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


A MONTHLY MIRROR & DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

Vol. X, Nos. 1-2, 1984

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Retrospect

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Defence JOURNAL
A MONTHLY MIRROR & DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

Vol. X, Nos. 1-2, 1984

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1983 In Retrospect

1983 saw the world misbehave itself rather badly. On the whole, the world had been awfully unkind to an year that comes but once in a century and leaves its footprints on the sands of time — sometimes neat and regular, sometimes grotesque and disorderly. 1983's footprints had been in the latter category which was a pity. For an year is what the world makes of it; and, in truth, it is the world rather than the year itself that is to blame for what it has to show for it in the final reckoning.

1983, by and large, had been ill-treated by the world, itself turning fast into an impossible topsy-turvydom. Ours is a world of plenty: the only question is what type of plenty? Plenty of everything! Only more of trouble than comfort, more of wars than peace, more of turmoil than tranquillity, and so on. If the world today could be reduced to a solitary symbol, it could be portrayed as an imminent suicide on the edge of the precipice contemplating the yawning chasm below before taking the fatal plunge.

THE SUBCONTINENT: Starting from ones own house, Indo-Pakistan relations in the last quarter of 1983 had been but one step short of an actual war. While in India in November last, I heard so much of war talk that I feared the next thing would be the declaration of war itself. There was Madame Gandhi, her foreign and defence ministers, and last but not least, her sole surviving son, the indefatigable Rajiv Gandhi jaw-boning untiringly about the challenge and threat from Pakistan.

Warning her people of the dangers "lurking both inside and outside" the country Mrs. Gandhi appealed to them to get ready to fight the dangers. Significantly enough, she chose the historic Kurukshetra māidan for her near-war speech. An Indian newspaper gleefully reported the event as follows: ...on the spacious ground between Sannihit Sarovar and Brahm Sarovar which has a mythological background, she recalled that the place had witnessed the Mahabharat war which caused widespread destruction.

"But the war, she went on to say, whose clouds had been gathering on the world horizon would be much more disastrous than even the Mahabharat War. "It might destroy the whole world".

She cautioned the nation against the "intentions" of Pakistan in "accusing" India of "interfering" in her affairs. She asked if "repeated accusation might not be an excuse for action."

Although big cities like Delhi and Bombay looked as busy and peaceful as ever while there was war in the minds and on the lips of the top Indian leadership. To all outward appearances, Indo-Pakistan peace had never looked remoter or a sudden eruption of hostilities more imminent; and one watched for the next high-powered speech with bated breath.

Short of the actual confrontations along the international border and ceasefire violations in Jammu and Kashmir, the later part of 1983, in sheer ominous tones, had been strongly reminiscent of the corresponding part of 1964 preceding the outbreak of actual fighting in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965, the first vital link in the chain of events leading to the first India-Pakistan war later that year. Happily enough much of the public posturing and declamation in 1983 had been mere sound and fury without any bones being broken on either side. Happily enough also, where the broad masses were concerned, they could not have been less excited by the fiery speeches of their leaders or more untouched by the war fever incessantly being whipped up.

Nonetheless, India would not stop short of making rude and hostile gestures practically to all its neighbours. It threatened to seal off the Indo-Bangladesh border by building a sort of Berlin wall or throwing up a barbed wire fence; it threatened intervention in the Sri Lankan civil turmoil; and its relations with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, though quiet, had been far from being warm and friendly. In the subcontinental menage India tends to behave much in the fashion of the jealous husband tolerating not even friendly visitors. It wants its neighbours to start learning to live in an Indo-centric, India-conscious regional setting. It wants to be recognized not just as the 'regional influential' but the only regional power to develop and determine a strategic framework for the region as a whole and persuade or force others to accept that.

Rival strategic formulations are not to be tolerated and exclusively nationalistic concepts of defence and security to be either discouraged or confined to a policing role only. More particularly, matters concerning bilateral relations between India's neighbours and outside powers in the context of national security and defence, are not to be even considered — let alone entered — without reference to the regional strategic framework of India's own making and choosing. As for foreign military assistance programmes and arms transactions with any of India's neighbours an approving nod from India, if not a written approval, should always be treated as an essential prerequisite or the faulting party be seriously reprimanded and exposed to the risk of relentless propaganda. India's thrust to regional primacy that had been gaining strength since 1971, accelerated noticeably in 1983 to a point where it made accommodation with neighbours increasingly difficult if not quite impossible. None of India's neighbours should either question or mind its primacy by virtue of its sheer size, population, technology, above all, military power. But it is one thing to be the *primus inter pares* and quite another to behave as the lord and the master.

The other irksome feature of India's thrust to power is the almost indecent haste and lack of poise with which it presses its claim to regional hegemony quite unmindful of the interests and sensitivities of its neighbours. This tendency became quite disturbingly manifest during 1983 when short of actually going to war, India brought the region very nearly to the brink of one. And still hardly a day passes when it would not snub, intimidate or actually threaten a neighbour.

AFGHANISTAN: On the northwestern edge of the subcontinent, Afghanistan went through yet another year of diplomatic failure and military stalemate. The Geneva process, off to a flying start to generate much hope and optimism, virtually stalled and seems unlikely to make any headway in the near future. Just as these lines are being written, world media carry the shocking news of the savage aerial bombardment of Pakistan's tribal territory by two MiG fighters/bombers of the Karmal regime. It is significant that just a few days before the dastardly event, the Soviet ambassador in Pakistan had threatened joint action by the Soviet and Afghan armed forces if "interference" from the Pakistani side would not stop. Was the low-level rocket and bomb attack on the Pakistani territory all of a piece with the Soviet ambassador's threat? We really do not know and would refrain from speculating about it. Just the same it would seem to be a most bizarre way of welcoming Diego Cardovez, the UN secretary-general's special envoy, who is about to visit Pakistan and Afghanistan to revive the Geneva process.

Afghanistan remains as one of the world's high-tension areas. What really worries is that unless the continuing stalemate is broken without undue loss of time, it might turn the whole Afghanistan crisis into a forgotten war. The world appears to have already accepted the continuance of the Soviet military presence and remains, by and large, unconcerned with it. The US, for its part, seems more interested in Afghanistan as a strategic ploy in its own global power game than in the preservation of Afghanistan's national integrity and status as a small, nonaligned state that remains the victim of a cold-blooded aggression by a European power. Pretensions and proclamations apart morality ethics and justice seem to have gone out of international relations.

IRAQ-IRAN WAR: Barring two major but short-lived offensives by Iran in the early 1983, the Iraq-Iran war is also gradually passing into the shadowy domain of a forgotten war. It goes on and on bleeding the two warring armies while denuding them of the flower of their youth without having anything to show for it on the ground. Here also, the year 1983 saw the futility of the various peace processes initiated by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the UN. The Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Dhaka and lately the Islamic Summit in Casablanca both took note of the long, fratricidal war, but the war goes on much to the despair and perturbation of the Islamic Ummah. This war, apart from its crushing costs and destabilizing impact on the general security environment of the region, has been, perhaps the most important single factor in shattering the passionate vision of the Islamic ascendancy expected to coincide with the inauguration of the fifteenth century of the Islamic calendar four years ago. The war was a stone thrown at the glasshouse of the still budding Islamic unity badly damaging if not destroying it completely.

MIDDLE EAST: The Middle East saw yet another Palestinian diaspora and the destabilization of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The Palestinians had been the multiple victims of their own in-fighting; of Israeli brutalities; of Syrian manipulation and violence and of the US land and naval forces in Lebanon. Yasser Arafat, together with his staunch supporters, was thrown out of Lebanon once and for all. They were carried aboard the French ships to their various destinations unarmed. Syria did not only refuse asylum to Yasser Arafat and his men but spared no effort to break him down personally and destroy his organizational base and power. Though still the symbol of the Palestinian unity and resistance under the PLO, Yasser today is in forced exile with the base of his

political power undermined and his military wing in total disarray. It is practically impossible to imagine at this stage if he would ever be able to regroup and reorganize his military forces to make them fit for any effective operational role.

The US would have nothing to do with the PLO until it gave (unconditional) recognition to Israel, in other words, countenance and accept its own extinction. The quid pro quo would be the revival of the Reagan plan to grant the Palestinians a much watered-down version of a homeland on the Western Bank and Gaza strip in association with Jordan.

Considered in their totality, the outright Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982; the brutal murders in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps; the signing of the May 17 accord between Lebanon and the Israeli occupation forces; the eventual disbandment of the PLO and its forced eviction from Lebanon, would all appear to be a part of a joint US-Israeli action plan. The US-Israeli strategic accord that suffered a temporary setback after the invasion of Lebanon was restored in 1983 and remains the main pillar of the US strategy in the Middle East. When Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir met President Ronald Reagan in Washington on Nov 28, 1983 the main topic of their talk was closer "strategic cooperation" to deal with what they perceive as the "common threat" posed by the increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. They agreed to establish a joint military-political committee to plan and programme US-Israeli military exercises. Other areas of "strategic cooperation" included the stockpiling of US military supplies in Israel and US military assistance to that country. On top of its strategic accord with Israel, the US is now also directly involved in Lebanon. It cannot thus escape the responsibility for such catastrophic events in the Middle East as the uprooting, of the PLO from Lebanon. Even Syria, despite its proclaimed divergencies with the US converged with it, for reasons of its own, in its uncompromising and active hostility towards Yasser Arafat and his supporters.

So the Middle East to-day offers the dismal spectacle of a house divided against itself. It is Syria vs PLO, Iraq vs Iran, Libya vs Syria, Syria vs Iraq, Jordan flexing its military muscle without knowing why, where and how (general mobilization against Syria; raising of the Yarmouk Force to reinforce Iraq against Iran and now organizing some sort of a rapid deployment force for any future use in the Gulf etc.); the Gulf states busy arming themselves against foreign threats but continuing to face a plethora of internal ones (Kuwait bomb blasts etc.) and Egypt, the largest and the most powerful Arab nation still outside the Arab mainstream.

Viewed in the light of the number of Arab states surrounding it, Israel looks no more than a mite but quite a giant when considered in the context of the Arab disarray and its own military might.

EUROPE: The year 1983 saw the beginning of the deployment of the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe and the suspension of the START (Strategic Armaments Reduction Talks) and INF (Intermediate range Nuclear Forces) negotiations in Geneva. It saw the US perfect its dense-pack basing modes for its own ICBMs to kill or confuse the invading Soviet ICBMs through intense heat and radiation even before they hit their targets. The surviving US ICBMs would then be able to fly out and hit the targets in the Soviet Union. Both the superpowers also perfected their hunter/killer satellites, laser and Particle Beam Weapons (PBW) to destroy the incoming missiles in the outer space. A typical

star war scenario—only terrifyingly realistic and practical. Ever-new and mind-boggling inventions are being perfected to destroy the world many times over. And all these under the control of power hungry bureaucrats and politicians and in the hands of professional amateurs who would mistake a Boeing 747 for a fighter and destroy it. The KAL-007 incident apart from being savagely inhuman should all put us to thinking as to what small errors of judgement by people, with their finger on the doomsday button, can do.

President Reagan now talks of "peaceful competition and credible deterrence", which is all very well. The question is: what does credible deterrence mean? There are limits to deterrence and those may well have been overreached already. If in practical terms, deterrence would mean only matching weapon for weapon or neutralizing one's rival system by perfecting a superior one, then the race would go on and on until one day the limits of human endurance and competence would be reached and the world explode into nothingness. Victory and defeat in war become totally meaningless when the existence of the world itself is threatened with total extinction.

AFRICA: Africa had its own share of problems up and down and across. There was a coup in Nigeria; Sudan experienced serious disturbances in several northern cities; Mozambique continued to face a growing insurgency problem as the South African backed Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) mounted repeated attacks on vital communication lines; impasse over Namibia continued with the racist regime of South Africa still fighting SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) freedom fighters in defiance of the UN efforts; Chad remained the battleground between France and Libya; up north Morocco continued battling with Saharan Arab Republic (SAR) guerrillas. And so on.

THE CARIBBEAN: Farther west in the Caribbean, US invaded the tiny Grenada at the "request" of Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). In essence, the US invasion of Grenada was much the same thing as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by *invitation*. Regardless of the apparent triviality of the event, it does make mockery of the independence of small hapless countries. What if tiny Maldives invite the US to invade Sri Lanka? The question even if, hypothetical, is fraught with deadly possibilities.

In Nicaragua the tussle between the Sandinista regime and US-backed guerrillas continued to rage. In El Salvador it had been the reverse in that the US kept backing a shaky regime against insurgents. And so on.

Considering that no major holocaust occurred, the year 1983 can still be regarded as not too bad a year on the whole. But the seeds of conflict that had been germinating throughout the year could sprout through '84 and grow into a bitter harvest. The areas to watch will be South Asia and the Middle East quite hopelessly drawn into the superpower cold war. The real trouble with these areas is that whereas the countries located there have the wherewithal to wage small wars they do not have the power to make and maintain peace in the face of the superpower global strategies. Their manoeuvrability is hopelessly restricted by the moves of these powers on the global chessboard.

Most of the small Third World countries are being forced to seek not the type of security best suited for them but only the type of security considered best for them by the superpowers in their own national interest. For instance if a local war must be waged to des-

troy the Iranian revolution, then Iraq would somehow be dragged into it and also sold the necessary hardware to press it on unmindful of the crushing costs on either side. What a powerful combination could Iraq and Iran have made through mutual unity and co-operation. And what a mess they have really made of their own security, stability and economy by engaging themselves in an utterly senseless war without a strategic design and tactical direction. The only beneficiaries are the super and major powers and their arms manufacturers.

France has emerged as the principal armourer of the Gulf concluding major arms deal with Iraq for the supply of a panoply of weapons among them, the Exocet missiles and the Super Estandard bombers of Falklands' fame. It has now clinched a huge arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth about four billion US dollars. As for the US, it can catch with much glee and satisfaction revolutionary Iran—a thorn on its side—being bled white and a socialist, confrontationist Iraq being cut to size. The same goes for the Soviet Union who would have hardly relished the prospect of a major Islamic country emerge as a rival centre of Islamic revolutionary dynamism in its immediate environs.

On the whole, the year 1983, had been bad year for the Islamic world. It saw the cold-blooded and ruthless superpower strategies come into full play in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Lebanon and at work elsewhere including Pakistan.

—Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi (Retd.)

Higher Conduct of 1965 Indo-Pak War

Brigadier (Retd)

Riazul Karim Khan, LOM, MC

As expected *MY VERSION—INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR 1965* by General Mohammad Musa, the war-time Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, generated much critical interest and comment. In our September issue (Vol IX, No. 9, 1983) besides our own editorial comment, we carried articles by two eminent military professionals Lieutenant General (Retd.) M. Habibullah Khan Khattak, Pakistan Army's last Chief of Staff under General Musa and Lieutenant Colonel Irshad Rashid, MC, a decorated soldier of World War II.

While the higher conduct of the 1965 war remains a subject of much controversy there are certain specific points that need to be elaborated and clarified. For instance, General Musa's observations about the *Gibraltar Ops* and his predicament vis a vis one of his Div. Commander Gen. Akhtar Malik; the circumstance wherein the '65 war began to take us by surprise; the conduct of armoured operations and the move of the First Armoured Div. from south to north; the C-in-C's initiative in ordering troops on Sept. 5/6 to forward positions without prior Govt. approval in contrast to his quiet acceptance of the Foreign Office's (Govt's) views and orders on *Gibraltar Ops*; the conduct of war at the highest level of national strategy etc. are just some of the points chosen for much discussion in the reviews.

We invited General Musa cordially to elaborate the above or any other points he might wish to for *Defence Journal*. In reply, the General wrote that he had "nothing to add to what has been stated in my book."

In the meantime, we received yet another incisive review of *MY VERSION* by a senior Brig. Riazul Karim, M.C., a distinguished tankman himself. This article is being published below.

The pages of *Defence Journal* remain open to the author of *MY VERSION—INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR 1965*—for whatever comments he may wish to make for the benefit of our readers.

—Editor.

The Indian Army attacked Pakistan in the early hours of 6 Sept., 1965. Long before this, *Operation Gibraltar* had been in progress i.e. the raids into Indian-held Kashmir. It is difficult to assess how far these raids were a success because a rosy picture from the front was one thing and evidence

of real success another. We in GHQ (I was Director Armoured Corps at that time) usually had a good laugh at some of the reports which came into the Military Operations (MO) Directorate. We questioned many a time as to how many prisoners, arms, maps or other enemy material had been captured by the raiders but there

was no answer. We were satisfied in our minds that the reports were obviously very exaggerated.

Gen Musa knew that Bhutto used to meet Maj Gen A.H. Malik and some other officers to discuss with them the situation in Jammu & Kashmir and that he also was invited to attend such meetings but went only once. He was given a concrete proposal for enlarged operations in Kashmir with which he did not agree and after its examination recommended that the raids be postponed so that the time thus gained could be utilized for making proper arrangements not only for guerilla activities in Kashmir but also for building up the army's capacity for an open war. Although it was not to his liking, Gen Musa did not stop his officers from mixing with Bhutto or other senior civil servants, because obviously he knew that the foreign minister had got the blessings of the President. The raids continued against Gen Musa's recommendations but he neither tried to convince the Field Marshal (Ayub Khan) of his point of view nor did he offer to resign. He later satisfied his vanity by saying that "Army High Command did not visualise that the raids would escalate into a general war..."

... "Army personnel were therefore not stopped from going on leave from their concentration areas and, as a safeguard against surprise, mines were laid in front of defensive positions. His assessment might have worked had the *Operation Grand Slam* not been approved by him under duress. This was the deliberate the Chamb-Jaurian Sector immediately across the ceasefire line on the night 30/31 August, 1965, under full control of GHQ. The ultimate aim of this operation was not understood by observers like us because it was now only too obvious that GHQ had invited

India to wage a full scale war against Pakistan whereas we were not prepared for it. It was just not possible for the Indians to sit and watch and be content with the thought that the operation was only in the disputed territory of Kashmir. It was an expensive way to high-light the Kashmir issue in the United Nations. Nevertheless, according to GHQ, "the situation was well in hand".

Uncertain Warning. On 4th September our views were confirmed when Mr. Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister, announced over All India Radio, words to the effect that Pakistan should withdraw its troops back to the ceasefire line otherwise they would be responsible for the consequences and that India would choose the time and place of its counter-attack. Who could doubt at this stage that there were all the chances of a full scale war with India? Gen Musa says that on the same day he sent a warning signal to all formations that they should be very "Vigilant" but he does not clarify the meaning of this word in the army lingo. The C-in-C should undoubtedly have been more specific in stating what he actually wanted. The troops at this stage could either occupy battle positions or go forward into assembly areas or remain in their present concentration areas. But they could be vigilant or alert in any of the three situations. Therefore, the orders were vague and incomplete, particularly in view of the fact that all along he had been warning his formation commanders not to take any action which might aggravate the situation. In the Lahore sector, it was Allah who saved us by making the Indians falter on their own, and stop at the Batapur Canal thinking there was some trap laid on by the Pakistani Forces. On receiving flash information from our screen troops located on the canal banks, our main force went forward on 6th morning after

they had done their morning PT within their unit lines!

Pakistan Army's one and only Corps HQ was still in its permanent station on the morning of 6th Sept. Between 0900-1000 hours, the COS of this HQ issued orders for its move forward to its battle location, which they did at about mid-day and reached there in the evening. The corps commander was thus able to take a grip over his command not before mid-night 6th/7th Sept. Leave of army personnel was still open on 6th Sept. morning. So, it is up to the reader to guess as to who was surprised, the Indians or ourselves?

GHQ's Contribution. GHQ's contribution towards the war was the sole effort by the C-in-C together with the CGS and his Military Operations Directorate. There was overemphasis on the secrecy aspect and none of the other PSOs or arms directors were consulted on any matter, either before or during the war. Staff officers of Grade-I level (i.e. Lt Cols) within MO Directorate were moving troops by trains and road convoys over the heads of formation commanders from one area to another, they were transferring armoured regiments from one division to another and, at times, it was reported that forward brigade commanders received direct orders from MO Directorate to readjust the position of their battalions and even of their companies. Many times a regiment or a battalion received orders from MO Dte to move in a hurry but on reaching its new destination, it was ordered to return to the original location. Such hurried moves, backwards and forwards, only helped to affect adversely the morale of the troops. During peace time, the aim was always to group together, parti-

cularly armoured, artillery and infantry units so that they lived and trained together and carried out exercises similar to the roles which they were likely to be allotted in war. *The sudden break-up of compact groups immediately before and during the war, therefore caused great confusion and plans of formations lacked cohesion and understanding. Brigade and unit commanders on arrival at new destinations, not only found unknown faces of superiors, but were confronted with entirely new plans to implement in an entirely new area which they had not reconnoitered or even seen previously. Furthermore, all such units could not immediately be supplied with maps of the new area. Can one imagine the confusion?*

THE AUTHOR

Brigadier (Retd.) Riazul Karim Khan, LOM, MC was commissioned in the Indian Armoured Corps in 1941 and joined the famous Cavalry Regiment, Probyn's Horse, with which he remained until he finished his tenure of command. He served in Burma during World War II, having received the immediate award of Military Cross for gallantry in one of many tank battles. He was the only one Indian Armoured Corps Officer who was not only decorated but was given command of a tank squadron during the Burma campaign.

In Pakistan, he served as an instructor at the Command and Staff College (Quetta) and commanded two armoured brigades (including an independent brigade) for over five years and subsequently was appointed Director Armoured Corps.

During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, he commanded an armoured brigade in the Pasrur Sector and was awarded the Imtiazi Sanad. He was also awarded the "Legion of Merit" (LOM) by the US Government on his vacation of the appointment of Pakistan's Head of Military Mission.

As per GHQ war plans, Corps HQ had an entirely different sector to command, but on declaration of the war, they were

ordered to move to another sector to command a different set of troops and to implement a completely new plan. To cap it all, after having arrived 12 hours too late in their battle locations, the corps staff found out that they did not have adequate number of maps of the new sector!

Khem Karan. The study of the battle of Khem Karan will shock any average person. It is not the intention to suppress the mistakes of Armoured Corps officers. The execution of orders by brigade and lower commanders was undoubtedly faulty in many instances but the plan and orders issued by GHQ and the necessary arrangements made for this operation were worse and inadequate, and did not in the least help any one down the line.

First, let us discuss the command aspect. Gen Musa says about 1 Armoured Division that "It was led by a General Officer who had adequate experience of armoured warfare, having commanded for about three years our Independent Armoured Brigade which was later converted into an armoured division." What a misstatement! This General Officer had commanded the brigade in question (as a brigadier) when it had not yet been designated as an armoured brigade. He did have two reconnaissance regiments as part of this brigade but everyone, except possibly Gen Musa, knew very well that this brigade commander was conducting himself more or less only as administrator of these reconnaissance regiments. He knew nothing about armour and took no pains to learn anything about the subject. Can anyone conclude from this that the officer had had experience of armoured warfare? He was promoted to command an infantry division located at Quetta where he was of great value and assistance to his senior officers. Subsequently, he was transferred to command 1 Armoured

Division, presumably on the basis of his previous experience of "armoured warfare". Again his conduct and command techniques of the armoured division became well known throughout the Pakistan Army. He was more interested and spent most of his time in directing the intelligence staff in his area to spy on the private activities of officers and the enjoyed taking disciplinary action against them. He was not on speaking terms with two of three of his armoured brigade commanders and also with his colonel staff—his principal staff officer. When the division was ordered to move out of its permanent station to the concentration area, it left behind at least 25 per cent of its vehicles as being 'off road'. This is an unusually large figure for an armoured formation, particularly here as this Division was our main striking force. A fighting fit armoured formation is expected to have a minimum of 99 per cent vehicles on road. Needless to say, this very important incident was not only ignored but it also did not still serve as an eye-opener to the technically ignorant bosses at GHQ. Changes could have been made even at that stage if only the national interest came above personnel likes and dislikes, at least at the hour of crisis.

Commander 11 Division was a good instructor and staff officer but he had over the years developed mental slowness (due to certain habits) to be an effective and decisive commander. It is a fact that an armoured brigade had been placed "under command 11 Division" for Phase 1 of the Operation i.e. for launching of the bridgehead across the Roohi Nala. The armoured brigade commander, however, pulled back his leading regiment on two consecutive evenings for leaguering immediately in front of his Brigade HQ. Everyone was upset by this action but the blame was apparently put on the GOC Armoured Division who was at that stage not in

control. It was entirely the job of 11 Division Commander to have ensured that his armoured brigade commander did not repeat the mistake at least on the second night, and the results may then have been much more favourable to us. His Tactical HQ should have been well forward near the leading armoured brigade commander but it was situated miles behind, somewhere in Kasur Area.

The offensive was essentially a break-out battle with the armoured thrust to go towards Amritsar. However, the planning was very poor and armour was not given a fair opportunity to break out. Some of the main reasons for this opinion are as follows:

- (i) The bridgehead launched by one of the infantry brigades of 11 Division was hardly one to one and half miles deep. This was very inadequate for an armoured division to go through. When the leading elements of armour got stuck in the initial stages, it was the job of the infantry division to immediately expand the bridgehead and to push forward the infantry elements as far forward as possible. This was not done and instead the impatient GHQ ordered the armoured division to go through in phase II of the operation. A second armoured brigade was therefore moved into the extremely restricted bridgehead, resulting in utter confusion, shooting down of each other and loss of direction as no arrangements had been made to guide the tanks on correctly.
- (ii) BRB Canal had only one masonry bridge over it (which could take the load of tanks) in the area where the bridgehead was to be launched. No arrangement had been made to build more bridges by our engineers.
- (iii) Another factor was the change in plans of the armoured division at the last minute and thereby not allowing sufficient time to the troops for proper reconnaissance of the ground. They had been preparing for another move but the latest intelligence information at the start of war was that the Indian Armoured Division was concentrated in area Jallundar and therefore the brain wave that our own armoured

Perhaps secrecy was the reason but obviously lessons had not been learnt from the costly Exercise Tezgam. The C-in-C was insisting on a complete surprise by a quick move of the armoured division across the canal. But people who understand armour moves will confirm that at least two other bridges should have been made available. Three bridges are required but two are the absolute minimum. One was just not enough and if the enemy air or his artillery had destroyed this one and only bridge at the start of the operation, the offensive would never have taken off at all. Perhaps, that would have saved a lot of our tanks from falling into enemy hands! Then there was Roohi Nala which also had no tankable bridge over it but it had not been foreseen that it had steep banks which would not allow tanks to cross easily. The tankers therefore got quite a surprise when they arrived at the Nala and considerable delay was further caused in the preparation of a crossing over it. The main reason for the slow take-off of the operation was the result of this arrangement and surprise was lost and time gained by the Indians to reinforce their defence.

division should move swiftly and block the Indian Armoured east of Amritsar and not allow them to come westwards of it. However, it was discovered a little too late that the Indian Armoured Division had already moved well forward and was hiding in general area between Pathankot and Gurdaspur. One can imagine the chaos, confusion and excitement the information covered after Khem Karan battle had started. Gen Musa must have taken the failure of the offensive as a blessing in disguise because he was able to reinforce the Pasrur Sector with more armour to meet the main Indian striking force. The military intelligence chief was rewarded by a promotion to the rank of Maj Gen soon after the war ended.

The then C-in-C states that the two divisional commanders reported that the canal masonry bridge had been damaged when one of the tanks fell down on one side while crossing it, and they therefore, requested that they be "allowed to build a bridge from their own resources and resume the advance". What a shame! It just shows how much minute-to-minute control GHQ had over the actions of the two general officers. Under normal circumstances they should have done the job on their own initiative, merely "informing" GHQ. This is the type of training we used to give to our troop and squadron commanders. However, to conclude the sad story of the Khem Karan battle, the CGS arrived on 9th September in the area and stayed there for two days.

Chawinda. The scene moves over to the Pasrur-Chawinda-Sialkot Sector where, according to Gen Musa, "the greatest tank battle was fought since World War II".

This is again a very misleading statement. The action of concentrating tanks by both sides in areas opposite each other does not automatically mean or lead to a full-scale battle. As I have mentioned earlier, I was director, Armoured Corps on the out break of war. I reported to the CGS and requested him to send me forward in command of armoured troops. I had been waiting and training all these years since Independence for this opportunity. I was told not to be unnecessarily excited as we had already got good commanders with the armoured formations. However, as soon as the news of the failure of 1 Armoured Division's offensive was confirmed, I was suddenly called up by Gen Musa who said that I should go immediately to join 6 Armoured Division and guide the GOC on armour operations. These were his words. I arrived by an L19 plane at the Gujranwala airstrip and after reporting at Corps HQ enroute, I joined HQ 6 Armoured Division on the evening of 9th September as Deputy GOC. In the meantime another senior armour officer (of the rank of Maj Gen) was detailed by the GHQ to join Corps HQ, presumably to advise the corps commander on the expected greatest tank battle since World War II. The general officer was reported to be discussing on telephone plans and events directly with the C-in-C over the head of the corps commander, and, furthermore, also passing GHQ orders regarding even minor armour operations direct to GOC 6 Armoured Division. So, whenever I advised the latter on any matter, he told me that he had already received orders from C-in-C/CGS/DMO to do something else. My GOC was therefore usually in a flat spin. Fortunately, however, there was never any divisional battle as such. The normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe or to infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their

own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides, although in the end we came out better.

One would like to ask a question from the then C-in-C as to why did he have to place a senior Armoured Corps Maj General in Corps HQ and another senior Armoured Corps Brigadier as a Deputy GOC in 6 Armd Division? Did he have confidence in his senior commanders or not? If he did, what was the necessity for these attachments?

After Khem Karan. Immediately after the Khem Karan set back, 4 Armoured Brigade was detached from 1 Armoured Division and sent to reinforce 6 Armoured Division in area Pasrur on 12 September. It arrived the same evening and I received orders to take command of this brigade which was to operate within 6 Armoured Division. I was replaced by a more senior Armoured Corps officer in the HQ.

GHQ was expecting all the time a major thrust by the Indian 1 Armoured Division but it never came. The Indians maintained tactics of probing forward with a regimental group at a time, and our forward elements repulsed these attacks each time. Having taken over command of 4 Armoured Brigade, I was now virtually in direct control of the major portion of armour in 6 Armoured Division. The first thing I did was to stop the "Kabaddi Game" i.e. for one regiment to go sailing along into the blues and come back with a bloody nose. From now on, I conducted a proper and controlled brigade battle. One regiment protected the left flank and also kept liaison with troops of Sialkot Sector. Our right flank was protected by the Chawinda infantry brigade whilst we pressed forward with another regiment but on a systematic style and with

adequate artillery support. I still had one armoured regiment and one armoured infantry battalion as reserve and uncommitted. From then onwards, our tank casualties were suddenly and considerably reduced and we kept giving the enemy a bloody nose each time he was spotted. He was getting more and more defensive each day.

My staff did a great job one morning. They tuned on to an Indian wireless net which obviously belonged to an armoured regiment. The latter was reporting some enemy shelling in its area. I immediately checked with my artillery commander to find out who was firing at that time and where. I then asked him to put down all the available corps artillery on to the same area. A little later we heard reports on the same wireless net that the CO had been killed and also a majority of the tanks of the regiment had been destroyed. This was Gen Chaudri's famous 16 Cavalry!

By about 22 September, our morale was very high. We had broken the back of the Indian threat and we felt that they had become quite exhausted and had suffered heavy casualties. Many officers approached my HQ to convey their feelings that it was about time we launched a proper offensive! However, GHQ (at last) decided on that very day that we were to attack the enemy at dawn of next morning with my armoured brigade supported by the reserve infantry brigade. We made out a detailed plan and the draft operation order of the Task Force was also handed over to Divisional HQ. However, in the late evening we received orders to cancel all preparations as the offensive had been called off in anticipation of a ceasefire agreement. It was a great disappointment to everyone because we were absolutely certain of achieving complete success in our mission. Immediately after ceasefire, a rumour went around that our senior officers were

unnecessarily panicky and that the war had been fought mainly by officers of the rank of brigadiers and below. This caused a storm in GHQ and intelligence personnel of all ranks were rushing around to confirm whether this type of talk by junior officers was true or not.

Gen Musa's criticism of Air Marshal Asghar is most unjustified. He probably expected the same type of conduct of the

war by the PAF Chief as he himself had demonstrated. I know both Air Marshals Asghar Khan and Nur Khan who are not only excellent airmen but equally good commanders and administrators. Gen Musa was himself responsible for not maintaining a close contact and liaison with the PAF. Nevertheless, it was such a thrill to the troops in the front line to see our air force perform so well.

Sovietization of Afghanistan

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Moscow is using Afghan Turkestan not only as a strategic base for its military power, but also as a starting point for the ideological disintegration of Afghanistan's people and for the destabilisation of Afghanistan's territory. Turkestan must now play Cuba's role in Afghanistan.

In this way, Turkestani intellectuals from the five Soviet republics in Turkestan—scientists, writers, artists, teachers and of course agitators—are sent to Afghanistan, who disseminate Russian propaganda and implement the so called Leninist nationalities policy.

In the press and during meetings, condemned Turkestani rulers, classical poets and scientists from the past centuries, who reigned in Turkestan as well as in Herat, Kabul, Balkh and Badakshan, are being suddenly projected as great men, to legitimate rulers and true friends of Afghanistan because it now suits Moscow's politics. Literary evenings for Afghan-Uzbeks are organized in Kabul to which actually 90% of the participants come from Tashkent.

Radio programmes in Kabul are transmitted in the Uzbek and Tajik languages; the Soviet press and numerous literature and school books of the five Soviet republics in Turkestan appear in Arabic script and are sent to Kabul in order to accelerate the ideological disintegration.

With the formation of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, the Soviets in Afghanistan appear to have long term, and a definite programme. The Ministry which is headed by Suliman Laiq, works in close collaboration with KHAD (Khidmat-e-Ittila'at-i-Daulati or State Information Agency), the Afghan secret service, trained and directed by the KGB. The KGB has long experience in running ministries of this sort, and dealing with nationalities.

In the Soviet Union the Ministry of Nationalities was formed in 1918, with Josef Stalin as its Commissar. A carefully laid out plan was framed:

- (1) To disintegrate the religious and racial bonds between different ethnic groups;
- (2) To alienate neighbouring ethnic groups from each other, and link each one

directly with Centre, through the Russian language, which would be the medium of instruction, and the only common link between two different ethnic groups;

(3) To hire influential personalities from different spheres of life, and exploit their ego to restrain their respective groups or classes from indulging in anti-revolutionary activities;

(4) To promote local cultural values in order to make them more inclined towards their own tribal ethics and traditions, rather than towards nationalism;

(5) To educate the young generation on the lines of communism;

(6) To bring them up as hard core communists to gather ideological, rather than material, support for the State.

Soviet System. In the Soviet Union this system has been at work since 1918. The Soviet Union has been divided into Soviet Republics in the name of ethnic groups that are in a majority within a certain area. Each Republic has further been divided into an autonomous region for the majority living there and into autonomous areas for the minorities inhabiting them. Each group, whether in a majority, or a minority has been given the freedom, or in a way obliged to adopt their mother tongue as official language, and learn Russian as the lingua franca. The programme of education in mother tongue is undoubtedly carried out under strict supervision of Russian experts, who are either KGB agents or are cleared by KGB as true communists. In this way, the communist ideology is communicated in local languages. In Afghanistan a similar pattern has been adopted, but keeping in mind the social structure of its people and the tribes of the neighbouring countries.

The main problem is the administration of the Pukhtun and Baluch in such a system. The Baluch people being small in number are given a separate administrative unit. But the Pukhtuns who are more than 50% of the total population of Afghanistan, occupy almost half of the country between the Hindukush and the Durand line. They are divided into tribes, sub-tribes, clans, sub-clans, and families. Each tribe occupies a definite area, and a few tribes also have their kinsmen on the other side of the Durand line in Pakistan. There is a likelihood of creating a large republic of Pukhtuns divided into autonomous areas of alien tribes inside the regions. In order to make this system work, the Afghan Government has to shatter the political and tribal power of the Pukhtuns by offering each tribe an autonomous administrative unit to promote its own tribal heritage within the limits of its own tribal area.

The Ministry of Tribes, and Nationalities in Afghanistan has been split up into three departments: *Akhwam, Tribes, Nationalities*.

The Akhwam. Under the department of Akhwam, come areas of Nuristan, the Pushto speaking Provinces of Kunar, Ningarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Kandhar, and Baluch areas of Afghanistan. In other words all the Afghan areas bordering Pakistan come under this department. All the tribes living within this area are to be formed into large communes, the chief being the commissar, who in turn would give up his children for education to the government. The children would get initial education in their local language, culture and religion, and then sent, either to the Soviet Union or to Kabul from where after completing their education, they would be sent back to take over the duties of their

father, as tribal chiefs, but in their hearts of hearts, as die hard communists.

The AKHWAM personnel has been split up and recruited on the following basis :

(i) **Khad** (Khidmat-e-Ittila'at-e-Daulati or State Information Agency).

About 80,000 agents have been trained by the KGB from among the local population who, in turn, train more agents to gather information for the Government.

(ii) *Bureau Guard Committee*: Boys between the ages of 10 and 15 years are taken into this Committee. They are given weapons and a special uniform. They are trained for the defence of local villages and espionage activities, and get a pay of about 3,000 Afghanis. The boys in this committee are mostly sons of army officers and party members.

(iii) *Vanguard Committee*: Or (Pesh-a-hang). Boys between the ages of 7 and 10 years are recruited into this committee. They are trained by KHAD, and their main task is espionage.

(iv) *Nijat Militia*: (Liberation Militia). They are volunteers recruited from among trusted persons and are given modern weapons. They have been assigned the task of protecting the houses and offices of high party members but sometimes they also work as spies. Their monthly salary is also 3,000 Afghanis.

(v) *Thunder Militia*: (Lightening Militia). This is a sort of a guerrilla militia, recruited from amongst trusted persons. All its members are heavily armed. Their main task is to protect the villages from the Mujahideen, but when the need arises, they may be also sent to the front. This

Militia has proved quite effective against the Mujahideen in Ningarhar, and Logar. Their starting salary is 3,500 Afghanis.

(vi) *Toofan Militia*: (Storm Militia). This is a counterguerilla militia. All its members are recruited from very trusted official party members. They are very well equipped, and their starting salary is 7,000 Afghanis.

(vii) *Sartari*: Or (Suicide Squads). This militia force is mobilised, and moved from one place to another. They have all sorts of modern weapons and, when asked for, they also get armoured cars and tanks. They are highly paid and all their expenses are borne by the Government.

Tribal Department. The Tribal Department of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities covers the entire tribal belt of Pakistan. Since they are very conservative and orthodox, their indoctrination has not so far started. The chiefs are given money and weapons, as well as official recognition. Their children who are taken over for education, are sent to the Soviet Union, so that they come back as thorough bred communists. The Soviets aim at long-term planning. They are willing to tolerate the present older generation of orthodox, and conservative tribal chiefs, but their actual planning, and conversion, would start with the next generation who would come back as communists from the Soviet Union. The tribes living on this side of the Durand line are given education, to promote their tribal heritage, so that they can join their co-tribesmen on the Afghan side, or their tribesmen living in the settled districts of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.

The President of the Departments of Akhwam and the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities is Dr. Najeebulah who is

also the chief of KHAD. In other words these two departments are directly under KHAD, the Afghan secret service as in the Soviet Union the Ministry of Nationalities works under the KGB Dr. Najib is assisted by three deputy ministers, one for the Northeastern, one for South-eastern and one for Southwestern area. All three are local tribesmen.

Nationalities. This department, which works directly under the Minister, Suliman Laiq, deals with ethnic groups like Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkeman, Kirghiz, Alimaq, etc. They are the settled ethnic groups living in specific areas, and are known by their area links. Moscow is using Afghan Turkestan not only as a strategic base for its military power, but also as a starting point for the ideological disintegration of Afghanistan's people and for the disintegration of Afghanistan's territory. Turkestan must now play Cuba's role in Afghanistan.

In this way, Turkestani intellectuals from the five Soviet republics in Turkestan are sent to Afghanistan, scientists, writers, artists, teachers and of course agitators who disseminate Russian propaganda and implements the so called Leninist nationalities policy. In the press and during meetings, condemned Turkestani rulers, classical poets and scientists from the past centuries, who reigned in Turkestan as well as in Herat, Kabul, Balkh and Badakhshan, are being suddenly projected as great men, to legitimate rulers and true friends of Afghanistan because it now suits Moscow's politics. Literary evenings for Afghan-Uzbeks are organized in Kabul to which actually 90% of the participants come from Tashkent. Radio programmes in Kabul are transmitted in the Uzbek and Tajik languages; the Soviet press and numerous literature and school books of the five Soviet republics in Turkestan appear in Arabic script and

are sent to Kabul in order to accelerate the ideological disintegration.

The Russians do not appear personally in this ideological activity in Afghanistan, but leave this activity up to the Turkestani and this with the special emphasis that over 3 million Uzbeks, 3 million Tajik and over 1 million Turkmenians and Kazakhs live in Northern Afghanistan as far as Kabul, in a total population of approximately 20 million.

In order to emphasize the traditional and historical relationship between the Turkestani on both sides of the boundary, West Turkestan and Northern Afghanistan on the one hand, the former kings and statesmen who today enjoy great respect, are bombastically praised as extremely human and vindicated and that they ruled on the basis of friendship and solidarity. May this great tradition be continued today. After long preparations in Tashkent a "Commission for the study of the works of the Uzbek poet and statesmen Ali Sher Navai" was established in Kabul in order to also respectfully commemorate the 550th anniversary of his birth in 1999 in Kabul. He lived and worked in the 15th century in Herat in the court of the Uzbek king Husain Baykara. Even President Babrak Karmal gave his opinion on this theme and emphasize his gratitude and respect of the Afghans for Navai.

"Navai's justified idea has not lost its power from the 15th to the 20th century. Afghanistan's democratic Government is grateful to Ali Sher Navai not only for the development of culture, progress and science in Afghanistan, but also for the services of friendship and solidarity to the people living in this country."

Emperor Baber Praised. Turkestan's emperor Babar, whose dynasty reigned bet-

ween 1526-1858 in India and who conquered Afghanistan and is buried in Kabul was also praised.

"Babar served progress and development in Afghanistan and brought Afghanistan to its prime. His great contribution in the development of culture, art and literature is irreplaceable...." The 500th anniversary of his birth is to be eminently celebrated in Kabul.

In addition, Abdul Aziz Khan, Emir of Bukhara, who ruled in northern Afghanistan was also praised for his good neighbour policy with the Mongolian empire (Babar Dynasty) and Iran. It was emphasized that he reigned from 1680-1702 in Balkh. His foreign affairs politics were supposed to be founded on friendship and peace. May this tradition be continued today.

All of the former Turkestani rulers and thinkers are excessively praised in the Soviet press in Uzbekistan in this way. This is then circulated in Afghanistan with the aim to transfer and continue this former hereditary relationship today. At the same time an attempt is being made to expose the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Afghanistan and to destroy their territorial unity and to cause disputes and misunderstandings in the more than 1,000 years co-relationship between Afghans and Turkestani. Much is already being spoken about Afghan-Uzbek, Afghan-Turkmen, Afghan-Tadzhik opposed to Soviet-Uzbek, Soviet-Tadzhik, Soviet-Turkmen etc. Moreover, the so-called Leninist nationalities policy is constantly being praised. This policy is practised in Turkestan in that the Turkestani tribes were elevated to nation and people and their territory in Turkestan was dispersed and divided into the so-called five Soviet republics, this divide-and-rule policy is now being propagated through the press and other media

for Afghanistan with the assertion that "culture, economy and the intellectual life have been developed in the underdeveloped former outlying districts of Tsarist Russia i.e. Turkestan".

In this way the supposed pitiful life of the Afghans before the revolution, their unlawfulness and exploitation is presented in the press of the five Soviet republics in the October revolution. It is said that thanks to the nationalities policy the last people are being liberated from this misery. Starting points to the application of the Leninist nationalities policy in Afghanistan are clear in the historian's essay, M. Nischan(ow) entitled "Afghanistan's fateful determining April Revolution".

"Different nations and peoples like the Pushtuns, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz Turkomen, Hazara, Baluchis, Nuristanis live beside our southern neighbour Afghanistan and existing state consisting of many nation... In Afghanistan there are 3 million Uzbeks. This is 20% of the population... The Uzbeks live mainly in the northern regions and cities of Afghanistan. In the region of Kuanduz, Baghlan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Samangan, Kabul, Khanabad, Imam Sahib, and Pul-e-Khumri areas.

"The people in Afghanistan suffered under the terrorist regime of Zahir Shah and Daud. During this period no one thought about the people, nations and their value at all. All tribes and people were simply referred to as Afghans...In their constitution that is to say, all people who live in Afghanistan belong to the Afghan nation".

The subjugation and terrorization has ended. Now there are even Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik schools in which the national languages are taught. There were

never such schools before, just as there were no newspapers and magazines.

Indoctrination. Propaganda is in full swing in Afghanistan. The newspaper "Yiildiz" (Star) appears in the Uzbek language and in Arabic script, just like "Kurasch" (Struggle) appears for the "Baluchis". The function of these newspapers is to "enrich and develop the Afghan-Uzbeks with poetry and novels which appear in Soviet-Uzbekistan: to propagate a new life and to present the achievements in the Soviet republics in Middle Asia...."

This, of course, is pure communist literature with the glorification of Leninism and the Russian people. Even the party organ "Soviet Uzbekistan", which appears in Cyrillic script, is being published extra in Tashkent in Arabic script and sent to Kabul just like the newspapers, magazines, novels, poetry and school books which appear in the five Soviet republics. As officially reported, these press productions are spread among teachers, and Uzbek, Tadzhik and Turkomen intellectuals. One must ask oneself, indeed, who reads all of this communist literature when supposedly 99% of the population is illiterate?

Radio programmes were arranged in Kabul in the Uzbek and Tajik languages; a department of Uzbek language and culture studies was created at the Afghan Ministry of Education and a department of "Afghan-Uzbek" culture studies was created at the Science Academy in Afghanistan. The ideologically best-trained Turkestanis from the five Soviet republics reside here. Moscow apparently wants to consistently pressure and threaten the Afghans with all of these policies, propaganda and especially with Leninist nationalities policy in order to establish similar republics in Northern Afghanistan as in Turkestan or simply to incorporate the regions settled by Turkes-

tani into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—the Soviet republics which border on Afghanistan. The party and president of Afghanistan Babrak Karmal speaks Moscow's language like a faithful servant and calls the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz and other peoples of Afghanistan to a common battle against internal and external enemies.

Furthermore, Moscow's attempts with all means not to appear externally as a colonial power but as a "helper" as a "magnanimous supporter". Therefore, on June 11, 1982 a great celebration was organized on the occasion of the occupation of Kazakhstan by the Russians at which historically-false facts were presented.

"Kazakhstan voluntarily and according to its own will annexed itself to Russia 250 years ago. The wishes and hopes and right for self-determination of the Kazakh people were fulfilled. Its fate is externally bound with its great Russian brother..."

Kunay(ew) Rasid(ow), the first party secretaries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, exuberantly thanked the Russian people that "her friendly hands reached these people and that she had helped them to fulfill the century-old hopes and wishes". Moscow especially sent W. W. Grischin, member of the Politburo of the CPSU, to Alma-Ata in order to present the order of Lenin on the occasion of the 250 years voluntary annexation to Russia. Babrak Karmal had spoken the same words as Rasid(ow) and Kunay(ew) on the occasion of the unveiling of a great Lenin monument in the Border City Termez, in Uzbekistan. "The hands which our great northern neighbour stretched out to us guarantee a bright future and give us support and protection. We are grateful.. We will not turn back on the road which we voluntarily chose..."

This Lenin monument—"A shining glory of friendship between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" as it is officially called, shows Lenin—his hand raised viewing Afghanistan as though it was already his empire. This illustrates Moscow's far-reaching aims in Afghanistan.

Building Bridges. In order to bind Afghanistan even closer to the Soviet Union the "Friendship Bridge" was completed on May 12, 1982 over the Amu-Daria and ceremoniously opened. This road and railway bridge near the bordering city Termez in Uzbekistan has great strategic significance. Its construction was immediately started in December, 1979 after the invasion of Afghanistan. Karmal and Rasid (ow) opened it, and Karmal honoured it as an expression of trust and friendship of the Soviet Union.

The first bridges known as the Freedom bridge was built on the Oxus, near Herat linking Afghanistan, with the Soviet Union. Oil Pipeline have been brought up as far as Pul-e-Khumari, one pumps in diesel and one petrol. Electricity has been brought to Kabul, vis. Balkh, Pul-e-Khumi, and to Kabul.

A new bridge is being built at Shegnan, over the Panja river in Northeastern Badakshan, to link it with the Soviet Shegnan. A barter trade centre has been set up in Khawahan in Northwest Badakshan where goods are exchanged under a Barter system between the Tajiks of Soviet Badakshan, and the Afghan Tajiks e.g. An Afghan Tajik gives a sheep, and he gets a cooking set in return, or he gives a horse and a gets a refrigerator, showing how advance the Soviet Tajiks are, and how backward the Afghans have remained. An agreement have been signed between the mountainous region of Afghan Badakshan, and Soviet

Badakshan, under which Afghan Tajiks can go to the Soviet Tajikistan to get free medical treatment, and travel without any travelling documents, Soviet Tajik doctors cross over into Afghanistan, and roam around in the countryside, giving free medical help to Afghan Tajiks. Changes have also been made in the provincial boundaries, by taking certain parts from one province and giving it to another.

Certain *uluswalis*, and other administration units have been taken from civilian administration, and handed over to the military for security reasons. Shindand has been included into Herat Province on security basis, the military has taken over the administration of the whole area. Reasons being that in Farah region, there are no big garrisons. Herat being the head-quarter of 17th Afghan Division, and a few battalions of Soviet troops. The administration have centralised, areas which have been added to Parwan, from Kapia, are on security basis, the reason being the location of Bagram in Parwan Province.

Area of Ghazni Province bordering Pakistan have been handed over to Pakthika merely on security reason for the border police is present in Pakthika.

An area from Helmand have been handed over to Kandahar for security reasons also. The Afghan Government is trying to develop Sistan area, which a long time back was known as the bread basket of this region. Half of Sistan lies in Iran, and is inhabited by Baluchis. The Afghan Government is developing its irrigation system, and since population is spare, they are bringing in 5,000 Baluch families from Soviet Central Asia, that had once gone from this area, and 5,000 Turkoman families to develop this area.

Afghanistan may follow the Polish case. The Soviet Union would absorb the

northern part of Afghanistan i.e. areas between the Amu River and Hindu Kush. The areas between the Hindu Kush and the Durand line would be Afghanistan, and the Soviets would create an independent Pukhtunistan and Baluchistan out of the NWFP and Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. There three states would be satellites of the Soviet Union which would have access to the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan, and also serve as a buffer zone between India and the Soviet Union.

Solution to the Afghan crises lies in the unity and close co-operation of the neighbouring countries. Pakistan should have close relations with India, and Iran. A no-war pact is a good move, followed by exchanges, and co-operation in industry, commerce, agriculture, and education. The property and security of one lies with the property and security of the other. The same should follow with Iran, and China.

Indo-Pakistan Relations: Recent Phase

Dr. Mujtaba Razvi, Ph.D. (London)

The fundamental problem of Indo-Pakistan relations arise out of a set of conflicts—a conflict over status, a conflict generated by the problem of identity of the two states as two nations. According to an Indian defence analyst, Rajeev K. Bajaj: “One more war, then, is very much on the cards...If war comes, it will not be the pointless war of 1965, nor the half-decisive conflict of 1971, but a turning point in the history of the subcontinent. This time, victory or defeat, will have to be decided on the western front...Therefore, the Pakistanis will be fighting for a victory in specific areas and the achievement for a stalemate after a limited victory. And very rightly in 1971, the Indian armed forces went for an all-out victory, albeit only in the eastern sector”..... He goes on to write: “this time, it won’t be a repeat of the old events. For the Pakistanis will fight for Kashmir, not for the acquisition of what they consider is disputed territory, but for the very survival of Pakistan...”

“India today, in conventional terms, is the fifth strongest world military power, after the USA, USSR, China and West Germany. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out many times before, there are many constraints that prevent India from

decisively defeating Pakistan. And foremost among them is the fact that India’s victory battlefield takes time to develop, and in that time international opinion usually intervenes to make a decisive victory impossible. It is only because of this that complete overhauling of Indian military tactics and strategy seems to be taking place”.¹

According to this Indian writer, “India’s objective would be the destruction of Pakistan armed forces and the seizure of a sizeable portion of terrain. Its political goal would be the assertion of hegemony over South Asia and the achievement of dominant power status in the region.

“India and Soviet Union could attack from the east and west with the purpose of totally dismembering Pakistan. Moscow’s goal would be to achieve access to the sea and to control Afghanistan’s southern border. India’s goal would be to undo partition once and for all”.²

India’s Regional Ambition. India regards the strategic struggle today is for the Central Asian landmass and the Indian Ocean. The mere fact India is strategically located, in the region of Southwest Asia, South

Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, gives her (according to Indian perception) the opportunity to play a big part in regional as well as global affairs. The scene of potential confrontation has shifted from Europe to the Central-South Asian landmass and India has her role to play in the era of proxy wars. India, as a mini-superpower does not consider its security or threat in the context of India-China or India-Pakistan, rather disorder, strife and disaffection in strategically placed states. To Pakistan, this means a twentieth century version of Monroe Doctrine Indian strategists present the example of the Indian subcontinent. In 1947 the subcontinent was bifurcated and in 1971 trifurcated. According to them, this state of flux or change would continue for sometime. India should therefore build up its self-reliance in military, scientific and technical terms "the armed forces need to produce the best type of deterrent against the powers of the region."³ For this purpose, India has just concluded its biggest arms deal up to now with the Soviet Union (besides its purchase from Western powers). The large order, providing for the supply of the latest MiG's tanks, helicopters, transports and anti-aircraft missiles is worth over six million rubles, or very nearly five billion dollars. In the last week of October, 1983, high level of talks had been held in Moscow and New Delhi on a major new arms deal under which the Soviet Union agreed to supply India with the latest version of MiG aircraft, tanks, missiles and other weapons. This includes the MiG-31, Russia's latest fighter planned for manufacture in the next few years. This is still on the drawing boards and the Russians have indicated they will supply it to India once it has been successfully flight-tested. In the meantime, the MiG-29, Fulcrum, is to be supplied to India with rights to manufacture the highly sophisticated fighter under licence. This is likely to be

done in existing Hindustan Aeronautics plants in India, originally set up to assemble the obsolete MiG-21 which is being phased out of service. The Russians have also agreed to supply the T-80 tanks.⁴

Weapon Buying Spree. *The Far Eastern Economic Review* estimates that between 1971 and 1981 the Indian arms purchases in the Soviet Union have been to the cost of about 20 billion rubles. The Soviet promises of technological transfer and supply of spare parts, as well as the extraordinary good financing conditions have remained uninterrupted. The Indian government will buy most modern weapons worth about Rs. 9.7 billion during this financial year. The Indian Defence Minister had recently concluded a visit to four European countries: France, Britain, Sweden and Austria and reached agreement to buy weapons for the Indian forces. The Indian government has on order 12 additional Sea Harrier warplanes. Earlier, India bought six similar planes from Britain. These planes will replace the old Sea Hawk warplanes of the Indian aircraft carrier. India will also buy eight Sea Eagle missiles which can be fired from Sea King helicopters. The Sea Eagle missile is the equivalent of the French Exocet missile which the Argentine forces successfully used against British warships during the Falklands war. Mr Venkataraman said Sweden, Britain and France had agreed to transfer the weapons' technology to India after the conclusion of the arms deal. India will manufacture 155 mm guns and spare parts of the tanks in collaboration with the Swedish technicians, while she will manufacture light fighter planes and aircraft for communications in collaboration with Britain. However, the Soviet Union remains the biggest supplier of arms and ammunition to India. The terms of deal with the Soviet Union are generally favourable to India.

Regional Geopolitics. The war in Afghanistan has increased Soviet interest in India, to which the USSR looks for help in muting international criticism of its intervention and curtailing Pakistan's support to freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is significant as a means for advancing Soviet interest in the Gulf, as well contributing to Soviet efforts to encircle China. Already Moscow has annexed the Wakhan strip linking Afghanistan with China. The Soviets believe that consolidation of firm political and military control over Afghanistan will facilitate further expansion in Southwest and Southeast Asia. The US deputy secretary of defence, in his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs sub-committees for Asia and the Middle East, said: "In the Gulf region itself, fundamental Soviet objectives are to establish itself as the principal power in the area, to gain strategic foothold and to be to control the flow of the oil to the West".⁶

"Moscow's long-term objective in Pakistan is to transform the country into a pro-Soviet or atleast a pliant state. In the near term, the Soviets seek an end to Pakistan's support of the Afghan resistance forces which they believe constitute a major factor sustaining Mujahideen resistance to the Soviet rule in Afghanistan and to move Pakistan toward recognition of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul".

A Defence Department official, James Keely, predicted: "The Soviets will continue efforts to strengthen their position in South and Southwest Asia. They will continue efforts to offer sophisticated weapons to India at concessionary rates, and thereby remain New Delhi's largest weapons supplier. Moscow will maintain the claim that it is interested in a political settlement with Pakistan and push direct talks between Zia and the Kabul regime,

while pursuing its efforts to undermine the Zia regime and aid its opponents".

Offering a slightly different perspective, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Brown told the House panels reviewing the Soviet role in Asia that "while close Indo-Soviet ties have been a valuable asset for India in its often difficult relations with Pakistan, Moscow has almost always tried to maintain a separate relationship and at least some influence with Islamabad, largely independent of its ties with New Delhi".

"The invasion of Afghanistan has seriously hampered the Soviets in this regard. And if the Soviets had calculated that their presence in Afghanistan would make Pakistan more pliant to Moscow's will, they would have discovered that their invasion has actually increased Islamabad support in both the West and the Islamic World, enabling Pakistan to play to consolidate their occupation".

The testimony by Administration officials wound up a series of six hearings by House Foreign Affairs sub-committees at which private witnesses offered their views on Moscow's approach to the South and Southwest region as a whole and Soviet goals and opportunities in specific regions.

Soviet Build-up. The Soviets have upgraded 29 divisions and over 80 tactical aircraft in their southern theatre opposite the Gulf region and deployed more than 50 divisions and 1700 aircraft against the Chinese and built up a formidable power in Indian and Pacific Oceans during the last two decades, according to US Administration before the Congress.⁷

Afghanistan: Soviet Aims. Dr. Lawrence Ziring, an American expert on Pakistan

affairs said, at a meeting of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, on 19 November, 1983, the Soviet Union was determined to stay in Afghanistan and absorb the nonaligned Muslim state into the Soviet Republic. Dr. Ziring said that the Soviets wanted to "Mangolise Afghanistan into a model State". He said the issue of Pakhtunistan was more alive today than ever before, with more than three million refugees on Pakistan's soil, as the Soviets had moved the issue directly into Pakistan.

"One could not treat this question (Pakhtunistan) lightly," he said. While talking about the Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, Dr. Ziring disclosed the Soviets had informed him that Pakistan "was making life miserable for the Soviet troops by supplying heavy arms to the resistance groups which are very formidable". Answering a question, he said the superpowers exploited "your weaknesses. One of the most tragic events was that India was given a chance to exploit the situation in East Pakistan and create Bangladesh," he added.⁸

Pakistan's security situation is one of the worst in the world because of its historical enmity with India, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and a changed Iran. In spite of the vastly superior naval and air presence in the region, can the US really do anything in the event of a large-scale conventional war up in the mountains or plains of north Pakistan? What can, for instance, American submarines or even air power do if the Afghan-Soviets were to mount a major infantry-armour across the Durand Line? To this question, Dr. Robert G. Wirsing, the author of *The state of US-Pakistan relationship* said: "We know that Harpoon missiles or those F-16s can't stop a Soviet invasion....Of course, America is not going to retaliate with full force if the

Soviet Union were to claim 10 acres or 200,000 square miles of Pakistan's territory. Nobody is going to precipitate World War Three over Gilgit or Hunza or Parachinar. But what counts is that we view Pakistan as a strategically important state of interest to America".⁹ Ironically enough, according to him, any US-Pakistan security treaty would complicate Washington's relations with New Delhi, as such a treaty would be viewed in New Delhi with 'enormous concern' and would 'drive that key state into Soviet arms'.

India's Interference. In the context of Soviet policy and the US response, it becomes easy to understand India's belligerent attitude towards Pakistan, in spite of Islamabad's diplomatic overtures to have normal relations with New Delhi. Taking advantage of internal strife in Pakistan, particularly in Sind, India took the opportunity to interfere in the domestic affairs of Pakistan. While professing adherence to the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another, India has continued to make hostile statements about the political situation in Pakistan. The holding of World Sindhi Sammelan in New Delhi under the patronage of Mrs Indira Gandhi herself. The speeches delivered there stressed that "time was ripe for Sind to become a part of Bharat so that all Sindhis (*including Hindu Sindhis of India—italics added*) should jointly work for their welfare". To say the least it a gross violation of international law and neighbourly relationship.

Mrs Gandhi, on a different occasion had expressed concern over the detention of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and had suggested his immediate release. Sponsored anti-Pakistan rallies were staged in front of the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi and the All-India Radio embarked upon on a hostile campaign. These things

happened in defiance of the Simla Agreement embodying a framework for the conduct of bilateral relations. The Indian role ever since the launching of anti-government in Pakistan under the banner of MRD has been directed towards impairing the stability and tranquillity of Pakistan. The Indian leaders' concern for democracy in Pakistan seems to remind the Pakistanis of similar Indian concern for refugees of East Pakistan in 1971.

States of Northern Areas. India also protested against the hosting of dinner by the President of Pakistan in Gilgit for the Islamabad diplomatic corps and boycotted it on the ground that Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu were an integral part of the occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The fact of the matter is: "By no stretch of imagination could the Gilgit Agency including the Feudal States of Hunza and Nagar, be considered as owing loyalty to a Government in Srinagar".¹⁰

Though Gilgit theoretically became a part of the Maharaja's domains according to the Amritsar Treaty of 1846, in practice, Dogra authority in Gilgit never became fully effective. It used to be governed by the local princes. It was in 1877 that the British, out of their fear of Russian expansionism beyond the Pamirs, made Gilgit a Political Agency, in effect an out-lying British administrative district. Hunza and Nagar accepted British paramountcy towards the close of the 19th century; but they were only subject to the control of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In reply to a letter from Gopalaswamy Ayyengar (then Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), dated July 27, 1939, the Resident in Srinagar communicated the decision of the Government of India, dated July 14, 1941, regarding the status of the Hunza and Nagar States and the political districts *vis-a-vis* the Kashmir State. It was stated that though Hunza and Nagar were

under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they were not parts of the Kashmir State, but separate States. The British Government withdrew the Political Agent after Independence on August 15, 1947, and the Maharaja of Kashmir sent a Dogra Officer to act as governor of the area. When the Maharaja acceded to India in 1947, the people of Gilgit revolted and requested the Government of Pakistan to take over the administration. The rulers of Hunza and Nagar also acceded to Pakistan and these territories are therefore outside the areas of conflict over Kashmir.¹¹ Now, in the context of uneasy situation in the Indian-held Kashmir and the unhappy relations between New Delhi and Srinagar, Indian protest displays shaky control of India on Jammu and Kashmir.

The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi continues to express concern over what she described Pakistan's stockpiling of sophisticated weapons. She argues that since the weapons acquired by Pakistan could not be used against Afghanistan or the Soviet Union, these would be used against India only. When asked whether India's relations would improve if the former backed the idea of Pakistan rejoining the British Commonwealth, Mrs Gandhi said Pakistan had left the Commonwealth of its own free will and India had nothing to do with it. She said further that the Commonwealth would also have to consider the view of some people in Pakistan that they would not be responsible for any agreement-entered into by the Pakistan Government. Replying to a question whether India would desist from interfering in the internal affairs (though her statement on Pakistan re-entry into the Commonwealth was itself an interference in internal affairs of Pakistan). Mrs Gandhi said her Government had not interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan and added that she had only sent a perso-

nal letter to Pakistan President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq about Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who is 96 and seriously ill. The Indian Foreign Minister, Narasimha Rao has said India would take appropriate steps to counter the threat to its security after the US of Harrier missiles to Pakistan.¹²

Mrs Gandhi's Critics. Leaders of public opinion in India continue to criticise reckless Indian policy of Mrs Indira Gandhi's Government which has alienated almost all its neighbouring countries. The English fortnightly, *India Today*, in its cover story spotlighted the awesomeness of India's military might on a new and more ambitious course with Mrs Indira Gandhi's return to power. "It is distressing that Prime Minister should use her official position for personal gains (vote-catching) at the cost of national interest". "Love cannot grow in an arena of suspicion. India's present policies cannot possibly stop superpowers interference in South Asia. Mrs Gandhi should not exploit the neighbouring countries' problems to gather votes."

Commenting on the military forces of various countries in the region, *India Today* has said "that even in statistical terms, it is easy to see why fear psychosis and paranoia exists in the neighbouring countries. India accounts for 77 per cent of the region's population, 72 per cent of its area and 78 per cent of its GNP. Its military strength in comparison to the rest, is awesome. It is good to have giant strength, but to use it like a giant is wrong."¹³

Mr B. G. Verghese, Editor-in-Chief of leading Indian daily, *Indian Express*, said at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, that the current events which had cast their shadows would not persist and eventually there would be a realisation

on both sides to move forward together. He described the present freeze in the relations between the two countries as a result of lack of communication coupled with what he called "perception gap" and fears and suspicions of the past. Asked to give his own thinking on how to settle the Kashmir issue, he said he could only suggest the first step. To start with, the dividing line in Kashmir should be made a soft line. This step could pave the way for an eventual solution of the issue. Disintegration of Pakistan, Mr Verghese said, would be against the interest of India itself. A strong, stable and prosperous Pakistan would lead strength, stability and prosperity to India.¹⁴

Speaking on "Security issues of South Asia" at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Indian Opposition Leader Dr Subramanyam Swamy said, *all countries of this region are facing internal problems* which provides an invitation to foreign powers to intervene in their affairs. Dr Swamy said events of last few years have shown that both superpowers have their global strategy and expect other countries to fit into that strategy. Even their treaty relations with various nations have been subjected to this global strategy allowing superpowers to back out from their treaty commitments. He said one major difficulty in formulating a South Asia doctrine is the fact of India being out of step with most of its neighbours. On issues like Afghanistan and Kampuchea it has a different approach than many other countries of the region.

Dr Swamy said ambivalence and vagueness in Indian attitude has led her to a crisis of confidence not only with Pakistan but other countries of the region as well, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. He said a key factor in evolving a South Asian doctrine is improvement of relations between Pakistan and India.

which would be reflected in relations with other South Asian nations. He said if mutual differences continued, these countries would remain amenable to superpower exploitation. The initiative should come from India to resolve differences. He said the concept that India's defence preparations should be on the basis of Pakistan's *capability* while Pakistan should depend on India's *intentions* while planning for its defence, does not hold good.

India would have to change this attitude and accept others have equal right to do what India was doing.

A leading British newspaper, *Daily Telegraph* has advised Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi that if she wants to prevent a war with Pakistan, she should not look for weapons alone but also an effective diplomatic effort.

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Evolution in India's Defence and Arms Procurement Policies

R. D. M. Furlong and G. S. Sundaram

The visit to Moscow by Indian Defence Minister Mr. R. Venkataraman in late June aroused considerable speculation that India might be about to resume its heavy reliance on the USSR for the supply of arms, possibly to the detriment of its non-aligned status. Indian press reports before and during the visit mentioned the MiG-31 fighter and T-82 tank as being part of a lengthy list of new Soviet material under discussion for procurement and/or licence production by India.

A senior Indian defence official (who has requested anonymity) recently explained New Delhi's position on these and other questions during an exclusive interview with the International Defence Review, Geneva.

Meanwhile, said the official, "India is in the difficult position of having to shop for new weapon systems which have become very costly. And this naturally has political overtones."

There is, no question of Indian giving up its non-aligned status, the senior official insisted, and India had no aspirations to the leadership of the South Asian region or any grouping of nations. "Even the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) leadership was thrust upon us," he said, when India was asked to host the last NAM summit that had been scheduled for warring Iraq.

"Most current international violence today arises from territorial claims" he

continued, "India has not such claims against anybody. We have a border dispute with China, but have no claims against any clearly recognized parts of China. It is the same with Pakistan." Asked about the status of negotiations with both China and Pakistan, the Indian official said that, although China had stated its desire to settle the border dispute, both sides were at present confining themselves to re-stating their positions and there was little progress. On the proposed Indo-Pakistani "No-War" pact, he said that two meetings

had been held and "they are still talking about it, so we may hope for some success."

"India has no reason to offend any other country," the senior official said. "But looking at the international environment, even if I observe the rules of the road it does not mean that I am immune from traffic accidents. The fact that large amounts of sophisticated armaments are pouring into Pakistan, out of all proportion to its defence needs, makes us all anxious. There is an air of anxiety over the whole issue."

"If our neighbour goes on storing gunpowder, we will go on storing it too. However, we prefer to buy a lot of fire engines so that we can quench the fire if it explodes."

Pak Facing 2-Front Threat. When asked if he did not think that the justification for Pakistan's current military procurement policy was that Islamabad felt threatened on two fronts, by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as well as by India. "I do not question that," replied the senior Indian official. "But the mere fact of such a large number of weapon systems being located on my border is a threat to me. Scientists have not yet invented weapons that shoot in only one direction." Nevertheless, the official said that India did not feel threatened by China's nuclear capability and that he did not believe Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons were serious.

Concerning India's recently more muted efforts to exclude US and Soviet forces from the Indian Ocean, he said "the problem is that the superpowers will not talk to each other." With regard to the US Rapid Deployment Force, he said that "if the United States uses Pakistan as a base

for it, it will increase the threat to India". Asked if the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan were not the key to eliminating Indian fears, by removing much of the rationale for both the RDF presence and Pakistan's military build-up, he acknowledged that "a reduction of tensions in Afghanistan would be of great benefit."

Future Arms Procurement. The Indian official denied that Defence Minister Venkataraman had gone to Moscow with a detailed "shopping list" of new armaments for India. He said the visit was primarily a reciprocal gesture, returning Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov's visit to India in 1982. "It was not a delegation meant for striking deals," he said, although "the discussions covered many things of interest to us. All (the Soviets) said was that they would help India with their latest technology and weapons."

The senior Indian defence official remarked that India would like to purchase armaments by selecting the best from wherever it was available. But he said that "the United States imposes too many ad hoc conditions, particularly on equipment usage, spare parts and ammunition supply. In some cases we can accept them, but not very often. In addition, they are expensive. "The Europeans," he said, "do not impose such conditions, but they are pricing themselves out of the market." IDR noted Indian press reports that Soviet arms supplies to India are paid for in rupees at only 2.5 percent interest, over 17 years, following an initial seven-year grace period.

European Systems Superior. The official argued that, nevertheless, when an evaluation showed that a European system was clearly superior, India tried to buy it.

He cited as examples the Jaguar and Mirage 2000. "There was no discussion of the MiG-31 in Moscow", he said, but he refused to be drawn when asked if India were indeed seeking to build new MiG versions in order to be sure of being able to match Pakistan's F-16s, as the Indian press had reported. If MiG-29s and -31 were to be built, it would mean that the Indians had now decided either that the Mirage 2000 could not match the F-16 or, more likely, that it would be too expensive and available too late if manufactured locally, after the initial buy from France of 40 aircraft. It is also of interest that the Indian decision not to manufacture Jaguars, while increasing the number bought from the UK, was followed by an announcement in the Indian parliament that the MiG production line at HAL was being extended to include the MiG-27. India is still negotiating with potential foreign partners to collaborate on development of a new Light Combat Aircraft.

In the ground armament sector, the official said that indigenous development of both the Chetak main battle tank and a new towed 155mm howitzer was continuing. But he cautioned that "results should not be expected too soon. In the interim," he said, "India will have to buy from elsewhere." He said that the Soviets are very accommodating about allowing licence production of tanks and aircraft and that Belgium and Austria impose no conditions. The latter is thought to be a reference to the 155mm Voest Alpine GHN-45 howitzer and PRB extended-range full-bore ammunition. Pending production of the Indian 155mm howitzer, he said that India "cannot buy large numbers of foreign artillery weapons," so the result of the major international competition in India was likely to be only "some small order". The Indian press has reported that an understanding has been reached on the expansion and re-equipment of the Avadhi

heavy vehicles factory to produce T-72 tanks with Russian assistance, and eventually "T-82s" when these more advanced versions are available.

In the naval sector, the Soviets are said to have agreed to supply submarines, frigates and patrol boats.

To date, no agreement for any of the new Soviet weapon systems has yet been signed, but signature is not expected to be long delayed.

A large and high-level defence team, led by the Indian Defence Minister and including the Defence Secretary and the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, recently visited Austria, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK to examine offers for new weapons and proposals for joint ventures from these countries. The visits and discussions are in line with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's policy of trying to diversify India's sources of arms supply while maintaining the country's special relationship with the Soviet Union. According to a senior Indian defence official that the visits were extremely useful and that equipment discussed included aircraft, artillery, AEW systems, ground radar systems, ECM suites and AAA fire-control systems.

Field Artillery. India is seeking 125mm and 155mm towards artillery pieces, as well as 155mm SP howitzers, and has been evaluating equipment from Austria, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. India is understood to have been quite impressed by the Austrian GC45 155mm towed weapon, but the Swedish FH77 and possible Dutch and French candidates are still under consideration. According to the Indian official, in addition to the weapon's performance, the terms being offered for procurement, subsequent licence-produc-

tion in India and technology transfer will all play a significant part in the ultimate selection.

Aircraft. Having failed in its bid to sell India the Super Puma/Varan ASW helicopter/radar combination over the Sea King/Super Searcher, the French are now pressing India to proceed with follow-on phases in the Mirage 2000 deal and are making attractive offers to collaborate on the India Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. India has until June 1984 to decide whether to exercise its option to manufacture Mirage 2000s in India after the initial direct procurement of 40 aircraft. The Indians are primarily looking for a two-engined aircraft and, if the Soviet

MiG-29 is made available to India soon, as is widely expected, the IAF will go for this aircraft since no western alternative is available. The USF/A-18 Hornet is highly unlikely to be offered to India, while the Panavia Tornado is considered to be over-qualified for the roles envisaged as well as being too expensive. Britain for its part is competing hard for a part in the LCA project. India has recently stated its wish to increase co-operation with Britain in the arms field and has, in addition to the Sea Kings, decided to procure more Sea Harriers (although details of numbers involved have not been released). The UK has agreed to make all current and future Sea Harrier and Jaguar updates available to India.

India Seek European Weapons & Collaboration

India is looking for a 155mm SP howitzer to replace the Soviet towed 130mm guns in its one mechanized and two armoured divisions. The Soviet weapon has difficulty in keeping up with the accompanying tanks and, as an interim solution, India has built a number of tracked SP versions using the Vijayanta tank as the platform. A prime candidate is the French GCT which is mounted on an AMX30 chassis. Although GIAT would like to supply the complete GCT/AMX30 system and is prepared to offer attractive terms, India wishes to procure only a few complete systems and with a view to keeping costs down, to install the GCT turret on the Vijayanta. GIAT has agreed to help India in this venture and a Vijayanta will be shipped to France next year for installation trials. Earlier attempts to obtain the US M109 155mm SP, which, it is understood, would have cost half as much as the GCT and could have been delivered sooner, have now been given up as a result of US un-

willingness to transfer technology and allow local manufacture.

AAA fire control. Although an official decision has not yet been announced, it is generally thought that India prefers the Contraves Skyguard air-defence fire-control system to the Signals Flycatcher to control the Bofors L/70AA guns in the Indian Army. Both systems were extensively tested in India in the spring of 1982. According to Contraves, at the time Skyguard did not have an integral 1/J-band radar for poor-weather operations, as did Flycatcher, but the company has since added one and is now offering it to India.

MBT 80. The first MBT 80 Chetak prototype (see Defence Newsletter), which was rolled out several months ago, will according to present Indian MoD plans, take part in the Indian Republic Day parade in New Delhi on January 26, 1984. Contrary to initial reports this first proto-

type, while using an MTU engine, includes an indigenous transmission system and not a German one. India is officially committed to the MBT 80 as the replacement for the Army's Vijayantas and T-55s. The T-72s and T-72Ms being procured are, it is insisted, merely an interim solution. The T-72M is to be built in India—this is the first time the Soviet Union has allowed its licence-production outside the Warsaw Pact countries—and the Indian version is reported to be very similar to the T-80.

Arms exports. The Indian cabinet recently took a policy decision to promote arms exports, particularly to countries in the Third World, in an effort to establish or increase India's influence in these countries while at the same time improving its own trade balance. Items to be exported

include small arms, mortars, light artillery, jeeps and other military vehicles, defence electronics and helicopters. The country is self-sufficient in most of these and has, in the past, exported them in small quantities. The defence official tells IDR that a major export order for Chetak helicopters (the Indian version of the Aerospatiale Alouette III built by HAL) is expected from the Soviet Union. The Russians are unhappy with the performance of some of their own military helicopters under Siberian conditions and have been impressed by that of the Chetaks used in the Himalayas by the Indian armed forces. Eight Chetaks have recently been ordered by the Russians for evaluation in Siberia.

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Nos. 7 and 12/1983.*

Defence and Development

Syed Shaukat Ali

Indeed, development at the cost of defence may make a country a more tempting prize for the aggressor, and therefore a greater security risk. The basic determinant is whether the expenditure is meant for essential defence requirements or for aggrandisement and war. It may be difficult to draw the line, but so long as a country is sure of its premises and is honest in its approach, expenditure on defence cannot be regarded as unnecessary and extravagant.

Defence expenditure is an insurance premium for national assets and national sovereignty, and a prudent person bears the insurance cost year after year so that he does not lose the assets altogether. Insurance seems too expensive to one who lives only in the immediate present but is highly economical and worthwhile to one who has a larger perspective.

It is generally believed that defence and development are opposed to each other: expenditure on defence is regarded as a drain on development resources, and enlarged outlays required for development mean less availability of resources for defence. Thus defence effort and development effort are considered as pulling a country in opposite directions.

To a large extent, this is true. Development is a function of investment. Any national resources which can be invested but are used for consumption on defence instead of building up productive assets, are a loss to the development effort. However, defence expenditure is not wholly a negative expenditure, and not always necessarily opposed to development. It is wrong to think of the defence organisa-

tion and operations as something wasteful and sterile, and of the defence effort as hostile to the development effort.

Defence must for growth. First of all, defence and national security are a pre-condition of development. In a situation where there is no security, external or internal, little mobilisation and development of resources can take place. The country would not be able to plan for economic progress or indeed for the fulfilment of any objectives, or to provide infrastructure needed for development, or to offer inducements to private enterprise to make long-term investments. The extent to which this security aspect has importance and meaning depends, of course, on the circumstances of each country. When national independence and

integrity is in jeopardy, the development effort loses its meaning whether we like it or not: Liberty and homogeneous nationhood and national culture are what the colonial countries have been fighting for centuries, and it would be unwise for them to risk their loss. Indeed, development at the cost of defence may make a country a more tempting prize for the aggressor, and therefore a greater security risk. The basic determinant is whether the expenditure is meant for essential defence requirements or for aggrandisement and war. It may be difficult to draw the line, but so long as a country is sure of its premises and is honest in its approach, expenditure on defence cannot be regarded as unnecessary and extravagant. Defence expenditure is an insurance premium for national assets and national sovereignty, and a prudent person bears the insurance cost year after year so that he does not lose the assets altogether. Insurance seems too expensive to one who lives only in the immediate present but is highly economical and worthwhile to one who has a larger perspective.

As long as we are threatened by external aggression — and we had proof of this in the past that this threat is real and not imaginary — we can hardly close our eyes ostrichlike, and continue unswervingly to put all our resources in development. If we had the choice — I mean the practical choice of people in touch with reality and not the theoretical choice of intellectuals concerned only with growth models and equations — there is little doubt that we would have allocated much less resources to defence and more to development. No country could be more dedicated to development than Pakistan, and we have demonstrated this by work rather than words. The President of Pakistan, General M. Ziaul Haq, himself a soldier, has ensured the maximum allocation of resources to development

and has pressed all governmental and private agencies, and all policies and measures, into the service of development.

Defence Expense Spin-Off. The second aspect to bear in mind is that defence expenditure is not unproductive in its entirety. There can be activities which contribute to the productive effort, and add to non-warlike goods and services even though they are primarily meant for use of the defence services. For instance, there may be military formations for the breeding of cattle and production of fodder, there may be military dairies for the production of milk and milk products, there may be military factories for the production of consumption goods. These production units, though meant to cater for the requirements of military personnel, may also make surpluses available to the civil sector and, as their products are usually of higher quality, may help to set standards and improve production. The same is true of defence training institutions which turn out civil engineers, mechanical and electrical engineers, doctors and specialists, telecommunication and other technicians, drivers, mechanics, fitters, etc. Military cantonments provide a much better example of regional and town planning than municipal areas. Every soldier who has been trained in discipline, punctuality, business-like methods and devotion to the job in hand, and has been kept in good health and form, becomes a valuable asset for the manpower resources of the country.

In addition, of course, are the ordnance factories specifically meant for the production of warlike materials like arms and ammunition and training establishments specifically meant for imparting training warfare. These formations do not produce goods and services of the type required for general consumption and

turn out products which are usable only for destruction. Nevertheless, they represent high degree of technical knowledge and skill, and have incidental and potential benefit for economic growth. Defence production and research organisations, often because they were defence units where the usual financial criteria and cost-benefit ratios did not apply, have led to important scientific discoveries and technological innovations. Indeed, the tremendous expansion of nuclear and space knowledge in the modern era may be attributed to defence. Thus the defence effort makes a positive and sometimes vital contribution to the reservoir of production capacity trained manpower and scientific skill in the country. This reservoir could feed the requirements of economic development whenever the defence needs decline, and in any case after the person or equipment involved is no longer in direct use of defence.

There is the new concept of "cost effectiveness", that is useful and expressive. One should ensure maximum cost effectiveness in meeting the threat, in the consciousness that every additional rupee spent unnecessarily on defence means a rupee less for development and to that extent weakens the basic national strength and fundamental economic stability. In the long run and in the final analysis, economic strength is the best deterrent against aggression. Accordingly, a constant review is needed of the organisation, procedures, equipment, tactics, training arrangements, personnel policies and morale requirement of the defence services, and a jealous scrutiny of the expenditures involved.

Long-term Planning Expansion of indigenous production of defence materials, non-warlike and warlike, to the maximum extent feasible, is important, not only from the strategic viewpoint but also from the eco-

nomic angle. Unfortunately, it is easier to import than to go through the time-consuming and neveracking exercises of revising and rewriting specifications, coordinating defence and civil requirements, securing feasibility reports for production, initiating new production units or processes, accepting delays and defects in the initial stages, etc. But the objective is worth all this trouble, and more. In order to enable proper planning and production, defence requirements over a period have to be identified, and orders assured to the production units. To the extent private sector production capacity can be mobilised and reorganised to meet defence needs it may be relied upon, although quality of the products and cost will have to be watched. For other requirements, public sector enterprises may be needed or the responsibility entrusted to defence ordnance factories. In either case, the commercial aspect of production should not be ignored, proper pricing policies (even for monopoly and non-importable items) should be adopted, and maximum profits (or minimum losses) insisted upon. Unwarranted subsidies and concessions should be eliminated. Where a defence production unit necessarily has surplus capacity during peace time, its utilisation for feasible civil production need not be frowned upon.

What is, however, most important, and also the most practical, is that military personnel, who retire at a comparatively young age, and have excellent background and professional skills, should be made use of for development work. For this purpose, the technical manpower deficiencies should be identified by the country's planners, and before or after release, arrangements made to provide relevant training. In the case of officers, there is an idea to put them through a course of business management; if this is done and some practical training with business houses is organised in addition, the acute

deficiency of "professional managers" experienced at present by public enterprises as well as the more progressive private entrepreneurs, could be partly met. If

the officers were more development-oriented and development-trained, they could make much greater contribution.

Soviet Envoy Speaks on Afghanistan

LAHORE, Feb 1: The Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Vitaly S. Smirnov, has said that his country can consider the question of withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan as soon as "the undeclared war and all kind of interference in Afghan affairs is stopped and international guarantees provided that it would not be repeated in any form in the future."

Efforts to find a political solution to the Afghan problem would be fruitless "until the USA and its allies continue their policy directed at whipping up tension, particularly in this region", he warned.

The Soviet Ambassador was addressing a gathering on "Soviet Policy Towards The Countries Of The Subcontinent" under the auspices of the Council of National Security Studies.

Mr. Smirnov, who covered extensively the entire gamut of Soviet foreign policy with special reference to its relations with Pakistan, the situation in Afghanistan and ties with the United States, made it clear that the limited Soviet military contingent was staying in Afghanistan at the invitation of the "lawful Government" of that country and would remain there as long as that was considered necessary by both sides.

He maintained that his country stood for direct talks between Afghanistan and its neighbours, particularly Pakistan, to

settle all outstanding mutual issues among themselves and to establish good-neighbourly relations. "You may not like the social structure in the neighbouring country, but you cannot separate yourselves from bordering with her," he said.

Maintaining that the Geneva talks were a step in the right direction and a means to finding a political solution to the Afghan situation, he posed a question: "Why are these talks still continuing and why is a positive result not in sight?" He was of the opinion that this was so because foreign "aggression" against Afghanistan was not only continuing but also increasing.

He alleged that American 'experts' were now studying the question of directly air-dropping arms to the Afghan 'bandits' (Mujahideen). Moreover, he claimed, that to achieve this objective they were now insisting on a time-table for Soviet withdrawal. At the same time, he alleged, "aggression from the territory of a neighbouring country against Afghanistan was continuing," and there appeared to be no desire to stop it and guarantee that it would be repeated again.

This, he believed, was the main impediment in the way of a peaceful solution of the Afghan question.

Making an obvious reference to Pakistan, Ambassador Smirnov alleged: "It is also an open secret from where these forces

have been waging their undeclared war against the DRA. Mainly from a neighbouring country. Then again it is a well-established fact that all the main counter-revolutionary Afghan groupings are stationed there, as at their own home. They are cheered, helped and saluted there. They have everything there at their disposal, including the national television and mass media. They are invited there to chair international conferences which are used by them to call on the Muslim countries to kill the Soviets, to call for 'crusade' against Socialism.

"The gangs of Afghan bandits are being trained, armed, and equipped there. There they return to health their wounds and to boast about their massacre of women and children in Afghanistan. That country is the main conduit of foreign arms and various supplies to the Afghan terrorists. From there American CIA, the same agencies of other well known countries are directing their subversive propaganda and other hostile activities against Afghanistan. Does not it affect the Pak-Soviet relations?"

He was of the opinion that there were some forces in this country that were not in favour of improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations. There were no such forces in the USSR. The Soviet people believed that the relations between our nations would continue to develop in future on the basis of good-neighbourliness and cooperation.

—*Dawn, Karachi, Feb. 1, 1984*

Pak-Maldives Joint Commuque Excerpts

While reviewing the global political situation the two Presidents noted the identity of purpose and intent obtaining

between their two countries, inspired by their common allegiance to shared principles founded in the moral and social ethics of Islam. The two sides stressed the need for all countries, especially members of the Non-aligned Movement, to increase their efforts aimed at promoting and strengthening international peace and security. They expressed their grave concern regarding foreign intervention in the internal affairs of states. They strongly opposed the use of force for the settlement, of international disputes and stressed that solutions should be sought by peaceful measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two sides agreed that continued presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan posed a serious threat to security in the region, with far reaching implications for global peace and security. They reaffirmed the principles enunciated in the relevant resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan adopted by the Casablanca Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. The President of Maldives expressed deep sympathy for the Afghan refugees and profound appreciation for the shelter and humanitarian assistance being provided by Pakistan to them, in the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood. He reiterated support for their determination to return to their homes in dignity and honour.

Emphasising the *inadmissibility of intervention* by one country in another, the two Presidents also called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, restoring its independent and non-aligned status.

While discussing the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the two sides expressed their conviction that a just and lasting peace in the region cannot be achieved without Israeli withdrawal from all the

occupied territories including the Holy city of Jerusalem and the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and independent statehood, under the leadership of the P.L.O., their sole legitimate representative.

Both leaders expressed their deep anguish over the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq and renewed their appeal to both sides to bring this fratricidal war to an immediate end. The President of the Republic of Maldives expressed appreciation and support for the efforts made by the President of Pakistan on behalf of the Islamic Conference to restore peace between the two Muslim nations.

The two sides reiterated their conviction that solidarity and cooperation amongst Muslim countries reflects the firm belief of their peoples in the unity of the Ummah. The two sides pledged themselves to continue efforts to strengthen the role of the Islamic Conference Organisation and to intensify mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields among its members.

The two sides expressed their profound concern at the escalating arms race, in both conventional and nuclear weapons, which jeopardises international peace and security and constitutes a deplorable waste of resources for development. The two Presidents called upon all states to cooperate in international efforts for general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international controls. They also emphasised the need for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

The two Presidents agreed that the countries of the Third World must persevere in a concerted struggle for the realisation of a new international economic order. Just and rational relations between the industrialised and the developing countries would contribute to the progress and prosperity of both and to the dawn of a new era free from exploitation and domination. To the same end, the two sides agreed further on the need for greater economic, technical and technological cooperation among the developing countries.



Newsletter

WEAPONS • DEALS • RESEARCH • DEVELOPMENT



Anti-Aircraft Guns and Anti-Aircraft Tanks

Salim Mehmud

There are currently two established methods of interdicting and destroying enemy aircraft attacking their targets. First the ground-to-air missiles and secondly, the ground-based anti-aircraft guns. The ground-based anti-aircraft guns have been in use with highly satisfactory results in achieving both the mission objectives since the World War II days. As in the case of other armaments, the anti-aircraft guns have also gone through large scale improvement phases with the result that this weapon has now indeed become very lethal against the aircraft particularly those flying at very low level for precision bombing attack guns. The anti-aircraft guns of modern times combine mobility with high slew rates and directional accuracy, firing rates and reliability of performance.

The shells fired from these guns vary in calibre which may be 20mm, 35mm, 40mm, and 45mm. There are also higher calibre anti-aircraft guns. These guns have ranges anywhere between 2,000 meters to as high as 16,000 meters. The rate of fire also varies from one gun to another, but generally

speaking it is extremely high to increase the hit probability of the shells on the targets. Just to give an idea of the rates of fire, these may vary from 200 rounds per minute to 1,100 rounds per minute per barrel. The muzzle velocity of the shells is also quite high to achieve better accuracy of the shell in hitting its target. These velocities depending upon the gun system may be of the order of 1,200 meters per second. Some of these guns have laser range finders to establish the range from the gun to the target to be attacked so that the guns open up when the target comes within the range of the gun, at which time an audible alarm is sounded in the headphone of the gunner.

It is quite common now-a-days that more than one gun barrel are mounted on one turret. There are generally two or four barrels, an example of the latter is the Chinese 45mm Quad anti-aircraft gun. With more than one barrel a large number of shells (ammunition) can be directed toward the same one target to increase chances of hitting it. As an example, if each barrel

would be firing 500 rounds per minute, the 4 barrels combined would throw as many as 2,000 shells per minute in the direction of the target. A number of modern guns are directed with special anti-aircraft radar which in the first place detects the presence of hostile aircraft far away from the location of the gun, and then with the help of a computer automatically calculates their advancing speeds and remotely positions of the anti-aircraft guns taking into account the advancing speeds of the hostile aircraft, and lethal range of the guns so as to enable the shells fired from the guns to intercept the aircraft with a high degree of probability. The radar even interrogates aircraft through a system called IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) to establish whether it is a friendly or an enemy aircraft with an appropriate indication to the gunnery commander. The fuzes fitted on the anti-aircraft gun shells are of different types. These would explode the charge in the shells either through direct impact or even when the shell passes within a close distance of the aircraft, called working through proximity fuze, so that in the event of working of proximity fuze when direct hit is not achieved the fragmentations of the shell could hit the aircraft and damage some vital part of it.

In order to provide protection to the troops on the move against air attacks, the anti-aircraft guns are also mounted on the anti-aircraft tanks which not only have a high degree of protection against small calibre ammunition but also can negotiate difficult ground conditions and is therefore considered quite mobile. These anti-aircraft tanks are invariably equipped with sophisticated radars for detection of targets as also to align the guns in the direction of the targets. Generally two different sets of radars are used: the first type of radar is called surveillance radar which has a broad beam to detect hostile targets at long ranges, though not with high order

of accuracy, and once the target is within the range of the anti-aircraft guns, the selected target is transferred to firing control radar which though has short range but is extremely precise in its pointing accuracy. As already pointed out the radar is coupled to a computer which computes the direction in which the gun should point taking into consideration the speed of the aircraft and characteristics of the gun as well as the prevalent weather conditions. The anti-aircraft gun mounted on the tank can thus be moved swiftly from position to position. Not only this the gun itself can be pointed in the direction from which hostile aircraft are coming with very high speed: about 90° per second for positioning in bearing angle and 45° per second for positioning in elevation angle. Normally there are two guns mounted on the anti-aircraft tank turret, but there are several examples when there may be four barrels

NO U.S. ARMS IF PAK BLASTS BOMB!

The U.S. would stop arms supplies to Pakistan if that country went in for nuclear weapons tests, Mr Harry G. Barnes, U.S. ambassador to India, said recently.

Mr Barnes' assertion comes in the wake of the defence minister, Mr R. Venkataraman's announcement in the Lok Sabha that the government of India had information that Pakistan had developed its own uranium enrichment process.

Mr Barnes, now on a tour of Karnataka, was talking to reporters at the Mangalore port guest house.

According to Mr Barnes, the supply of American arms to Pakistan was to ensure stability of the region in the context of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

He did not think that this would affect his country's relations with India.

mounted on the turret. In the first category the calibre of the shells may be 40mm whereas in the second category the calibre may be smaller say 23mm. The combined rate of fire of four barrel anti-aircraft gun may be 3,400 rounds per minute. The tank also has ability to cross water obstructions.

One of the highest speed anti-aircraft gun systems is brand name 'Vulcan' gun which has six barrels firing 20mm calibre ammunition. This gun has been modified to make it suitable for air defence system and has firing rates of 1,000 to 3,000 rounds per minute. The gun can be mounted either on a trailer or armoured personnel carrier or for that matter anti-aircraft tank. Originally this gun was used for mounting on the aircraft in which role it has firing rates as high as 6,000 rounds per minute. Typical example of the range of anti-aircraft tank guns is 2,500 meters. There is no doubt that should there be necessity to engage ground target the anti-aircraft guns can also be used in that role.

Without anti-aircraft guns protection the ground targets would be at the mercy of the hostile aircraft which can play havoc not only with the troops but also with all the logistic support like motor vehicles, telecommunication and armament they need for operations. The availability of effective anti-aircraft system with army on the move as also to defend fixed vulnerable targets is therefore essential element of defensive weapon systems.

Needless to state that a modern anti-aircraft gun with combined features as discussed earlier on has become quite effective in disabling hostile aircraft particularly those flying at low level. This fact has been amply brought home many a times and one could definitely give an example of the Vietnam War when the anti-aircraft guns inflicted a heavy toll on

the United States Air Force aircrafts when these aircrafts engaged in attacking ground targets.

India's 'Tank Royal'

The armoured jaws of the Army are being equipped with newer, dreadful, nay, deadly fangs. The fear-instilling teeth are christened Chetak, after the battle horse on which rode Rana Pratap to the famous Haldighat to challenge the Moghul might.

The modern Chetak, however, is not a steed, but Tank Royal, the Indian Army has been engaged in developing for nearly a decade.

The search for a new generation tank began in the 70's after Vijayanta was put into service in the mid sixties. In 1974, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs approved an outlay of Rs. 56.55 crores for a future Main Battle Tank (MBT). The enviable task was entrusted to the Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) at Avadi near Madras. About 2,000 scientists and technicians worked relentlessly to produce the first prototype of MBT. The pledge then taken reads: "Task is Chetak MBT; date is December 1983; dusk to dawn think on it and dawn to dusk work on it."

The time has come to redeem that pledge and this month the first prototype of the "invincible armour" will roll out to join the battle formations. Subsequently, every six months or so, the metamorphosed prototype will regularly come out the assembly line. The last one will be produced at Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF), Avadi, located adjacent to CVRDE.

The HVF is at present turning out Vijayanta tanks. These successive prototypes will incorporate improvements,

in the armour and engine and have far greater sophistication. The government has appointed a committee to identify a suitable site and assess the required infrastructure for batch production of Chetak so that no time is lost in translating the designs into hardware.

The Defence Research and Development has made a number of breakthroughs in tank technology—the first the "Kanchan" armour developed at the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL), Hyderabad, which can withstand anti-tank weapons like the Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) and High Explosive Anti-tank (HEAT) ammunition at point-blank ranges. If appropriately thickened, it can also provide protection against anti-tank missiles, fin-stabilized APDS ammunition and also High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) ammunition. This armour can be used either integrally or as an 'add-on'. With its eventual development and testing, MBT will have one of the best immunities in any tank.

Chetak, in a sense, is the true successor to Vijayanta and T-72, which are at present doing service. The make Vijayanta fleet as formidable as the MBT, the Kanchan armour will be added on to the Vijayantas. Additionally, their punch and reliability will be increased by an engine of higher horse-power. The 105 mm guns, mounted on the Vijayanta is of the same calibre as that on the American M.1 and the French AMX-30 tanks. The hit probability of the Vijayanta on the move will increase when the CVRDE has carried out substantial research to incorporate fire-control systems with electronic linkage, laser range-finder and night-vision devices.

The Army's armoured fleet has already been strengthened with the most awesome

tank in the world—T-72. This low-silhouetted, high power-to-weight ratio, three-men crew, 41-ton tank with the 125mm smooth bore gun, firing APDS ammunition will soon be manufactured at the Avadi factory. With an automatic loading device, providing them a very high rate of fire, T-72 will be able to make through water even when fully submerged and cross all kinds of hurdles, surfaces and terrain specially to achieve their objectives by delivering a mighty punch.

Chetak, of course, will take the lead over Vijayanta and T-72. Dressed in 'Kanchan' armour it will acquire near immunity with lesser armour. It will also make it lighter than German Leopard (T2), U.S. M.1 and British Challenger, each of which weighs nearly 54 tons. Chetak's powerful engine will go up to 1,500 horse power. A wholly indigenous and an extremely accurate gun which can fire FSAPDS and HESH ammunition will be mounted on it. The Instrument Research and Development Establishment (I R D E), Dehra Dun, has developed for Chetak a fire-control system, incorporating stabilized sight for the gunner, panoramic sight for the commander and low-level television for navigation to provide high first-round hit capability. It has also developed for the new main battle tank laser range-finder, ballistic computer, sensors and serve loops. Chetak will have hydro-pneumatic suspension which will give it a stable platform for its accurate gun, fixed with a highly advanced fire-control system.

Surely, and hopefully, when Chetak joins the Indian army it will be the most powerful tank in the world.

—The Times of India,

New Delhi, 10-12-1983.

India Aware of Pak Nuclear Designs!

The Defence Minister, Mr R. Venkataraman, told the Rajya Sabha today that the Government had information that Pakistan was "trying to go through a process of enriching uranium" at one of its atomic stations.

However, he assured the House during question hour that "our defence preparedness is at its peak and it can meet any challenge from any quarter".

Mr Venkataraman pointed out that countries like Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Turkey, Holland, France and Dubai had been providing equipment which would go into bomb manufacture. Pakistan was conducting its uranium enrichment programme at Kahuta. Whether China and the USA were helping Pakistan in the process was "too wide a question", he told a Congress(I) member.

Such was the interest generated in the question that it took up nearly 50 minutes of question hour. The Defence Minister's replies prompted the Chairman, Mr Hidayatullah, to say he was doing "exceedingly well".

The Minister said the information the Government had "does not suggest that Pak submarines are equipped with nuclear warheads". Also, the Government had no information whether any missile had been installed in Tibet. "We have information that in parts of Tibet certain arrangements were being made. For what purpose, we do not know. We have no information that they are having any

particular missile landing pad for firing nuclear weapons".

Mr Venkataraman stated emphatically that the supplies of lethal arms received by Pakistan so far had "not tilted the balance". India was trying to "match" through purchases from "friendly countries".

"We are trying to equip ourselves with every kind of defence equipment regardless of its origin". India got it from Russia as also from Western countries—"purely on merit of each case".

The purchases were based on the merits of each weapon, he clarified, adding that "we are getting it from all countries wherever...available".

In this context, Mr Venkataraman pointed out, Russia had been "generous" with help. He referred also to his recent visit to some European countries and said India was going to buy some weapons from those.

Referring to nuclear-powered submarines, Mr Venkataraman said India had kept its options open. "If necessary, we will go for it". At the same time he made it clear that India was going to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes.

Mr Dinesh Goswami (Ind) asked whether India had used diplomatic channels to persuade at least the members of the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement not to supply arms to Pakistan. The Defence Minister replied that he had only "peripheral" information about it as it was the domain of the Minister for External Affairs. But it was "too much to say that the countries supplying equipment to Pakistan which would be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapon did not know that it will be used for that purpose".

Mr B. P. Maurya (C-1) was not satisfied with the Minister's assurance that India's defence preparedness was at its peak. "We had heard the same thing in 1962 and I wish the Minister had not referred to it", he said. He wanted to know if the defence budget would be increased.

Mr Venkataraman said he would see if the defence budget could be increased. But the efficiency of the armed forces depended on its morale, which was "very high". Besides, India had the best conventional arms equipment.

In reply to a question from Mr G. C. Bhattacharya (DSP), the Minister said he discounted reports that China had allowed Pakistan to use its territory for nuclear explosion.

Mr Jaswant Singh (BJP) wanted to know if Pakistan had shut down the Kahuta nuclear plant following an explosion in which two persons had been killed, and whether this meant a setback to Pakistan's uranium enrichment programme. "We don't know. It is not verified", the Defence Minister replied, but assured the House that he saw all such things as "danger".

—*The Statesman, New Delhi, 7-12-83*

CIA Link with Defence Officials Revealed

In a major crackdown on the activities of foreign agencies in India, the Intelligence Bureau (I.B.) has virtually ripped open the operation of the C.I.A. and as a sequel to it, about half a dozen U.S. diplomats are reported to have left the country.

It was a real cloak and dagger drama and the sleuths of the I.B. took about a year to

tie up the various loose ends to book the offenders, all retired senior defence service personnel.

The main suspect, Air Vice-Marshal, C. H. Larkins (Retd.) was the recipient of the highest award for gallantry from the Indian President and he was decorated many times for his valour. His brother was a retired Major General F. D. Larkins. While the then Air Vice-Marshal retired from service only in July this year, his elder brother after retirement was acting as a consultant to the various western arms manufacturing units and in that capacity, had access to the various Defence Ministry offices.

The I.B. officers kept a close watch on the Azad Apartment at Mehrauli Road, where the retired Air Vice-Marshal Larkins was staying. The other two suspects, who were nabbed by the I.B., were Lt. Colonel Jasbir Singh (Retd.) one Jaspal Singh Gill.

The espionage story created a furore in both the houses of Parliament today. Defence Minister, Mr R. Venkataraman disclosed that it was because of the information furnished by an Air Force officer with a high sense of duty and patriotism that the spy ring was ripped open.

After their arrests, these suspects have been taken to the "spy room" in the Red Fort, where they are under interrogation. Air Vice-Marshal Larkins had broken down and given a detailed report, implicating many diplomats and some senior officials. These reports were being rechecked. The others have also given their versions.

It was Air Vice-Marshal, Raghavendran, who had made the written complaint about the activities of these people to the Delhi Police Commissioner, Mr Subash Tandon. It may be remembered that this officer

Raghavendran had since been promoted and appointed as Air Marshal and senior Air Staff Officer of the Western Command. In his complaint it was revealed that Vice-Marshal Larkins (Retd.) had offered a heavy bribe of Rs. 30,000 to Flying Officer Jasjit Singh for procuring certain classified information for the benefit of some "foreign powers". The latter agreed and immediately informed the senior authorities, who in turn alerted the I.B.

Some documents were believed to have been forged which the officer handed over to Air Vice-Marshal Larkins. Obviously, those represented some graphs of an electronic equipment of an aircraft. At that time, the sleuths stepped in and arrested the Air Vice-Marshal. This drama took place about six days ago, but the authorities kept it as a closely guarded secret.

It has been established now that the CIA-inspired operation was in full swing for the last few years and many of the American operators have secretly left the station.

Ever since India started getting sophisticated armaments from the Soviet Union, the United States were out to get the details of these items, especially the manuals and electronic mappings. They were curious to know about the MiG-27, Chilka (multi barrel guns) and other equipment. Although they have some knowledge of the operational faculties of the MiG-25 a fighter bomber, (in early 70s one Soviet pilot force-landed a MiG-25 in Japan) they seem to be eager to know whether the Indian MiG-25 had new devices.

Luckily, due to the prompt steps taken by the counter-intelligence wing of the Intelligence Bureau, not much damage has been done to the security. These measures have

been further tightened. Meanwhile, there is flutter in the western lobbies and many American diplomats are slowly seeking transfer from Delhi.

The Defence Minister, Mr R. Venkataraman, meanwhile today assured the Parliament that steps had been taken immediately by the Government to prevent leakage of any classified information.

Making a statement regarding the arrest of some defence service officers in connection with suspected espionage activities, the Defence Minister, however, requested the members to bear with him and not seek details lest this would jeopardise the investigations.

In the Rajya Sabha, a cross-section of MP's wanted to know with whom the arrested defence personnel were connected and whether there were any links with the CIA. Mr Shiv Chandra Jha (J), demanded that a parliamentary committee should be set up to go into the episode.

Replying to several supplementaries, Mr Venkataraman said the leakage occurred in the defence library where only senior officers were permitted to consult documents and books for reference and other purposes. Now the library had been plugged and nobody can enter its premises without the permission of an officer holding the rank of no less than an Additional Secretary, he added.

The Defence Minister further assured members that it was not correct to say that the espionage activities were going on for a long time. In his written statement, he said, on information furnished by an Air Force officer "with a high sense of duty and patriotism" investigations were carried out which led to the arrest of some persons.

Mr Venkataraman said a case under Section 359 of the Official Secrets Act had been registered by the Delhi police. The investigations so far have led to the arrest of Air Vice-Marshal K.H. Larkins (Retd.), his elder brother Major General F. D. Larkins (Retd.), Lt. Col. Jasbir Singh (Retd.) and Mr Jaspal Singh Gill, he disclosed.

Giving clarifications sought by the members, the Defence Minister denied that the leakage was going on for the past eight to ten years.

Replying to Mr Jaswant Singh (BJP), Mr Venkataraman said the Government was aware of its responsibility that information about the equipment of a particular country did not go to another country.

Mr Singh wanted to know the steps the Government had taken to check the leakage of technical information about equipment procured from one country to another country, since others would have an obvious interest in it.

The house joined the Minister in appreciating the sense of duty of the officer which had resulted in unearthing the spy ring. Mr Venkataraman requested the members not to insist on mentioning the name of the officer for the time being.

Dr Bhai Mahavir (BJP) said the minister's statement had neither confirmed nor denied the CIA involvement in the current case. Mr Rameshwar Singh (LD) wondered whether some other spies were in league with the arrested people.

While Mr G. C. Bhattacharya (DSP) wanted the minister's assurance to control the CIA activities, Ms S. C. Jha (Janata) said a parliamentary committee should look into the latest leakage of classified information.

Meanwhile, the Intelligence Bureau has seized incriminating documents from the four persons who have been arrested, adds UNI. The four people, have been remanded to the judicial lockup at the Tihar Central Jail.

—*Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 7-12-83*

Sea King—Star of the South Atlantic

A preliminary analysis of the Falklands operation has shown that helicopters not capable of operating from the deck of a ship in all weathers are of no value whatever to a naval task force. This alone ruled out one type of helicopter from any role in the Falklands operation.

Another fact learnt the hard way is that early warning radar is essential in protecting a task force from air attack. Helicopter-borne early warning radar would have been invaluable and could have largely negated the effect of medium range missiles such as Exocet. As a result of this discovery, the Westland helicopter company from Yeovil in south-west England produced a maritime surveillance variant of its Sea King helicopter in a record 11 weeks last year.

The Sea King is now equipped with an advanced Thorn-EMI radar, known as Searchwater, which has been proved a success in the four-jet Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft. This is housed in a massive radome on the starboard side of the Sea King and provides 360 degree coverage and long range detection of aircraft at low and high altitudes. Surface targets as small as submarine periscopes can be detected even in high seas.

The Sea King helicopter was in fact labelled by UK defence officials as the "star of the show" in the Falklands campaign. It is said to have shown itself to be a "master of all trades".

The Sea King, powered by two Rolls-Royce Gnome turboshaft engines, is primarily intended for anti-submarine and search and rescue roles, but has secondary roles of tactical troop and cargo transport and casualty evacuation. An air to surface missile version is also available.

As a completely self-contained tactical unit with integrated radar and sonar tactical display, fully automatic flight control system and a range of weapons, it has won some 250 orders from Norway, India, Australia, Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar, Belgium and Federal Germany as well as Britain.

A total of some 200 helicopters were

used by Britain in the Falklands, mostly Sea Kings but also including Wessex, Lynx, Scouts and Gazelles from Westland plus a solitary Boeing-Vertol Chinook.

Despite being designed many years ago it has been progressively modernised to match the best available today. In the Falklands, the Sea Kings achieved up to 10 times the normal peacetime usage with each machine accumulating 160 hours in the air in a month. Normally a military aircraft would fly only 160 hours a year.

The Sea Kings also flew at weights up to 20 per cent in excess of previous limitations, and in atrocious weather that included 60 knot winds, sea state 7, driving rain, fog, ice and snow. All this was achieved with minimal routine maintenance carried out without any workshop facilities. Reliability and availability were described as "excellent".

Containership For Helicopter Operations

The 23,000 tonne containership Astronomer chartered by the Ministry of Defence has been converted into a Helicopter Support Ship and renamed RFA Reliant. Trials have recently been completed.

A British Aerospace team has managed the design production and installation of 74 containers. Those for the hangar came from the prototype Arapaho system leased from the United States by the Royal Navy. These were rebuilt and equipped to form within the hangar the helicopter fuelling unit, flying control office, damage control office, stores, power distribution centre and mechanical and electrical workshops.

The other 56 containers were designed, manufactured and fitted out to form a 4-level accommodation block for 150 naval personnel water and sewage plants, magazines, stores and fuel farm. The accommodation block contains cabins, bathrooms galley, wardrooms, NAAFI, ratings messes, cold and cool food storage rooms, laundry and power distribution centre. The fresh water distillation plant and sewage facility is sited beneath the accommodation block. An area for refuelling and defuelling helicopters has been provided beneath the hangar. All containers and deck modules have ISO interfaces for fixing to points on the ship.

This contract represents the first opportunity for putting into practice the concept of SCADS (Shipborne Containerised Air Defence System). British Aerospace began actively to promote SCADS principles several years ago to provide self-defence for container and other ships. A merchant ship can be converted to operate Harriers or Helicopters and also include a comprehensive self-defence containerised weapon system such as Seawolf. Amphibious assault capability could be provided using suitable roll on and roll off ships.

The container manufacturing, conversion and fitting out tasks have been undertaken by the principal contractors working under the direction of British Aerospace.

Saudi Arabia Accepts RDJTF Pre-positioning Plan?

In a move which could have dramatic political repercussions, the US Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) is planning to pre-position hundreds of new 120mm-gunned M-1A1 Abrams main battle tanks in Saudi Arabia, starting in 1985-86, according to several independent sources. Furthermore, says one, the plan appears to have been approved in Riyadh by at least the defence minister, Prince Sultan since the Saudi Army intends to pick 200 M1As for its own use out of the American stockpile, provided that the Abrams is selected as a result of trials of two M1s which are to be conducted in the kingdom in the middle of this year.

According to one extremely well placed source the entire subject is so sensitive that no answers can be expected to requests for official US confirmation or denial. Confirmation has therefore had to be obtained and checked by separate means outside the United States.

Saudi acceptance of the RDJTF pre-positioning plan and Saudi interest in the Abrams are both significant departures from previous policy. The ruling inner circle of the royal family has hitherto

maintained at least in public that the region should be kept free of superpower involvement, and it has studiously avoided

CRASH RECORDERS FOR INDIAN AIR FORCE

Bracknell Division of British Aerospace has received orders valued at £ 0.75 million from the Indian Air Force for the supply of 40 SCR 300 crash protected Flight Data Recorders and 32 C2J compass systems.

Both the SCR 300 Flight Data Recorders and the C2J Compass Systems will be supplied as kits to Hindustan Aircraft Limited for assembly at their Lucknow factory.

The SCR 300 is the latest of a range of flight data recorders developed by the Bracknell Division that was formerly Sperry Gyroscope. The Flight Data Recording System, which in addition to data also records voice/cockpit noise, is of very advanced electronic design and of very small size.

The C2J Compass is fitted to British Aerospace Jaguar aircraft including those supplied to India.

The SCR 300E system is also specified for the British Aerospace ACA (Agile Combat Aircraft) demonstrator.

giving any impression of being favourable to granting either base rights or facilities to the RDJTF. The pre-positioning plan is likely to be bitterly criticised by the Israelis and the hard-line states. It will probably also arouse the fury of the fundamentalist Iranian regime and could provoke serious internal Saudi dissent, despite some obvious strategic advantages. These last include greatly improving the RDJTF speed of reaction in strength against threats to regional security, as well as a far more strongly implied commitment by the Americans to assist in the preservation of stability in Saudi Arabia itself.

Saudi Army interest in the Abrams appears to have been ignited by the refusal of Helmut Schmidt's SPD-FDP government in Germany to sanction the export of Leopard 2s and other military hardware to the Arab kingdom. As part of a major civil/military trade package deal with the FRG, the Saudis had expressed a desire to purchase upto 240 Leopard 2s from Krauss-Maffei and Krupp MaK (in which they hold a large financial stake), plus 60 Gepard AA tanks and 480 wheeled Transport panzers.

Two M1 Abrams with 105mm guns were airlifted to Saudi Arabia in May last year, for trials running through July and August. The M1A1 version, with the Rheinmetall 120mm smooth-bore gun, will not enter series production in the USA until 1985, however. An initial batch of about 310M1A1s for the RDJTF is believed to be scheduled for US Army procurement in the FY 1985-86 defence budget. According to certain sources, the number of RDJTF M1A1s to be pre-positioned in Saudi Arabia would be increased incrementally to a total of upto 1,000.

The rather strange procurement process for the Saudis, should they select the Abrams, whereby they would choose vehi-

cles from the RDJTF stockpile, is said to be to ensure that they receive tanks that are equipped to full US Army operational standard. The Saudis are understood to be concerned that their Boeing E-3A AWACS are not fitted out to the same operational standard as those of the US Air Force.

The 35,000-strong Saudi Army's requirement for 200-plus advanced main battle tanks, to add to its existing inventory of 300 French AMX-30s and 150 US M60s, is almost matched by a requirement for 150 tanks by Prince Abdullah's 25,000-strong Saudi National Guard, which so far has none. The National Guard is not, apparently, going to be allowed to acquire such an advanced type as the Army, but it will be permitted to arm its future vehicles with 120mm guns. In what may be an effort to prevent rivalry between the two from becoming uncontrollable, the Saudi rulers are said to have recently promulgated a decree in council which permits officers to be transferred from one service to the other.

The build-up of Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia has now reached brigade size. Although Saudi officials were at great pains to deny IDR's first report that a "special division" of 10,000-12,000 Pakistanis was eventually to be deployed in the kingdom, it was subsequently confirmed, quite separately, by other media.

—*International Defence Review, Geneva*,
Vol. 16, No. 2/1983.

New Senior Defence Posts to be created

About 100 more posts of major-generals and lieutenant-generals are proposed to be created as part of the armed forces cadre review under consideration by the Government.

According to highly informed sources, the Government has approved in principle the creation of 20 additional posts of lieutenant-generals and 75 major-generals for which the financial implications are being studied. A larger number of upgradations of appointments would take place when the proposal comes through. Additional posts of senior ranks in the Air Force and the Navy would also be created as a corollary of the cadre review.

The previous cadre review took place in 1981 when 11 posts of lieutenant-generals, 51 of major-generals and 125 of brigadiers were created. At present there are about 40 lieutenant-generals, 140 major-generals and more than 550 posts of brigadiers. There are about 740 posts of ranks of brigadiers and above.

According to the proposal the ranks of chiefs of staff of central and southern commands, who are at present major-generals, will be upgraded to lieutenant-generals. The chiefs of staff of the remaining three commands are already lieutenant-generals. Similarly the commandants of the training establishments like the National Defence Academy, the Infantry School, the Ar-

moured Corps Centre and School, will be lieutenant-generals. In fact the ranks of a few of the commandants of the training establishments like the Indian Military Academy (IMA) and the College of Combat at Mhow have already been upgraded.

The area commanders at some stations are also proposed to be lieutenant-generals since they have to deal with senior civil officers of the states.

The case of the director-general of the National Cadet Corps (NCC) was delinked from the rest of the proposal and the present incumbent is already a lieutenant-general.

A number of posts, including those of the sub-area commanders, which are presently held by brigadiers, are also proposed to be upgraded to the rank of major-generals. The proposal for making time scale lieutenant-colonels after about 13 years of service and making full colonels instead of lieutenant-colonels commanding officers of battalions and their equivalent is also being considered.

—*Indian Express*, New Delhi, 8-12-1983.