectively build and improve the infrastructure in the Middle East, which will greatly facilitate enhanced economic cooperation. Opening up our markets to one another and increasing trade ex-

root cause of future social unrest in the Middle East. An economic cooperation fund could be established from petroleum revenues, and its fund may be made instrumental for this purpose.

Another important process which should go hand in hand with economic cooperation is the process of democratization. This would help the region keep in pace with the exigencies of the new world order, and strengthen the necessary conditions to achieve a true peace in the Middle East.

We have our work cut out for us once the Gulf crisis is over. We must dedicate ourselves to establishing conditions for a lasting peace in the Middle East. Although we cannot in any way condone Iraq's methods, and we condemn aggression in the strongest possible terms, many of the issues that have come to the fore in the course of the conflict do deserve international attention. Let us hope for the quick return of peace so that we may turn to building a truly new world order. ■

For Many Arabs, End of War will Begin the Struggle

Nearly three weeks after the fighting began, it is obvious that the progress of the Gulf war has deepened confusion throughout the Middle East over who is right and who is wrong, what the fighting is about, and even how to define victory.

The battle for the Saudi town of Khafji, in which Iraqi troops took control of the town and were in turn routed by Saudi and Qatari troops backed by U.S. forces, was not only the first important ground engagement of the war. It was also a duel across the fault line that lies between the rich Gulf states, with their oil money and American military hardware, and the poorer Arabs of many lands who President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, with some justification, claims are rooting for him.

Some feel time is on Mr. Hussein's side in this complex struggle.

Ahmad Khalidi, a Mideast expert who edits a London based Arab strategic review, said, "With every day that passes it is very very clear that the longer the war goes on, the longer Mr. Hussein holds out, the more you will have a ground swell of support for Iraq."

The crisis has exposed deeper and more real contradictions between poor and rich, secularists and fundamentalists.

"This pan-Arab, pan-Islamic sympathy for Iraq," he said, "will depend on the direction of the war, the destruction visited upon the Iraqis by allied bombing, the possible entry of Israel into the conflict and the size of the civilian Iraqi casualties."

But within the Arab world, the agonized soul-searching has to do with those very myths of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic unity and brotherhood that were dearly held for the last four decades and that turned out to be hollow.

The crisis has exposed deeper and more real contradictions between poor and rich, secularists and fundamentalists.

It has opened deep wounds among Arab people themselves, to the point of pitting dispossessed Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories who fanatically

Twenty-two Arab governments, and beyond them the broader community of Islamic nations, have stood for six months haplessly watching a violent dispute within their ranks, unable to put together a credible Islamic or Arab force to defend Arab Islamic Kuwait.

support Iraq against their own better-off brethren living in the Arab Gulf region whose welfare has been undercut by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Twenty-two Arab governments, and beyond them the broader community of Islamic nations, have stood for six months haplessly watching a violent dispute within their ranks, unable to put together a credible Islamic or Arab force to defend Arab Islamic Kuwait.

Worse, they have watched "the American Satan" and the much-maligned former imperialist forces - Britain, France and Italy - begin to recreate a new Arab order whose profile is impossible to predict and that is

fraught with danger and instability.

Nowhere is this confusion, or canniness, more evident than in non-Arab Iran, which has been a sworn enemy of Iraq for years. It has condemned both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the American-led military action to end it.

It has said it would confiscate Iraqi fighter planes fleeing to Iran but, evidently in a nod to its majority Shiite Muslim population, it ordered its Red Crescent Society to supply the Iraqi people with food and medicine in defiance of the United Nations embargo.

It has said it could not maintain its neutrality if Israel entered the war, but has also signaled that, in its eyes, a defeat of Iraq could be a prelude to a larger anti-Western alliance in the region with a fundamentalist Islamic government ruling both Iraq and Iran.

Arab leaders from President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to King Hussein of Jordan are at each other's throats, justifying in daily diatribes their divergent positions. In Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, the Sudan and even in faraway Muslim nations like Malaysia and Pakistan, thousands of people have demonstrated in favor of Iraq.

But the governments are not always in sync with the people, nor is it clear to what extent the popular sentiment is truly with Iraq. In Morocco, King Hassan II warned opposition parties to end their aggressive demands to pull Moroccan troops from Saudi Arabia, threatening them with charges of treason.

Egypt has increased its force in Saudi Arabia to about 45,000 soldiers, but shut its universities this week, fearing pro-Iraqi demonstrations.

Arab leaders from President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to King Hussein of Jordan are at each other's throats, justifying in daily diatribes their divergent positions.

'Still Not Too Late' for Peace

The international campaign to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 678 (authorizing force) against Iraq has created a catastrophe for the peoples of our region. I fear that from the ashes of this crisis will emerge not a stable "Arab order" but a confusing welter of uncertainty and bitterness. Today's violence is not going to inaugurate a new era of peace.

The destruction being militarily unleashed by the United States and its allies is bloody and unprecedented. Innocent lives are being lost daily; tens of thousands of refugees - many of them third-country nationals - are desperately fleeing war-ravaged areas into Jordan. Losses to property and to local economies cannot even be imagined, let alone calculated. Yet global leaders appear to be proceeding as if people did not matter.

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The United Nations estimates that nearly a million refugees will flood into Jordan in the next few weeks. Many will be wounded, and Jordan will certainly not close its borders to them. Indeed, we have already started preparing facilities to accommodate at least 100,000 evacuees. But there is a limit to what Jordan can endure.

Having already spent more than \$55 million in assisting men, women and children who fled Kuwait and Iraq since last August, we can hardly cope with our cur-

rent financial burdens, let alone the nightmare of a new mass demographic transfer. The long promised international compensation for our humanitarian expenses has yet to arrive in full measure. It is a miracle that we have managed at all, and our economic survival certainly has little to do with those who have called themselves our traditional friends and to whom Jordan has more than amply demonstrated its friendship.

The tragedy being visited upon our region is certain to widen. More nations may be engulfed by the flames of war. The human, political, economic and ecological costs will mount so massively that future generations will end up paying for today's follies. The very survival of this region, not just political and social stability of individual nations, hangs in the balance.

We in Jordan are in an extremely vulnerable situation, and in a geopolitically thankless position. But we are determined to defend our land and our sky against all comers. And we will certainly not allow ourselves to serve as a corridor for anyone.

The target of the UN sanctions - and subsequent international military action - was Iraq, but Jordan has been a key victim. The sad irony is that despite our complete compliance with Security Council Resolution 661 [imposing sanctions] - compliance which has been repeatedly verified by international organizations - international

There can be a new regional order for the Middle East only if the dignity and human rights of Arabs and Jews alike are respected and codified.

donors have allowed our economic plight to continue.

A report commissioned recently by the United Nations secretary-general said that Jordan's losses for 1990-1991 would be at least \$5.2 billion because of the cutoff of trade and tourism; the loss of jobs and assets of Jordanians previously employed in the oil-rich Gulf; the cost of resettling the returnees in Jordan; monumental increases in the price of imported oil; the demographic inflow of additional Palestinians.

There can be a new regional order for the Middle East only if the dignity and human rights of Arabs and Jews alike are respected and codified. Jordan is alarmed by the Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli cities. The attacks have demonstrated, in a violent and tragic way, the nexus between the Gulf crisis and the long-lesser Palestinian question. The Palestinian question commands its own merit and deserves to be effectively addressed by the international community.

Jordan urgently calls for an end to an extension of this terrible war. We urge all people of goodwill, common sense and morality to work toward this end. It is still not too late to prevent further bloodshed. In this age where technology can be employed comprehensively in the cause of war, the collective wisdom of nations can surely be summoned to bring about a comprehensive peace. I believe Jordan has the sanity and means to contribute to that peace. A new regional order simply cannot be imposed on us.

Despite malicious attempts in sections of the American media to characterize Jordan as "in the enemy camp," we believe that aggression should not be rewarded. But if annexation and occupation of a sovereign nation are a high crime, you do not counter it with another crime. If aggression begets more aggression, then we are only playing into the hands of those who will ultimately destroy the fragile compact that mankind so tenuously enjoys with Planet Earth. We must end this horrible conflict immediately, peacefully and honorably. ■

Israel has also been affected. The hawks are using the Scud attacks as proof of the nation's vulnerability to Arab aggressions, further pushing aside any resolution of the Palestinian problem, while dovish officials hope the show of restraint will translate into greater American financial and political support.

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"There is not one Arab country where the political system is not under attack," said Fahmy Howeidi, an Egyptian columnist. "From Algeria to Saudi Arabia the voices of dissent are louder and the walls of silence are falling," he said. "Change is necessary, but I fear it won't be a natural birth but a cesarean operation marked with blood and trauma."

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Beyond the immediate circumference of the Middle East, non-Arab Muslim powers like Turkey and Iran are locked into the confrontation to determine not only what geopolitical gains they may snatch out of

it but also which forces will chart the future.

One possibility is what Iran likes to call "American Islam": the nonpoliticized faith embraced by pro-Western capitalistic nations in the region that believe in free enterprise and embrace Western modernization.

Another is the militant brand of anti-Western Islam propagated by the Iranian

revolution and embraced by powerful blocks of Muslim fundamentalist movements active in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, the Israeli-occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and even deep within the Saudi kingdom and Turkey.

Americans who are told by President George Bush that the Gulf crisis is a black-and-white issue where an aggressor is being forced to give up his prey are discovering that to many Arabs the takeover of Kuwait seems far less important than a redistribution of Arab oil wealth between poorly populated, rich oil-producers like

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the large, destitute countries like Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Yemen.

Furthermore, nearly all Arabs, including America's allies, firmly believe that a resolution of the 40-year Palestinian-Israeli conflict must somehow be linked to the liberation of Kuwait. And that makes the American vision of victory quite different from the visions held by the Arabs.

Within some countries, especially America's biggest ally, Saudi Arabia, the crisis has aroused an increasingly vocal liberal minority demanding more modernization and personal freedoms as basic as the right of a woman to drive a car, only to be opposed by a huge, xenophobic Islamic establishment arguing for a rollback of all modernization.

"The status quo will be impossible to maintain at the end of this war when all Arab regimes will be shaking," said Nabil Shaath, a political adviser to Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization. "We are talking about a nightmare, not a passing phase. There is a deep resentment of the United States' support of Israel accumulated over four decades. There are hurt feelings, hurt dignity.

But without a consensus on what direction the region should take in the postwar era, or who should lead it, the forces of change could simply translate into renewed chaos. ■

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Gulf War Imperialism by another name

THE Gulf war happened because Iraqi President Saddam Hussein got "too big for his breeches," and the US - once Saddam's sponsor - decided to destroy him, according to US academic Noam Chomsky.

And in the process, the US hoped to secure its hold on the world's energy resources, and the profits they create.

The US-led multinational force did not go to war in the Gulf to repel aggression or to install the so-called "new world order," Chomsky argued.

In fact, what we have seen is not a new world order, but rather a continuation of the old one, he said - "just an extension of the war against the Third World that has been going on for 500 years."

While many in Europe wanted to avoid a military confrontation with Iraq, "Washington insisted on it," Chomsky said in a recent speech to the London-based Catholic Institute of International Relations.

"From the very first days the US moved instantaneously to cut off the possibility that sanctions might work and flatly rejected any form of diplomacy. That's what's called going the extra mile," he said sardonically.

Chomsky, a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has long been one of the most famous anti-war thinkers in the US, making his mark during the Vietnam War. He is also a staunch critic of the mainstream media and what he calls American imperialism in the Third World who has managed to combine political activism with a highly-successful academic career.

In an interview, Chomsky said

Saddam's crimes did not matter so much to the US as long as the Iraqi leader posed no direct threat to the US scheme of things in the Middle East. That changed when Saddam asserted his independence.

"Saddam Hussein showed that he's an independent nationalist, and that can't be tolerated anywhere" by the US. I mean it's not because of anything bad that he did, Saddam Hussein was a murderous gangster on August 1 and he was George Bush's favourite friend and trading partner.

The invasion of Kuwait adds minimally to his already existing crimes, but it added one critical crime — he showed he was an independent nationalist.

"The invasion of Kuwait adds minimally to his already existing crimes, but it added one critical crime - he showed he was an independent nationalist. Up until then (the US) assumed that he could be kind of bought off and worked into the American system. But when he forcibly invaded Kuwait that showed he was just too independent and had to be destroyed."

Chomsky said that on the face of it, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was little worse than the US invasion of Panama.

"At the time when the UN and the US reacted (to the August 2 invasion of Kuwait), there was simply nothing to differentiate Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait from the US invasion of Panama.

"Casualties were about on the same scale, maybe a little worse in Panama. If there hadn't been such a strong reaction to

Saddam Hussein, it's possible he might have done what the US did in Panama and put in a puppet government.

"Look, we just went through the same story with Manuel Noriega. Noriega is a very minor crook compared with Saddam Hussein, who is a major gangster. But Noriega was on the CIA payroll, they thought he was just great, killing people and running drugs...he was just fine until he began to show that he was too big for his breeches and stopped obeying US orders."

Chomsky said the US action in the Gulf was simply an extension of a long-standing policy of crushing independent nationalism when it surfaces in a region of strategic or economic importance to the US.

"It really takes blindness not to see this. This is almost the historical universal."

He pointed to many instances where the US supported military dictators with appalling human rights records, then destroyed them once they no longer served US interests.

"The list includes Trujillo, Somoza, Duvalier, Marcos - all these guys were perfect so long as they worked for the United States. If they begin to look too independent, you cut off their heads."

He discounted the argument that the multinational force had to go to war with Iraq in order to put right the wrong of aggression.

Chomsky has joined the growing chorus asking why similar international action has not been taken to address the invasion and occupation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975, the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkey, and the occupation of South Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel - all acts of aggression that have been soundly condemned by the UN.

If there was any "new order" at all, said Chomsky, it was the absence of the Soviet Union from the world scene, giving the US free hand to engage in conflicts like the Gulf war that would have been unthinkable before. ■

GULF

Not a U.N. war

The war which the United States launched against Iraq, on January 17, is not only not a war on behalf of the United Nations but, contrary to the general impression, even without its proper sanction to repel by armed force Iraq's aggression on its hapless neighbour, Kuwait. It is a war to destroy Iraq's power, remove its leader, President Saddam Hussein, and impose on the region a political order which will respect American interests and legitimise its presence there.

Far from being dispelled, the impression is confirmed by President George Bush's State of the Union address on January 29: "We do not seek the destruction of Iraq, its culture or its people. Rather, we seek an Iraq that uses its great resources, not to destroy, not to serve the ambitions of a tyrant, but to build a better life for itself and its neighbours."

The motivation was not concealed, either. "We must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance further aggression." Mr. Bush has set out to build "a new world order". Since only the United States of America has had both the moral standing and the means to back it up, it will be Pax Americana. The formal tribute to the 28 countries which have joined the multinational force in the Gulf is lost in a speech which reeks of sheer chauvinism. "The conviction and courage we see in the Persian Gulf today is simply the American character in action."

Two wars in the region in the last decade were triggered off by U.S. consent. Haig's green signal to Sharon encouraged Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982, as Ze'ev Schiff, the Israeli journalist, documented in his article entitled the "Green Light" in the journal *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1983). In their book *Saddam's*

War, Johan Bullock and Harvey Morris have revealed that it was Brezezinski who gave the green signal to Iraq in August, 1980 to attack Iran.

War objectives

There has been a flurry of assurances recently that Iraq's destruction is not one of the war aims. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said on January 27: "It is not, of course, the purpose or goal of the multinational coalition to destroy Iraq." This formulation is well understood in the light of President Bush's remarks the very next day that "it's the regime of Saddam Hussein against the rest of the world". His speech on January 17 contained no such assurance, significantly. The stated objectives went

Hussein had been "pinpointed" and "warplanes were despatched to the site". A storm prevented the execution of this foul crime. A senior U.S. official lamented "We didn't get to cross the target."

General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, boasted on January 23 that Iraq's two operating nuclear reactors were "finished". Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has rightly pointed out that both were under IAEA safeguards and had been inspected only in November 1990. The air strikes dealt a "death blow" to the NPT and "also violate the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention" which forbids (Article 56) attacks even of "military objectives

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said on January 17: "We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed."

beyond repelling Iraqi aggression: "We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed."

The real objectives were never in doubt. An acute observer, Mr. F.J. Kherganwala, formerly of the Indian Foreign Service and not. The *Hindu*'s Gulf correspondent, reported (January 23) that "from every indication available, the U.S. led coalition had decided on running Iraq's economy totally". The *Washington Post* reported (January 25) that shortly after the war was launched the whereabouts of President Saddam

located at or in the vicinity of such (nuclear) installations".

Resolution 678

The British have been more candid. The House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs was informed that the coalition's aim is to remove Iraq's President. On January 27 Defence Secretary Tom King told the BBC that the coalition's aims went beyond the liberation of Kuwait. They covered the destruction of Iraq's military might and the coalition would not leave its task "half-finished". He gave the game away by arguing that the Security Council's "ultimatum"

resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorised Member States not only to implement earlier resolutions on Kuwait, but also "to restore international peace and security in the area". So construed, the resolution will be used as a *carte blanche* for imposing the West's schemes in the Gulf.

It is a war to destroy Iraq's power, remove its leader, President Saddam Hussein, and impose on the region a political order which will respect American interests and legitimise its presence there.

President Ali-Abdullah Saleh of Yemen sensed this early when he said on January 24 that the coalition was more interested in destroying Iraq than in liberating Kuwait. Three days later, even Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Boutros Ghali, told the BBC that U.N. Resolution does not encompass either the destruction of the Iraq's army or of its President but only the liberation of Kuwait.

In such a situation a heavy duty rested on the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, to make the position clear to all. He has miserably failed to discharge it. Belatedly and then in a press interview to the Italian weekly *Panorama*, published on January 28, he said that the war was not a U.N. war against Iraq but added that only the permission for the war had been issued by the Security Council. This interpretation is manifestly wrong. In a speech on January 28, President Bush also claimed as "legitimate authority" the principle of "collective self-defence" and "12 Security Council resolutions".

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter protects "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs" against a member of the U.N. "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary" to restore peace. Members are bound to report to the Council their exercise of the right. More, it "shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council". It has not

even been allowed to meet promptly in the instant case.

However, on November 8, 1990, Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that the U.S. had no authority to wage war against Iraq unilaterally since the Council was seized of the matter. Any attempt to take military action against Iraq under Article 51 could, he added with exquisite delicacy, "face legal difficulties". Responding specifically to President Bush's assertion a day before that the U.S. could take action against Iraq under Article 51, in response to the appeal of the Emir of Kuwait, Mr. de Cuellar said that Article 51 was not available three months after Iraq's invasion.

This leaves Resolution 678 as the sole source of legitimacy. Its crucial Para 2 reads thus "Authorises Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area".

Two wars in the region in the last decade were triggered off by U.S. consent. Haig's green signal to Sharon encouraged Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982..... it was Brezezinski who gave the green signal to Iraq in August, 1980 to attack Iran.

Is it not strange that in a document of such momentous importance the use of armed force was not explicitly sanctioned? Resolution 665 (August 25) had explicitly referred to States "deploying maritime forces" in the Gulf and authorised them to enforce the embargo. The Security Council's resolutions in similar situations could not have been unknown to the draftsmen of Resolution 678.

Its resolution of June, 1950, on Korea asked Member States to assist the republic of Korea "to repel the armed attack". Its

resolution of July 13, 1960, on the Congo authorised the Secretary-General "to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary". Its resolution of November 24, 1961 on Katanga's secession from the Congo empowered him "to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary" for defined ends. The resolution of April 9, 1966 on Rhodesia is very opposite in that, like Resolution 678, it delegated the power to a State, the U.K. It was authorised "to prevent by the use of force if necessary" breaking of the oil embargo.

Use of force

The absence of such explicit language authorising use of force in Resolution 678 cannot be explained away as being implied in what is a formal document of grave consequence. Even the notorious Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed by the U.S. Congress on August 10, 1964, authorised "all necessary steps, including the use of armed force". As Mr. Henry Brandon said, it was used "to justify the escalation of the war (in Vietnam) and to handcuff Congress into sharing responsibility for it". Others alleged deceit.

In any case Resolution 678 even by its own terms cannot be stretched to justify the kind of war the U.S. has unleashed on Iraq. Nor can the principle of collective self-defence. Two noted jurists, Dr. Norman Bentwich and Dr. Andrew Martin, aptly remarked in their commentary on the Charter that "Modern history is crowded with instances where aggression was committed under the cloak of self-defence". A noted American jurist, Dr. Myres S. McDougal, said that the right of self-defence was subject to the limitations "of necessity and of proportionality". According to a classic formulation by an American Secretary of State, the legendary Daniel Webster, "the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it". The attacks on Iraq cannot possibly fall within the ambit of self-defence.

However, all pretence of U.N. sanction stands exposed by the persistent obstruction in convening a meeting of the Security Council despite the fact that Para 4 of Resolution 678 enjoins the States "to

keep the Council regularly informed" and by Para 5 the Council decides to remain seized of the matter. This nullifies the entire resolution.

This is more than a procedural matter. It is the deliberate undermining of the authority of a vital organ of the U.N. which its Charter says (Article 8) "shall be so organised as to be able to function continuously". It bears "the primary responsibility" for keeping the peace. Rule 2 of its Rules of Procedure provide that "the President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council."

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
President's role

Once, a President refused to follow this rule. On April, 7, 1966, the U.S. asked Ambassador Keita of Mali, President for the month, to convene a meeting urgently. More than 48 hours elapsed between the request and the meeting. The U.S. rightly pointed out that Rule 2 is mandatory and that even if a majority of the Council members are opposed to a meeting, it must nevertheless be held. The President has a discretion "to set the time of a meeting" but he acts as a servant of the Council. Mr. Sidney D. Bailey opines in his authoritative work *The Procedure of the U.N. Security Council* that "the work of the Council would be brought to a halt if the President for the month were capriciously to flout the wishes of his colleagues." This has now come to pass. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Jordan and India backed Yemen and Cuba, in their request for a formal, open meeting of the Council only to be stalled by the U.S. and U.K. with the co-operation of the Council's President

Zaire. This has happened for the first time in the U.N. history.

There must be few precedents, if any, for the Secretary-General's report on his peace mission to Baghdad to be kept secret. *The Times* (London) of January 16 quoted the President as asking his visitor twice to use his good offices and assuring him that his position on Kuwait was not "irreversible". PTI's report published a week later quoted him as hinting at a "package deal" and expressing "concern that if the meeting were to produce insufficient results, it could be used by those who wanted to wage war against Iraq". The President said, that it would not be possible in a single day to find 'ready solutions' to such a complicated situation. Incredibly Mr. de Cuellar declared soon after that he had "lost hope". President Bush struck only a few hours after the deadline elapsed.

President Saddam Hussein cannot escape blame. He was the aggressor. Precisely for the reasons he mentioned he should have accepted Mr. de Cuellar's proposals. The diplomatic process was abruptly ended by the U.S. to unleash for its own ends a war devoid of legitimate sanction or purpose. ■



A Postwar Job for the United Nations

In fact, a gap has opened between the consensus UN goal of freeing Kuwait and the more ambitious American hope to undo Saddam Hussein and neutralize Iraq's war making capacity. And while this gap would close if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, another gap is widening. It extends not to war aims but to a peace process.

How odd that the United States, champion of internationalism in the Gulf, should have resisted a new United Nations Security Council discussion of the war. It is the same Security Council that the American government repeatedly congratulated for voting 12 condemnations of Iraq, including the resolution authorizing a turn to force. Yet its debate sought by UN members fearing that the bombing was taking the coalition beyond the basic United Nations mandate, was received in Washington as an embarrassment and shoved behind closed doors.

In fact, a gap has opened between the consensus UN goal of freeing Kuwait and the more ambitious American hope to undo Saddam Hussein and neutralize Iraq's war making capacity. And while this gap would close if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, another gap is widening. It extends not to war aims but to a peace process. Institutionally, the United Nations has not begun consideration of a postwar settlement, but the Bush administration is already working on its own broad terms. Secretary of State James Baker invites the United Nations to "encourage" plans drawn up by others.

It is natural and right that the United States should be thinking of the next stage. The reason is not simply that America has carried the burden of war coalition leadership. Given the range of American interests at stake in the Gulf, it would be negligent not to plan how to serve them after the war.

A series of administration statements, however, has produced no analysis of why or whether it would be good for Americans to get out front. The Bush team seems simply to be figuring that since the United States has called the shots in war, it is entitled to call the shots in peace. Conceivably, George Bush believes he is riding a grand wave that will carry him, if not into history, then at least into a second term. One can sniff an air of unexamined premises that speaks of national confidence but of possible overreaching as well.

To this take-charge tendency, the label of "new world order" is fixed. President Bush first applied the term to define the international cooperation he successfully organized to confront Iraqi aggression. Now it is becoming an umbrella opening over the American drafting of a postwar agenda. In this way does the new world order, a phrase with a nice internationalist ring, become the emblem of an American solution, a *Pax Americana* as it is sometimes called.

What? America is to be the arbiter, the guarantor, the policeman of the Gulf? Is this where President Bush is headed?

Where is the United Nations or some combination of relevant members? The end of the Cold War finally rendered the United Nations fit for particular challenges. True, it is not practiced at planning or agenda-setting. And the U.S. determination to have the United Nations authorize force but not itself employ force, while necessary in the crisis, deprived the world body of useful command experience. But who can look

with a cold eye on the convulsions likely in the postwar Gulf and want Washington to take first responsibility for them? The Gulf is not the Arab-Israeli dispute, an issue far readier for American massage. The case for not dishing off the Gulf to the United Nations remains to be made.

And where is the Soviet Union? Here things get interesting. No sooner had Secretary Baker (with his Moscow counterpart) pledged "mutual U.S.-Soviet efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace and regional stability" than unnamed White House officials started murmuring in the go-it-alone *Pax Americana* vein. ■

The Gulf is not the Arab-Israeli dispute, an issue far readier for American massage.
• *The case for not dishing off the Gulf to the United Nations remains to be made.*

Transformation of world power

If Americans define national interests too ambitiously, they are bound to be frustrated. The United States cannot hope, for example, to exert much control over the internal policies of other countries. In an age of nationalism, the United States will never have the resources for control over developing countries that Great Powers had earlier.

Since the age of Athens and Sparta, statesmen have understood power to mean economic and military strength. Today, however, many international issues – global debt and the greenhouse effect, for example – resist solution by classical means. "As world politics becomes more complex," political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr., writes, "the power of all major states to achieve their purposes seems to diminish."

How, then, should we measure power in a rapidly changing world? In the United States, these discussions often take the form of a debate over America's role in the international order that is emerging. Historian Paul Kennedy and some other critics see the new constraints on U.S. ability to effect its policies abroad as signs of national decline, but Nye disagrees with this view. For Nye, all nations, including the United States, must learn to pursue their goals through new sources of power: the manipulation of interdependence, the structure of the international system, the attraction of shared cultural values.

Nye is a professor of government at Harvard University and the director of the university's Center for Science and International Affairs. His books include *Power and Interdependence*, *Nuclear Ethics*, and *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*.

The critical issue for the United States in the 1990s is developing a realistic sense of the strengths and limits of its power. Polls report that half the public believes the country is in decline, and that those who believe in decline tend to be more protectionist and to counsel withdrawal from what they see as "overextended international commitments." But such advice would be counterproductive in today's world of growing interdependence: it could bring on the condition it is supposed to avert, and, if the most powerful country fails to lead, the consequences for international stability could be disastrous. Throughout history, anxiety about decline and shifting power relations has led to times of tension and mis-calculation. Now, when Soviet power is declining and Japanese power is rising, misleading theories of American decline are not merely "academic".

A number of observers assume that the emerging world can best be described as multipolar, and some theorists have argued that the flexible shifting of alliances associated with the classical multipolar balance of power will be a new source of stability in global politics. But the development of a true multipolarity of five major power centers – the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and a united Europe – does not seem likely in the near decades.

A good assessment should go beyond traditional geopolitics. If we focus too heavily on power transitions among leading

states, the historical analogies may cause us to miss other changes occurring in world politics. The end of the century will be very different from its beginning; the real problem will be power diffusion rather than hegemonic transition.

How should we measure power in a changing world? Throughout the centuries, statesmen and other observers have made mistakes perceiving the metric of power. In the 18th century, those who focused on France's population and rural industry would have missed the rise of Britain due to its political stability and favorable conditions for the industrial revolution. At the turn of this century, the American writer Brooks Adams used the control of metals and minerals as his index of future military and economic power; he predicted the decline of Britain and the ascendancy of Russia and China.

In fact, as the sociologist Daniel Bell has pointed out, at the end of this century, raw materials and heavy industry are less critical indices of economic power than are information and professional and technical services. If Bell is correct, the appropriate indicators of power are those related to manufacturing and services in the information industries.

In terms of traditional resources, the United States is likely to retain its super-power status. But looking only at traditional power resources is the wrong way to approach the question. The proof of power is in changed behaviour, not in resources. Power resources are imper-

Traditional instruments of power are rarely sufficient in dealing with issues of transnational interdependence. New power resources such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions may prove more relevant

fect predictors of influence. Games are not always won by the players who start with the largest pile of chips. The critical question for the future is not whether the United States will start the next century as a superpower with the largest pile of chips, but to what extent it will be able to control its environment and get others to do what it wants. Put simply, the game is becoming more complicated, with a broader range of issues and a wider variety of players.

A more complex world

As world politics becomes more complex, the power of all major states to achieve their purposes seems to diminish. To understand what is happening to the United States, one must distinguish power over other countries from power over outcomes. The United States still has leverage over particular countries, but far less leverage over the more complex system as a whole. The United States is less well placed to attain unilaterally the goals it prefers. But it is not alone in this situation. All states must confront the changing nature of world politics.

The end of the century will be very different from its beginning; the real problem will be power diffusion rather than hegemonic transition.

These changes are not entirely new. The rapid growth of private actors operating across international borders, whether they be large corporations or political groups, was already widely observed in the early 1970s. By the late '70s, however, the American mood shifted. Iran's

seizure of the American embassy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed to restore the role of force and the primacy of the traditional security agenda. Ronald Reagan's election accentuated these trends in the early '80s. The U.S. defense budget increased for five straight years, arms control was downgraded, and nuclear forces and deterrence aroused public anxieties. The shifting agenda of world politics seemed to discredit the '70s concern with interdependence and to restore the traditional emphasis on coercive military power.

Contrary to the tone of the political rhetoric, however, the world of the '80s was not a return to the world of the '50s. Public psychology and mood shifted more than power resources. Interdependence in finance and trade continued to increase rapidly. Trade deficits and international debt put new pressures on governments. Despite the rhetoric, the relations between the superpowers did not really return to the Cold War period. In the '80s, the United States and the Soviet Union had far more contact and communication, both private and governmental, than ever existed in the '50s.

In a sense, the contrast between the '70s and '80s was merely the latest oscillation in a recurring argument between two main strands in Western thought about international relations. Realism focuses on hard power, particularly on states use of military force to balance power in the international system. Realism has been the dominant strand; the liberal tradition has been secondary. The liberal approach is more concerned with soft-power resources and with the impact of societal contacts, economic interdependence, and international institutions on states.

However, the sharp disagreement between the two approaches to international affairs is overstated, for in fact they are complementary. Realists tend to take national interest for granted. Liberals notice how interdependence and international

institutions and ideas can influence the way states define their national interests. How states define their national interests and how their interests change have always been a weak spot in the realist approach. Nor does the traditional realist approach pay sufficient attention to the way that soft power and contacts among societies can introduce new ideas about national interests. Foreign corporations bringing new jobs, for example, may make trade unions less protectionist in their attitudes.

In defense of the realist approach, however, one might say that international politics is politics without appeal to a higher government to settle conflicts. In such a realm of self-help, force is an ultimate, if expensive, trump card. States ignore military force and balances of power at their peril. Such security dilemmas have existed since the time of Thucydides and they continue today. On the other hand, technology and growth have added new elements of economic and ecological interdependence to the puzzle. After all, Thucydides never had to worry about global debt, nuclear winter, or the depletion of the world's ozone layer.

The appropriate response to the changes in world politics is not to discard the traditional wisdom of the realists and their concern for the military balance of power, but to realize its limits and to supplement it with insights from the liberal approach. For instance, in the traditional view, states are the only significant actors in world politics; but today there are more than three times as many states as in 1945. Equally noteworthy, nonstate actors have increased in importance. Although they lack military power, transnational corporations have enormous economic resources. Twenty corporations individually have annual sales greater than the gross national product of any one of 80 states. The issue is not whether state or nonstate actors are more important—states usually are—but that more

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complex potential coalitions of actors affect outcomes in modern times.

Redefining security

As the actors in world politics are changing, so are their goals. In the traditional view states give priority to military security, but now they must consider new dimensions of security. Security is basically a negative goal—the absence of a threat to the state's survival. However, national survival is rarely at stake, and most people want to feel secure about more than survival. In fact, most national-security policies in today's world are designed to ensure economic welfare, group autonomy, and political status, not just physical survival within national boundaries. Indeed, some security policies such as nuclear deterrence increase the risk to physical survival in order to attain greater enjoyment of those other values.

In the traditional view, military force is the dominant instrument of power, but military force has become more costly for modern Great Powers to use than in earlier centuries. Other instruments such as communications, organizational, and institutional skills have become more important.

In particular, manipulation of interdependence has become an instrument of power. Contrary to some rhetorical flourishes, interdependence does not mean harmony. It simply means mutual dependence and it is often unevenly balanced. The less dependent or less vulnerable party in an interdependent relationship can derive power from threats to manipulate the interdependence. Interdependence is often differently balanced from one issue to the next, such as security, trade, or finance, and creating and

resisting linkages between issues where one is less or more vulnerable becomes part of the power game. States use international institutions to discourage or promote such linkages: they shop for the forum that best fits their interests in defining the scope of an issue.

Not only are the instruments of power changing: so are the strategies that relate instruments to goals. In the traditional view, the goal of security and the instrument of military force were linked by the strategy of balancing power. States wishing to preserve their independence from military threat followed a balancing strategy to limit the relative power of other states. Relative military power is, like dividing a pie, a zero-sum game where one side's gain is necessarily the other's loss. But economic and ecological issues involve large elements of joint gain—like agreeing to bake a larger pie. These gains are achieved through cooperation. In short, balance of power is not an obsolete strategy, but it is more limited than in earlier times in what it successfully predicts about states' strategies.

Finally, traditional accounts of world politics often refer to the "international system." They assume that it is sufficient to speak of one system with a structure that results from the balancing strategies of states. Up to a point, we can usefully speak about bipolarity and multipolarity—but, increasingly, different issues in world politics have different distributions of power. Military power, particularly at the nuclear level, remains largely bipolar in its distribution. But, in trade, where the European Community acts as a unit, power is multipolar. The power of states varies and so does the significance of nonstate actors in different issues. For example, one cannot understand the politics of the international-debt issue without considering the power of private banks. Thus there is more diversity in the hierarchies that characterize different issues.

Four new trends

The critical problem for understanding American power at the end of the century, then, is to understand the changing nature of world politics. This world is not entirely new. Strong elements of continuity make concern for the traditional military instruments and strategies of balance of power a necessary condition for a successful policy—but new elements in the modern world

contribute to the diffusion of power away from all the Great Powers.

One significant trend is the rise of economic interdependence. The changing technologies of communications and transportation have had a revolutionary effect. A century ago, it took two weeks to cross the Atlantic; in 1927 Charles Lindbergh did it in 33 hours; the Concorde makes it in three; and telecommunications are instantaneous. Declining costs of transportation and communication have revolutionized global markets and accelerated the development of transnational corporations that transfer economic activity across borders.

World trade has grown more rapidly than world product, increasing its importance in all major economies. In the United States, trade has more than doubled its role in the economy over the past two decades. Changes in financial markets are even more dramatic. International monetary flows are some 25 times the world's average daily trade in goods. With money pouring across their borders at unprecedented rates, the capacity of national monetary authorities to influence their national money supplies, to affect their national exchange rates, or even to supervise their banking systems has been reduced to new low levels.

A second trend, the process of modernization, urbanization, and increased communication in developing nations, has also diffused power from government to private actors. One of the reasons that military power is more difficult to apply in the late 20th century than in earlier periods is the social awakening

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that increased nationalism in otherwise poor or weak states. In the 19th century, Great Powers carved out and ruled colonial empires with a handful of troops. Today, increased social mobilization makes military intervention and external rule more costly.

A third trend in the diffusion of power represents a strengthening of weak states. The spread of military technology enhances the capabilities of backward states. While the superpowers have kept a large lead in military technology, the forces that many Third World states can deploy in the 1990s make regional intervention more costly than it was in the '50s. In addition more countries are acquiring sophisticated weapons capabilities and by a recent count 15 Third World nations could be producing their own ballistic missiles by the year 2000. A small nuclear capability will not make these states contenders for global power. In fact, it may increase the risks they face if their neighbors follow suit or if the bombs fall into the hands of rebel groups. It does, however, enhance their regional power and increase the potential costs of regional intervention by larger powers.

The fourth trend that diminishes the ability of Great Powers to control their environment despite impressive traditional power resources is the changing nature of the issues in world politics. An increasing number of issues do not simply pit one state against another. The solution to many issues of transnational interdependence will require collective action and cooperation among states. Such issues include ecological changes such as acid rain and global warming, health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and control of terrorism. These issues are transnational because they have domestic roots but cross international borders. When a major accident occurs, even a domestic issue like the safety of nuclear reactors can suddenly become a transnational issue.

While force may sometimes play a role, traditional instruments of power are rarely sufficient in dealing with such issues. New power resources such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions may prove more relevant. Moreover, cooperation will often be required from small weak states that are not fully

capable of managing their own domestic drug, health, or ecological problems. Economic assistance and military force can play a role in coping with terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or drugs, but the ability of any Great Power to control its environment and to get what it wants is often not as great as traditional power indicators suggest.

Power for what?

In addition, the fragmented structure of world politics among different issues has made power resources less fungible, i.e.,

Up to a point, we can usefully speak about bipolarity and multipolarity—but, increasingly, different issues in world politics have different distributions of power.

less transferable from one issue to another. In the 18th century, a monarch with a full treasury could purchase infantry, which allowed the conquest of new provinces, which in turn could enrich the treasury—but, for reasons we have already seen, the direct use of force for economic aggrandizement is generally too costly and dangerous for modern Great Powers.

More than in previous times, one must ask the question, "Power for what?" At the same time, because world politics has only partly changed and the traditional geopolitical agenda remains relevant, some fungibility of military power remains. The United States still serves as an ultimate guarantor of the military security of Europe and Japan, and that protection creates a power resource in the complex bargaining among the allies.

A second effect of changing world politics is that power behavior is also becoming less coercive, at least among the major states. Imagine a spectrum of coerciveness in the instruments of power, ranging from diplomatic notes through economic threats to military coercion. In earlier periods, the costs of coercion were rela-

tively low. Force was acceptable and economies were less interdependent. But, under current conditions, the use of force against small countries is more costly.

Manipulation of interdependence under the current conditions is also more costly. Economic interdependence usually carries some benefits in both directions, and threats to disrupt the relationship, if carried out, could be very expensive. For example, Japan might wish the United States to reduce its budget deficit, but a threat to refuse to buy American treasury bonds could disrupt financial markets and have enormously costly effects on Japan as well as on the United States. Because the more threatening and coercive applications of power tend to be more costly, the less threatening types of power resources are becoming more useful.

An important aspect of power is the ability to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with one's own. This attractive or co-optive power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction, as well as the rules and institutions of international regimes.

The United States has more cooptive power than other countries in the international system. Institutions governing the international economy, such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody the liberal free market principles that coincide in large measure with American society and ideology. The United States has succeeded in creating an institutionalized political framework for world capitalism, as well as a framework that has permitted the development of transnational corporations. For example, in the

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'70s, the United States resisted a restrictive UN code for transnational corporations and instead supported a liberal code within the more sympathetic Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The United States has also pressed for the liberalization of trade in services such as banking, insurance, transportation, advertising, and consulting. It was U.S. pressure that persuaded the OECD countries to commit themselves to liberalized transborder data flows in 1985.

Cultural resources

Multinational corporations are another source of co-optive power. Susan Strange, in her book *States and Markets*, argues that U.S. power in the world economy has increased as a result of transnational production. In part this power arises from the fact that 40 percent of the largest multinational corporations are headquartered in the United States (compared to 16 percent in Japan). "Washington may have lost some of its authority over the U.S.-based transnationals, but their managers still carry U.S. passports, can be subpoenaed in U.S. courts, and in war or national emergency would obey Washington first," Strange writes. "Meanwhile, the U.S. government has gained new authority over a great many foreign corporations operating inside the United States. All of them are acutely aware that the U.S. market is the biggest prize".

American culture is also a relatively inexpensive and useful soft-power resource. Obviously, many aspects of American culture are unattractive to other peoples, and there is always danger of bias in evaluating cultural sources of power. But American popular culture embodied in products and communications has widespread popular appeal. Soviet teenagers wear blue jeans and seek American recordings. Young Japanese who have never left home sport jackets with the names of American colleges. Of

course, there is an element of triviality and fad in popular behavior, but it is also true that a country that stands astride popular channels of communication has more opportunities to get its message across and to affect the preferences of others. According to UNESCO studies, the United States exported seven times more televi-

not only because they have numbers and resources of libraries and finance, but also because their work is conducted in English. By comparison with this predominance in the knowledge structure, any loss of American capability in industrial manufacturing is trivial and unimportant.

Adapting to change

The ethnic openness of American culture and the political appeal of the values of democracy and human rights also provide a source of international influence which some European nations have to a degree, but which the communist countries have largely lost. Compared to Japan and Europe, America's relative openness to immigrants is a source of strength. As the European scholar Ralf Dahrendorf says, "It seems to me relevant that millions of people all over the world would wish to live in the United States and that indeed people are prepared to risk their lives in order to get there."

If Americans define national interests too ambitiously, they are bound to be frustrated. The United States cannot hope, for example, to exert much control over the internal policies of other countries. In an age of nationalism, the United States will never have the resources for control over developing countries that Great Powers had earlier.

sion shows than the next country (Britain), and had the only global network for film distribution. As Strange has put it,

The American language has become the lingua franca of the global economy and of transnational social and professional groups.... American universities [have] come to dominate learning and the major professions

A third effect of changing international politics on the nature of power is that less tangible resources are becoming more important. Power is passing to the "information-rich" instead of the "capital-rich." Indeed, it is information that unlocks the door giving access to credit, not the mere possession and accumulation of capital. Information is becoming plentiful, but the flexibility to act first on new information remains a scarce skill. Product cycles are shortening and technology is moving toward totally flexible production systems, in which the craft-era tradition of custom-tailoring of products will be incorporated in modern manufacturing plants. Japan has been particularly adept at pioneering such flexible manufacturing processes.

Timely response to information is not only important to manufacturing leadership, it is also important in critical services such as finance, insurance, and trans-

portation. Markets in past centuries have always been determined by the limits of transportation and communications connecting buyers and sellers. In the past, such limits were measured in weeks or days, but the new means of communication allow information on market trends to be immediately accessible to buyers and sellers worldwide.

Another intangible aspect of power arises in the context of inter-dependence. For instance, the "power of the debtor" has long been known. If you owe a bank \$10,000, the bank has power over you, but if you owe \$10,000,000, you have power over the bank. If a relationship is beneficial to both parties, the possibility that the weaker side might collapse under pressure limits the power of the ostensibly stronger partner. That is the "power of the weak." Interdependence creates a power situation poorly described by the overt distribution of economic resources. Developing countries that cannot prevent destruction of their forests will affect the global climate, for instance. Yet the very weakness of those states will diminish the power to influence them which the United States would expect from its superior resources.

A final aspect of power in the current context is not new, but takes on a different significance. There is almost always a gap between a country's potential power

as measured by its resources, and its actual or realized power as measured by the changed behavior of others and the extent to which others share its preferences. Not all potential power can be effectively mobilized and converted to realized power. For example, before 1914, Russia's potential power was decidedly greater than its realized power because of the weakness of its physical infrastructure and the inefficiency of its political system.

Some countries are more efficient at power conversion than others. In the United States, the political system promotes freedom rather than efficiency; but, in the current information-based economy with its reduction of time to react, American inefficiencies in power conversion may become very expensive. Domestic changes such as improved education and less hierarchical corporations will be needed to improve America's ability to mobilize its power resources. Otherwise, the gap between the American preponderance in resources and the United States' ability to achieve its purposes will continue to grow and frustrate.

There are several things the United States can do to enhance the prospects for achieving its purposes under the condition of interdependence and power diffusion. One is to be modest in the choice of purposes. If Americans define national interests too ambitiously, they are bound to be frustrated. The United States cannot hope,

for example, to exert much control over the internal policies of other countries. In an age of nationalism, the United States will never have the resources for control over developing countries that Great Powers had earlier.

Second, the United States will have to invest more heavily than it has in the recent past in the soft-power resources that help to provide co-optive behavioral power. On the one hand, this means a greater investment in international institutions. On the other, it means domestic reforms that enhance the openness and attractiveness of American political culture. This means social performance more in accord with professed American ideals, something more easily urged than accomplished.

In sum, the American problem at the end of the century is not one of decline or replacement by a new hegemon. It is a problem of adapting to the changing nature of power in world politics. Only if the United States understands the nature of this situation correctly will it be able to exercise the necessary international leadership as the world enters the new century. ■

Courtesy: *Dialogue*
4.90

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1514-1555

Intermittent Turkish-Persian hostilities in eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Mesopotamia, ending with the Treaty of Amasya (Amasya) confirming Turkish possession of Mesopotamia.

1756

Kuwait's autonomous status established with the appointment of a member of the Sabah family as Sheikh.

1932, 18 September

Ibn Saud proclaims the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

1934

Kuwait grants concession to Kuwait Oil Company, a joint Anglo-American venture.

1938

Oil discovered in Kuwait.

1939-1945

World War II.

1946

Oil first exported from Kuwait.

1948, 14 May

State of Israel proclaimed.

1948, 14 May

First Arab-Israeli War (Israeli War of Independence).

1950, 29 January

Abdullah as-Salim as-Sabah becomes Sheikh of Kuwait.

1956, 29 October

Second Arab-Israeli War and Anglo-French invasion of the Suez area (Suez crisis).

1958, 14 July

Iraq Revolution. Free Officers' movement led by Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem overthrows the regime of

Premier Nuri al-Said in a bloody coup. King Farouk II and Nuri al-Said slain.

1961, 19 June

Britain grants Kuwait independence.

1961, 25 June

Iraq claims Kuwait and threatens invasion. British troops are landed in Kuwait.

1961, 20 July

Kuwait admitted to the Arab League and protected by a League peacekeeping force, forestalling Iraqi annexation.

1963, 8 March

Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party headed by Amin Hafiz attains power in Syria following coup.

1963, 14 May

Kuwait admitted to the United Nations.

1963, October

Iraq recognises Kuwait's independence.

1966, 23 February

Second Ba'athist regime, more radical and leftist than its predecessor, seizes power in Syria.

1968

Ba'ath Party seizes power in Iraq.

1975

Iraqi attempt to pressure Kuwait to cede territory.

1985

Attempted assassination of Kuwait's Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad Al Sabah by Iraqi radical al-Dawa group.

1988, August-1990

Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations strained by territorial disputes, including the question of sovereignty over Bubiyan Island.

1990, 2 August

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Beyond the Gulf War

The background to the Gulf war needs to be examined simply in terms of the specific quarrel between Iraq and Kuwait. The history of the Iraq-Kuwait disputes has some bearing, of course. But from an international point of view that is now a minor detail. Whichever way it is settled is unlikely to affect the global or regional balances of power. The outside world has larger interest in the political outcome of the war. For, it would influence the regional and wider international relationships. One cannot do better than to look at the political background.

The Regional Picture

Developments prior to the 1990 crisis in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations are dominated by two major events in the region: there was the eight-year-long Iraq and Iran war that came to an end in August 1988; and secondly, the outbreak of Intefada among the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied areas of West Bank and Gaza Strip. The latter is, miraculously, still continuing. These two factors, taken together, make it plain that the situation in the whole of what is West Asia cannot continue as it is without something giving way; it is an inherently unstable situation. A third element in the situation can also be noted: the American-sponsored peace process, initiated in 1978, had run into sand. This was largely because Israel was totally unwilling to make any concession whatever. No matter what assurances and understandings had been given by the US to various moderate and pro-Western Arab regimes, none of them looked like being implemented. The major stumbling block was Israeli obduracy and the inability or unwillingness of the US to compel Israel to go along even with the moderate proposals that the US itself made from time to time. (That the Israelis also advanced a peace plan of

their own and later all but killed it is a minor detail that need not detain us). The major fact of an unstable stalemate in the region, insofar as Arab-Israel dispute is concerned, cannot be gainsaid while in the Gulf sub-region, the fundamentally inconclusive war had left Iraq and Iran in a strange condition.

The war came to an end, when it did because the Iranians had no means to counter the chemical weapons that Iraqis had used, although Iranians had withstood the superiority of Iraqi armour and having no air cover of their own, worth the name. The economic ravages of the war for Iran

The American lead in technology and productivity has been eroded; that lead is now held by Japan and Germany and to an extent by other West European countries.

were far too serious more so because of its diplomatic and political isolation: its oil exports had suffered drastic diminution and it could buy modern armour from nowhere on any significant scale. Iraq, on the other hand, could rely upon plentiful supply from all western countries. Resources were no consideration for it. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE were bank-rolling at without stint.

Thus Iraq was able to make good all its losses of military hardware, especially heavy armour of all kinds including the best aircrafts of eastern and Western technology. Thus, except for the incalculable factor of the troops morale and their

possible war weariness, Iraqi war machine was, or should have been, in Aye¹. One condition by the time Kuwait crisis exploded. The inherent limitations of size, resources and manpower, of course, remained. Militarily, Iraq overshadowed every one in the Gulf sub-region. (Iran, in any day-to-day sense, did not tower over others these days but its resources and potential make it a potential great power).

The regional picture will not be complete unless two other factors are mentioned: First, military strength of Israel has been maintained as a mini-super power of the area largely with the help of the US and other western powers. Secondly, US diplomacy has succeeded in dividing the Arab world into two virtually irreconcileable halves of a large number of states with moderate pro-western regimes and the more radical states that were, and to an extent still are, ready to do something to upset the status quo (mainly to redress the Palestinians' grievances). The reason for befriending the oil-rich Gulf Sheikdoms and keeping them in a pro-western alignment served the western purposes: it helped to recycle petrol incomes of these states through absurd arm deals where billions of Arab money was transferred to western countries and all of it starved the more radically-inclined Arab states of cash resources to implement their pro-Palestinian, or rather anti-Israeli, designs. In fact, keeping the Arabs divided has been a major aim of western diplomacy ever since the establishment of Israel in 1948.

International Developments

The Gulf war would not make any sense unless major international developments are kept in view. The most dramatic one was the series of revolutions in eastern Europe in 1989. It has been the climax of a long process

initiated by the Russian leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev with his *glasnost* and *perestroika* programmes in 1985. By 1989 things had gone so far as to have knocked out the Soviet Union as a major player of realpolitik, indeed as a superpower. The communist regimes were overthrown and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Soviet Union, with a strange alacrity, agreed to withdraw its Red Army from all of eastern Europe. Strangest of all, it agreed to the western takeover of East Germany and eventually withdrawal of 360,000 troops from there. This meant several things: sudden creation of a unipolar world and, inside Europe, Russian willingness to countenance the emergence of a new potential power-centre of united Germany.

By the time the crisis in the Gulf compelled world attention, Europe was witnessing dramatic developments-dramatic not in terms of isolated spectacles but the steady growth of west-European integration had resulted in the notional emergence of a new potential superpower (European community) EC.

The climactic developments took place in 1990. In fact a date can be put. The 35-nation Summit in Paris on November 19-21, 1990, was meant to be a grand spectacle. It was the hour of crowning glory of the Helsinki Process. It was the Summit Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at which leaders of both the Atlantic alliance and Warsaw Pact agreed formally to declare an end of the 44-year old global cold war between the socalled east and west. A European Charter was also signed, emphasising that henceforth people of Europe shall respect human rights in a way with institutions through which all problems and disputes shall be resolved peacefully and democratically. Earlier the West Europeans had set themselves the goals of economic and monetary union, on the one hand, and the creation of a true single market throughout EC, on the other. There were also some other brave declarations and some agreement on proceeding to create eventually a united states of Europe comprising mainly the EC states and conceptually open to all of Europe. In this idyllic picture there was also a conundrum: suddenly the prospect of a united Germany in the middle of Europe arose in the summer of 1989.

Initially it upset most Europeans. But quickly, the most of the EC members overcame the shock and came up with the goal of even tighter European unity with the new united Germany fully integrated into it. The French should be given credit for this bold concept, though the British demurred. The latter thought that a united Germany in the new unified Europe would be the proverbial camel in the tent. Since the autumn of 1989, West Europeans are being pulled in opposite directions: the British, discreetly but strongly supported by the US, want to keep European integration to about what has been achieved already- perhaps a little more may be added to it. The other side comprises mainly France and Germany who want a proper European integration even in political matters. There are nuances of

the balance of payments, reinforced by equally huge deficits in the national budget and on the external trade account. The American lead in technology and productivity has been eroded; that lead is now held by Japan and Germany and to an extent by other West European countries. The relationship among the three major economic power centres, viz. US, EC and Japan, has been less than friendly. It is optional to consider it frequently tension-ridden or being at the stage where major trade wars can be witnessed.

The international monetary system has been in turmoil for almost two decades. There are no fixed exchange rates any longer. The world economy is clearly lopsided: a very large number of states are weighed down by huge debts

...it is already being said that the war had been fought in order to promote Israeli interests and to make it supreme in the region. Which is why the US is being expected to by some move against Iran and even Pakistan as the longer-term and possible threats to Israeli supremacy.

differences also. The French wish to keep the European integration confined mainly to western half of the continent, including all of Germany, while the Germans are prepared to conceive a true continent-wide European integration-mainly to allay the fears of German domination that are found in all parts of Europe. This concept of European integration is an important component of the background in which the Gulf war needs to be seen.

Economic Backdrop

In the purely economic sphere, the world has been for some time a multipolar one. It has seen the decline of the American superpower in financial and economic terms and the emergence of Germany and Japan as two potential economic superpowers. In the case of US, the transition from being the world's biggest creditor to the world's biggest debtor has been as spectacular as it was rapid. This involved more than merely large deficits in

that cannot be repaid in any meaningful future; indeed the process is towards increasing these mountainous debts. A few states are chalking up surpluses, among these Germany and to an extent a few other EC members on the one side, and Japan, on the other. That the process of incurring debts can, in nearly all cases, be correlated with the militarisation programmes (including chiefly the US) is an interesting conclusion. But this aspect is not relevant here, except to say that the militarisation programmes are an important means for the transfer of wealth between developed and underdeveloped nations, the US case being a special one where a quantum jump has been made from a quantitative to qualitative change. The point to note is the total instability in the world trade and this is matched by a virtual absence of monetary system. The years 1989 and 1990 were marked by a great deal of illwill between the US, on the one hand,

and Japan and European Community, on the other. The trade quarrel over subsidized exports and services had been worsening all the time until the end of the year 1990 when in a grand ill-tempered finale of the collapse of Uruguay round of GATT negotiations on December 8, 1990. What happens next is any one's guess. The drift of events is towards more or less uninhibited trade wars, though efforts are still continuing to rescue trade talks and preventing all-out trade rivalries. The point nevertheless remains that the world is poised on the brink of 1990's-like trade wars in which the US would be pitted against its erstwhile political allies in Europe and Japan.

Also relevant are several other symptoms that have made people dust off old studies of the 1930's period: old, easy optimism of 1950s or even 1960s had dissipated completely during the turbulent 1980s, with the persistent failure of most western economies to maintain anything like full employment. Indeed, a persistent, almost malignant,

techniques of arresting the damage at much taxpayer's expense have been employed to save the system from collapsing; these techniques of using public funds to save private fortunes could not be visualised in 1929.

Other symptoms too have been troubling, only, their impact in the immediate postwar period, with its welfare state, was less. That is changing now. Trade cycles, the boom-bust alternations, never disappeared. Only, the recession of early 1980s, mainly because of its special features, reminded a lot of people that no fundamental change has taken place since the 1930s. Now again, the foreign exchange, commodity, futures and stock markets have moved from fluctuations to heavy turmoil. No doubt, US administration has been lately pooh poohing the mounting fears that the US economy is on the brink (winter of 1990-91) of a truly big recession that may actually become the first major postwar slump. Most other economies are expected to follow with variable rates of recession. The basic

of America becoming a second-rate, debt-ridden power struggling behind more successful Europe and Japan have disturbed the Anglo-American leadership. The Gulf war may be, in days to come, seen as the first expression of a new strategy by the troubled governments to shore up their sagging (leadership) roles and economies.

If we keep these several considerations in view, they may help us in inferring the American design. Some explanation is needed to account for two radically different responses to Iraqi dictator's aggression: when he invaded Iran in September 1980, the Americans appeared to applaud. No rebuke from them could be heard. Instead, Iraq was afforded every help in procuring the sinews of war. The fact that Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti rulers massively bankrolled Saddam Hussein's war against Iran has to be attributed to an American decision rather than their own. These rulers are not known to open the strings of their purses without a prodding from America. All the friends of America in the western alliance vied with one another to supply the latest technology to Saddam Hussein despite the fact that he was, simultaneously, being supplied by America's chief adversary, the Soviet Union on a big scale. Perhaps for them cash nexus was supreme.

This needs to be compared with what was the US response after August 2, 1990. One cannot go to the extent of saying that Saddam Hussein was in fact encouraged to attack Kuwait, though many think so. The evidence is too sketchy and inconclusive. But it is enough to create strong suspicions about the American wishes. It certainly had ample knowledge of what was cooking. It certainly did not move to prevent Saddam Hussein through warnings. Rather the contrary. That is where one has to stop until more is known about the US ambassador's ambiguous response to Mr. Saddam Hussein's more or less clear expressions of his intentions. However, the fact is that America suddenly cried foul and moved heaven and earth to assemble a grand coalition against Iraq has a significance that few can miss—more so when it is remembered how the US acted in 1980. However, the UN was pressed into service. How the Soviet and French votes

...there appears to be absolutely no evidence that the Israelies are in any mood to make such a radical compensation as to concede a state to Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza — or even to surrender Golan Heights to Syria.

substratum of a reserve of unemployed has been a feature of almost all economies more in distinctly-declining ones like the US and UK and less in more thrusting ones like Germany, Japan and even the magic economies of Scandinavian countries. The old curse of permanent unemployment has returned, and with it has returned poverty. A substratum of real poverty in the US, reaches up to 20 per cent, and in Britain it is even higher. The phenomenon is growing and has made its appearance in several European (OECD) countries.

Western world received a severe jolt on that "Black Monday" in the autumn of 1987: stock markets in all the major capitalist countries spectacularly crashed, a la 1929. There have been several such crashes since. Only, new

cause of the loss of confidence is political in nature: with the end of cold war and the prospect of big arms-cutting agreements, the prospects of what is called "peace dividend" has unnerved powerful lobbies in the west. The whole gamut of armament industry and services that flourish around it are jittery and active to find ways of continuing high defence spendings. The consequences of American economic development during the last 45 years are also responsible: rates of savings have steadily declined, and consumption preference has equally steadily increased. The engines of growth have considerably slowed down. The perception of American dependence on the inflow of foreign credits — and the requirement of facilitating it with higher interest rates — has sapped business confidence and visions

in the UN Security Council were mustered and how the Chinese were persuaded not to vote against remains a murky detail. The rest is recent history. People cannot help wondering at the differences of American approach to two aggressions by the same aggressor. What is different?

It is easy to concede that the Americans had no love lost where Iran was concerned. But did the Americans have to be so naive simply because the Iranians were being difficult with them? After all it was a case of unprovoked aggression. In the case of Kuwait, it is also easy to concede that Kuwaiti regime was seen as good one for the Americans and the west. But did the attractiveness of the Sabah family go so far as to evoke so sharply different response from America—in fact to the point where the resources of entire west have been pitted against Iraq. The good practitioners of *realpolitik* that the Americans are could not have moved so fast and so far simply because of the theoretical inexcusability of Iraqi aggression. One would like to search for hard geopolitical or other long-term interests of the US and the west in countering Iraq. Thus it has to be seen as America's war against a maverick dictator being waged for America's and or western long-term purposes, as indeed it is widely seen. There is no contradiction in mentioning the economic and trade rivalries within the west and a coalition against Iraq for possible common western interests.

Political Consequences

The first outcome of the war stands out. It is the destruction of economic and military infrastructure of Iraq. Indeed the question is whether Iraq as a political entity would survive. Among the current uncertainties while the war lasted, but greatest was the possibility of its spreading; who else would be drawn in? Iraqis themselves had been anxious that Israel should be drawn into the conflict for which purpose it had been throwing Scuds missiles on it. The American strategy has successfully held the Iraqi hand off Israel. There is much speculation about what behind-the-scenes understandings have been exchanged among the anti-Iraqi coalition members. Speculation is rife that Turkish intentions, depending upon the nature of circumstances of war,

might include a ground offensive by Turkish army against northern parts of Iraq that are also oil-rich.

For clear demographic reasons — there are mainly Kurdish areas in the north-east of Iraq adjacent to the Kurdish areas of Turkey itself, while there are Turkish-speaking people in northern Iraq whom the Turks call Turkomans — a temporary occupation of northern Iraq by Turkish army could easily become a prelude to the eventual annexation of those areas. More so if, in the process of Iraq's military collapse, assertion of local personalities alarmed other neighbours and which felt compelled to intervene for their own security ends. If any such situation developed, it is speculated, that both Syria and Iran would also feel compelled to intervene. For the present, there are loud disclaimers from Washington, Ankara, Damascus and Tehran that Iraq's territorial integrity and its sovereignty are not intended to be brought under question. But mere disclaimers at this stage are not

of American wishes. There is bound to be a new Gulf security scheme that would, unavoidably, revolve round America and would be under-written by the US. Whether efforts would finally succeed is an open question. The most malleable material in American hands would be the oil-rich Sheikdoms of the Gulf. The earlier Gulf security scheme, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), would surely be revamped and incorporated into the new American—sponsored security system.

The most interesting point being discussed avidly all round the globe concerns Iran. Where is its neutrality headed? Clearly, Tehran is in no mood to play second fiddle to either Turkey that has its own schemes of cooperation for the region or, even less, to a confused Islamabad that toys with the idea of a loosely-thought-out Strategic Consensus. Contrary to impressions, Iranian decision-making is much less romantic than many others think. Already

The Gulf war may be, in days to come, seen as the first expression of a new strategy by the troubled governments to shore up their sagging (Leadership) roles and economies.

considered an adequate guarantee, as is shown by the hyper-activity of Iranian diplomacy: out of all Iraq's neighbours, the most apprehensive appears to be Tehran. Dire consequences for Iraqi sovereignty and integrity can still come to pass despite initial good intentions of its neighbours. Vicissitudes of a war are always unpredictable and the change in judgements and intentions of combatants is a well known phenomena.

New Configurations

Several other consequences of a relatively long war can be safely predicted from the viewpoint of *realpolitik*, it is safe to conclude that America would emerge as even stronger, if it is possible. Much of political re-drawing of maps that may follow the war would carry the imprimatur

many western Arabists in the west have been struck by certain tendencies in latter-day Iran: it might not take very long for a tacit or informal understanding over the Gulf Security Scheme between Tehran and Washington.

Along with Israel, Iran would be the main beneficiary of the elimination of Iraq as a local power centre. Iran certainly looms large today. It is possible to hold that for strictly ideological reasons and the momentum of past hatreds, Iran might yet refuse to countenance any cooperation with the US. Most Iranian hardliners are sure to press for Iran striking out on its own and continue to favour the end of American military domination of the area. It is impossible to say which of the two schools in Tehran will finally win. The power struggles there are hitherto incon-

clusive. Much will depend on what transpires in the domestic politics of Iran.

What can be said with somewhat greater certainty is that if Ankara and Islamabad are counting on Iran joining up in their pet schemes without demur, they are mistaken. Chances of Iran asserting its prominence and preserving its non-aligned character vis-a-vis the triumphant west (enjoying the rather incoherent but full support from the surviving Sheikhs, whether or not local people like it) are fairly high. But they depend on the substantive survival of the hardliners in Iran who can be expected volubly to go on hoping for popular revolutions in the Sheikhdoms.

For the US, one legacy of the war would be to live down its image of the greatest violator of Arab power and honour. Trail of bitterness that the war would leave can surely be imagined. It would be a moot point as to who would be the greater enemy of Arabs between Israel and the US. The traditional pro-west regimes in the Gulf would become far more isolated in their own territories. Their political ricketiness would become even more palpable. Much American ingenuity would be needed to preserve them against the wrath of their own people. But this would be nothing compared to the larger problems that America would face.

The biggest, as ever, would be the Palestinian problem. this 73- year-old problem would again stare the American policy-makers in the face. On any view, it is already being said that the war had been fought in order to promote Israeli interests and to make it supreme in the region. Which is why the US is being expected by some to move against Iran and even Pakistan as the longer-term and possible threats to Israeli supremacy. No doubt western behaviour is ambiguous at best; several explanations are possible. But some do take this view- shared incidentally by General Mirza Aslam Beg. But few Arabs and Pakistanis doubt it. There is the emergent factor of the western alarm and dislike of what is called Islamic fundamentalism which may effectively jeopardise all western security schemes. One of the major beneficiaries of the war would be political schemes that are generically placed under label of fundamentalism.

This would be the joker in the pack. Whatever the positive content of these schemes, there would be powerful (local) sentiments against the west. The Americans are already worried about the threat of Arab or even Islamic terrorism against western targets.

Another conclusion that can be drawn is that despite all the unchallengeable military power and political influence of America, as a result of the war, stability in not merely the Gulf but throughout western Asia would remain an aspiration rather than a reality. The anti-western feelings as such, Islamic and other radical nationalist movements and the general restiveness of the population all point in the direction of instability. The contest between the designs of major western powers to impose an order of their choice for making the region stable would be countered by the growth of all manner of rebellious and radical popular movements. Doubtless the Americans would be as good as their word in the matter of calling a UN Conference on what they call Middle East. But that begs the question: can Israel be persuaded to vacate West Bank areas, Gaza strip and Golan Heights? What is the use of a UN Conference if Israel refuses to cooperate or even attend? Depending upon the vicissitudes of the war, it looks quite likely that the Israeli leadership, helped by many in America and elsewhere, would try to fob off the Palestinians with the gift of Jordan and call it Palestine after expelling them from Gaza and West Bank areas. The latest appointment to Mr. Shamir's Cabinet in Israel is a straw in the wind. In any case, there appears to be absolutely no evidence that the Israelites are in any mood to make such a radical compensation as to concede a state to Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza or even to surrender Golan Heights to Syria. And if Israel cannot be made to disgorge these ill-gotten gains of war, hoping for stability in the whole region would be futile. A power advantage in the military balance of power cannot confer all the political advantages that can accrue from sagacious statesmanship that among victors knows when and where to yield.

Pessimists foresee a period in which Americans, in company with Israel and other former colonial powers, may have to embark on a new and more vigorous version of colonialism or neo-colonialism.


lonialism properly so called. The basis of this is that military defeat alone may not break the spirit of the Arab peoples. If the strongly rebellious and radical movements would sprout (as indeed some of these have already in Iraq) throughout the Arab countries, especially west Asia and the Gulf regions, the only way to preserve the gains of the war against Iraq would be through heavy-handed suppression in which increasingly the security troops of foreigners would have to be used because local security forces may become progressively more unreliable. Those who find the outlook to be cheerful appear to be few. ■

One of the major beneficiaries of the war would be political schemes that are generically placed under label of fundamentalism. This would be the joker in the pack.

[Such odd variations of tense as may be noticed through this article are attributable only to the period preceding the end of the Gulf war, in which it was written. We apologise for any inconvenience thus caused to our readers.]

—Editor, Defence Journal

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The New World Order

Collective burden-sharing and the collective acceptance of responsibility regarding war in the Gulf has helped to create the foundation for a new world order, a high-ranking U.S. official said February 2.

Robert Gates, assistant to the president and deputy for national security affairs, said in an interview on the "American Interests" television program that the international community has also been encouraged with the opportunity to use the United Nations the way in which it was meant to be used.

The "automatic East-West conflict" which used to appear whenever there was an aggression or a problem in the world "has really disappeared," and that is another sign of optimism, he said.

"It means a lot to Americans that the Soviet Union is cooperating with the United States in trying to deal with this Iraq aggression," Gates said.

Gates was interviewed by program host Morton Kondracke. Following is the transcript of the T.V. interview:

Question: Welcome to American interests. I'm Morton Kondracke.

Mr. Gates, thanks very much for being with us. Before we get into the post-war arrangements in the Middle East, let me ask you about how this war might end. How do you see it concluding?

Answer: I think it concludes simply and that is by the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the Kuwaiti government to their country.

Q: If they get out, if—will we keep on any kind of arms embargo, assuming that Saddam Hussein is still in power?

A: Well, I think that a post-war situation develops, frankly, or depends on

how the war itself develops. One of the possible uses of sanctions, for example, may have to do with the question of compensation. These oil spills are doing terrible damage. This—or environmental terrorism. And so one possibility would be that—that some of the sanctions may be kept on until questions of compensation are dealt with, until decisions are made on whether there might be war crimes, activities. It may have to do with what happens to prisoners of war. In other words, there are a number of uncertainties about how the remainder of the war will go that I think makes it prudent to wait until after it's concluded before deciding what steps to take with respect to—

Q: But on the basis of his behavior right now, do you think that Saddam Hussein ought to be put up for trial on war crimes charges?

A: Well, I think that it's an alternative that we ought to keep available to us.

I think that it is the collective burden-sharing, the collective acceptance of responsibility together with the opportunity to use the U.N. that creates the foundations for this new world order.

I—no decisions have been made. It's something that the coalition would have to address. But I would say that everybody's keeping track of his behavior.

Q: If he were to say, "I'm pulling out of Kuwait," and began significant movements,

would we agree to a ceasefire then to let him get out?

A: Well, I think he knows what he has to do to bring about a halt in the hostilities and that's to get his army out of Kuwait. And that—that's really the primary consideration.

Q: Okay. Let's go to the post-war era which you're involved in game planning. Can you tell us what your assumptions are for each of the big countries involved in this? For example, Saudi Arabia. I mean, is it your notion that there would be a Saudi-Egyptian axis that would emerge from this conflict that would be the basis of security in the future?

A: Well, let me approach it in this way. We have known from the beginning—beginning on August 2nd that when this crisis was concluded, the chess board in the Middle East would look different than it did at the beginning of the crisis or before the invasion of Kuwait.

We're not—we're still not quite certain exactly how that chess board will look. What we have been looking at are really some ideas of our own in terms of security structures, in terms of arrangements that might be made in the political, economic arenas, and so on, that would lead to a situation that would produce an enduring peace and perhaps an overall lessening of tensions in the region. This includes some thoughts on arms control and so on. But this is not something where we are going to just by fiat sort of lay something on the table and say this is the way it's going to be. We have some thoughts. We have some ideas. We're still developing them. We've been working on some for quite a while. But it's something that we're going to have to consult with our coalition partners about and it's something that I think all of us together will begin to develop as the war

proceeds and as it concludes.

Q: Well, let me ask you about the bad guys in this, then. What about the P.L.O., which sided with Saddam Hussein? Are they written out now of any post-war peace process?

A: Well I think that it's really premature to write anybody in or out of the post-war peace process. Clearly, people are not going to forget who lined up on what side of the issue when it came to question of the Iraqi aggression. By the same token, I think we learned after both World War I and World War II that to exclude people or to decide that we're not going to deal with one or another group is — perhaps sows the seeds for future conflict. That — so I'm really ducking your question, because I think we don't know the answer to that yet. But clearly the fact that the P.L.O. came out on the side of Saddam Hussein's aggression the way it did is not going to help their — their reputation with anybody involved in this process.

Q: All right. Let me ask you about Iran. It seems that some sort of deal had to be made in order for all these planes of Saddam Hussein's to fly off and be — get sanctuary in Iran till the end of the war. Do you have any idea what's going on here?

A: Well, we don't have any particular evidence of deals that may or may not have been struck — that have any real credibility, I should say. It does appear that in certain respects the Iranians were surprised by some aspects of this. Everything that we've heard from the Iranians, both publicly and indirectly privately, suggests that they are, in fact, going to impound these aircraft and that they will be kept on the ground until the end of the war.

Q: Aren't some of the transports flying back and forth?

A: Not that I'm aware of.

Q: So the reports to that effect you can't confirm?

A: No.

Q: Okay. If there is a sanctuary arrangement of some sort, doesn't this sort of undercut what the President has said about no more Vietnams? I mean, if he can transfer part of his air force either

to have it fly later or at least save it after the war is over, isn't he — isn't Iran cooperating with him in continuing his opportunity to be a menace?

A: If a significant portion of his first-line fighter interceptors are sidelined during this war in Iran and they are not part of the war effort, that's just fine. I think that our military briefers have made clear that from a military standpoint this is a satisfactory outcome from their standpoint.

Q: So you don't think that the "no Vietnams" pledge has been violated by the fact that he's got a sanctuary over there?

A: No, I don't think so. I think that if the planes were flying back and forth, that would be a very different matter.

Q: Can you envision that the United States would form better relations with Iran when this is over?

A: Well, let me — let me say that the United States for quite some time has accepted the Iranian revolution. And it's hard to imagine a set of security arrangements in Iran or in the Persian Gulf that did not take into account Iran's size and the historical role that they have played out there.

point.

Q: Do you trust them as reliable partners in a post-war security arrangement?

A: I wouldn't go quite that far.

Q: Uh-huh. What makes you think that the United States can succeed in structuring this region in a stable way when the British and the French couldn't do it in the distant past?

A: Well, I go back to your earlier question. This isn't something that can be imposed or structured by the United States. This is something — we have built this coalition thanks to the tremendous efforts of Secretary Baker and others in the administration, led by the President, obviously, in terms of a voluntary coalition. This is a coalition of partners and I anticipate that any post-war arrangements would come out of the same kind of collective effort as the military alliance has. Now, we have the largest number of forces there, so we have taken the leadership role in assembling the military aspects of the coalition and the coalition itself. But the fact is, these other folks are partners of ours and we're going to have to work these things out together.

I think what the President has tried to articulate in talking about a new world order is a view that with the ending of the cold war, particularly in Europe, and a change in the nature of — at least in the practice of Soviet foreign policy in many respects, that this automatic East-West conflict whenever there's an aggression or a problem in the world has really disappeared.

Q: Are you making attempts now to develop closer relations?

A: Well I would not go that far. The United States has conducted quietly and steadily discussions with the Iranians at The Hague on claims settlements. We have contact indirectly through third parties, and that's pretty much the extent of it at this

Q: Well, what about the fact that you go into the street in a lot of places — Jordan, Algeria even to some extent in Egypt — and you find ferocious anti-Western sentiment? Once this war is over, aren't the people of these places going to want us to be gone?

A: Well, I think that there is concern

in the region about the possibility of a long-term American ground presence. And I think that they should take reassurance from the president's assurances already that American forces, ground forces, won't be there any one day longer than they're needed. And I think they will be further reassured by the implementation of his words.

Q: Let me turn now to the President's statements about the new world order. Is this basically going to be a Pax Americana, that we are going to sort of lead the way and if there's trouble in the world, we'll go to the U.N. as we did in this particular example and basically supply the troops and supply the leadership?

Or is there going to be some sort of new arrangement for collective security?

A: Well, I think that a little historical perspective may be in order in this regard. The United States has taken a leadership role throughout this century in trying to develop arrangements for collective resistance to aggression—President Wilson in the League of Nations, President Roosevelt in the United Nations. Unfortunately, after the war with expansion and aggression of communism, every issue that came before the U.N. was stymied because it took on an East-West character. And so the U.N. was never able to really fulfill the aspirations of its founders as a mechanism for maintaining collective security or collective resistance to aggression. I think what the president has tried to articulate in talking about a new world order is a view that with the ending of the cold war, particularly in Europe, and a change in the nature of—at least in the practice of Soviet foreign policy in many respects, that this automatic East-West conflict whenever there's an aggression or a problem in the world has really disappeared. And I think the best and first manifestation of it really is the Gulf situation. And I think it means a lot to Americans that the Soviet Union is cooperating with the United States in trying to deal with this Iraq aggression. So the first premise of the new world order really is that the U.N. can be used the way it was originally anticipated by its founders. But there's a second aspect, as well. And that is in this Gulf crisis we have seen really for the first time the acceptance on a broad scale among a diverse number of countries a willingness to accept respon-

sibility for their share, a burden-sharing not just of money, but also of military forces. So I think that it is the collective burden-sharing, the collective acceptance of responsibility together with the opportunity to use the U.N. that creates the foundations for this new world order.

Q: Forgive me, though, part of the cost of this, of putting this coalition together was that we had to basically ignore the fact that Syria took over Lebanon. We forgave Egyptian debt. We're going to give lots of money to the Turks. We'll presumably give lots of money to the Israelis. And we ignored the fact that China was convicting its dissidents. Now, isn't this kind of bribery to put these coalitions together?

A: I think that's nonsense. I think, first of all, that the notion that we're going to give all these people a lot of money remains very speculative at best. But more importantly, we can't solve all the world's problems at once. And it is a diversity of nations that are

and we are trying to make arrangements for Turkey—I mean, it does cost a lot of money putting these coalitions together and keeping the new world order together.

Are we going to have to pay for it?

A: Well, I think there the question of burden-sharing that I raised is absolutely critical.

The Europeans and the Arab donor countries, the Japanese, the Koreans and others have all contributed to these front-line states, to the Egyptians, to the Turks, to others who are on the front line and dealing with this aggression.

In fact, as far as our own expenses are concerned, you talk about the costs—the United States' expenses from the 2nd of August until the end of December for Desert Shield, our incremental costs were covered—about 80 percent of our incremental costs were covered by our allies, our coalition partners. The President spoke in the State of the Union about commitments already of 40 billion dollars just for the first three months of this year.

So the idea that this is some sort of a big give-away by the United States to get these people to be members of the coalition just ignores the reality that a lot of countries are involved in sharing this burden.

Q: Is it not possible that when this ordeal is over, this war, that as happened after World War I that you could have in this country an isolationist backlash that would prevent the President from fulfilling his vision of the new world order?

A: Well, there clearly is a strain of isolationism in the United States of people who, having fought the cold war, as it were, have now decided that it's time for us to turn inward and pay attention to the problems we have here at home and deal with those.

But I think that for the vast majority of Americans, they realize that the United States' future is intimately bound up with developments abroad. The United States' dependence at this time on overseas energy supplies, our trade relationships all over the world, the competition that we face from a variety of countries—our future is bound up with these other countries and isolationism simply isn't an option for

It may be that the new world order creates the circumstances in which we can also undertake efforts to try and expand democracy, expand peace elsewhere, and work on some of these other problems.

involved in this, and a diversity of practices. We don't make any claim that all these nations are Western democracies that are contributing to this. What's important is that there was an aggression against an innocent country and the world has come together in resisting that aggression.

It may be that the new world order creates the circumstances in which we can also undertake efforts to try and expand democracy, expand peace elsewhere, and work on some of these other problems.

Q: But the point is, though, that we have already forgiven the Egyptian debt

the United States, however much some people might want it.

And frankly, I believe neither is the question of American leadership optional. I think that we've come to a point in the 20th century where it is clear the kind of role that the United States can play, is prepared to play and is playing, for example, in the Gulf.

Q: I judge by the communique that Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh agreed upon that the Soviets are going to play a role in the Middle East after the war is over.

Is that correct? I mean, have we cut them in on - in the Middle East post-war planning?

A: Well, I've watched the Soviets in the Middle East for a long time, over 20 years, and I think it's fair to say that for most of that time they have not, in our view, played a constructive role.

In fact, they have often contributed to the tensions in the Middle East, rather than helping to diminish them or try and bring about settlements. I think that the Soviet support of the U.N. resolutions with respect to Iraq and their consistent enforcement of the sanctions and the overall role that they have played certainly bespeaks a different approach to the Middle East than the Soviets have taken in the past.

I think we'll have to see how the situation develops in terms of the role the Soviet Union can or should play. But clearly the role that they have played so far has been a constructive one.

Q: Well, this statement, the Bessmertnykh-Baker statement, says that the two ministers agreed that in the aftermath of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, mutual U.S.-Soviet efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace and regional stability in consultation with other parties in the region will be greatly facilitated and enhanced.

It sounds as though there's going to be a US-Soviet structure for what's going to happen afterwards in consultation with the parties in the region, which suggests not an international conference with everybody, including the Europeans, or going through the U.N. Is that fair?

A: Well, I don't think anyone is talk-

ing about a U.S.-Soviet condominium in the Middle East. I think that what that refers to, in essence, is that the Soviets will clearly be one of the multitude of players that will have a part in dealing with this. But it also includes all of the members of the coalition and our own friends and allies out there.

Q: How do you evaluate the behavior of Mikhail Gorbachev?

A: I think that he is a leader of a country that has some desperate problems and he's working very hard of try to figure out what to do about those problems.

Q: But one day he is a democrat, he seems to be a democrat, the author of glasnost and perestroika, and the next minute he's sending the KGB and the troops into the streets and into Lithuania and he's pulling troops out. How do you accounts for the shifts back and forth?

tion that has accompanied that, the difficulties that he has had in just trying to cope with the legacy of Russian and Soviet history-all of these problems, I think, have - are besetting him. He faces the problem that enormous political pressures built up.

Political reform in many respects moved ahead much faster than economic reform, which for all practical purposes has largely come to a halt, at least for the time being.

And those political pressures thus have been intensified by these problems. So this is a guy who is trying to deal simultaneously with a country that in many respects is suffering the consequences of the beginning of the loosening of the constraints that have held it for 70 years.

Q: It sounds as though when you

The United States' dependence at this time on overseas energy supplies, our trade relationships all over the world, the competition that we face from a variety of countries - our future is bound up with these other countries and isolationism simply isn't an option for the United States, however much some people might want it.

A: Well, I think that-if I may, I think part of the problem as people look at the Soviet Union is that there is too much of a tendency to look at the headlines of the day and lose perspective on what's going on in that country. The Soviet Union at this point is roiled with revolution and counterrevolution. Gorbachev faces simultaneous problems across an incredible array of areas that anyone of which would be daunting. The whole nationalities question, the conflict between nationalities and between ethnic groups, the conflict between those ethnic groups in the center, the conflict between Russians living in the ethnic areas and the center and those others, the dismantling of the old institutions before new institutions could be built, and the social disorder and chaos and crime and corrup-

talk about him and when the President talks about him, too-that there's a certain amount of sympathy in this White House for Mikhail Gorbachev.

A: Well, let me - let me answer you this way. We are very troubled by some of the developments in the Soviet Union. The President has made clear his unhappiness over the violence and the deaths that have taken place in Lithuania, the intimidation that has taken place in other areas, the setbacks to economic and political reform.

These things are of concern to us and we're not oblivious to them. They worry us a good deal in terms of the future direction. But at the same time, this is an administration that you may recall a year

and a half ago was criticized for being too cautious about Mikhail Gorbachev, about not jumping into bed with him enthusiastically enough.

A: (Laughs)- I am not at all. Let me - let me just remind you of what has happened under Gorbachev, keeping in mind that what we have to focus on is American

future and I think if you consider all of those things that he certainly deserves some consideration for performance past.

Now, the President - that has not kept the President from putting the pressure on when it comes to the Baltics, from putting the pressure on when it comes to performance in arms control and in other areas. We're not going to lose sight of what our national interest is, or that of our - of our allies.

Q: But on the arms control front, for example, it looks as though the military has decided that agreements reached up to now, formal agreements like the CFE agreement on conventional weapons, can be backtracked from.

They're - they've assigned, I guess, two armored divisions to the navy and they've moved 20,000 tanks behind the Urals instead of destroying them. Doesn't this indicate that either Gorbachev's not in control or that he's being forced to renege on deals that he made?

A: Well, there's no question but that we have seen some evidence of old thinking in recent months in certain aspects of arms control. But my understanding is that Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertrykh made some headway during the visit just past.

And I think we still believe that with some more time and some more efforts that we can turn some of these problems around.

Q: Thanks very much for being with us. For American Interests, I'm Morton Kondracke.

Since Gorbachev came into power - the Russians out of Afghanistan. The Vietnamese out of Cambodia. The Cubans out of Angola. A free election in Nicaragua. A Germany unified and free in NATO. The liberation of Eastern Europe. And that's just in the foreign policy arena. And you look inside the Soviet Union and I think what you can say is that Gorbachev at this point has mortally wounded communism.

This is a guy that not all that long ago people were calling the man of the decade. He won a Nobel Peace Prize and so on. So there's a tendency, I think, in the West to be too prone to jump one way or the other.

And I don't think you can make American foreign policy on that kind of a basis. Let's-

Q: Oh, well, are you - are you though in bed with him,?

interests and the interests of our friends. Since Gorbachev came into power - the Russians out of Afghanistan. The Vietnamese out of Cambodia. The Cubans out of Angola. A free election in Nicaragua. A Germany unified and free in NATO.

The liberation of Eastern Europe. And that's just in the foreign policy arena. And you look inside the Soviet Union and I think what you can say is that Gorbachev at this point has mortally wounded communism. And now this is a country in search of a



GULF: US-USSR discussions on Soviet Peace Proposal

(From official statements)

President Bush said February 22 that the United States welcomed the Soviet peace initiative and that the U.S. has remained in very close contact with President Gorbachev and the USSR during its talks with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. President Gorbachev's spokesman Mikhail Ignatenko confirmed that the United States and the Soviet Union have been in close, and even daily, contact on various levels, and that their combined efforts have been complimentary in seeking Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions.

Excerpts from U.S. and Soviet Statements

President Bush, February 22

"The United States and its coalition allies are committed to enforcing the U.N. resolutions that call for Saddam Hussein to immediately and unconditionally leave Kuwait. In view of the Soviet initiative, which, very frankly, we appreciate, we want to set forth this morning the specific criteria that will ensure Saddam Hussein complies with the U.N. mandate."

"After examining the Moscow statement and discussing it with my senior advisers here late last evening and this morning, and after extensive consultation with our coalition partners, I have decided that the time has come to make public with specificity just exactly what is required of Iraq if a ground war is to be avoided."

President Bush's spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, February 22

"The Soviet announcement yesterday represents a serious and useful effort

which is appreciated. But major obstacles remain. The coalition for many months has sought a peaceful resolution to this crisis in keeping with the U.N. resolutions. As President Bush pointed out to President Gorbachev, the steps the Iraqis are considering would constitute a conditional withdrawal and would also prevent the full implementation of relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. Also there is no indication that Iraq is prepared to withdraw immediately."

"Let me just add a couple of points. First of all, that a copy of this document (final U.S. terms for withdrawal) was provided to Iraqi diplomats here in Washington about noon today (February 22). President Bush and Secretary Baker spoke with President Gorbachev for over an hour and 15 minutes this morning to discuss this situation. Secretary Baker spoke with Soviet foreign ministry officials both yesterday and today."

Spokesman for President Gorbachev, Mikhail Ignatenko, February 23

"The telephone conversation which lasted for more than one hour and a half with US President Bush, as far as that conversation is concerned, I would like to emphasize that in that conversation was emphasized the importance of the attitude taken as regards the aggression against Kuwait that made it possible to adopt all those UN resolutions, and everything that happened could not have been possible if there had been no improvement in the US-Soviet relations".

"President Gorbachev said and expressed deep understanding on the fact that the American people had put on themselves a heavy burden of implementing the

will of the international community in overcoming a serious obstacle to international peace which the aggression against Kuwait by Iraq constituted. Naturally, in all those talks and during the conversation, telephone conversation with President Bush, it was—President Gorbachev expressed his readiness to continue working towards ensuring peace. It was emphasized that of primary importance for both of our countries are such relations of trust—of personal trust."

"All those talks and conversations that took place, which were characterized by profound philosophical content, I believe that we have, on the basis of all those talks, we have a vision of a new world, of a new policy, to which we will someday arrive at, and I believe that this day is not far away."

Question for Ignatenko:

Q: Do you now wish that you had been working closer with the American side all along so that the proposal put forth in Moscow would have been acceptable to the American side and to the coalition instead of only to the Soviets and the Iraqis? Thank you.

MR. IGNATENKO: Yes, we've been working very closely with the Americans and we are maintaining a constant communications link, not only with—President Bush. And this is indeed with Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh also has a constant contact with his counterpart, his American counterpart. I believe that this is a matter-of-fact and businesslike... contact. And what I am telling to you right now is what has been done in attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution. And it seems to me that in that process, not only mutual interests were taken into account, but also the interests of the entire world. ■

Bush directs use of ground forces to liberate Kuwait

President Bush announced February 23 that he had directed General Normal Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, "to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait."

"The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase," the President announced in the White House briefing room after returning to Washington from the Camp David Presidential Retreat.

On February 22, Bush gave Iraq until noon February 23 to begin an "immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait" or face an allied ground attack.

Following is the text of the President's statement:

Good evening. Yesterday, after conferring with my senior national security advisors, and following extensive consultations with our coalition partners, Saddam Hussain was given one last chance, set forth in very explicit terms, to do what he should have done more than six months ago—withdraw from Kuwait without condition or further delay and comply fully with the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council.

Regrettably, the noon deadline passed without the agreement of the government of Iraq to meet demands of United Nations Security Council Resolution 660, as set forth in the specific terms spelled out by the coalition to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. To the contrary, what we have seen is a redoubling of Saddam Hussein's efforts to destroy completely Kuwait and its people.

I have therefore directed General Normal Schwarzkopf, in conjunction with coalition forces, to use all forces available, including ground forces, to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Once again, this was a decision made only after extensive consultations within our coalition partnership.

The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase. I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly and decisively to accomplish their mission. ■

United Nations sets conditions for Gulf Peace

Following is the text of U.N. Security Council resolution number 686 which was approved on March 2, setting forth conditions for peace in the Gulf. The sponsors

of the resolution were the United States, Belgium, France, Romania, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and Zaire.

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678 (1990),

Recalling the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter,

Recalling paragraph 9 of resolution 661 (1990) regarding assistance to the Government of Kuwait and paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,

Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all of the resolutions noted above (s/22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of war immediately (s/22273),

Taking note of suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990),

Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in resolution 678 (1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region,

Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the Member states cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Affirms that all 12 resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect;
2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all 12 resolutions noted

above and in particular that Iraq:

- (a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
- (b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
- (c) Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained; and
- (d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period;

3. Further demands that Iraq:
- (a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft;
- (b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time;
- (c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990); and
- (d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and

in the adjacent waters;

- Recognizes that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remain valid;
- Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to provide access and to commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross;
- Requests all Member States, as well as the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to cooperate with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country;
- Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken the actions set out above;
- Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the Security Council remains actively seized of the matter. ■

Pickering hails U.N. resolution on ceasefire terms

Following is the text of March 2 statement by ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council, on passage of a Security Council resolution setting terms for a definitive Gulf war ceasefire, including the immediate release of all prisoners of war and detained Kuwaitis.

Mr. President, the resolution the council has just approved signifies a watershed in its affairs. We are entering a new phase in the effort which began on

August 2 last year to repel aggression and restore peace to the Persian Gulf. This resolution turns our attention from a war we never wanted, from the tragedy precipitated by Iraq, to the greatest challenge of all: building lasting peace and security.

From the first hours after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council has been at the centre of the international community's response. The council made clear that Iraq's aggression would not stand, it established the terms for resolving the crisis, it imposed sanctions when efforts at persuasion were rejected by Baghdad. The Security Council demonstrated in November its resolve both to leave open all possibilities for a peaceful solution, and its readiness, after a pause of goodwill, to mandate the expulsion of Iraq by force.

Resolution 678 set the stage for intensive diplomatic efforts which proved as

fruitless as those which preceded it. Almost every government represented in this room and many outside it, in one way or another, engaged directly in trying to persuade Baghdad to comply with the council's resolutions, and warned of the calamity ahead if Saddam Hussein remained obdurate. And throughout, the Secretary General worked with hope and determination, leading the world-wide effort to resolve the crisis peacefully, right up to his far reaching proposals of January 15. But Iraq's intransigence led it to compound the catastrophe of the wanton destruction of Kuwait with the catastrophe of war. It is upon the heads of Saddam Hussein and the other leaders of Iraq that the responsibility for this rests.

Since the end of November and the adoption of resolution 678, the council has focused on its implementation. Now,

Mosbacher opens business centre for building Kuwait

U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, has opened an information clearinghouse at the Commerce Department to advise U.S. businesses seeking reconstruction work in Kuwait.

At the March 4 inauguration of the Gulf Reconstruction Center, Mosbacher said an umbrella group of 18 U.S. government agencies will assist the U.S. private sector communicate with the Kuwaiti government.

One U.S. government agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, already has a \$46 million contract for initial damage assessment and design work.

"Now that there is a cessation of hostilities, the peoples, industries and resources of this important region are open for business," Mosbacher said. "Working with the Kuwaiti government and planning experts of the Corps of Engineers, we're moving ahead on the blueprints for reconstruction."

According to the Commerce Department, the initial 90-day phase will concentrate on food, water, medicine, communications and putting out oil well fires; already 300 contracts worth more than \$500 million have already been made for the first phase, with 70 percent of them going to U.S. business.

The second phase, from late May to late August, will include detailed damage assessment and design as well as the beginning of extensive rebuilding, the department said.

key goals it adopted have been achieved. Aggression has been beaten, firmly and decisively. They have brought dishonor and ruin to themselves. We are overjoyed that Kuwait is liberated, and restored to its rightful place in the international community. We welcome this resolution's paragraphs recalling the appropriate part of Resolution 661 signifying that sanctions against Kuwait are not imposed, and the immediate reestablishment of normal relations—diplomatic, economic and financial with Kuwait, its people and its legitimate government. Today, the Kuwaiti flag and the flags of Kuwait's friends fly again in Kuwait City. Together, today, we pledge ourselves to assist the people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their ravaged country.

Now the council turns its attention to the restoration of peace and security in the area, as Resolution 678 recognized would be required. The present resolution points the way. We seek as soon as possible a definitive end to hostilities; this is the first priority. The resolution sets out the measures which Iraq must take, and the arrangements which must be put in place, to bring that about. Iraq has much to account for, and there is much yet to be done to fulfill the resolutions of the council and the requirements of international law.

In this resolution, the council puts forth the immediate requirements. Iraq must make clear that it no longer harbors aggressive intent, and it must take the steps needed immediately to implement the twelve United Nations Security Council resolutions. It must return immediately prisoners of war. It must return the property it has stolen. It must release immediately all third country nationals and detained Kuwaitis. It must cease further military action, including any activities related to missiles Iraq used to attack Saudi Arabia and Israel. It must return immediately the remains of those who died in the war or while held prisoner in Iraq. Iraq must assist the coalition in identifying the location of mines, booby traps, chemical and biological weapons. Until it is clear that Iraq has complied with these requirements, the provisions of Resolution 678 authorizing Kuwait and those cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary means to ensure Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions remain in effect.

The United Nations and Security Council remain at the center of the effort to fulfill the overarching tasks set by the

8-point Soviet peace plan

President Mikhail Gorbachev's spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko outlined eight points which he said Iraq and the Soviet Union had agreed as a possible basis for resolution of the Gulf war.

- 1. Iraq announces a complete and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait.*
- 2. Withdrawal begins on the day after cessation of hostilities.*
- 3. The withdrawal of forces takes place in a fixed timeframe.*
- 4. After withdrawal of two-thirds of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations are lifted.*
- 5. At the end of the withdrawal all U.N. resolutions against Iraq become invalid.*
- 6. Directly after a ceasefire all prisoners of war should be released.*
- 7. The withdrawal of forces should be monitored by countries not involved in the conflict and under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council.*
- 8. Work on finalising details continues. The Security Council will be informed of the outcome.*

Later, probably after Gorbachev's talks with George Bush, some addition or changes were effected in the peace plan: They are 1) Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait city within 4 days and from Kuwait within 21 days; 2) The POWs would be released within 72 hours after the ceasefire.

twelve resolutions passed thus far: to repel aggression and to build genuine peace and stability. The council today is providing a broad framework for dealing with this initial phase of our present task. Tomorrow the military leaders of the coalition meet with Iraq's military leaders to define the details of the arrangements required to put an end to hostilities, with this resolution as the foundation. We hope for early success in those discussions so we can get on with our work.

Even as we are putting this framework into place, the United States, other members of the council and other states in the region are beginning to consult on the future steps which will be required. Secretary Baker is departing soon for the area to discuss with his counterparts the key questions which need to be addressed in order to ensure that the peace we have secured at such a great cost is a lasting one. The nations of the region will clearly take the lead in finding answers to these questions. My country looks forward to working on this in capitals and within the council. We have a long and difficult road before us, and the council has a most important role to play.

President Bush said in his address of February 27, lauding the coalition and the liberation of Kuwait, that "this war is now behind us. Ahead of us is the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace." President Bush has frequently repeated that our quarrel is not with the people of Iraq, but with leaders of Iraq and their destructive policies. Indeed, the United States will be looking for ways to identify and meet the humanitarian relief needs of the Iraqi people who have suffered so much under Saddam Hussein. We look forward to the day when Iraq can once again assume full membership in the family of nations. This resolution shows Iraq the way to begin to do so.

International collective security functioned in the Gulf. All of us now have a responsibility to those who have suffered, to those who risked their lives, and to those of all nations who perished, to see to it that history does not repeat itself. We cannot have paid the price of aggression and its defeat only to allow it to recur. The council's task now, the one we begin accomplishing today, is to point the way to building a peaceful and secure system which deters the repetition of aggression and suffering we have seen over the past seven months. ■

5-point peace plan by China

The Chinese representative in the UN presented a five-point proposal for peace in the Gulf region.

China's permanent representative to the UN, the ambassador, Mr Li Daoyu, told the Security Council meeting if peace efforts were to be successful, there should exist five elements, according to a report received in Beijing.

The elements are:

- 1. Iraq should signify that it will withdraw its troops from Kuwait immediately:**
- 2. The parties concerned agree to seek a peaceful solution:**
- 3. The belligerent parties exercise restraint so as to reduce hostilities and prevent expansion and escalation of the war:**
- 4. The settlement of the West Asia question should be scheduled:**
- 5. The arrangements after the war should be made mainly by the countries in the region and foreign military forces should withdraw from the region.**

Saddam accepts all UN resolutions

Gorbachev again calls for ceasefire • Toppling Saddam a violation: Cuellar

Iraq has informed the UN that it is ready to accept all resolutions including 661, 665 and 670 which pertain to sanctions and reparation. Soviet Ambassador said that Iraq was ready to accept the UN Resolution 662 which pertains to Kuwait's annexation.

According to Baghdad Radio, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz has told Soviet Ambassador that Iraq is ready to accept UN Resolutions 661, 662, 670 and 674 and after this, there must be ceasefire.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, has said that

US conditions for peace in Gulf

The following is a list of conditions set forth by the United States, after consultations with its allies, that Iraq must publicly accept by noon EST (1700 GMT) on Saturday to avoid a ground assault by coalition forces to remove Baghdad's troops from Kuwait. The conditions were announced by White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater at a briefing shortly before 1 p.m. EST (1800 GMT), on Friday.

- 1. Iraq must begin large-scale withdrawal from Kuwait by noon EST (1700 GMT), Saturday, Feb 23.*
- 2. Iraq must complete military withdrawal in one week.*
- 3. Within the first 48 hours of withdrawal, Iraq must remove all its forces from Kuwait City and allow for the prompt return of the legitimate government of Kuwait.*
- 4. Iraq must withdraw from all prepared defences along the Saudi-Kuwaiti and Saudi-Iraq borders, from Bubiyan and Warbah islands, and from Kuwait's Rumaila oilfield.*
- 5. Within the one week specified, Iraq must return all its forces to their positions of Aug 1, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 660.*
- 6. In cooperation with the International Red Cross, Iraq must release all prisoners of war and "third-country civilians" and return the remains of dead servicemen. This action must begin immediately with the start of the withdrawal and be completed in 48 hours.*
- 7. Iraq must remove all explosives or body traps, including those on Kuwaiti oil installations, and designate Iraqi military liaison officers to work with Kuwaiti and other coalition forces on the withdrawal's operational details.*
- 8. Iraq must cease combat air fire, aircraft flights over Iraq and Kuwait, except for transport aircraft carrying troops out of Kuwait, and allow coalition aircraft exclusive control over and use of all Kuwaiti air space.*
- 9. Iraq must cease all destructive actions against Kuwaiti citizens and property, and release all Kuwaiti detainees.*
- 10. The United States and its coalition partners will not attack retreating Iraqi forces, and will exercise restraint so long as withdrawal proceeds in accordance with the above guidelines and there are no attacks on other countries.*
- 11. Any breach of these terms will bring an "instant and sharp response" from coalition forces.*

any attempt to topple Saddam Hussein will be a violation of UN mandate given to allies. He said that liberation of Kuwait and removal of Saddam are two different affairs.

In an another move, the Security Council has decided to seek Iraqi assurance to comply with all UN resolutions on the Gulf.

However, western diplomats in UN said that even then there is no guarantee of any ceasefire.

The diplomatic sources feel that Iraqi response on this proposal is expected within few days.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has once again stressed, US and allied forces to ceasefire after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Mr Gorbachev said that there was no justification for continuing the war as Iraq had implemented UN Resolutions. He said that US-USSR relations might receive a fatal blow if there was no ceasefire.

to be designated in the Kuwaiti theater of operations to discuss the formal terms of a ceasefire.

With Baghdad and other Iraqi cities virtually in ruins after five weeks of relentless allied bombing, Bush also addressed himself directly to the Iraqi people in an effort to rebuff claims that the allies aimed to destroy Iraq altogether, and he appeared to urge them to overthrow President Saddam Hussein.

"You the people of Iraq are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction". "Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort and look forward to the day when Iraq is led by people prepared to live in peace with their neighbours."

Looking beyond the war, Bush said he was sending Baker to the region next week to begin discussions on stabilising the area.

Arabian military officials estimate that between 85,000 and 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed or wounded in the onslaught. *The Washington Post* reported.

The majority of these casualties were suffered during the weeks of ceaseless bombing of Iraqi troops dug into the Kuwaiti desert, the officials told Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, according to the Post.

In contrast the United States suffered light casualties. The US reports 79 of its troops killed, 213 wounded and 44 missing.

Schwarzkopf had no estimate for Iraqi casualties. But he said at a Riyadh news briefing that when allied troops breached the Iraqi frontline ground defences, "there were very, very, large number of dead in these units." The Pentagon estimates about 200,000 of 620,000 Iraqi soldiers were massed on the Kuwaiti border when the ground assault began. Schwarzkopf said the desertion rate on the front line at one point was about 30 per cent.

The coalition forces were holding at least 80,000 Iraqi soldiers as prisoners of war.

Up to a year could be required to repatriate the 40,000 British troops in the Gulf with their material.

Ceasefire in Gulf

A ceasefire was holding between US and Iraqi forces at 8.50 am (0500 GMT), 50 minutes after the ceasefire time announced by Washington.

"There is silence on the front-no hostilities," said US spokesman Lt-Col Mike Gallagher. "The war room reports no incidents," said Lt-Col Virginia Pribyla.

Earlier President Bush announced the US-led coalition would suspend all offensive combat operations against Iraqi forces at midnight (Washington time 0550 GMT on Thursday—February 28).

"Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met", Bush said in a dramatic televised announcement from the White House Oval Office.

He spoke after a day in which allied forces fought lopsided battles with a desperate and cornered Iraqi military, and Kuwait City was declared liberated as coalition tanks and other vehicles rumbled into greetings from jubilant residents waving their country's red, white, black and green flag. "I am pleased to announce that at midnight tonight, exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and six weeks since the start of Operation Desert Storm, all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat operations," Mr. Bush said.

The ceasefire would become permanent, he said, once Iraq met conditions that included releasing all allied prisoners of war, any hostages of third countries

and the remains of allied war dead.

Iraq must inform Kuwaiti officials of the location and nature of land and sea mines placed by Iraqi forces that invaded the Emirate on August 2, Bush said.

Bush said Iraq must accept all 12 United Nations resolutions passed during the Gulf crisis and made specific mention of two of them—one reversing Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and another stating that Iraq can be forced to pay compensation for destruction wrought in Kuwait and to other nations affected by the war.

Earlier in the day the White House and the allies rejected an Iraqi offer to comply with the resolutions once a ceasefire had been declared. The allies insisted that Iraq yield unconditionally to their terms for ending the war.

The suspension of offensive operations is also contingent on Iraq not firing any more Scud missiles at its neighbours—Israel and Saudi Arabia—or attacking coalition forces, Bush said.

"It is up to Iraq whether the suspension on the part of the coalition becomes a permanent ceasefire," Bush said. "If Iraq violates these terms, coalition forces will be free to resume military operation" he added.

Bush said he had directed Secretary of State James Baker to arrange a meeting of the UN Security Council to make arrangements to end the war. He called on Iraq to designate military commanders to meet with allied officers within 48 hours at a place

Yaqub rules out change in Gulf war policy

Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan has ruled out change in the Government policy on the Gulf war which he contends was in the national interest.

The Minister while briefing newsmen in Lahore dismissed the assertion of some of the senior journalists that it was a partisan policy biased against Iraq and favourable to the objectives of the United States.

"Changing a policy is not like changing a dress. Once it is adopted with particular objectives in view it has to stay till those objectives are reviewed," he said.

The present crisis in the Gulf had two facets, he said. One was the aggression committed by Iraq against Kuwait which had hardly provoked it to action and it could not be condoned in any circumstances. Condoning aggression for any consideration would have meant accepting an unholy tradition of a bigger country occupying a smaller one. Territorial integrity was sacrosanct and it would be immoral to let any country do it with immunity. That was a matter of principle and Pakistan was at one with the rest of the world in seeking vacuation of that aggression, he said.

The other facet of the situation was the heavy bombing resorted to by the multinational force headed by the United States. Pakistan, he said, had shown no reservation in condemning it most vehemently. That must stop and the war come to an end immediately.

It was, in fact, that objective in view that the Prime Minister had undertaken his peace mission to Muslim countries and was trying to invoke the Organisation of Islamic Conference. The Prime Minister would extend his peace mission to other countries as well with that object in view, he told newsmen.

It was a matter of record, the Foreign Minister asserted that Pakistan had condemned military action for undermining the sovereignty of any country, be it Kashmir, Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Grenada. Pakistan had always sided with the

country against whom aggression had been committed and the forces committed to the liberation of those countries. Pakistan had not spared even the United States for undertaking military action against any country.

A journalists pointed out that the people of Pakistan had demonstrated against carpet bombing by the United States and had hailed Saddam Hussein as the hero of the Islamic world. Sahabzada Yaqub agreed that some demonstrations had given that impression but it did not mean that Pakistan should review its "principled policy" on that score.

The Foreign Minister did not agree with a newsmen that the Security Council resolution had not authorised United States and its allies to take military action against Iraq. Sahabzada said it was a matter of interpretation of an expression used in the resolution and he believed that the resolution did cover the use of military force against Iraq. But it was a moral aspect as to what extent such force should have been used. Wholesale destruction was not on the cards and should not be allowed. There was no justification for it either. War was an evil and it must end, he said.

The Foreign Minister asserted that world perspective had considerably changed. There was only one superpower left in the field. Even the erstwhile rival of the United States, the Soviet Union had come to support the sole Superpower. Syria, who was opposed to the Saudi Arabia, was supporting it against Iraq. Same was true of Egypt. The reason was that Iraq was aiming at becoming a hegemonic power in the region. Even Turkey and Syria were threatened by it. Hence the support behind the forces arrayed against Iraq was understandable.

Sahabzada Yaqub Khan reiterated that the Pakistan contingents despatched to Saudi Arabia for the defence of the holy places had been legitimately ordered by the legal government of the day. It was not true that they were sent by the authorities who were not competent to do so.

He assured newsmen that the Pakistan troops would be not involved in any aggressive action against Iraq. Further they were stationed in an area which was far away from the war arena ■

French Defence Minister resigns

Twelve days into the Gulf war, French Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement resigned Tuesday saying he feared, "the logic of the war is daily growing further away from the declared goals of the United Nations".

Chevenement, who has consistently opposed using military force to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait, said he was compelled by his convictions concerning the French republic to tender his resignation.

The move was a slap at President Francois Mitterrand and followed repeated resignation threats dating back to shortly after the August 2 invasion of Kuwait.

For Saudi Society, War Is Jarring To Ancient Ways

The number of male-female couples having lunch together in a hotel dining room amazed an American-educated Saudi observing the scene. "This would never have been possible before the war," he said.

Signs of change are visible throughout the kingdom. Saudi soldiers patrolling Riyadh streets in jeeps mounted with 50-caliber machine guns can be seen craning their necks at a pair of British female soldiers walking along the sidewalk in camouflage trousers. In Dhahran, a Yemeni taxi driver gets visibly agitated after a visit to a hotel lobby where female Western journalists are walking in jeans and short-sleeved shirts.

"They have uncovered women in there!" he told a passenger in an urgent tone. "They are uncovered!" he repeated, gesturing along his face, neck and arms.

Not since the oil-boom days of the late 1970s has this arch-conservative Muslim country experienced such a flood of Westerners and the sudden changes they are imposing on this kingdom's traditional way of life.

The swift evolution began as soon as Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2 and gained momentum with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and other foreign troops. It pushed more deeply into Saudi society and government when coalition forces attacked Iraq on Jan. 17, transforming the peaceful desert realm into a staging area for war.

For some Saudis and diplomats, the changes have been vast and profound and seemingly irreversible, altering the Saudi role in the Middle East and shifting regional politics into a new order. These analysts say they see the new order, in which Saudi interests are more closely and openly linked to those of the West, as most likely to offer several benefits, including making resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict easier.

"It is a new era in the whole Middle East," said Othman Rawaf, director of King Saud University's Center of Arabian Gulf Studies.

For others, however, the Islamic conservatism on which King Fahd and his brothers have based their rule remains the only permanent point of reference in the royal court. When the war is over and the U.S. troops go home, they predict, Saudi Arabia is most likely to close back up at home and revert to its long-standing foreign policy based on generous foreign aid and financial arm-twisting in hopes of achieving Arab consensus.

With half a million U.S. troops in the region and nearly 200,000 soldiers from other nations, points of contact cannot be avoided. The fallout is visible everywhere in Saudi population centers.

Islamic zealots have upbraided some female soldiers and reporters, reminding them that walking in the street with bare arms or uncovered hair offends traditional Saudis. In one such confrontation, a female U.S. soldier was reported to have responded with the butt of her M-16 rifle. In general, however, Saudi authorities and people have displayed a rare tolerance since the crisis began. ■

US involvement to cost \$ 130b

Involvement in the Gulf will cost the United States more than \$130 billion this financial year if some 400,000 American troops remain in the area without war, Congress was told.

War would drive costs up dramatically, Comptroller General Charles Bowsher of the General Accounting Office told the House of Representatives Budget Committee.

He said he agreed with estimates that war would send costs as high as two billion dollars a day, including the price of destroyed equipment that need not be replaced.

The defence and State Departments were asked to testify at the hearing, but refused to appear and provide their cost estimates for US deployment in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Bowsher said \$ 30 billion or more will be spent for despatching forces, calling up the reserves and providing other support for US troops.

Another \$7 billion to \$10 billion will be spent for such costs as debt forgiveness for Egypt.

The largest chunk, \$100 billion, is provided for in the budget for the current financial year, which ends on October 30, but Bowsher warned that taxpayers will ultimately feel the effect of spending it.

Pentagon, CIA at odds over battle damage

The Pentagon's official claims of destruction of Iraqi tanks, artillery and armoured vehicles inside Kuwait are at least three times greater than the estimates from US intelligence agencies, a US official who has reviewed the intelligence figures said.

"The numbers out of Cent Com (the US Central Command in Saudi Arabia) are at least triple the intelligence numbers," said the official, who asked not to be further identified.

The issue of how much of Iraq's armour and artillery has been destroyed in bombing sorties assumes greater significance as allied troops get into position along Kuwait's borders for what some officials say is the imminent beginning of the ground campaign. US and allied officials have said they would like to see 50 per cent of Iraq's war-fighting capability in and around Kuwait destroyed before committing ground troops to wrest Kuwait from Iraq.

Intelligence sources said the major reason for the discrepancy is that the Central Command relies heavily on debriefing from pilots returning from

bombing missions, as well as prisoners of war and low-level reconnaissance photography, while the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defence Intelligence Agency rely almost entirely on satellite photographs. These often are analysed three or four days after the sorties.

Pilots, intelligence sources said, often exaggerate the success of their missions—"Take what a pilot says and divide it by three," said a former Air Force pilot—while photo reconnaissance can miss some "kills." Thus the intelligence estimates are conservative, they said, while the "I've talked to senior people from the Central Intelligence Agency's are often overly optimistic."

Nevertheless, because of the enormous differences between the estimates, some intelligence officials are upset at the quality of the Central Command's estimates.

The US official who has reviewed both intelligence and Central Command data said, "They are not satisfied at the numbers they're getting from Cent Com, and professionally they are offended. Professionally they think these numbers are disastrous."

He said that while military officials in

Saudi Arabia announced that about 30 per cent of armour and artillery had been destroyed inside the Kuwait theatre of operation, "the number in Washington (from the intelligence agencies) was about 10 per cent."

A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that discrepancies exist between the military and the intelligence assessments of bomb damages inside the Kuwait theatre of operation. "And never the twain shall meet," Army Maj. Kathy Wood added, indicating that both camps are sticking to their figures.

CIA spokesman Peter Earnest, while not discussing specific figures, defended his agency's estimates.

While there have been published reports that intelligence analysts believe the Pentagon's official figures—that about a third of Iraq's tanks, artillery and armoured vehicles have been destroyed—are exaggerated, this is the first time that such wide differences have been disclosed.

The US military's latest official bomb damage assessment was released. Pentagon and Central Command officials claimed 1,300 Iraqi tanks had been destroyed, or 30 per cent of those in the Kuwait theatre; 1,100 artillery pieces, or 35 per cent of the total in the theatre; and 800 armoured vehicles. ■





ARMS DEALS: RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT



Gene D. Tracey

F-117A: Mystery Fighter of Gulf War

Almost a decade has passed since Lockheed Advanced Development Company watched the first F-117A fighter take to the air in 1981. Since then, it has performed only one operational mission—the last December mission over Panama. What may ultimately be most important is its long-term success in proving 'low-observable technology' as a new-generation of fighters—the F-22 and F-23 emerge this year.

Three major public "unveilings" of the Lockheed F-117A fighter this year have much new information on the programme that began a decade ago to build and operationally deploy a

'low-observable technology' fighter. Designed as a plane that could operate primarily at night hence the subsequent popularising of the term "Stealth" fighter the F-117A has reached a point in its operational career where the Department of Defence is anxious to take the aircraft out of the 'black' programme status and begin normal funding and budget handling of the aircraft. The result has been a wealth of new information and photographs for the public including the Soviet's to see.

Unveilings of the aircraft has occurred last year at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, in April, at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland in June, and most recently at Palmdale, California on July 12. The latter occasion was the ceremony to mark delivery of the last of 59-117As ordered by the Air Force, by the Lockheed Advanced Development Company (LADC).

According to Lockheed, the entire F-117A production programme was com-

pleted within funded budgets and that the fixed-price on the aircraft flyaway cost of US\$ 42.6 million per aircraft- was within contract stipulations. Ben Rich, President of LADC, noted at the ceremony, "that's an amazing statement when you consider our low production rate. We only produced eight aircraft per year over the seven full years of production."

Rich also noted that "it's not often that one has the opportunity to develop and field an aircraft that represents a true technological breakthrough. And the F-117 is just that... the world's first very low-observable fighter aircraft. It certainly is an odd looking flying machine... all black, flat surfaces, highly swept wing and V-tail and grids over the inlets. Yet it is a sterling example of what American ingenuity and hard work can create in response to a critical need."

That need, "in the 1970s, was the Soviet Union developing and deploying

new early warning radars, surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft. These new systems posed a major threat to American conventional fighter and bomber forces. At the time, technology breakthroughs in very low-observables were emerging which offered the potential to counter the menacing threat build-up," noted Rich.

Development of the F-117A might be viewed as the third of a great line of aircraft to emerge from the Special Project Office or "Skunk Works" of Lockheed. The first was the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane, followed by the ultrafast SR-71/A-12 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and now, the F-117A fighter.

While a decade old, the technologies

incorporated into the aircraft have been refined and developed further into a new-generation of high-technology fighters, the YF-22 and YF-23, that will fulfill the requirements for a new fighter of the 1990's decade. That may ultimately be the greatest legacy of the F-117.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Development of the aircraft began in the mid-1970s under a programme called "Have Blue", a Stealth prototype programme designed to validate theoretical work done under an unclassified programme known as "Project Harvey". First flight was in June 1981, only 31 months after the full-scale development contract was awarded. Lockheed began deliveries in 1982. Assembled in Burbank, California, periodic reports from local residents abounded for a period of

time about C-5 Galaxy transports arriving during night hours after Burbank commercial airport was closed and flying out before dawn. After the July 11, 1986 and October 14, 1987 crashes, media interest grew to a peak, especially after helicopter-borne news crew from the Los Angeles area were initially able to fly over the Bakersfield crash site — before the Air Force closed the immediate area air space. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was established in October 1983, less than five years after go-ahead.

A US\$5.6 billion programme produced 59 aircraft through July this year, with three aircraft lost in crashes.

average fly away cost is US\$42.6 million, as calculated by Lockheed. However, if non-procurement expenses are included, the cost per aircraft is closer to US\$111.0 million. This would include the US\$2 billion for research and development and US\$295 million for construction of individual-aircraft hangars at their base at the Tonopah Research Site, Nevada.

Release of some of the F-117A cost information came in April this year, at a time when Congressional hearings were beginning on the 1991 Budget. By way of comparison, the projected costs per aircraft of the future F-22/F-23 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) is on the order of US\$40 million per aircraft, while the still-to-fly A-12 Avenger Advance Tactical Aircraft (ATA) is estimated at US\$96 million. As such, the F-117 may have come off looking like a bargain by today's costs.


DESIGN DETAILS

The aircraft has a gross weight in the order of 52,500lbs and is powered by two General Electric F-404 non-after-burning turbofan engines. Basic F-404 is used with the F/A-18 Hornet and F-117A engines are thought to be F-404-GE-F1D2 versions developing about 12,000lbs thrust. The F-117 has high subsonic speed, but details have not been released. It should be noted with keen interest that the engine inlet throat is about four-times that used on the Northrop F-20, A-4S, or F/A-18 aircraft using the F-404.

Dimensions of the aircraft include a wingspan of 43ft 4in, length of 65ft 11in and height of 12ft 5 inches. This makes the aircraft longer and with greater wing-span dimensions than the F-16, but some four feet lower in height. Early operations with the aircraft were often referred to as "A-7" (Corsair II) flights. Many of the first pilots may have been from either the Air Force's A-7 and F-16 pilot communities, as the former probably has similar flight characteristics.

In order to keep costs to a minimum, LADC used a number of proven aircraft systems and components, including:

- cockpit control system of the F-16 Fighting Falcon;
- environment controls from the C-130 Hercules;
- ejection seat of the A-10 Thunderbolt II.



The F-117A stealth fighter is the world's first operational aircraft designed to exploit low-observable stealth technology. It is designed to penetrate dense threat environments and attack high value targets with pinpoint accuracy. Developed by Lockheed's Advanced Development Projects, it is flown by pilots of the Tactical Air Command's 37th Tactical Fighter Wing.

This makes maintenance requirements similar to F-16 and F-15 fighters, according to the Air Force. Unlike its more robust SR-71 High-Flier, standard engine oils and hydraulic fluids are utilised. The Air Force also says that F-117A maintenance statistics and airframe life expectancy are similar to the F-15 Eagle.

Close examination of photos taken at the roll-outs reveal some interesting details not yet provided by the Pentagon. The F-117 has a forward-looking infrared camera mounted in front of the cockpit, with a downward-looking FLIR system at the forward edge of the nose landing gear. Both are covered with an electrically resistive screen. The screen probably works under a resistive damping principle, with resistive scalant covers on the fasteners around the sensor opening port.

Details seen during the Andrew's AFB viewing indicate the aircraft is made mostly of aluminium (riveted construction is evident). There are joints in the radar absorbant material (RAM) evident in some locations on the aircraft, which presents itself as a flat, rough texture over the airframe. Special tiles are mounted to dampen engine exhaust heat along the fuselage trailing edge. Airframe stress limits are probably about 6-Gs. A cockpit head-up display (HUD) is quite evident in photos.

OPERATIONS AND THE FUTURE

Initial F-117s were assigned a mixed air wing structure built around F-117s, A-7/T-38 and T-38 jets. In October 1989, the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (formerly the 3350th Tactical Group) was placed under operational control of Tactical Air Command's (TAC) 12th Air Force, headquartered at Bergstrom AFB, Texas. Bergstrom AFB is located seven miles from the city of Austin, and is broadly responsible for US Air Force tactical reconnaissance missions, weapons and aircraft familiarization training associated with McDonnell-Douglas RF-4C and F-4D Phantoms. F-117s remain at their Tonapah, Nevada facility.

Co-located at Bergstrom AFB is the 10th Air Force of the Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 924th Tactical Fighter Group (AFRES), and a Tactical Air Control Wing detachment. With increasing flight hours

needed for realistic training, it became increasingly necessary for the Air Force to bring the F-117s 'in from the cold'. Amateur photographers were beginning to photograph the aircraft in daylight combined with budget supporting requirements worked to bring the F-117 in public view. It is interesting that the F-117s were placed under the command of an outfit whose primary function is the aerial reconnaissance mission. There is an 'exchange' pilot from the Royal Air Force (RAF) assigned to the wing. According to the Pentagon, operational F-117As are being upgraded by Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., at a depot-level maintenance facility located at Palmdale (adjacent B-2 Bomber hangars). Details on what upgrades are being worked into the aircraft have not been disclosed, but are most likely associated with air-to-ground strike roles.

In Tom Clancy's novel Red Storm Rising, the aircraft is portrayed in mostly a 'special mission' air superiority role in use against Soviet Air Force 1L-76/MIDAS AWACS aircraft, which traditional high-visibility aircraft could not get close enough to kill. Stealth characteristics allowed the fictional aircraft opportunities to get close enough before detection to effect kills with short-range AAMs.

Pilots get about 15 to 20 hours per month in the F-117. According to Col. Antony J. (USAF), 37th TFW Commander at Tonapah Test Range, "the programme was so secret that we had to wait until after dark to even open the hangars. To a pilot undergoing his first flight in a new aircraft, that desert is really, really dark. It is little wonder there were two, and not more, crashes of production aircraft."


The aircraft flew its first combat mission in December 1989, during "Operation Just Cause", the invasion of Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega from power. Six F-117s were allocated to the Panama mission, four of which were ultimately stood-down. Two attacked the Rio Hato barracks facility to deliver one 2,000lb (900kg) bombs against the facility, which hit about 55 and 300-yards wide of their target. According to press reports, the mission called for a 'near strike' (50-Yards off target) on the Panamanian Defence Force (PDF) barracks facility, intended to stun and cause minor injuries to the occupants. Miscommunications between the two pilots led to failure of the mission.

F-117A CRASHES

Details on the two crashes have been partially declassified by the Air Force. These are the July 11, 1986 and October 14, 1987 crashes, involving aircraft side number 81-0792 and 83-0815.

The first occurred 15nm northeast of Bakersfield, California which was investigated by the Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Centre (Nellis AFB) as to the cause of the crash. The investigating officer was assigned to HQ TAC/DOCX, Langley AFB, Virginia, an indication of the importance attached to the crash investigation. The aircraft departed Tonapah at 0113 local time for a single ship mission and proceeded to the eastern portion of the San Joaquin valley under IFR flight rules.. a common flight regime for the aircraft which endeavoured to stay out of populated areas. The crash occurred at 0145 PDT; the pilot, Maj. Ross E. Mulhare, was killed. No ejection attempt was made. The aircraft crashed while "descending as requested to FL 190. All radio transmissions were normal up to that point. The aircraft turned to the southeast... and ARIEL 31 (aircraft code) requested descent to 17,000 feet. ARIEL 31 cancelled IFR with LA (Los Angeles) Centre at 0144 PDT. ARIEL 31's acknowledgment of LA Centre's receiving cancellation was the last transmission received from the mishap aircraft. The aircraft impacted a hillside (el. 2,280ft MSL) at approximately 0145 PDT and was destroyed. The sky was clear and moon illumination was 14 per cent. Analysis of the fire pattern, crater and the scatter pattern of the parts, indicate that the aircraft was upright in a steep dive ("no less than 20° and probably in the neighbourhood of 60°) and at "high velocity", according to the official crash report.

The second crash of an operational F-117A occurred on October 14, 1987 at the Tonapah Fighter Weapons Centre (TFWC) 53nm east of Alamo, Nevada. This was also a 'single-ship' sorty, whose precise mission has also been deleted from the crash report. The flight was entirely within the boundaries of the TFWC/Nellis AFB, crashing at about 2033 local time. The crash was in gently sloping high desert terrain and the plane was totally destroyed. The pilot, Maj. Michael C. Stewart (USAF), was killed. No ejection attempt was made.



Powered by two General Electric F-404 non-afterburning engines in specialised versions, the F-117 has high subsonic speed. The maintenance statistics and airframe life expectancy are similar to the F-15 Eagle.

The aircraft took off from Tonapah at 1953 local time on a night mission. The flight (BURNR 54: "BURNER 54") was under VFR procedures and remained within the TWFNC range boundaries. During flight the aircraft disappeared from local radar and impacted at approximately 2033 PDT, on October 14, 1987.

According to the crash report, "procedures after take-off and radio calls...

were normal...the aircraft departed the planned heading of 273the last radar plot of the aircraft shows...deviation from the planned track. BURNR 54's final flight profile (altitude and ground track) were derived from the Nellis Air Traffic Control Facility (NATCF) radar. The aircraft impacted the Nellis Range Complex in gently sloping high desert terrain (5,502 ft) at approximately 2033 PDT....(weather was) clear with unlimited visibility, there was no moon illumination at the time of the mishap."

An alert C-12 was dispatched to investigate the possible crash site: a range fire was reported by the US Forest Service, as picked up by an earth sciences satellite. The C-12 was unable to locate the crash site.

An additional helicopter was added to the search effort at approximately 0100 on October 15 and searched until approximately 0345 when the effort was suspended until daybreak. The actual location was identified on the afternoon of October 15. The aircraft impacted "at a steep angle, digging a hole approximately six or seven feet deep."

The pilot was dual qualified in both



A stealth fighter undergoing mid-air refuelling. The F-117 appears to be a docile aircraft quite capable of making manoeuvres common to both A-7 and F-16 aircraft with a bit of latitude for aerial aerobatics. Operational F-117As are being upgraded for air-to-ground strike roles.

The aircraft flew its first combat mission in December last year during "Operation Just Cause", the invasion of Panama to apprehend General Noriega. A total of 20 F-117As were deployed to Saudi Arabia during mid-August following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

F-117A and A-7D/K Corsair II aircraft, with an accumulated fighter flight time of 2,166 hours in the F-117, A-7, F-15C (at Kadena, Okinawa), F-4C/D and F-5E aircraft, of which 449 hours was instructor time. He had a total of 76.7 hours in the F-117A...this was clearly a highly qualified pilot...whose aircraft crashed some 40 minutes into what should have been an otherwise uneventful flight. "Based on the

results of the inspections, we concluded that the flight controls were in the following positions at impact .. (deleted)... In brief, these figures suggest that the pilot was commanding slightly nose up with a moderate left bank..."

In both crashes, the report indicated there was no onboard in-flight fire as the possible cause of the accidents. On the second crash, it is interesting to note the comments of William L. Mitchell, equipment specialist (electronics) at TE Oklahoma City ALC/MMIRIA, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma:

"Attitude Director Indicator (ADI): The design of this indicator is such that it tends to retain the indications existent upon loss of electrical power. The re-

covered indicator had sustained major impact damage... the sphere was crushed and captured indicating 28 nose down. The roll gimbal was captured in a position that correlates to 55° right wing down."

The impact of the crash was seen by a number of individuals including "a flight of F-4s from George AFB conducting an aerial refuelling fifty miles to the west, saw the flash from the fireball at 2033."

In the first crash, it is evident from other pilot debriefs that the aircraft may have been performing "Barrel Roll Attacks" on the mission when the crash occurred, a flight profile that pilots have

often performed in A-7s.

In neither crash were there any evidence of aircraft or its sub-systems malfunction. The F-117 appears to be a docile aircraft quite capable of making maneuvers common to both A-7 and F-16 aircraft, with a bit of latitude for aerial acrobatics—but well within the 'book'. Both pilots had worked closely with a lot of difficult manoeuvres—according to crash report testimony of others—within or just outside standard 'rules of engagement' (ROE). The crashes both appear to have been due to pilot error—always an unfortunate reason for the loss of any aerial warrior.

The F-117s broke new ground for what is most commonly called 'stealth' aircraft. Future aircraft will incorporate new technologies that were untested and only theory when the first F-117s were begun. The F-117s are clearly 'pathfinders' for a future generation of combat aircraft. ■

By Arrangement with
Asian Defence Journal 11/90

F-117s DEPLOYED TO THE GULF

Twenty US Air Force 'low-observable technology' Lockheed F-117A fighters were deployed to Saudi Arabia during mid-August, as part of the larger United States build-up in that country following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

This is the first overseas deployment of the F-117s after a decade of flying and one short operational flight during the Panama action to oust General Manuel Noriega last year. The August 19th flight initiated from Tonapah, Nevada, still home of the F-117s assigned to the 37th TFW—included an aerial tanker support group comprising about a dozen USAF KC-135 tankers. Twenty F-117As departed the following afternoon from Langley AFB (VA) for the 15 hour non-stop flight to Saudi Arabia, using USAF/McDonnell Douglas KC-10A Extenders for aerial refuelling support during the long overwater crossing. The KC-135s originated from Beale AFB, California, where they traditionally have supported SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft flight. KC-135s do not have new-generation turbofan engines, using 1950s' generation P & W J-57-59W turbojet engines.

Commander in charge of the formation flight was Col. Richard W. Salsbury (USAF), who is also Vice-Commander of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (Beale AFB), widely known for its TR-1/U-2R operations. The formation flew at 22-25,000 foot altitudes at mid-range speeds for attack aircraft. Three flight refuellings were provided by KC-135s, the F-117As proving very stable during refuellings due to their fly-by-wire flight system.

Reports on the aircraft since arrival in Saudi Arabia have yet to be allowed. A major advantage the F-117As would have in a chemical or conventional desert war would be night attacks against key Iraqi bomber bases and radar warning facilities. This would include night attacks on Iraqi Air Force bases housing new Sukhoi SU-24/Fencer-C fighter bombers and air defence MiG-29/Fulcrum-A and IL-76/Adnan-1 AWACs aircraft. The former would greatly reduce Iraqi long-range strike capabilities, while attacks on the MiG-29/IL-76/Adnan facilities would greatly reduce the sophistication of Iraqi air defence interceptor force. Early attacks on the key command centres associated with the complex of Soviet-origin air defence radars would allow for 'sanitised' air corridors to be created for friendly attack aircraft. G. JACOBS

GULF WAR: Technological advantages for US

Shortly after President George Bush ordered the virtual doubling of US forces in the Gulf, Gen. Colin

Powell, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, offered a glimpse of how the US would fight a desert war against Iraq.

In testimony to the House armed services committee on December 14, Gen. Powell said he wanted to avoid the impression that the US would adopt "a canon fodder strategy", mindlessly confronting Iraqi strengths.

"Nothing could be further from the truth. To us, every American life is precious," he said. "We will use our technological advantages in ways seen and unseen that the Iraqi army never really dreamed of."

Gen. Powell's comments under-line the US military's absolute faith in technology, not just as a guarantee of victory to ensure minimum casualties in a short, if bloody, conflict. Is this confidence misplaced?

No one should doubt the awesome firepower the Pentagon has assembled in the Gulf. But recent military engagements demonstrate that human error as well as unforeseen technological flaws can make a mockery of the best laid plans.

ACCURACY DOUBTFUL

When President Reagan dispatched US warplanes from the UK and from aircraft carriers to bomb the Tripoli and Benghazi areas in 1986, the long-distance mission was widely deemed a success because it intimidated Col. Muammer Gadaffi at little cost of American lives. Yet the accuracy of the F-111 bombers and their laser-guided munitions fell short of the Pentagon's expectations. One F-111 was lost, seven were forced to turn back and two failed to drop their bombs. They may even have missed their assumed target - the Libyan leader himself.

"It is easy to get carried away with high technology," says Mr. Seth Carus, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Some caution is justified, if only because much US weaponry remains untested in combat. Unproven in the desert. Yet the US armed forces, gearing up for their first protracted military engagement since the Vietnam war, have not hesitated to put on trial some of the most exotic equipment in their arsenal.

Among the most eye-catching weaponry: a laser-guided artillery round costing \$30,000 a shot; "stealthy" aircraft such as the F-117A designed to avoid detection by radar; the helicopter-borne Hellfire anti-tank missile as well as the Phoenix air-to-air missile and deadly fuel air explosives (a high density aerosol combination that can detonate with the bomb force of a small nuclear bomb).

DESTRUCTIVENESS

"The Iraqis do not really understand the destructiveness of modern conventional warfare," says Dr Loren Thompson, deputy director of national security studies at Georgetown University.

One weapon never yet used is the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) fielded by the US and British armies - although the UK was not due to have it fully in service until later this year. This has two pods of six rockets each, fired individually or in a ripple to a range of about 20 miles, each containing 644 fragmentation bomblets.

It is clear that the US army, navy, marines and air force can muster ferocious technological power which should exploit acknowledged strength: vastly superior night-fighting capability; superior intelligence-gathering and electronic warfare skills; a force that is almost entirely mobile; and virtually certain supremacy in the air and at sea.

The intelligence-gathering capability

is particularly impressive. The US can draw on a steady stream of information about the disposition of Iraqi forces, using space satellites with five-metre resolution pictures, US navy drones with high-definition cameras in their bellies, as well as the Awacs air surveillance system which can detect low-flying targets 230 miles away and high-altitude objects even further away.

DETECTION TECH:

Such is the quality of equipment deployed that the US ought to be able to detect not just the movement of an Iraqi armoured column, but also the fuelling of an Iraqi ballistic missile.

"This gives the US a tremendous tactical advantage," explains Mr. Carus. He concedes, however, that it is also possible to be overwhelmed with so much data that the risk is missing "the big picture".

The accumulation of information since August nevertheless should allow US military planners successfully to pinpoint key Iraqi installations in the first phase of an all-out aerial assault which many believe would precede a confrontation on the ground.

In this first wave, unmanned Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from ships and possibly submarines would combine with F-117A "Stealth" fighter-bombers to target the Iraqi air force's command and control network. This would deny Iraqi pilots radio contact with ground controllers tracking US warplanes, giving the Americans near instant control in the air.

Scores of F-111s and navy A-6 Intruder bombers would then carpet-bomb Iraqi installations, using earth penetrators with delay fuses that detonate periodically after the raid has finished. Other sophisticated munitions include bombs that can crater runways and root out planes and tanks hidden in bunker-style shelters. British Tornado GR1s with JP233 weapons, containing 30 bomblets for damaging airstrips and 215 more to prevent their repair, would also be used.


Flying in support of US and British bombers would be dozens of USAF F-15 and F-16 fighters, guided by Awacs aircraft, as well as US navy F-14 Tomcats and F-18/A Hornets.

LONG RANGE WEAPONS

Unlike the dogfights of the past, where pilots used to "lock on" behind an enemy jet to catch the heat signals from engines, the latest Sidewinder missiles can attack from all angles at a range of 10 miles. The Sparrow, guided by radar rather than infra-red sensors, has a range of more than 30 miles and can also attack from any angle.

This kind of battering should smash the resistance of even the most resilient of foes. But no one, not even the coolly confident Gen. Powell, is willing to predict an early Iraqi surrender. At some point, the US army would have to enter the fray, whereupon US infantrymen would have to rely on the rifle and bayonet as much as laser-guided bombs to overwhelm the enemy.

The battle would then revert, at least temporarily, to an age-old test of morale, training and will-power. This is a sobering thought for those in Washington who sometimes sound as though technology alone will get the job done and play down the possible causalities of war. ■



IRAN'S WEAPONS
In Iran
Three-quarters of the 100 fixed-wing aircraft believed to have been taken in turn are combat planes. Military and civilian transport planes and one of Iraq's two radar-reconnaissance planes make up the balance. Source: Jane's All the World's Aircraft

The B-52 Bomber: A Much Modified Workhorse



The B-52 Bomber

Originally designed in 1948, the planes could be used in active duty until 2035. The U.S. never sold the plane to other nations. The structure and electronics have been updated numerous times.

Sources: Prentice Hall Press, Aerofax Datagraph, Jane's All the World's Aircraft, Periscope data base, NYT

Recent improvements allow communications with air force satellites, electro-optical systems to provide low level guidance at night or in bad weather and radar-jammers and lasers used to guide "smart" weapons to targets.

B-52G

Range: 7,500 miles without refuelling
Cruising speed: 509 mph
Wingspan: 185 feet
Length: 160 feet 10 inches
Gulf War payload: 51 gravity bombs of 500 or 750 pounds apiece internally and 12 smart missiles externally.

International Herald Tribune

More than 30 years after the lumbering aircraft first rolled off the production line and 18 years after they traumatized Hanoi in the Christmas raids of 1972, U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers hammered targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait.

One of the oldest and by far the biggest combat plane flying against the Iraqis, the swept-wing, Boeing-built heavy bomber has been so extensively remodeled since its Vietnam days, to bolster its accuracy and make it safer from enemy attack, that little more than its airframe and hulking silhouette remain the same. The prototype first flew in March 1952.

Of the 744 B-52s that were built between 1955 and 1962, all but 247 have been retired, including the "D" models which were the most widely used in Vietnam.

Those earlier versions of the bomber carried more than twice the bomb loads of the "G" models that are now attacking in the Gulf. In the newest reconfiguration, much of the space that was once used to hold bombs now accommodates banks of computers that have increased bombing precision.

Even with half their old bomb capacity, the surviving B-52s deliver the biggest and perhaps most terrifying wallop in the American air arsenal.

They operate equally well in day or

night, and are immune to most variations in weather. A B-52G can carry up to 51 bombs. The bombs used are usually 500- or 750-pounders (225- or 340-kilograms).

B-52s typically attack in formations of three, unleashing all their bombs at once from altitudes of six to seven miles (9.5 to 11 kilometers), and blasting a swath of up to a half mile wide and perhaps a mile long.

"You turn the target into something that looks like a moonscape," said Major Cole, a former B-52 crew member.

Flying at high altitude, he said, the B-52s "can't be seen or heard until the bombs start falling and then it's like rolling thunder".

"It's a great psychological effect," Major Cole said. "You scare the hell out of them."

The B-52, "has got a mystique about it," said Major General John L. Borling, deputy chief of operations at the U.S. Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. "Because of its destructive power it has an ethos, a sense of awesomeness."

The plane carries a crew of six and is three or four times bigger than other U.S. fighting aircraft. ■

National Defence College Team Visits Alsons Industries

By a Correspondent

On Feb. 25, 1991 the War Course of the National Defence College visited ALSONS INDUSTRIES (PVT) LTD.; four days earlier on Feb. 21, 1991 the Air War Course of the PAF Air War College had also visited Alsons. This is significant since traditionally the defence officers undergoing courses in these institutions visit the public sector and the military's own industrial complexes like PAC Kamra, POF Wah, HRF, Pak Steel Mills, Naval Dockyard, TDC etc.

ALSONS has been singled out by the two staff colleges since it is the leading defence-product dedicated private industry in



Pakistan today. The 20 minutes briefing given by its Managing Director Mr. A.R. Allana recounted Alsons history of development from clock manufacture in the early 60's to dedicated fuze-manufacturing for POF's 81mm and 120mm mortar bombs in early 70's. This is a major shift from low tech engineering industry to high-tech defence products. This transformation was done on a very tight self-financed budget. The process involved innovating on available machinery to keep capital costs low.

On conclusion of the briefing by Mr. A.R. Allana, very searching questions were asked by the War Course staff and students on quality assurance system, manpower training, labour problems and development potential of the company for defence products. The management claimed to have the highest engineers

to technician ratio for any industry in Pakistan. ALSONS has a dedicated workforce of 32 engineers and 300 skilled workers. ALSONS has its own CAD Division capable of designing hi-tech products in-house.



The War Course was then conducted to a detailed tour of the factory. In his closing remarks Major General Jamshed Malik appreciated the high quality of work being carried out, he advised ALSONS management to continue their dedicated service to the Armed Forces and keep a forward looking attitude for development and manufacture of a larger number of defence products.

PSO services for the Armed Forces commended

Maj. General M. Akram, Director General, Supplies & Transport, Pakistan Army, heading a high-powered delegation visited P.S.O. Head office and had detailed discussions with Mr. M.M. Farid Managing Director of the Company.

Matters relating to the supplies of POL Petroleum products to Defence Services, especially in the context of changes taking place in the region due to Gulf War, availability of crude oil and its other products came under discussion. He was assured that PSO was fully equipped to look after total requirement of the country including Defence Services. All necessary arrangements had been made to make adequate availability of Petroleum Products.

He was also presented with a "Quality Control Manual", to assist Defence Services to maintain better controls in their field of Aviation Operation and storage/handling of other products.

Gen. Akram appreciated the services being rendered by P.S.O. to the needs and requirements of the country's valiant armed forces and holding regular training courses on POL at its training centre for the Armed Forces personnel.