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A MONTHLY MIRROR AND DIGEST OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

The Soviets in Afghanistan

The Second Year

آمدن "باجازت" "رفتن" "بارادت"

Come "by invitation" leave by choice
Old Persian proverb (reversed)



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The Soviets In Afghanistan: The Second Year

آمدن "با اجازت" رفتن "با ارادت"

Come "by invitation" leave by choice.

Old Persian proverb (reversed)

Whether the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan are there in pursuance of a grand design or simply stuck there through a grand error of judgement is quite immaterial in geo-strategic terms. What truly matters is that they remain there regardless of all else—the United Nations, the United States of America, the Islamic Ummah, the sheer rage and horror of weak Third World countries and last but not least the continuing Afghan resistance.

What kind of a world is ours where international and moral sanctions are followed mostly in breach and only seldom in observance? What kind of an organization is the United Nations whose sole function, through sheer ineptitude and procrastination, would appear to be to justify in time what cannot be justified in space? *Already, with the passage of time, the Afghanistan affair is beginning to look like a fait accompli in terms of superpower realpolitik or an act of fate as an average God-fearing and submissive oriental might look at that.*

What the future holds for Afghanistan may be as risky a guess as a guess could be; but it is not an impossible one, to be sure. It can be reasonably assumed that the Soviet forces would, one day, in not too distant future, pull out from Afghanistan: between now and then, however, heads will roll. Also before they do their rearguard, they would see to it that the necessary political and diplomatic groundwork was laid for the successful execution of such a manoeuvre and the continuance of their influence (if not exactly hold) in Afghanistan. Simple in appearance, the political solution of the Afghanistan affair may not be as simple in reality.

The fundamental and hitherto insuperable barrier to a political solution has been inherent in the very nature of such a solution which can be based only on dialogue with one or more legitimate and concerned parties. And that is where the rub lies in the case of the present Afghan regime brought to power and kept there entirely by the force of the Soviet arms. Even a successor regime installed under continued Soviet occupation, would carry the odium of illegitimacy, and be no better qualified than the present one for a dialogue—the *sine qua non* of a political solution. It seems doubtful, if in the next six months or a year, situation in Afghanistan would improve so dramatically—through reconciliation with or pacification of the broad masses (collapse of the Afghan resistance in other words)—as to enable the central authority in Afghanistan to stand on its own two feet without the

Soviet support. The alternative to Soviet support in Afghanistan in its present perilously fluid state could be anything from a sudden eruption of fierce tribalism, in-fighting among revolutionary and pseudo-revolutionary resistance groups to intervention by another major or superpower. Also the overspill of anarchy and civil war in Afghanistan could be so considerable as to affect the peace and stability of the region and particularly of its two immediate neighbours—Pakistan and Iran.

The worst part of a situation created by foreign military intervention is that it turns eventually into a terrible impasse and a veritable trap—both for the occupier and the occupied—in two different senses though. While the occupier gets invariably stuck, the occupied is confronted with a bizarre and baffling situation not of its own making. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan confronted the Afghans not only with the brutal fact of being conquered but also exposed them to strong currents and cross-currents of sudden change wholly inconsistent with their time-hallowed tribal status quo. Whatever be the long-range effects of the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan quite certainly, will not be the same country again. Much snow has already melted down the Hindu Kush and many a poppy flower withered away between December 27, 1979 and now. The prospect of an early return of peace and stability to the tortured land, even when liberated carry back from the Soviet stranglehold, look bleak, if not totally non-existent.

In the meantime, the Afghan resistance would continue to ebb and swell, the Soviet Union to maintain its military presence, and the Afghan masses, physically land-locked and insulated psychologically from the rest of world, to remain exposed to sudden changes brought about by a foreign power armed with lethal arms and an equally lethal ideology.

As for Pakistan and Iran, it is feared, they might well have to live with a succession of illegally Soviet-installed governments in Afghanistan until such times as the Soviet-engineered changes are routinized and integrated into an institutional framework. Or else a determined counter-intervention by US takes place to dislodge USSR. The hard fact remains that while there is a way into Afghanistan through the grim passes, there is no easy way out of it. This is historically borne out by the three Afghan wars. The Soviet Union for as long as it remains in control of the situation, would see to it that what befell the British expeditionary forces between 1839 and 1919 does not befall its own occupation forces. Soviet-installed, inspired and supported regimes, it appears, would therefore be the only governments in Afghanistan to reckon with, regardless of their lack of legitimacy.

The question now is: how to have anything to do with an illegal government without losing one's face and credibility (also perhaps some of one's own legitimacy)? Originating in the United Nation, the quest for an expeditious political solution of the Afghanistan problem has followed a rutted course through Islamic conference; individual initiative such as Lord Carrington's proposing 'neutralization' of Afghanistan; the European Council, demanding withdrawal of Soviet troops and a return to status ante in its meeting in Venice in June; Japan and seven Western countries' heads of state reiterating the withdrawal demand at their meeting in Venice in the same month; President Carter suggestion for "transitional arrangement" along with foreign withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan's own hectic efforts towards a political solution.

Thus the Afghanistan problem gravitated from the UN (Jan. 80) to IFMC (Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference) onto Europe, onto US, back to UN (Nov. 80) back to the Islamic forum (Taif Summit) and down to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in New Delhi. Being just next-door, Pakistan had been deeply conscious of the dire need of a political solution without compromising principles and seeking out peace without sacrificing honour. Its major predicament flows from the fact that it could not possibly talk to someone it did not recognise.

Unfortunately, Pakistan's quest for peace had been hampered not only by Kabul's irrational insistence on a political dialogue on its own terms but also by such a major catastrophe as the eruption of Iran-Iraq war in September last with its wide-ranging, unfortunate consequences for the budding Islamic unity and power. More or less, all Islamic causes, Palestine and Afghanistan in particular, suffered because of the unnecessary fratricidal war. The focus which, through time, has already been shifting away from the cherished causes, moved farther away and lingered on the rising internal conflicts and dissensions in the Islamic world itself. The war also impaired the effectiveness of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to serve as the common Islamic forum to press and fight for the common Islamic causes by peaceful means. The OIC efforts to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table were of no avail. Hostilities still continue and appear to be settling down in an extended and indecisive conflict in military terms but with a deep and abiding impact on the shape and character of the Islamic world.

Using its own initiative, Pakistan introduced in November last a draft resolution urging the UN General Assembly to call for an immediate (and total) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and "affirm the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government". The Pakistani resolution was passed by 111 votes with only 22 abstentions—even a more damning public indictment than the first resolution moved and passed in January last by 104 votes to 18 with 18 abstentions. While introducing the resolution Foreign Minister Agha Shahi said that a peaceful solution of Afghanistan could be best pursued by a special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This approach, he said, provided 'maximum flexibility' to the Secretary-General in "renewing his endeavours for peace in the region."

The next major landmark in the tortuous quest for a peaceful Afghanistan solution was the Islamic Summit in Taif and the adoption of a resolution on Afghanistan. The Taif Summit (25 to 28 January 1981) confirmed the commitment of the OIC to find a solution to the problem, recommending to the ministerial committee to cooperate with the UN Secretary-General and his representative in finding a just solution to the situation in Afghanistan. Iran, which did not take part in the Taif Conference, remains irreconcilably opposed to the government of Babrak Karmal and would have nothing to do with it in any way or manner until the last Soviet soldier had withdrawn from Afghanistan. Iran's inflexibility is more than overmatched by the endless prevarications of the Soviet and Afghan governments to prevent the proposed political parleys from getting off the ground at all.

Coinciding with the Taif Summit came the proposal of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France (subsequently rejected by Afghanistan itself) for an international

summit of all the countries "accused rightly or wrongly of interfering in Afghan affairs". The concerned countries include Iran and Pakistan, the five permanent members of UN Security Council (US, USSR, Britain, France and China) India and "some Islamic countries" to be identified later. As for Afghanistan, President Giscard said there was no need for the current government in Kabul to participate in the Conference since the plan was not a matter of defining a new status of Afghanistan but of ending interference. The French proposal, without conflicting in essence with the Pakistani proposal came as an unexpected move to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi admitted that the "timing and the substance" of the proposed conference had come as a "surprise" to him. As a country vitally concerned in Afghanistan, prior consultations with Pakistan would have been in order.

There are two other aspects of the French proposal which merit deep consideration: and one of these is the formal induction of India into the whole affair. This cannot but upset Pakistan inasmuch as Pakistan had been trying all along—and successfully too—to find an Islamic forum for discussing and finally settling the Afghan problem. India, on the contrary, stood for 'regionalizing' the problem thus depriving it of its religio-ideological content and eventually monopolizing it as the major 'regional' power. It sought to hunt with the Russian hound and run with the regional hare to its own best advantage. Considering its sheer size and power, any geo-political re-structuring in south and south-west Asia would seem to help India to grow in stature if not to expand in area. Once India is inside the ring others may not exactly be eased out but reduced to bit roles according to their physical size and irrespective of the size of the impact which sheer geographical proximity makes in the form of an unwanted but unavoidable refugee problem, cross-border incursions and encounters, hot pursuit and so on. Such is the situation Pakistan has been facing and will continue to face while it lasts. It would be only fair and reasonable therefore to assign it a place in the scheme of things commensurate with the burden it has been carrying and the threat it faces and is supposed to tackle if ever the crunch comes. The fear of being diplomatically excluded while continuing to remain physically involved is only too real in Pakistan to be dismissed lightly.

The French proposals, which like Lord Carrington's proposal, seek to internationalize (rather 'westernize') the Afghan problem has been conceived largely in terms of European or Western peace and the protection of detente at all events. President Giscard linked the Afghan problem to the entire framework of East-West relations which he would "like to see stabilized". According to him three conditions were needed to safeguard detente: These were—balance in security, reciprocal restraint and sense of responsibility during crises. The French package, however, shows little concern with the facts of aggression and continued occupation as such. Neither does it make any mention of the mounting refugee problem and the pressing need for its expeditious settlement.

On second thoughts, and in the interest of furthering the peace process, Pakistan even agreed to "accommodate" the French proposal "if it was found to be compatible with Pakistan's present efforts to open dialogue with Kabul". The French and the Pakistani proposals could be 'dovetailed' if accepted by Moscow and Kabul. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi said in an interview in New Delhi (Feb. 8): "We are not here to compare the relative merit of the two proposals. Our approach is constructive."

From the Islamic Summit at Taif the Afghanistan problem moved on to New Delhi to generate even more polemics and more polarization at the commemorative of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference. A two-sided triangle, impossible to visualize, emerged as a result of Kabul's insistence on a bilateral dialogue with Islamabad and Teheran on a government-to-government level. Inspite of his acceptance in principle of the UN Secretary-General's personal representative to "mediate" in the Afghanistan crisis, Babrak government's foreign minister Shah Muhammad Dost kept back-tracking to the earlier, untenable stand of his government on bilateral talks on a government-to-government basis.

Explaining Kabul government's insistence on bilateral talks, Shah Muhammad Dost said at a press conference in New Delhi (Feb. 12) that while the appointment of the UN representative had been accepted by him, he still believed that the "only forum for the discussion of the problems with Pakistan and Iran could be bilateral talks without the active participation of a third party..." He also said that he did not want "internationalization" of "local" disputes.

What further complicated matters has been Iran's blunt refusal to enter into a dialogue with Babrak's regime. The leader of Iranian delegation, Behzad Nabavi, reaffirmed his country's refusal to "recognise anyone's right to decide the destiny of the people of Afghanistan who 'alone' had the right to decide their destiny". Iran, he stressed, did not accept the Kabul government as the people's government. Iran's reluctance to join the trilateral dialogue (as demanded by Pakistan) coupled with its firm refusal to look at the Babrak regime, stalls the negotiation process at least for the time being. It has introduced, what the Pakistan's foreign minister called a "qualitative change" in the present position and "in such an event the government and not he alone could determine the response".

Mr. Shahi also ruled out talks with the Karmal regime's foreign minister "either at New Delhi or at any other venue as talks on a government-to-government basis with Afghanistan would amount to recognising the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal's regime, which is not a true representative of the Afghan people."

Deadlock may be a depressing expression, but if there can be a stalemate it is there in the quest for a peaceful political settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. As it is, one of the three main parties, Iran, is not willing to talk at all while the other two, Pakistan and Afghanistan, would talk on their own terms. In any extreme situation such as Afghanistan's when things are not moving forward they start moving backwards and the reality of the situation—military occupation of Afghanistan—gets snowed under masses of wordy exchanges and polemics.

Even after the limited moral victory at the New Delhi NAMFMC Conference in mobilizing an unambiguous consensus on "withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and a political settlement ensuring full respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status" of Afghanistan, situation facing that country remains materially unaltered—with not too bright prospects of an early improvement. The appointment of the UN Secretary-General's representative is indeed a major achievement but by itself can make little material change in the situation. At the end of the NAMFMC meeting,

Mr. Shahi admitted: "No progress has been made towards starting a dialogue on the Afghanistan crisis". He also said that if Iran did not participate in agreement it will be "impossible to implement."

It is too early yet to assess fully the impact of the NAMFMC deliberations and resolutions on Afghanistan. What cannot be missed, however, is that after the UN, IFMC, European Council, US and the Islamic Summit, NAMFMC has also got its finger into the coarsening Afghan pie. This may be invaluable in the general terms of a moral support and international opinion. However, in the more specific terms of a purely (or predominantly) Islamic initiative, to see the affair shuttling from one forum to another and farther away from the Islamic forum, cannot be particularly edifying. Through the passage of time and enlargement of other countries' interest and involvement, in a grave crisis situation as in Afghanistan, the real problem may get mixed up with too many extraneous issues (e.g., the Iran-Iraq war) and that mere passage of a resolution may be mistaken for the resolution to be the problem itself.

It would be inexcusably cynical to underestimate the purpose and impact of all the high level deliberations and efforts to bring about a political settlement of the Afghanistan problem or, in other words, to restore that country to its historical and unfettered independent status. It would, however, be equally naive to overestimate the actual result achieved by these confabulations in terms of any material change or relief in the agony of a people under foreign domination.

To all outward appearances, chances of an early and total Soviet withdrawal are extremely limited. However, a situation may well arise in the foreseeable future when compelled by tactical failure and mounting diplomatic pressure, the Soviet Union could consider and opt out for a policy of strategic withdrawal. In practical terms, this would mean the return of the Soviet occupation forces to their own home bank of the river Oxus to keep the Afghan situation under close watch from there and, land square among the pigeons like a cat when the situation so demands. Russia's perilously close physical contiguity to Afghanistan reduces the chances of a second Vietnam, springing out like Jack-in-the-box, to the minimum. Hypothetically, of course, the contingency can hardly be ruled out and may well arise depending on the increasingly organized power of the Afghan resistance.

Suppose the Russian tactical and diplomatic failure does emerge as the factor potent enough to dictate a policy of strategic withdrawal, what could be its possible impact on Afghanistan itself? Will it mean a return to status quo ante: liberation and the end of all the trouble. Or would it open another chapter in Afghanistan's troubled history marked by a resurgence of tribalism, anarchy and civil war? The Soviet occupation cannot but have eroded the very base and the infrastructure required for a national government to function outside the insidiously protective umbrella of a foreign power. The only organized and time-honoured institution in that country—monarchy—(for better or worse) was the first to fall a prey to outside influence and force. This was followed by the collapse of the incipient national democracy and the institutional framework that went with it.

Whatever semblance of civic and administrative continuity may still exist in Afghanistan rests on the force of the Russian arms. The Babrak (or any successor regime similarly

placed) would collapse like a papalogue without the Soviet crutches. They would, one day, for the crutches must go, sooner or later.

Who takes over in Afghanistan once the Russians leave? The question cannot wait for the answer to arrive in due course: it has to be thoroughly examined and answered now: An overflow of trouble from Afghanistan combined with Iranian destabilisation and proliferation of threats—internal and external—in the region, could touch off a crisis of such gigantic size as to threaten global peace and security. In a situation like this, chances of foreign intervention, at the major and superpower level, become too real to be overestimated. So if the Americans take over where the Russians leave off, what good will it be to Afghanistan and the region? Such an eventuality must be avoided at all events and the only insurance against it is the consolidation of Afghanistan's internal harmony and stability without any foreign crutches.

The Afghan Resistance, out of which should emerge the government of liberated Afghanistan, has stood up to the Soviet occupation, with incredible persistence and determination. By now it must have become painfully obvious to the Soviet military planners that perhaps the worst mistake they made in their invasion plan had been in grossly underestimating the spontaneity and fierceness of the Afghan response. It is a pity, however, that despite unquestioned valour and sound battle tactics, the Afghan Resistance remains badly splintered.

In a despatch ex-Peshawar, Lawrence Lifschultz of *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (January 23, 1981) lists six major groups as follows: the Hezb-i-Islam (Islamic Party) led by Gulabuddin Hekmatyar; a group which split off from Gulabuddin's party, but which still calls itself the Hezb-i-Islam, led by Younous Khalis; the National Liberation Front led by Shebratullah Mojadidi; the National Front for the Islamic Revolution led by Sayyed Gilani; the Islamic Society of Afghanistan directed by Prof. Burhanuddin and the Islamic Revolutionary Movement of Maulvi Mohammad Nabi. In addition, there are territorial groupings based on fronts or sectors like Nuristan, Bādakhshān, Hazara, Kunar and Ghazni. There are also small groups of extremists like the Sazman-i-Azadbaksh Mardom-i-Afghanistan (SAMA, Organization for the Liberation of the Peoples of Afghanistan); Grohe-Inquilabi-Khalqhai Afghanistan (the Revolutionary Group of Afghanistan) and others of the kind. Some of the revolutionary leaders are reported to have stressed their deep concern about the future possibility of a new dictatorship in Afghanistan emerging out of certain tendencies existing among certain other groups, particularly the Peshawar-based groups of Gulabuddin and Younous Khalis.

For humanitarian reasons the refugee problem should best be left outside the purview of critical assessment of the Afghanistan affair. This problem will have to be dealt with in its own right as a part and yet apart from the gory military and political mess-up that Afghanistan is today. Although an integral part of the Afghan situation, this is also the one problem which for all practical purposes has become Pakistan's problem, and will remain so as far as one can see. It is doubtful if very many of the Afghan refugees will ever be able or like to return to their homeland since most of them seem to treat Pakistan as good as a home.

The Russians in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees up and down the rugged frontier from Chitral down to Mekran stay put where they are. Unlike the Russian occupation forces, however, the Afghan refugees did not come by invitation or choice and look disinclined to leave either by permission (اجازت) or by choice (ارادت).

Pakistan cannot afford, nor does it like to get itself militarily involved in Afghanistan. In a press talk in Islamabad on his return from Saudi Arabia on January 30, President Zia-ul-Haq said that there could be no military solution of the Afghan problem. He thought the efforts of Pakistan to get a dialogue started under the UN Secretary-General had become possible because of the "flexibility" indicated "lately" in the Soviet attitude towards Afghanistan. And yet Pakistan remains acutely aware of the military threat that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan poses to Pakistan itself.

In an interview to Saudi Arabian daily *Al-Bilad*, published on February 5, General Zia-ul-Haq said that his country was facing direct Soviet danger which "is increasing every day". He said: "The Soviet danger does not stop at the borders of Afghanistan but it extends to include other neighbouring Arab and Islamic countries and Gulf states in particular." He thought the Soviet "ambitions" were "very clear" and called for a "pooling of resources to create an Islamic power to maintain balance between superpowers and protect the Islamic Ummah from encircling dangers".

Even, if one manages to persuade oneself to look away from the Soviet military threat, the stark fact of Soviets military presence along Pakistan's north and south-western borders cannot be belittled or wished away. Indeed, as an eminent contributor to *DJ Forum*, Lieut.-Gen. H.I. Ahmed (*Defence Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 12, 1980) pointed out: "The actual boundary between Russia and Pakistan can now be taken as the administrative border of Pakistan." The geographical position of Pakistan in the South-Asian subcontinent is such that "whichever way it turns, it is sandwiched between hostile powers—Russia and India. The security of having a neutral country, Afghanistan, between itself and one of the world's superpowers, Russia, no longer holds good and the Durand line is no longer a viable frontier."

Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi
(Retd.)

The Mess In South-West Asia

M. B. Naqvi

The old idea of regarding the Russian aim of reaching the warm waters as the ultimate disaster owed, in fact, to the India-centred thinking of an imperial power whose supremacy depended on three factors: control over the resources of peninsular India (which sustained its land-based power for operations all round the Indian Ocean areas); its naval strength remaining unchallenged (which obviously precluded a rival being allowed to establish himself on one of its seabards who could mobilize sizeable resources for building a navy); and the vast bulk of the sources of Asia's raw material and markets remaining securely under British control.

It implied that the only way to make the Pax Britannica over and around the Indian Ocean secure was to control, apart from points of entry or exist like Straits of Malacca and Bab-el-Mandab (not to mention the Suez Canal) and Simons Town—the more strategic of the many littorals of Ocean....

Almost all had drawn the same conclusions from the Afghanistan coup of April 27, 1978: at least in terms of immediate consequences the Soviet Union has emerged stronger. It is immaterial whether the Russians were in on the act or were merely prompt enough to seize the opportunity by supporting the new government that needed their help to survive. The fact is that the new Kabul regime of the *Khalq* Party, two years and nine months in the saddle, is even more dependent on the Russians. The latter are willing to underwrite it and the Russian presence, in consequence, has massively increased; it is more visible than ever and has gone deeper into the Afghan state's infrastructure.

The second commonly accepted result is: Afghanistan's immediate neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, particularly the latter, have become more vulnerable to possible Russo-Afghan machinations.

China And India. The third is the steadily increasing activity on the part of the Chinese. They have been strongly signalling to India their desires for rapprochement

and large-scale economic cooperation. Although the Indian reaction has been restrained and they still talk about settling the boundary dispute over McMahon Line, the Indian Foreign Office, under three administrations—of Mr. Desai, Mr. Charan Singh and Mrs. Indira Gandhi—continues to play hard to get without flatly rejecting the overtures. The Chinese, for their part, began by trying to dazzle the Indians with the possible size of their orders for products of India's heavy industry—not much more than 40 per cent of which is being utilised. But it is Pakistan that is the recipient of a lot more attention. High-powered Chinese delegations began coming to Pakistan from 1978 onward after an interval of a few years; Beijing is again making euphoric assertions of 'indestructible' Sino-Pakistan friendship and cooperation. No doubt, the occasion for the revival of such declarations was also apposite: the inauguration of the highly strategic Karakoram Highway, which directly connects the Indus Valley with Sinkiang. Apart from a period of relative coolness—from 1971 to 1977—two other things are notable. First, a minute

change in the formulation of support: mention of Pakistan's integrity is usually not there. Secondly, it is accompanied with open or implied advocacy for an Indo-Pakistan reconciliation—and not merely normalization. Though it must be said that this change dates back to 1974 at the very least. As a result of Afghanistan's Khalqi *putsch* of April 1979, other high-powered Chinese delegations went to Teheran, Kathmandu and Colombo. The Chinese also began negotiating (albeit discreetly) with the Saudis, Kuwaitis and even Omanis for direct relations. Following the numerous Stalinist precedents, the Chinese were willing to sacrifice the cause of Dhofar rebels, most of whom were said to be Maoists, at the alter of the exigencies of the Sino-Russian rivalry. In the end, they did. It is now the South Yemenis, with presumably Russian support, who are helping the Dhofar rebels. Indeed, by far the most significant of immediate consequences of the Kabul events of April 1978 was the intensification of the Sino-Russian 'cold war' and it became particularly intense in South- and South-West Asia.

The fourth is still a rather vague formulation although it should not have needed much erudite learning: The Russians have made a strategic advance into the crucially significant regions of oil-rich South-west and populous South Asia. And it seems quite irreversible. Now, in a certain sense, it is not a new development; the gradually, if slowly, increasing Russian 'presence' in Afghanistan during the last three decades was always tantamount to a Russian victory in the "Great Game" that had begun in the first half of the nineteenth century between Great Britain and Czarist Russia. Many Pakistani publicists habitually take this view. This is on the unstated assumption that the British withdrawal from India in 1947 was co-terminous with the US taking over all of Great Britain's burdens,

complete with all the strategic assumptions that its Empire builders had always made. Now, whatever may have been the exact mixture of illusion and reality in the strategy behind Cento, post-Second-World War world was a fundamentally new one in which the Soviet power did not necessarily rely on a commanding military presence in Afghanistan for its assumed advance towards warm waters. No doubt the military power's underpinning is a constant factor but the Kremlin seems to have been placing greater stress on other instruments of policy: the diplomacy of encouraging non-alignment and isolating capitalist countries through more economic cooperation with ex-colonies.

Western Powers. The western powers, in contrast, have appeared to think chiefly in terms of power politics between the superpowers; the Free World of yore has been impatient with the economic light weights of the Third World. The newly freed non-great powers would also like to squeak that they exist; the West does not give much thought to the ex-colonies' sentiment of wanting to be counted for something. In terms of worldwide superpower rivalry, this Afro-Asian assertion was certainly far from being a decisive factor. And yet, as an emergent factor, some account had to be taken of it, as an influencing or even marginal one. The Soviet Union ostentatiously did make quite a few gains, not excluding South Asia, especially Afghanistan. At all events, the nineteenth century British ideas about Afghanistan's strategic role can scarcely govern the conduct of international affairs by either the US or other regional powers. Some of the old assumptions no longer hold?

The Russian intervention and still continuing insurgency in Afghanistan have given rise to much speculation in the region and elsewhere. It ranges from the Third World War at one alarmist extreme

through a trial of strength between the two communist giants in South Asian plains to a more relaxed, i.e., long-range, view of much social strife in Iran, Pakistan and India involving possible insurrections, civil wars and dismemberment. These things can possibly lead to a wholly new demographic map of the area. But in all these speculations one assumption is crucially important: whatever the upshot, it will largely result from the interplay of great powers' actions; the near-total impotence of the regional powers is implicitly assumed. Not that it is too gross a misreading of the military and even, to some extent, political situation, especially when the chips are down for the great power.

The American actions in recent years, especially after the fall of the Shah, have certainly intensified tensions. It has increased its naval and nuclear presence near the Straits of Hormuz—in fact much earlier than the Iraq-Iran War. The Rapid Deployment Force also had come into being before this war—or indeed before the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. The hostages' issue followed by the Iraq's Khuzistan invasion provided an occasion for renewed attempts to forge a pro-American but purely local Persian Gulf Arab security arrangement. The confrontation between the superpowers now looks menacingly near, particularly in the context of developments in Iran. But before the hour is struck, isn't there anything these so many nation-states, of not insignificant size—Iran, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal—can do to influence the outcome, if not to prevent the great powers from coming to a clash altogether? And it is here that the geopolitical assumptions that strategists make become directly relevant.

British Formulations. Inherited wisdom, largely British, about geopolitics assigns Afghanistan a special status; the British

strategists regarded Russian control of Afghanistan to be the penultimate disaster. From across the Hindu Kush range the Russians can bear down in either direction; either take the hoary routes east into India, "the most glittering jewel in the British Crown", or to the west into Iran and dominate the northern Persian Gulf seaboard—which again were parts of the western defences of India. (Middle East oil did not become a notable factor in geopolitical thinking until about the first World War.) Most of the British thinking was India-centred. Not only was India the highest prize: it provided the prowess and resources for defending British interests in the Far East, S.E. Asia and Australasia. The desire to dam up Russia in its own landmass was linked to preserving, and was facilitated by, the British naval supremacy round the world. Britain being the workshop of the world, with control over raw material-producing colonies on the different populous littorals of the Indian Ocean, its navy's control had converted the Indian Ocean into a British lake.

The British strategists could thus countenance some sharing out of the sources of raw material and markets with their European rivals in the Middle East and Africa and in the Far East, provided this did not threaten the dominant British position on the more important littorals of the Indian Ocean, particularly the southern seabords of Asia. Czarist (and later Soviet) Russia had a huge landmass (contiguous to the celebrated 'Heartland') under its control and, the British reckoned, if it could get control over either Iran, Afghanistan or western parts of the Indian subcontinent, not only would the accession to its strength be tremendous, it would then be able to put a navy in the Indian Ocean and to challenge the paramountcy of the Royal Navy. The entire power-structure

Britain had built all around the Indian Ocean—the centrepiece of its worldwide strategy—would become vulnerable: Hence, the obsessive fear of Russia reaching the warm waters of the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea.

The old idea regarding the Russian aim of reaching the warm waters, as the ultimate disaster in fact, owed, to the India-centred thinking of an imperial power whose supremacy depended on three factors: control over the resources of peninsular India (which sustained its land-based power for operations all round the Indian Ocean areas); its naval strength remaining unchallenged (which obviously precluded a rival being allowed to establish himself on one of its seabards who could mobilize sizeable resources for building a navy); and the vast bulk of the sources of Asia's raw material and markets remaining securely under British control. It implied that the only way to make the *Pax Britannica* over and around the Indian Ocean secure was to control, apart from points of entry or departure like Straits of Malacca and Bab-el-Mandab (not to mention the Suez Canal), and Simons Town the more strategic of the many littorals of the Ocean, and keep out all competitors, as far as possible. Thus Iran and India fell in a crucially important category even amongst such important areas as East Africa, Australia and South Africa.

Why? The Russians sat too near them and, if they got hold of them, their (enhanced) resources and opportunities would make them far more dangerous rivals (to the British supremacy) than were the French or Dutch. Secure on the peninsular India, and with the help of its resources, Great Britain could cast its shadow on other seabards of Asia both eastward and westward. Indeed it can still be said that if only a major power can combine control over South Asian subcontinent with a

matching naval muscle in the Indian Ocean, it stands more than even chance of dominating, at least, both the Middle East and South East Asia, if not all the seabards of the Indian Ocean.

New Factors. But that world picture no longer mirrors reality, or at least not all its facts. True, the geography has not changed. To the extent that the strategic thinking has to be based on unchanging facts of geography and demography, the relevance of old British theories is not entirely lost. But power equations have changed. Great Britain or the US or both, despite their big influence, are no longer the paramount naval powers in the Indian Ocean and the modern equivalents of the imperial possessions are not co-terminous with American or western commercial interests, except partially in West and Southwest Asia. Decolonization after 1945 has given birth to a number of nationalist regimes in Asia and Africa, only a very few of which have gone communist—China and Korea in 1949, Indo-China in 1975 and Afghanistan in 1978. Elsewhere, nationalism reigns supreme. Even the communist states are not immune from nationalism's colouring influences: take only the recent converts in Asia: China and Vietnam have fallen out over a strictly nationalistic, if not racial, quarrel. The earlier clashes between Kampuchea and Vietnam look uncommonly like nationalistic in motivation, even if overtones of great power rivalry (between China and Soviet Union) are also audible. Asia: and African nationalisms, despite their (military) powerlessness, quaintness or even sometimes incoherence, are a factor which the strategists, western or eastern, cannot go on ignoring. The Arab, Indonesian, Pakistani, Iranian, Vietnamese, Malaysian and even Afghan and other nationalisms are not an all that ludicrously negligible factor that their powerlessness and incoherence seem to suggest.

A hard-boiled practitioner of power politics is apt to be perplexed. The solid substratum of reality he is concerned with is still the deployable military power that can be quantified—in the crunch, that is. How is he to account for the interplay of specific interest of nationalistic small powers of a region or sub-region? Traditional wisdom is not much help. But he can begin re-assessing his strategic ideas, or call it the state of the power game, in the light of the distribution of power as it actually obtains and tries to superimpose on it, as a colouring and motivating factor, Asian nationalisms and their refusal to be vassals of anyone. Iran is an excellent example, so far. What may ultimately happen is more an internal factor than merely the ability of either the US and Soviet power, or of the CIA and KGB, to manipulate. The final outcome anywhere would be an interplay of all these, and more, factors. Now let us see what may happen.

One naturally has to begin with the Indian Ocean. Gone is the Royal Navy's paramountcy, of course. A part of the British mantle has been inherited by the US Navy, to be sure; symbolic of it were the elements of the Seventh Fleet that used to show the flag periodically. But it is the presence of the now Fifth and Sixth Fleets currently concentrated around Bab-al-Mandab and Hormuz Straits that represent substantive presence. The US also possesses not a few bases in the Ocean and has arrangements for utilizing the surviving facilities of the RN, particularly in the Simonstown, in the several Australian and New Zealand ports and elsewhere. It has concluded new arrangements with Somalia, Kenya and Oman for the use of Barbera, Mombassa and Masirah—not to mention the Egyptian bases. But the US does not feel able or compelled to 'control' this Ocean the way

the British did until 1939—not yet at any rate. From the later 1960s onwards, the Russians have staked a claim to be present in the Ocean: they too are vigorously engaged in showing the Hammer and Sickle to whoever is willing to receive their flotillas—which they are forced to replace at intervals. They too have varying arrangements for using port and other facilities with whoever is friendly enough to grant them. Right now they do not depend on local bases; they still rely on supplying their fleets through a train system. But the fire force of their armada—some 30 ships with nuclear missiles—is as impressive as their ability to choke off the Red Sea, and be a true menace to Hormuz or Malacca Straits. They have credibly served notice they are not willing to concede supremacy to anyone in the Indian Ocean and wish to be consulted on its future.

The US also operates a system of pacts—some bilateral and some a by-product of Nato, Cento, Seato and Anzus—which enable it to occupy perhaps the most prominent position in the Ocean. This is a purely naval proposition; the US position is not buttressed by a matching influence in the sense of 'controlling' the area's resources in the strategically important littorals, except oil in the Persian Gulf. Not that it happens to be entirely absent; it is there, within limits, in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa through friendship, economic inter-penetrations and cultural affinities. While the strategic Horn of Africa may be Russian-infested, if not controlled, East Africa, by and large, and Egypt and Sudan are friendly to the US. So are nearly all Persian Gulf states, except South Yemen. Iraq may soon turn out to be a new friend of the West. In South Asia the US enjoys Pakistan's—still an ally—and India's goodwill and friendship. There is much goodwill for America in ASEAN powers. But this goodwill is by no means

the same thing as the old British control.

While, conceivably, the US and Soviet Union can go on playing the Great Game, much as Czarist Russia and Great Britain did, it does not seem very likely. For one thing, despite the earnestness of their rivalry, the stakes are no longer a certain category. Ending of the colonial era and the emergence of so many autonomous and mutually hostile Afro-Asian nation states simply make a grand world-wide alignment an uncertain proposition. Two decades of intense cold war have proved that the recognition of two clear cut awe-inspiring military giants did not mean the rest of the world was willing to line up with either or both. Indeed the pressure on the two is to stop playing the dangerous power game. Who is exerting it? Not only the lesser non-aligned nations. But even their respective allies do not have much stomach for superpower confrontation that may involve them in warfare. Indeed, in terms of ideology and the desire to take all risks, the two alignments have ceased to be!

US's Dilemma. The strain on the Nato is there for all to see. The causes of it are not secret either. The US policies in the Arab-Israel dispute and in South-west Asia, both these are said to be strongly motivated by strategic factors. On the one hand, support to Israel is seen by most as something of an emotional character; the US is said to be staking the long-range, and Western Europe's economic interests for the sake of Israel. The larger interests are seen as being bound with Arab goodwill. This is, however, not quite the US perception. The Israeli military power is a dependable, almost strategic, factor for the US while the Arab volatility is proverbial. Here the true American reliance is on hard military power.

In the second category, the Persian Gulf oil-rich countries, the stakes are clearly

both economic and strategic. The US, after the fall of the Shah, can no longer rely on the old role allotted to Iran; it has to increase its own commitments because Israel's power cannot, for a variety of reasons, fill the vacuum. It has also to adopt a new version of containment policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in this region. Now, this is certain to require three things.

Increased military build up by the US, which will invite its concomitant catching up effort by the Russians. This, in its turn, will intensify cold war and increase the danger of its becoming hot; the death of European detente can be foreseen down this road. Third, the US strength deployed for the defence of Western Europe and Japan would actually diminish just when its need would be greatest during the intensification of the cold war and a possible beginning of the Third World War.

None of these prospects are acceptable to either Western Europe or Japan. Nor do these countries wish to go on hearing the US Government's nagging about these rich western powers not doing enough for their own defence. Insofar as economic interests are concerned, it is to be noted that if the going in the Persian Gulf does get rough the Russians or some of its friends or indeed any local power like Iran can choke off all oil, the strength of the US Navy notwithstanding. And an intensification of the superpower rivalry would more easily create conditions, or reasons, for anyone to do that sort of thing. For the European powers, it is a matter of life and death. In their case, both strategic and economic reasons dictate that detente between the Russians and the western powers should be preserved. Insofar as the US policies are endangering this detente, the western unity and the integrity of the Nato alliance

would increasingly come under strain. A closer look would reveal that both sides to this squabble, viz, the US and Western Europe (and Japan), stand to lose from this latter day version of the Forward Frontier Policy on the parts of the LPS.

Secondly, the newness of the post-Second World War situation lies in the old instruments of power failing adequately to do the duties for which they were originally designed. This is the case with military strength *per se*. Throughout history a clear superiority in this has conferred certain political privileges. Today, the plenitude of power has not enabled the US to win two 'minor' wars it has fought: Korea and Vietnam. Nor did its overwhelming power enable it to succeed in saving the Shah of Iran; its protege, Israel, despite clear military advantage, is finding it hard to get its way in matters that matter most.

USSR's Problems. The Russians, despite the obvious superiority they possess, are having similar difficulties with their ideological friends and allies that the US has experienced *vis-a-vis* its allies. Eastern Europe is no bed of roses for them. Troubles in Poland are a reminder that not all is well there. They had to use military force twice in Eastern Europe (1956 and 1968). They could not retain the allegiance of Yugoslavia and Albania in Europe and China in the Far East. The position of the North Koreans is ambivalent. Vietnam is a different kettle of fish; to begin with, Ho Chi Minh was distant from Khrushchev but relatively closer to Mao, purely in terms of Marxist theory; his successors, partly as a result of historical animosities with their Chinese neighbours, find themselves in close alliance with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's friends in Africa are too new a category to permit much theorising, though they have shown a waywardness that was thought to be strange

in ideologically committed people. The same goes for their Arab friends. Switching of sides has been rapid. The Afghans are their newest friends. But the Russians are having difficulties there too; indeed they are having to use their military strength extensively enough and appear still to be far from their objective.

All this enumeration is intended to make just one point: Like the friends and allies of the US, the Russians' friends and allies too do not wish to be led by the nose—possibly into unacceptable or unappetizing political quagmires. The two military alliances, the Nato and the Warsaw, were no doubt intended to create fighting fronts, but, for all the world, they look like peacetime affairs. Whichever country is compelled to fight by its Big Brother will do so without its heart in it; left to itself it would rather wish a *detente* between superpowers than confrontation and war. If the respective allies of the superpowers have their way, they would much rather restrain their leaders than urge them on to fight—not that either the Americans or the Russians are too happy at the prospect of having to fight.

Limits Of Power. The point to be made is that plenitude of military strength is not enough in today's difficult world to enjoy the fruits of power that imperial powers of yester years could. This is a hard lesson that has still to be learnt. The plentiful evidence of military strength creates a euphoria through which these new realities are hard to see. And yet the new historical evidence, a quarter of century's experience, is also there for all to see. Apart from the whole decolonization process, there have been repeated American failures to impose their will on their foes as well as their allies. Ditto for the Russians. The latter's strength did not frighten either Mr. Dubcek and his

friends or Mr. Welesa and his friends. While the arrogance of power is an unavoidable fact of life, there is another such reality the realization of which is long overdue. It is the limitations of power.

At its crudest level, it is summed up by the acronym of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction): both the Soviet Union and US possess so much nuclear clout that, no matter who attacks first with what power and with what results, there would be enough strength left in the victim (including the strength to fire back) to destroy much of the first-time striker. In short, there would be no winners, only losers. At a somewhat more sophisticated level, each 'minor' war or civil war or other trouble in sensitive areas like Afghanistan, Iran or even Pakistan run the risk of not merely escalation but, possibly, also superpower involvement. Already the world situation has been described by a number of statesmen as resembling the one in early 1914 in eastern Europe.

Mr. Ronald Reagan is taking office at a time when all these things are clear to even an average literate person. And yet he and his secretary of state are committed to build up more nukes for the US armed forces—just when their own ambassador to Moscow has been proclaiming that any further nuclear armaments would unleash a terrible arms race and no one superpower can win it. Only the level of armaments would be pushed several notches up. The new US Administration is also committed to take a very hard attitude in South-west Asia, although the Russians have let it be known that they would not stand down and would give a tit for a tat.

The outside limits of superpower intervention are well known. One invading American soldier on the Iranian soil would send the Russian divisions in Central Asia and Afghanistan rolling down the Elburz range, heading straight for the Gulf. Any serious trouble in the Gulf or South Asia would unleash forces that, in all likelihood, no one can control. The one near-certainty would be that the oil flows will stop: who will be benefitted is anyone's guess. The issues in the Gulf and all around it are too tangled. The use of force may be a line of least resistance at the obvious or crude level. Superficially, it thus looks that the immediate future would be a stormy one; may be the Reagan Administration would come to have a roller coaster quality about it. But that might be neither here nor there.

Perhaps both sides are making opening gambits before settling down to more serious horse-trading—which looks inevitable to most observers of international scene. The superpowers would, on this view, soon begin a wide-ranging dialogue; both are sure to aim at arriving at ground rules for behaving in various parts of the world. The South-west Asia would be of direct interest to us. The issue for us in Pakistan should look clearer in this perspective: Neither the Russians nor the Americans have quite behaved in the manner some of our homegrown strategists expected in either Afghanistan or Iran or indeed over the Gulf. Could it be that they have other perceptions. May be they are moving for a dialogue, each trying to speak from a position of strength on the ground. Would they make a deal over our heads? That needs to be pondered over.

Afghanistan:

A Retrospective—December 27, 1979— December 27, 1980

Moscow's present intention is clearly to cement Afghanistan firmly into the Soviet orbit, at the same time establishing the fiction of a legitimate, independent and non-aligned government. The extraordinary reception which the Soviets gave Babrak during his mid-October visit to Moscow (and again in February, 1981) represented a major effort to convey an aura of legitimacy.

The Soviets are taking steps to secure their position over the long term. Large number of Afghan students have been sent to the Soviet Union for their education over the past year; in August 12 protocol called for the enrollment of 1,500 students in Soviet institutions of higher education by early October. The Afghan party, government, and educational institutions are being reorganized in the Soviet mould. Economic ties between the two countries have been further strengthened as more and more of Afghanistan's trade is oriented towards the USSR.

According to Babrak Karmal, the Soviet Union is now supplying 80 percent of Afghanistan's Foreign Aid. In addition to building permanent facilities for their military forces in Afghanistan, the Soviets are creating a basic cross-boundary infrastructure; they have built three bridges across the Amu river, and railroad connections between the two countries are projected.

(The following document was released by the State Department in conjunction with a Press backgrounding session in Afghanistan.)

An year after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and replaced President Amin with their puppet Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan is still in turmoil. While the Soviets may have prevented its collapse, they

have had little success in building support for the Babrak regime.

In some respects, the situation in Afghanistan today is no better, from a Soviet point of view, than that which preceded the December invasion. The government faces widespread and growing alienation and resistance, virulent factionalism within the

ruling party, and an acute shortage of military manpower. Almost universal Afghan hostility to the Soviet presence has intensified these problems.

The national movement, while still fragmented and lacking coordination, is better organized and equipped than it was a year ago. Furthermore, there is evidence of more cooperation, in some areas, between nationalist guerrilla groups which are increasingly organized along tribal lines. These forces, however, have not been able to turn their improved capability into victory over the Babrak regime principally because of the presence of 85,000 Soviet troops inside the country.

The Soviet invasion in December 1979 transformed the Afghan conflict, which up to that time could be described as a civil war, into a case of international aggression. Soviet troops have taken over the primary effort to suppress the nationalists and Soviet officials have assumed virtual control of both military and civilian government departments. While the resistance movement is still directed against the marxists in nominal control of the Kabul government and particularly against Afghan government security organs, it is now focused primarily against the Soviet intruders.

By invading an independent, non-aligned Islamic country the Soviet Union brought upon itself overwhelming international condemnation. The Soviets thus damaged their relations both with the West and with the non-aligned Third World, in particular with Islamic countries. The Soviets may have calculated that the outcry would not last long; but the recent November 20 vote in the United Nations General Assembly, where 111 nations supported a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, underscores the fact

that the Soviet action is still resented. The plight of the over 1.2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan has aroused international concern and keeps the Afghan question in the public view.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan also added to strains between Moscow and Eastern Europe. It dealt a serious blow to detente, which has been particularly important to the east Europeans. At the same time, it undercut one of their staunchest supporters, Cuba, in its pretensions to a leadership role in the non-aligned movement.

Efforts over the past year by various elements of the international community to persuade the Soviets to join in serious discussions for a political settlement have come to nought. There is no indication that the Soviets are prepared to agree to any solution which entails the prompt withdrawal of their troops. Their continued insistence on basing negotiations on the May 14 proposals of the Babrak Karmal government rules out any meaningful discussion. These proposals would legitimize the present government in Kabul and by implication the Soviet role as well as would require the cessation of all resistance as a precondition for the withdrawal of Soviet Troops.

In this situation, all indications are that the Soviets are digging in for a long stay. Publicly, they maintain that things are going well in Afghanistan. While the prolonged nature of the conflict inevitably raises questions in Moscow, those in the Soviet hierarchy who opted for the invasion probably still believe that it will eventually accomplish its objectives.

The Soviets seem to have consistently miscalculated in Afghanistan. If they believe that the resistance is losing its mo-

mentum, then they are still misjudging the Afghanistan equation. The fact that the situation in Afghanistan is a stand-off after a year of punishing Soviet military operations is in itself a psycho-victory for the nationalists.

Situation In December 1979. In December 1979, it was clear that the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was in serious trouble. Insurgent groups were operating in many parts of the country and were exerting pressure on certain provincial capitals and military outposts. Their resilience was demonstrated by their ability to move back into Paktia province in the wake of a major government military sweep in October. At the same time, the Afghan army was being eroded by large-scale defections, desertions, casualties, and the inability to obtain fresh conscripts from the many areas of the country which were already out of effective government control. Estimates of the Afghan army size at that time range from 50,000—70,000 as opposed to 90,000—100,000 before the insurgency began.

In addition, then president Hafizullah Amin was feuding with the Soviets. Moscow had become deeply involved in Afghanistan's affairs soon after this People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, seized power in April 1978. Both Amin and Moscow were aware that the Soviets had conspired with Taraki to eliminate Amin. It was only by a stroke of luck that Amin, following September 14, 1979 shootout, had ended up as president while Taraki went to his grave.

If Amin had shown promise of ending the resistance, Moscow would probably have tried to continue to work with him. But the Soviets were well aware that Amin was generally considered by the

Afghan people to be the man most responsible for the bitterly resented Marxist *Reforms* and for the continuing wave of arrests and executions which had begun soon after the marxists came to power.

The Soviets had been searching since the early summer of 1979 for a way to stop the swelling resistance to DRA authority. They had evidently concluded by December that a second attempt at drastic action was necessary. They may have been influenced by the fact that Government forces had recently suffered a number of set-backs in areas surrounding Kabul and in north-eastern Badakhshan province on the Soviet border.

Observers of the Afghan scene, at that time, saw the return of Babrak Karmal, leader of the PDPA's Parcham faction, as a Soviet option, but not one which promised a solution to the problem. Babrak, together with key supporters, had been forced into exile by the dominant Khalq faction leadership in July 1978. Babrak was just as much of a communist as his predecessors. Furthermore, by December 1979 the Soviet advisory personnel in the country had not only increased numerically but had also begun to assume control to the point where the Soviets themselves were becoming a major focus of resentment. No one who came to power under Soviet sponsorship could have won the support of the people.

Soviet Invasion And After. On December 27, following a massive two-day airlift of troops and equipment, a special Soviet assault unit surrounded Tap Tajbek palace in the Darulaman complex, where President Amin was living. Afghan forces loyal to Amin defended the palace but were overcome after several hours of fighting. Amin and members of his family were executed.

At the same time, Soviet forces moved quickly to secure radio Afghanistan, where Afghan troops put up resistance, and other key civilian and military installations in the Kabul area. Two Soviet motorized rifle divisions promptly entered Afghanistan by land, and by January 1, there were at least 30,000—40,000 combat troops in the country. By January 20 that number had grown to 80,000 and it subsequently levelled off at a figure of approximately 85,000 in Afghanistan and another 30,000 supplementary forces just over the Soviet border.

On June 22, the Soviets announced the withdrawal of some of their troops from Afghanistan. These troops, numbering approximately 5,000 turned over to be forces unsuited to Afghan terrain or to fighting against hit-and-run guerrilla operations. The withdrawal, which occurred during the Allied Summit Conference in Venice and several weeks before the Moscow Olympics, was clearly for propaganda purposes. Even as the unwanted forces were being withdrawn, new and more useful units were being introduced and the total figure was soon back up to 85,000.

While the force level has remained stable throughout most of the year, the Soviets have made a number of changes to improve their military capability. They have substituted seasoned troops for reservists and reorganized the command and control structure to permit a more flexible response to the insurgency. The most striking change has been in the increasing size of the helicopter force. Helicopter gunships have proved to be the most formidable weapon in the Soviet arsenal, and over the year their number in Afghanistan has quadrupled to a current force of about 240.

These changes have become necessary as the Soviet forces have had to assume the

major burden of military operations against the resistance. Moscow's initial intention appears to have been to secure major cities and towns and the lines of communication, while stiffening the spine of the Afghan forces who would be free to pacify the countryside. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the Soviets had misjudged their ability to keep the Afghan forces in line. In fact, the Soviet's first combat experience in Afghanistan was against rebelling Afghan troops.

Since the first winter push into troubled Badakhshan province, Soviet forces have been continuously engaged in counter-insurgency operations. At some time or another over the course of the spring, summer and fall they have operated in virtually every province of the country. Certain strategic regions have been subjected to repeated Soviet offensive operations. Among these are the eastern provinces, where the Soviets have tried, unsuccessfully, to seal the Pakistan border.

Soviet military operations were significantly stepped up in the fall months, probably an effort to enter winter in as strong a position as possible. Winter will force the *Mujahideen* to come down from the hills, but will also reduce the mobility of the Soviets.

Soviet troops have reportedly retaliated brutally against villages suspected of harbouring nationalists. Homes have been levelled, crops destroyed, and grain stocks burned. There have been reports of Soviet troops massacring the inhabitants of villages in their rage at not finding the elusive resistance forces. There is convincing evidence that the Soviets have used both irritants and incapacitating chemical agents against the insurgents. Reports of the use of lethal chemicals are under investigation.

There are some indications that Soviet troops have suffered from poor morale in Afghanistan. Soviet casualties are believed to be relatively heavy and outnumber those of their Afghan army counterparts. There are also many reports of undisciplined behaviour, including black market operations, rape, and looting of shops and homes.

Babruk Regime's Weaknesses. Babruk Karmal returned to Kabul with a tough assignment to persuade the people of Afghanistan to reduce their hostility to the marxist government and accept the Soviet military presence. He was to effect a reconciliation between the estranged Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA in order to establish as broad a base as possible despite the fact that his Soviet sponsors had killed the Khalqi leader, Hafizullah Amin. Non-party people were to be brought into the government to produce the image of a national front, finally he envisaged conciliatory policies to persuade the people that the new government was not anti-Islamic and that it was genuinely prepared to roll back widely resented social and economic measure dating from the early days of DRA.

Babruk has not succeeded in his programme. He has failed to heal the Khalq-Parcham split despite the importance which the Soviets attached to this goal. The new government was a carefully contrived coalition of Babruk's Parcham group and those Khalqis who had been opposed to Amin. Because many Parchamis had been imprisoned and tortured by Taraki's secret police chief, Assadullah Sarwari, who became a deputy prime minister, there were bitter personal scores to be settled at all levels of the party.

Thus immediately, throughout the winter, spring and early summer, reports of

violent confrontations between the factions continued and each faction appeared to be plotting to overthrow the other. The resented Soviet presence exacerbated the conflict, as the Khalqis blamed the Parchamis for bringing in the Soviets.

The conflict between the Khalqis and Parchamis came to a climax in June in a high-level confrontation, the details of which are not known. The eventual result was the diplomatic exile (as ambassador to Mongolia) of the Khalqi deputy prime Minister Assadullah Sarwari and his replacement by a less tainted figure. This move deprived the Khalqis of one of their most aggressive leaders.

The Khalq-Parcham conflict, however, has continued to boil. There have been credible reports of three major military coup plots involving Khalqi officers, in June, July, and mid-October. Khalqis are alarmed by the fact that the Parchamis are gradually removing middle-level and upper-middle-level Khalqi officials from their positions. Khalqis are reportedly preparing for an open armed struggle. Furthermore, it appears that some lower and middle-level Khalqis have joined forces with the insurgents.

The strength of the Khalqis in the military justifies Soviet efforts to keep the Parchamis from provoking open party warfare. So while Babruk's speeches to the third PDPA plenum in July and to the fourth plenum in mid-November both obliquely threatened purges of prominent Khalqi leaders, no dramatic cabinet level changes followed. At the fourth plenum, Babruk established loyalty to Moscow as a new criterion for party membership and announced investigations of high level officials who have abused their positions.

The Soviets are clearly concerned about the current paralysis in Afghanistan's

government and party operations, which can be attributed in large measure to the intra-party feuding. Since his return from his October trip to Moscow, Babrak has made two important speeches criticizing the lack of effective government and party leadership and calling for a fundamental change in attitudes.

While Babrak's base of support is actually shrinking as a result of the continuing Khalq-Parcham struggle, he continues to try to appeal to all elements of society to join in a national fatherland front. After a year of endless speeches and conferences designed both to attract followers and to create the impression of broad support, there is no indication that the regime has made any progress along these lines. Indeed, many prominent individuals have fled the country precisely because they feared they would be approached to join the government.

Nor have the policies to nullify the unpopular "Reform" decrees of the previous regimes been particularly fruitful. The Babrak government has offered to return land to former measures to obtain new recruits. House-to-house searches started in Kabul in the spring and have been repeated periodically in the capital here are many reported even younger being taken off in the night. Press gangs have also operated in other cities and a prime objective of the Soviet and Afghan military offensives in the provinces during the summer and fall was to round up conscripts. It is clear, however, from a recent (December 3) speech by Babrak that these efforts and the new September 6 draft law have failed to alleviate the crisis.

To offset the dwindling size of the army, the regime has offered incentives (high pay) to young people to join local militia units called defence of the revolution battalions.

Like the army, however, these units remain critically undermanned and are plagued by frequent defections.

Failure to build up the Afghan army and other security forces poses a special problem for the Soviets as it obliges them to increasingly take over the main combat role in anti-insurgency operations. If they fail to rebuild the Afghan army and if the resistance persists at its current level, they may eventually have to introduce more forces to cope with the continuing resistance. At the moment, however, there are no indications that they are planning such a move.

The Resistance. In contrast to the Babrak Government's failure to gain support over the past year is the dramatic growth in the number of organized resistance units actively fighting the regime and Soviet forces. It is impossible to ascertain the number in the field, but the Soviet invasion has involved the entire population in the conflict so that almost every male is a potential freedom-fighter.

As much as 75 percent of the countryside may be out of the effective control of the government. There have been major civil disturbances in the important cities of Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad throughout the year. Soviet forces have engaged in active fighting inside these cities causing massive destruction, but they remain in turmoil. Even Kabul has had its share of violence.

Nationalist bands have been very effective at ambushing convoys and even Soviets and Afghan military columns. In some instances, they have been able to deny Soviet forces access to their strong holds, such as the Panjshir valley and the Hazarajat. Their activities have forced government officials to abandon many

district level offices and police stations in the provinces. On the other hand, while they have seriously threatened various provincial capitals, they have not been able to capture one. When Soviet troops arrive in force, accompanied by assault helicopters, the resistance forces have to disperse. When the Soviets leave, however, they return.

The two major problems confronting the nationalists as they seek to do battle with the formidable Soviet military machine are the lack of coordination and a shortage of weapons and ammunition, particularly anti-tank and aircraft weapons.

The early emergence in Pakistan of competing exile political organizations has served to create an impression of disarray in the overall resistance movement. Inside Afghanistan, however, the nationalists have, from the beginning, been organized under local leadership along tribal lines. There is a growing trend toward cooperation between tribal groups in some areas. While it would be a mistake to overrate the present organizational achievement of the new regional alliances, they may represent an important first step toward country-wide coordination. In any event, in many ways the spontaneous and country-wide nature of the resistance is one of its great strengths and makes it exceedingly difficult for the Soviet army to suppress it.

The Babrak regime and the Soviets are well aware of the inherent dangers of tribal cooperation. They have worked to create discord by playing on traditional tribal rivalries, offering large bribes to tribes who will agree to support the government and even, in some cases, to serve as mercenaries. While the government has had some success along these lines, the well-publicized murder in September of the minister of tribal and border affairs, who was res-

ponsible for implementing this policy, was a major set-back.

The dramatic increase in the number of potential freedom-fighters over the year has created a demand for more weapons and the challenge of Soviet helicopter gunships and tanks requires a more sophisticated arsenal. From the beginning, resistance weapons have come primarily from Afghan army stocks through raids and from defectors. In August, the Soviets took all anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons away from the Afghan forces, a clear sign that they were falling into the hands of the resistance, and also an indication that the Soviets have tightened up weapon security.

Longer-Term Soviet Programmes. Moscow's present intention is clearly to cement Afghanistan firmly into the Soviet orbit, at the same time establishing the fiction of a legitimate, independent and non-aligned government. The extraordinary reception which the Soviets gave Babrak during his mid-October visit to Moscow represented a major effort to convey an aura of legitimacy.

The Soviets are taking steps to secure their position over the long-term. Large numbers of Afghan students have been sent to the Soviet Union for their education over the past year; in August 12 protocol called for the enrolment of 1,500 students in Soviet institutions of higher education by early October. The Afghan party, government, and educational institutions are being reorganized in the Soviet mould. Economic ties between the two countries have been further strengthened as more and more of Afghanistan's trade is oriented towards the USSR. According to Babrak Karmal, the Soviet Union is now supplying 80 percent of Afghanistan's foreign aid. In addition to building permanent facil-

ties for their military forces in Afghanistan, the Soviets are creating a basic cross-boundary infrastructure; they have built three bridges across the Amu Darya and railroad connections between the two countries are projected.

Cost To The Soviet Union. The Afghan adventure has been costly for the Soviet Union both in monetary terms and in terms of its relations with the rest of the world. The financial burden of maintaining its military presence and underwriting Afghanistan's rapidly deteriorating economy may be tolerable in the short-term. As a long-term proposition, it may not be so attractive. Economic assets and development projects have been a prime target of nationalist attack and Babrak's recent speeches have underlined major dislocations in the economy.

More immediately significant, however, has been the damage to the Soviet Union's international image. Virtually all major international bodies have called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The first instance was the overwhelming vote of 104-18 in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in January 1980; in the recent November 20 UN General Assembly vote on the Afghan question the margin was increased to 111-22. In the intervening period, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was condemned by the Islamic conference of foreign ministers on January 29 and again on May 21; by the United Nations Human Rights Commission on February 14; by the foreign ministers of the European common market and the Association of South East Asian nations on March 7; and by the inter-parliamentary Union Council on April 12 and again on September 24.

The United States and some other

countries have restricted grain shipments to the USSR. The United States has also tightened controls on the sale of "High Technology" items, embargoed phosphates (a source of fertilizer and animal feed supplements), sharply curtailed Soviet fishing rights in US waters, and restricted scheduled commercial airline services between the two countries. In July, the international Olympics, held in Moscow, were boycotted by some 80 countries.

Not only is the issue of Afghanistan alive on the international front but disapproval of the Soviets appears to be hardening. In early December, the assembly of the western European union went beyond mere humanitarian aid to adopt a recommendation to "examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment to the Afghanistan resistance movement until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan." Even Brezhnev's recent visit to friendly India produced unfavourable international media coverage highlighting the Afghan refugees' demonstrations and India's reportedly cool stance on the Afghan issue.

Deflecting international attention from Afghanistan is a prime goal of Soviet diplomacy. But the frequent defections of prominent Afghans and government officials and the steady stream of refugees pouring into Pakistan keep the issue very much alive.

Well-published defections during the course of the year have included those of Ahmad Hakim Tabibi, the deputy permanent representative at the UN in January; Abdul Rahim Ghafourzai, a diplomat who had been sent to defend the Afghan position at a meeting of the non-aligned group at the United Nations in February; eight

members of the Afghan National Football Team in March; eleven members of the Afghan Olympic wrestling team in July; an Ariana Airlines crew in Frankfurt in September; and, most recently, the dramatic defection in October of Akhtar Mohammad Paktiawal, Afghanistan's delegate to the UNESCO conference in Belgrade.

The current presence of over 1.2 million refugees in Pakistan (up from 400,000 a year ago) with more arriving every day (as of mid-October the flow had

averaged 80,000 a month since January) has put an enormous burden on Pakistan and presented the entire world with a major humanitarian responsibility. In June, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was forced to double its 1980 budget from 55 million dollars to 100 million dollars. (The United States contributed 44 million dollars in 1980, or almost half of the total). The refugee inflow in Pakistan in the coming year may well be the greatest in any single country in the world. In addition, there may be over a quarter of a million refugees in Iran.

Courtesy :-

*International Communication Agency,
Karachi.*

Afghanistan: Chronology Of Events Since April 1978

In July 1973 Muhammed Daoud, the king's cousin and a former prime minister of Afghanistan, overthrew the monarchy in a bloodless coup. Many of the younger military and air force officers who supported the coup had been trained in the Soviet Union but their outlook was nationalist rather than communist, and despite the growing Soviet involvement in the economy Afghanistan maintained her independence.

The organization and constitution of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965, are modelled on those of the Soviet Communist Party. Three members of its leadership were elected to Parliament in 1965, including Babrak Karmal, who came to lead a breakaway faction of the party named after its magazine *Parcham* (Flag or Banner). Apparently with Soviet encouragement, the Parchamites reunited in 1977 with the main faction of the PDPA, called after its magazine *Khalq* (masses or the people) and led by Noor Muhammed Taraki. After coming to power in the military coup which overthrew President Daoud on 27 April 1978, the party soon began to split again.

1978

17 April. Assassination of the Communist leader, Mir Akbar Khyber.

25-26 April. Leading members of the PDPA, including Noor Mohammed Taraki, arrested.

27. April. President Daoud overthrown and killed by the armed forces in a coup organised and directed by Hafizullah Amin, a PDPA leader (belonging to Khalq group).

30. April. Newly-created Revolutionary Council proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and declared itself to be the "supreme governmental power" of the country. Noor Muhammed Taraki elected President of the Revolutionary Council, Prime Minister and head of the government.

Babrak Karmal became Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and senior Deputy Prime Minister; Hafizullah Amin appointed Foreign Minister and second ranking Deputy Prime Minister.

The Soviet Union became the first country to recognize the new government.

May-June. Armed tribal opposition to the new government reported from provinces in the north-east.

Early July. Babrak Karmal and two other Parcham Ministers, Noor Ahmad Noor and Dr Anahita Ratebzad, removed from the government and together with three other leading Parchamites posted abroad as ambassadors.

8 July. Hafizullah Amin appointed secretary to the Central Committee of the PDPA and became sole deputy prime minister.

12 July. Government Decree No. 6 began land reforms programme.

15 August. Col. Abdul Qader, Minister of Defence and a Parchamite, who had led the Air Force in the April coup, was among Army and Air Force officers charged with conspiring to overthrow the government.

19 August. President Taraki assumed the duties of Minister of Defence, assisted by Hafizullah Amin.

23 August. Arrest announced of two more Parcham Ministers for conspiracy.

6 September. Babrak Karmal and other Parcham ex-Ministers dismissed from their ambassadorships. They were summoned back to Kabul but remained abroad, apparently in Eastern Europe.

19 October. New all-red national flag and emblem introduced, similar to those of the Soviet republics.

27 November. First Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA. Babrak Karmal and other Parchamites expelled from the Party.

30 November. First edition of party newspaper, *Dar Saur Engelab* (The Saur Revolution, i.e., coup of 29 April 1978).

5 December. Afghan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation signed in Moscow during a visit by Taraki. President Brezhnev said it gave Afghan-Soviet relations a "qualitatively new character".

1979.

14 February United States Ambassador kidnapped, and subsequently killed in a "rescue attempt" by Afghan security forces.

19 March. Heavy fighting in Herat between Afghan armed forces and insurgents; a

number of Soviet military and civilian advisers killed. Fighting also reported in Pakhtia Province.

27 March. Hafizullah Amin appointed Prime Minister.

5 April. Soviet military delegation led by General Epishev, head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, arrived in Kabul for a "tour of inspection". Subsequently, Soviet involvement in the country's administrative machinery and in military operations against the insurgents increased.

23 June. Demonstration in Kabul against the regime suppressed by the army.

25 June. Nineteen officers and men killed in Army mutiny at Herat.

5 August. Army mutiny at the Bala Hissai in Kabul.

10 September. President Taraki, returning home from the non-aligned Summit conference in Havana, met President Brezhnev in Moscow.

14 September. President Taraki wounded in a gun-battle in his office, where Hafizullah Amin had gone for a meeting after receiving assurances of his safety from the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Puzanov. The incident was widely interpreted as an abortive attempt by the Soviet Union to secure the replacement of Amin as Prime Minister.

17 September. *Kabul Radio* described Hafizullah Amin as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (i.e. President) and Secretary-General of PDPA Central Committee.

9 October. Taraki's death "after a long illness" officially announced.

14-15 October. Further army mutiny in Kabul.

8 November. Soviet Government announced the recall of Ambassador Alexander Puzanov, whose replacement had been demanded by Hafizullah Amin. He left Kabul on 21 November.

2 December. Lieut-General V. S. Paputin, first deputy head of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Kabul, for meeting with President Amin.

4 December. Soviet leadership sent President Amin cordial messages on the anniversary of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

Early December. Soviet strike force of about 2,500 troops landed at Bagram military air base, 40 miles north of Kabul. Their forward move to Kabul Airport was reported by foreign Press observers.

24-25 December. Soviet transport planes began landing with increasing frequency at Kabul Airport, bringing troops and equipment.

27 December. 14-45 GMT. (19-15 local time) Soviet troops seized the Ministry of the Interior and largely neutralised the Kabul garrison of the Afghan Army by disarming the troops and immobilizing their vehicles.

16-15 GMT. A statement by Babrak Karmal that he had taken over the government and was appealing for Soviet military assistance was broadcast from Termez, on the Soviet side of the River Oxus, on *Kabul Radio's* wavelength. At this time *Kabul Radio* was broadcasting normally, with no indication of a change in the country's leadership.

17-00 GMT. Kabul radio station, hitherto guarded by Afghan troops, attacked by Soviet forces.

19-45 GMT. The Soviet news agency *Tass*, in Russian for abroad, transmitted the text of Karmal's appeal for aid.

19-53 GMT. *Moscow Radio's* home service broadcast Babrak Karmal's message.

20-30 GMT. *Moscow Radio's* Serbo-Croat service stated that "the anti-popular regime of Hafizullah Amin has been liquidated."

22-10 GMT. *Kabul Radio* began to transmit a list of the new Revolutionary Council, headed by Babrak Karmal;

28 December. (02-40 local time). *Kabul Radio* transmitted an announcement by "Revolutionary Tribunal" that Amin had been executed; and a government announcement that on the basis of the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of December 1978 it had requested the Soviet Union to render urgent political and military assistance.

Babrak Karmal reported to have been unanimously elected Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the PDPA.

1980

1 January. Babrak Karmal seen in public in Afghanistan for the first time since the coup.

4 January. Afghan leaders condemned efforts to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in Afghanistan.

Afghan deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, Ahmad Hakim Tabibi, resigned "as a protest against the violation of my country's independence and sovereignty by the Soviet Union."

7 January. Soviet Union vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution, sponsored by

the non-aligned group, deplored the intervention and calling for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops".

8 January. Clandestine leaflets ("night letters") distributed in Kabul by an Islamic resistance group, called on Afghans to rise up against Babrak Karmal.

14 January. UN General Assembly adopted by 104 votes to 18, with 18 abstentions, a Resolution sponsored by 17 non-aligned States calling for the "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal" of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

19 January. Two resistance groups based in Pakistan, the National Liberation Front led by Sebghatullah Mujaddedi and the National Islamic Front headed by Sayed Ahmad Gailani, joined to form the United Islamic Front of Afghanistan.

27 January. Six Afghan nationalist groups based in Pakistan announced the formation of an Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Its aim was to set up a "truly Islamic" State in place of the "alien and atheist" regime.

27-29 January. Emergency session of the Islamic Conference, held in Islamabad and attended by Foreign Ministers of 34 countries, condemned the Soviet invasion as a "flagrant violation of international laws". The Conference suspended Afghanistan's membership of the Islamic Conference Organisation and called on all member States to withhold recognition of the "illegal regime" in Kabul.

30 January. Demonstrations in Herat called for Soviet troops to leave Afghanistan.

Babrak Karmal blamed shortages of food and vital commodities on supply problems caused by "saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries".

1 February. Pakistani official sources announced that the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was well over 500,000.

2 February. Kandahar disrupted by a campaign of civil disobedience.

7 February. Babrak Karmal confirmed in an interview with the Indian newspaper, *The Patriot*, that Soviet troops had been entering Afghanistan since 17 December 1979.

14 February. UN Commission on Human Rights, meeting in Geneva, adopted by 27 votes to 8, with 6 abstentions, a Resolution describing the Soviet occupation as a violation of the country's independence and of international laws, covenants and norms.

19 February. Foreign Ministers of the European Community, at their Political Co-operation Meeting in Rome, agreed that the crisis in Afghanistan could be overcome constructively through an arrangement, suggested by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, which allowed for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan free from competition among the powers. They planned to consult with all countries having an interest in the stability of the region.

21 February. General strike began in Kabul following the distribution of leaflets calling for resistance. Large-scale demonstrations dispersed by armed police and Soviet troops.

22 February. Further demonstrations in Kabul; troops and militia again opened fire.

Abdul Rahim Ghafourzai, an Afghan diplomat attending a meeting of the non-aligned group at the United Nations, announced his defection in support of his people's opposition to the Soviet occupation.

President Brezhnev, speaking in preparation for the Supreme Soviet elections,

said the Soviet Union would be ready to begin withdrawing its troops only when the United States and Afghanistan's neighbours guaranteed an end to "all forms of outside interference" in Afghanistan.

4 March. *Moscow Radio* claimed that Babrak Karmal returned clandestinely to Afghanistan in early October 1979 to work for the overthrow of Amin.

Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan (now comprising five nationalist groups) announced formation of a Revolutionary Council.

5 March. Eight members of the Afghan national football team, including their captain, Muhammed Saber Rohparwar, a member of Afghanistan's National Olympic Committee, left the country secretly for Pakistan a few days before they were due to go to the Soviet Union to play friendly matches. They said they had left because of their opposition to the Soviet occupation.

Early March. Soviet forces began a major offensive against the resistance groups in Kunar Province.

19-21 March. Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca on "secret" visit to Kabul after discussions in Moscow.

26 March. Heavy fighting near Kandahar and the defection of an Afghan air defence unit to the resistance were reported.

28-31 March. Main road between Jalalabad and the Pakistan frontier closed by the resistance.

3 April. Heavy fighting around Bamiyan, involving Soviet armoured vehicles and over 30 aircraft.

4 April. *Tass* and *Kabul Radio* announced that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan had ratified an agreement on "conditions for the

temporary stay of the limited Soviet military contingent on DRA soil".

5 April. Second visit to Kabul by Senor Malmierca, reportedly to try to set up a meeting between Afghan and Pakistani leaders. He flew on to Delhi.

5-14 April. Foreign Minister, Shah Mohammed Dost, visited Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

6 April. PDPA activities called for the elimination of friction and factional activities within the party.

Resistance attacks on the police HQ, the airfield and the water pumping station at Jalalabad.

12 April. Inter-parliamentary Union, meeting in Oslo, adopted by 96 votes to 25 a Resolution sponsored by a predominantly Islamic group which condemned the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and called for implementation of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14 January.

13 April. Second Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee approved a set of Basic Principles to serve as the basis for a temporary constitution. They provided for the election of a *Loya Jirga*, or National Assembly.

17 April. PDPA Central Committee issued a manifesto setting out domestic and foreign policy aims. Friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union were declared to be the basis of Afghanistan's foreign policy and "of great importance to the defence and evolution of the April Revolution and its gains". Talks were proposed with Iran and Pakistan for the normalization of relations, and between the countries of the region on the reduction of military expenditure and the limitation of arms and armed forces under international guarantees.

21 April. New national flag adopted—a tricolour of black, red and green horizontal stripes bearing the new State emblem. The previous all-red flag with emblem was retained as the PDPA flag.

23 April. First issue of an underground student news-sheet called *Falah* ("Deliverance") called for united action against the Soviet occupation.

24 April. Violent disturbances at Kabul University and in the secondary schools; security forces opened fire.

25 April. First open meeting in Peshawar of Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Abdul Rasul Sayaf emerged as leader.

27 April. Official celebrations to mark the second anniversary of the April 1978 revolution. A number of people suspected of active hostility to the Soviet presence had been arrested the previous day as a security measure, and others threatened with immediate conscription into the army. Night letters had called for a boycott of the proceedings.

28 April. University and other students in Kabul, led by schoolgirls, tried to organize a procession and chanted anti-Soviet slogans; they were dispersed by the security forces.

29 April. Student demonstrations forcibly suppressed by the Afghan Army and PDPA militia, backed by Soviet helicopter gunships.

3 May. Over 500 students gathered at Kabul University but were prevented from marching by police and troops. Elsewhere in the city there were casualties when a schoolgirls' demonstration was fired on.

Total casualties in recent disturbances reported to be 50 deaths, with several hundred wounded.

8 May. Night letters praised the student demonstrators and called for further demonstrations and the closing of shops in protest against the occupation.

8-9 May. Students arrested following agitation in Herat, Kandahar, Shindand and Jalalabad.

12 May. Official statement said that a total of 620 people had been arrested in the late April/early May disturbances.

Several hundred young men in the Kabul area, including students, reported to have been summarily conscripted for military service.

Heavy fighting in the Wardak, Maydan Valley, central Hazarajat, Badakhshan and Nangahar areas.

13 May. Meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, of *Loya Jirga*, consisting of nearly 1,000 representatives of the Afghan tribes and provinces. Revolutionary Council appointed and a number of "fundamental resolutions" passed, aimed at drafting of a new Afghan constitution.

14 May. *Kabul Radio* and *Tass* broadcast proposals by the Afghan leadership for a negotiated political solution to remove tension in the region. The proposals included talks with Iran and Pakistan to normalise relations, the return of Afghan refugees under an amnesty, and guarantees by the United States and the Soviet Union that no interference or subversion against Afghanistan would take place. There was no clear guarantee in the proposals of the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

17-22 May. Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad, attended by 39 countries, expressed deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and called for the

immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops. It also called for assistance for the Afghan refugees and for the creation of conditions that would permit their early return. The meeting set up a Standing Committee, consisting of the Iranian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organisation, to work for consultations and the convening of an international conference, possibly under UN auspices.

20-22 May. Demonstrations in Kabul, by university students and schoolgirls chanting anti-Soviet and anti-government slogans, fired on by the security forces.

23 May. Convoy escorting the Minister of Information and Culture ambushed by resistance at Herat and his brother shot.

Moscow Radio admitted that anti-government activity in Afghanistan was seriously disrupting normal life.

24 May. Further clashes at Kabul University.

27 May. Foreign Minister Shah Mohammed Dost, at a Press conference, rejected as invalid any decisions of the Islamic Conference and any proposal for an international conference under UN or other auspices.

The resistance was reported to be enforcing tolls on the Kandahar-Hazarajat road.

30 May. 600 Soviet casualties estimated to have been admitted to the main Kabul military hospital during May, of whom some 200 died. This compared with average admissions of 150 per month in March and April.

Early June. Major Soviet offensive in the Kunar Valley.

4-6 June. First meeting of three-man Standing Committee of Islamic Conference in Teheran; decided to seek talks with the Soviet and Afghan Governments and with the Afghan resistance movement.

5 June. Tension persisting in schools and universities; 12th grade students threatened with immediate conscription into the army if their "disobedience" continued.

Fighting between resistance and Soviet and government forces reported in Parawan Province and in the Sakadarán and Ghorband Valleys north of Kabul.

Moscow Radio, quoting the Soviet party newspaper *Pravda*, said that "the counter-revolutionary terrorists" in Afghanistan had stepped up their activity.

8 June. *Kabul Radio* announced the execution of 10 close associates of Hafizullah Amin, said to have been found guilty by the special Revolutionary Court of a variety of offences, including murder.

Soviet presence in Kabul became more in evidence at night; tanks and other armoured vehicles took up strategic positions with infantry on guard nearby, withdrawing to barracks shortly before the end of the curfew at 4.00 a.m.

Drinking water supply to two schools in Kabul claimed to have been poisoned; 60 pupils admitted to hospital.

12 June. About 500 pupils at Kabul schools affected by poison gas.

13 June. European Council, meeting in Venice, expressed concern at the intensification of Soviet military activity in Afghanistan and reaffirmed the need for a solution which would ensure the withdrawal of Soviet troops and allow Afghanistan to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned State.

14 June. *Kabul Radio* announced the execution of three former Ministers under Hafizullah Amin, after their conviction of "savage and inhuman acts".

Soviet Government newspaper *Izvestia* said it was impossible to conduct negotiations and find the means of a settlement without the existing Afghan Government. A political solution should also take account of the interests and security of the Soviet Union.

15 June. Further incidents involving poison gas reported in and around Kabul, in schools and in the Ministries of Education and the Interior. The regime, the two factions of the PDPA and the resistance movement blamed each other.

17 June. Seven members of the Afghan Olympic basketball team left Afghanistan secretly for Pakistan. They said they did not want to appear to back the regime of Babrak Karmal.

18 June. Major-General Abdul Qader, a member of the PDPA Central Committee and of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, left Kabul for medical treatment in the Soviet Union. Press reports said he had been wounded in a shooting incident on 14 June by a member of the Khalq faction.

19 June. Large arms and ammunition store in Pul-e-Charki, Kabul, set on fire.

20-21 June. Islamic Conference's Standing Committee on Afghanistan held second meeting, attended by representatives of six resistance groups, at Mont Pelerin near Geneva. It confirmed political and moral support of the Islamic Conference for the resistance and noted the widespread suffering inflicted on the Afghan people by the foreign forces.

In a separate statement issued in the name of the Afghanistan Islamic Resistance

Movement, the resistance groups sought recognition as the legitimate representative of the Afghan people, recognition by the non-aligned movement, financial aid from OPEC and Muslim countries, a special UN conference on Afghanistan, and the severance of all ties by Islamic Conference States with the USSR.

21-22 June. Most shops in Kabul stayed closed in protest against the presence of Soviet troops and against the regime.

22 June. *Tass* from Kabul announced the withdrawal of some military contingents to Soviet territory "by agreement with the Afghan Government."

Pravda described the "so-called Standing Committee" of the Islamic Conference as having been created "on the direct orders of imperialist and reactionary circles".

Heads of State and Governments of seven industrialized Western countries and Japan, meeting in Venice, noted the announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops, but said that the withdrawal, if confirmed, would have to be permanent and continue until all Soviet troops had been withdrawn.

Asadullah Sarwari, Deputy Prime Minister and number two to Babrak Karmal (and presumed leader of Khalq faction), left Kabul reportedly for medical treatment in the Soviet Union.

23 June. President Brezhnev told a Soviet Communist Party Plenum that although the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw certain military units, it would "go on helping Afghanistan to build a new life and preserve the gains of the April revolution".

24 June. President Carter said the United States was prepared to explore a "transitional arrangement, to be implemented

along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan".

25-28 June. Conference of the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) held in Kabul "in support of the Afghan revolution".

29 June. Agreement signed with Soviet Union for construction of administrative and technical complex at Hairaton on Soviet border, costing 26 million roubles and taking three years to build.

30 June. During talks in the Soviet Union with Chancellor Schmidt of the FRG, President Brezhnev said the USSR favoured a political settlement on the basis of the appropriate proposals by the Afghan Government. The question of a withdrawal of Soviet forces would be solved in the context of such a political settlement.

2-5 July. Fighting between Soviet forces and resistance reported in several areas. In Kabul, the Director of the 17th District was shot dead in his office.

2 July. Seven of the 11 members of the Afghan Olympic wrestling team, including their captain, left the country secretly for Pakistan the day before they were due to fly to the Moscow Olympic Games.

4 July. Eight Afghan Army officers reported in New Delhi to have defected to the resistance after completing their military training in India.

4-5 July. Double the normal number of Soviet aircraft landed at Kabul, possibly forming part of Soviet military build-up during the first half of July.

6 July. Security authorities announced that all Afghans in Kabul were required to carry identity cards and produce them on demand.

7 July. Number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan reported to be more than 800,000.

7-12 July. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visited Kabul.

8 July. A Hungarian journalist, after visiting Afghanistan, admitted on *Budapest Radio* that the PDPA split was "extremely serious", that "great tasks" faced the country and that party unity was needed.

14 July (approx). Several agreements on economic and technical cooperation with Soviet Union signed.

15 July. *Tass* and *Moscow Radio* denied Western reports that Soviet forces had destroyed over 50 villages and killed thousands of Afghans during previous four days in the Kabul and Ghazni Provinces.

16 July. 32 Third World countries, in a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General, asked for "the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security" to be included on the agenda of the next UN General Assembly session.

18 July. Attempted army coup two units based at Pul-e-Charki near Kabul, foiled by Soviet troops, following leakage of plans.

20 July. Administrative reorganization in Kabul, involving creation of a new department under Babrak Karmal's control and reducing powers of Khalq Interior Minister, Gulabzai.

21 July. Death of Wali Yusufi, Deputy Higher Education Minister: probably murdered.

23 July. *Karachi Radio* announced total of more than 932,000 Afghan refugees now in Pakistan.

Late July. Rebellion by Afghan Army's 14th Division at Ghazni (subsequently denied by *Tass* on 14 August). Unconfirmed reports of mutiny of nearby garrison at Maydanshah.

25 July. In Rawalpindi, the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan and the opposition group *Hizb-e-Islami*, which had left the Alliance shortly after its formation, met in a *jihad* (holy war) conference.

29 July. Afghanistan and USSR signed Consumer-Cooperatives Protocol, providing for exchange of commodities and equipment.

President of Islamic National Revolutionary Council, Hassan Gailani, announced details of the organisation and its intention to set up a provisional government in one of the areas of Afghanistan under resistance control.

During July. Western Press sources reported fighting in the provinces of Ghazni, Paktia, Wardak, Parwan, Zabul, Baghlan, Konar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, Nangarhar, Helmand and Kabul.

3 August. New call-up of young men announced, including all school-teachers who had not completed at least half of their training.

4 August. Medical cooperation agreement signed with Soviet Union.

12 August. Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement with Soviet Union signed in Kabul, providing for 1,500 scholarships for Afghans in USSR and 43 Soviet lecturers at Kabul University.

14 August. Transport Protocol signed with USSR.

16 August. Appointment of Saleh Mohammed Zeary, a member of the Khalq faction, and a Minister under Taraki and Amin, to the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and of Abdurrashid Aryan, also a Khalqi, to be Deputy Prime Minister while remaining Minister of Justice and Attorney-General. Both posts were previously held by Asadullah Sarwari.

17 August. Sarwari's appointment as Ambassador to Mongolia announced.

Early to mid-August. Herat reported to be in hands of resistance fighters. Reports of fighting in Wardak, Parwan, Kandahar, Kunduz, Logar, Samangan, Balkh and Kapisa Provinces.

20 August. Pakistan Press reported total of 1,050,000 refugees in Pakistan.

23 August. Protocol signed with Soviet Union for expansion of Kabul Airport.

To be continued

Courtesy : Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, through the British Consulate - General, Karachi.

Afghanistan And East-West Relations. The main source of tension, both between East and West and within the Western Alliance, continued to be the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Western leaders were united in their continuing calls for a full withdrawal of Soviet troops; at the same time, the Soviet Union floated a number of proposals to legitimize the *status quo* and to cover her occupation with a facade of negotiation. In March, Britain called for the neutralization of Afghanistan and for guarantees against foreign involvement in the country's internal affairs. This was greeted sceptically by many in the West and rejected by the Soviet Union because it included the withdrawal of all Soviet troops.

On 14 May the Soviet Union announced her own plan, through the government in Kabul. It called for negotiations leading to diplomatic relations between the Kabul government and the governments of Iran and Pakistan, but it did not commit the Soviet Union to a specific withdrawal date. In June, just before the Summit meeting of Western leaders in Venice, Moscow announced plans for a limited withdrawal of tanks and troops

from Afghanistan. However, doubts quickly appeared about whether the withdrawal represented a real reduction in Soviet troops in Afghanistan, much less the beginning of a complete withdrawal.

While the Nato foreign ministers meeting in June in Ankara and the Western Summit in Venice in July produced a common front in the West, there remained divisions over how to deal with the implications of the Soviet invasion for East-West relations. On 18 May President Giscard d'Estaing of France met with Soviet President Brezhnev in Warsaw, with virtually no prior consultation with his Western allies. That meeting produced little and earned Giscard the general disapproval of the Western press, inside and outside France.

In July, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt paid a long-awaited visit to Moscow. He took pains to reassure his allies, the United States in particular, that he sought no special deals. The visit produced no change in the Soviet position on Afghanistan, even though the Chancellor took a firm line on the need for a complete Soviet troops withdrawal.

The Schmidt visit did, however, elicit an indication that the Soviet Union was prepared to drop her previous condition for negotiations on theatre nuclear forces—that Nato had to rescind or at least suspend its plan to deploy 572 new cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe. Apparently, Brezhnev said that bilateral Soviet-American discussions were possible before the ratification of SALT-II, but that agreement could only be reached afterwards.

Statement By Afghan Government, 14, May 1980. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan proposes to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that Afghan-Iranian talks be held in

order to draw up a bilateral agreement on the development of friendly relations and all-round mutually beneficial co-operation between our two countries. The Government also proposes to the government of Pakistan that Afghan-Pakistan talks be held, with the aim of drafting a bilateral agreement on normalization of relations. Such agreements would contain generally accepted provisions concerning mutual respect of sovereignty and readiness to develop relations on the basis of the principles of good-neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as concrete commitments on non-admission of armed and any other hostile activity from their territories one against the other.

The Government...again calls upon the Afghans, who are temporarily staying, by force of some or other circumstances, in the territories of Pakistan and other neighbouring states, to return home and confirm that under the General Amnesty declared in the Statement by the Government on 1 January 1980, and subsequent statements of this kind, they will enjoy respect, will be guaranteed full freedom and inviolability of person...

In proposing to hold talks with Pakistan and Iran without any preliminary conditions attached, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan firmly proceeds from the premise that their holding shall be accompanied by a continuation of hostile activity against Afghanistan...

A component part of political settlement must be appropriate political guarantees by some states...among them...must be the Soviet Union and the United States. The basic meaning of the guarantees must consist in the fact that the countries giving them will themselves respect and substantiate by their authority Afghanistan's bilateral agreements with Pakistan and Iran. As far as guarantees from the USA

are concerned, they must include a clearly expressed commitment not to carry out any subversive activities against Afghanistan, including those from the territories of Third World countries.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan declares that in the context of political settlement must also be resolved the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan's territory of the Soviet limited military contingent... The question of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will depend, in concrete terms, on the resolution of the question of effective guarantees of bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and with Iran...

The Government declares that in the process of political settlement notice shall be taken also of military-political activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area by the States, which do not belong to that area. Sharing the concern of other states over the build-up of the US military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the Government supports the proposal of turning that area into a zone of peace, of dismantling foreign military bases there and taking other measures of lessening tensions and strengthening security.

In putting forward these proposals for a political settlement, the Government declares most explicitly once again that questions concerning Afghanistan's interests cannot be discussed, to say nothing of being decided, without the participation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, or without its knowledge. At the same time, the Afghan government considers useful efforts by other states contributing to the start of talks. In this connection it welcomes and supports the initiative displayed by the Republic of Cuba as Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement in offering its good services...

Soviet Commentary, *Pravda*, 1 July 1980.

A political settlement of the situation which has come about over Afghanistan has become a matter of urgency. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have demonstrated in practice their desire for a constructive solution to that problem. Leaders of the socialist and many non-aligned countries have issued appeals for a political settlement. There is even demagogic verbiage along the same lines in the West...

A political settlement is quite possible. The key to it lies in the complete and guaranteed cessation of external armed aggression and hostile activity against the Government and people of Afghanistan. In order to open the way for a political settlement it is necessary first of all to put an end to aggression, that is to the armed incursion into Afghanistan by mercenaries of the imperialist, and secondly to give a reliable guarantee that subversive activities from abroad will not be renewed in any form...

That decision attracted great attention everywhere. The response to it, however, was far from uniform. These differences were particularly evident at the meeting of the leaders of the seven leading capitalist States in Venice. Speaking at a press conference there President Giscard d'Estaing of France said that he had learnt of the reduction in the strength of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in a personal message from L.I. Brezhnev on the eve of the meeting. When he informed the participants in the meeting of this they assessed the decision as 'a step in the right direction'. On the other hand, the US representatives at the meeting of the 'big seven' clearly wanted to play down the importance of the Soviet initiative, and even call it into question. Brzezinski asserted that it was just a 'tactical troop movement'...

During Carter's tour of southern Europe, official representatives of the White House openly revealed the idea behind the widely-advertised US proposals for a so-called 'transitional settlement', a way of achieving by peaceful means what it had not been possible to accomplish by means of armed intervention; to overthrow the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and to put their own puppets in power in that country, trampling on the will of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people...

The partial withdrawal of Soviet troops reaffirms the defensive, and therefore, limited nature of Soviet assistance to

Afghanistan. This step once again proves the absurdity of the propagandist fabrications that Afghanistan represents, as it were, merely the first stage of Soviet military expansion towards the Persian Gulf...

Text of Islamic Summit Communique

The following is the translation of the final communique of the Third Islamic Summit issued recently.

At the invitation of His Majesty King Khaled Bin Abdul Aziz of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and in accordance with the decision taken by the 10th Islamic Conference held in the city of Fez, the Kingdom of Morocco between 10 and 14 Jamadi al-Thani 1399 A.H. (8 to 12 May, 1979), the Third Islamic Summit conference, designated as Palestine-Jerusalem session, was convened in Mecca al-Mukarramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, between 19 and 22 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1401 A.H. (25 to 28 January 1981) and was attended by:

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Algeria.
2. The State of Bahrain.
3. The People's Republic of Bangladesh.
4. The United Republic of Cameroon.
5. The Republic of Djibouti.
6. The United Arab Emirates.
7. The Republic of Gabon.
8. The Republic of Gambia.
9. The Revolutionary People's Republic Guinea.
10. The Republic of Guinea Bissau.
11. The Republic of Upper Volta.
12. The Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros.
13. The Republic of Indonesia.
14. The Republic of Iraq.
15. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
16. The State of Kuwait.
17. The Republic of Lebanon.

18. Malaysia.
19. Maldives.
20. The Republic of Mali.
21. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
22. The Kingdom of Morocco.
23. The Republic of Niger.
24. The Sultanate of Oman.
25. The Republic of Uganda.
26. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
27. The State of Qatar.
28. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
29. Palestine.
30. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan.
31. The Syrian Arab Republic.
32. The Republic of Chad.
33. The Democratic Republic of Somalia.
34. The Republic of Tunisia.
35. The Republic of Turkey.
36. The Yemen Arab Republic.
37. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamuhiyra were absent.

The following attended as observers:

The State of Nigeria, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Rabita al-Alam-al-Islami, the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of African Unity, UNESCO, the Islamic Development Bank, the Motamar al-Alam-al-Islami, the President of the Permanent Council of the Islamic Solidarity Fund, the World Muslim Youth Seminar, the International Islamic News Agency, the Islamic States Broadcasting Organisation, the Islamic Chamber

of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange, the Inter-Nation Union of Islamic Banks, the Inter-Nation Arab Islamic Schools Association, the Islamic Capitals Organisation, the Islamic European Council, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the Arab Organisation for Culture, Education and Science, the Moro Liberation Front, the Afghan Mujahideen Movement, the Oriental Christians' delegation.

This Islamic Summit Conference was particularly distinguished because it was opened in the precincts of the Holy Grand Mosque, near the Holy Ka'aba, at the dawn of the 15th Century Hijra and during the month which witnessed the birth of the Holy Prophet Mohammad, the messenger of Islam. (*Peace be upon him*). It was, therefore, surrounded with the awe-inspiring sanctity of the site and with the grandeur of that particular historic coincidence which lent an atmosphere of profound reverence and solemnity to the opening session of the Summit Conference and inspired on the Islamic leaders the magnificence of their position there in front of the Holy Ka'aba where they stood in one line to offer prayers to the Almighty Allah and make their supplication to Him in one voice to help them shoulder their onerous responsibilities in a world fraught with dangers and challenges, guide them to the path of solidarity, unity and wisdom, and enable them to repudiate the causes of disunity so that the Islamic Ummah, through divine guidance and help, be reinstated as Allah wanted it to be and become "the best of all nations dedicated to promoting virtue and discouraging vice".

In his opening address to the Summit, King Khalid Bin Abdul Aziz said that the most outstanding trait characterising the Islamic Ummah at the dawn of this new Hijra century was the auspicious awakening

which is averse to enmity and partiality and augurs well for the emergence of a new society that should guarantee dignity and prestige for the Muslim individual and realise the sought after security, peace and progress for maniknd.

The Summit moved to the Conference Palace in Taif where they heard the speeches delivered by heads of delegations and representatives of international organisations, including the lengthy speech by the U.N. Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, which dealt with the various issues of concern to the international community and the role of Islamic countries in tackling them.

All the delegations highly lauded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the hospitality extended to them and for the massive preparations made for holding the Conference.

After head delegates delivered their statements before the Summit, in camera sittings were called on Tuesday-Wednesday 21-22 Rabi-ul Awwal, 1401 A.H., January 27-28, 1981.

The issues included in the agenda and regulations published by the Foreign Ministers Conference were approved. The conference has endorsed:

1. The proposed agenda.
2. The general report submitted by the Foreign Ministers' Conference.
3. The Holy Mecca Declaration.

The conference also endorsed the following resolutions.

In the Political Field. 1. Jerusalem: basic work programme for countering the Zionist enemy:

Commitment to liberate Arab Jerusalem to make it the capital of the Palestinian

State and calling on all countries to respect the U.N. Resolutions by not dealing with Israeli occupation authority in a way that could enable these authorities to regard it as an implicit recognition or an approval of the status of Jerusalem.

Palestine Middle East Cause. The Conference decided to consider the Palestinian cause, the core of the Middle East question, as the prime concern of the Islamic nation.

It reaffirmed commitment to liberate all the Palestinian and Arab occupied territories rejecting any attempt against Arab sovereignty in Jerusalem and opposing unilateral settlement.

It stressed that a just peace in the Middle East could be established only by a complete and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian and Arab occupied territories, restoring Palestinian rights including their rights to return, self-determination and establishing their State under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

It confirmed rejection of the Camp David accords and regarded the Security Council Resolution 242 as failing to meet Palestinian and Arab rights. (The resolution) does not constitute a sound basis for solving the Middle East crisis and the Palestine cause.

It confirmed commitment of Islamic State to use all their military political, economic and natural resources including oil as means for supporting the national rights of the Palestinian and Arab nations and to confront countries that render military, economic and political support to Israel.

It urged the European Community to fulfil its pledges by stipulating that its bilateral and communal deals with Israel do not cover the Arab and Palestinian occupied territories.

Afghanistan. The conference expressed concern over continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and renewed its call for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

It expressed deep concern over the Afghan refugees' condition and called for rendering aid to them and making their repatriation more convenient.

It called for intensifying efforts to enable Afghanistan to remain an Islamic sovereign and non-Aligned State. It confirmed the commitment of the Organisation of Islamic Conference to find a solution to this problem, recommending to the Ministerial Committee, which comprises OIC Secretary General and Foreign Ministers of Guinea, Iran, Pakistan and Tunisia to co-operate with the U.N. Secretary-General and his representative in finding a just solution to the situation in Afghanistan.

It stressed commitment towards direct and indirect non-interference in internal affairs and refraining from inciting differences that contradict Islamic tenets. It decided to endeavour removing all ideological differences by manifesting the spiritual, moral and social values that bind all Muslims and by suppressing those which contradict Islam.

Holy Jihad. The Islamic Heads of State agreed to declare Holy Jihad to save Jerusalem and support the Palestinian people and to secure Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. It stressed that Jihad has its Islamic criterion. Practical procedures will be undertaken through consultation among Islamic states.

Iraq-Iran Conflict. It expressed deep concern over the continued fighting between the two Islamic states and in view of the decision adopted by the Foreign Ministers' Extra ordinary Conference held in

New York on September 26, 1980, on the formation of a Mediation Committee.

The Conference decided to appeal to both countries to accept Islamic mediation. It also decided to expand the membership of the Mediation Committee to include OIC Secretary-General, Senegal, Gambia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Guinea and the PLO.

It called on both countries to order an immediate ceasefire. All countries agreed to establish an Islamic force to implement the ceasefire, if the necessity arises, in view of the Mediation Committee's recommendation.

Shell Problem. The Conference expressed concern over the drought problem and approved the programme prepared by the drought-stricken countries in order to render urgent aid.

It decided to form a specialised ministerial committee called the Shell People to follow up the implementation of measures and make initiatives. The Committee will be chaired by an Islamic head of state or government and comprise the OIC Secretary-General and the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Malaysia, Palestine, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and a member of the joint commission of countries suffering from drought.

The Comoros Mayotte Island. The Conference renewed its support to the Government and the people of the Comoros who are struggling to recover Mayottes to the national territory of the Comoros and its appeal of France to resume action regarding the initiative for finding a just solution in compliance with the OIC resolution on the Comoros Mayotte island.

Eritrea. The Conference called for reaching a just and peaceful settlement of the

Eritrean question and for supporting all efforts being made in this connection. It also called for setting up a committee composed of Senegal, Guinea, and the OIC Secretariat General for conducting the required contacts, for following up the peaceful endeavours and presenting the outcome of its tasks to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

The Islamic Court of Justice. The Conference agreed to form an Islamic Court of Justice and called for a meeting of member-countries' experts to prepare the statute of the court and entrusted the OIC Secretary-General with making the necessary arrangements to summon the experts' meeting and present the results to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

Horn of Africa. The Conference fully supported the persecuted Muslim inhabitants in the Horn of Africa and called for making joint efforts among conflicting parties to reach a just solution. It called for complete and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Horn of Africa and appealed to all member-countries to provide, in the spirit of Islamic solidarity, financial and material assistance to concerned populations, the refugees in particular.

The Conference agreed that:

- The Islamic Summit Conference be held every three years.
- Secretary-General's term be for four years and non-renewable.
- The creation of the post of Assistant Secretary-General for Al-Quds al-Sharif and Palestine.
- The question of revising the OIC Charter be postponed until the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, including the question of the terms of the Assistant Secretary-General.

It approved the following recommendations:

(a) Referring the document on human rights in Islam to a commission comprising all member countries, to be summoned by the Secretariat General to meet in order to examine this document and present its results to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

(b) Entrusting the Secretariat General, with the consent of by the experts commission, to receive the remarks of the al-Quds Committee members within three months of the latter's receipt of the document and to publish this document in the three language of the OIC so that it may reach all sections of international public opinion.

(c) Referring for study, the OIC information plan to a specialised commission of information experts composed of all member countries, in addition to the Organisation of Islamic Radio Stations and the International Islamic News Agency, and profiting from the results of the Islamic Information Conference in Jakarta.

The commission will meet at the invitation of the Secretary-General and its meeting will be held irrespective of number of attendants. The results of the commission's works will be presented to member countries for their remarks.

The results will then be presented to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

(d) Postponing Eritrea's demand to be admitted as an observer at the OIC to the coming session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference and upon examining the works of the commission on

Eritrea as stipulated by the resolution on Eritrea.

(e) Referring its previous resolution on the Muslims in the Philippines adopted during the 11th Islamabad Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference, leaving to the four-member ministerial committee the mission of preparing a draft resolution on the issue and presenting it to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

(f) Approving the project of changing the Organisation's flag and entrusting the Secretariat-General with preparing its final form and colours to be approved by the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference.

Action Plan to Consolidate Economic Co-operation Among Member-Countries. The Conference noted with concern that developing countries' problems have worsened because of current crisis in international economic relations, thus increasing the gap between developing and developed countries.

The Conference sees in economic co-operation among member countries in particular, an effective way to consolidate its unity in seeking to establish the new international economic order.

It approved an action plan to consolidate economic co-operation among member countries, and entrusted OIC Secretariat-General with rapidly taking suitable measures to implement this plan.

Creating The Islamic Center For Trade Exchange. The conference decided:

A—To set up a body pertaining to the OIC called the Islamic Centre for Trade Development and based in Tangiers, the Kingdom of Morocco.

B—To approve the statute of the center and its 1981-82 budget (annexed to this resolution).

C—Calls on the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco to take all necessary measures for the center's functioning.

D—To instruct the Secretariat-General to provide all possible assistance to the Moroccan Government and work in close co-operation with it set up the to Centre.

E—To invite all member countries to grant all necessary assistance to the centre to enable it to attain its goals and objectives.

Convention of Encouraging, Protecting And Guaranteeing Investments In Member-Countries. Conscious that concluding such a convention among member countries will achieve optimal exploitation of economic possibilities in these countries thus resulting in their development and allowing transfer of funds among them.

And enabling their peoples to attain economic development and prosperity as well as removing all obstacles facing transfer of funds among member countries, and that such a convention will also permit the expansion of sectors and investment possibilities, the Conference decided:

A—To urge all member countries to communicate their remarks to the draft convention to the OIC Secretariat-General.

B—To entrust OIC Secretary-General to convene a high-level meeting of member countries' representatives before the 12th Islamic Foreign Ministers meet to prepare a final form of the Convention's text in view of adopting it by the Conference or by the specialised ministers in a meeting to be held for this purpose.

The Conference examined the project of creating an Islamic union of maritime

transporters in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and approved the principle of creating the union and its statute entrusted the Secretariat-General to work in close co-operation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to achieve this project, and invited member countries to join the union and cooperate with it to enable it to achieve its goal.

Special Aid To Least-Developed Islamic States. The Conference decided to ask the Islamic Development Bank to grant urgent and increasing assistance to least-developed member countries, including financing trade under easier and more flexible conditions.

It also urges member countries and Islamic development institutions to grant its aid to least-developed member countries in all fields, particularly in emergencies and crisis.

The Conference calls on developed and developing countries and international institutions to apply U.N. resolutions on assisting least-developed countries.

It also asks the Secretariat-General to follow up these resolutions and assess these countries' special needs, and to evaluate developments in carrying out these programmes in favour of these countries.

Subscription To The Islamic Development Bank Capital. The Conference decided to subscribe the sum of 1,210 million Islamic Dinars, representing the non-subscribed share of the allowed capital, amounting to 2,000 million Islamic Dinars.

Financial And Administrative Situation of OIC Secretary-General. The Conference decided to ask the Secretary-General to present the studies concerning this question to the Organisation's permanent financial

commission so it can examine them and present its propositions to the 12th Foreign Ministers' Conference to make the suitable decisions.

Covering The Capitals Of The Al-Quds And Islamic Solidarity Funds And Their Endowments. Concerning the capitals of the Al-Quds Fund and the Islamic Solidarity Funds and their endowments, it was decided to refer them to Islamic Finance Ministers' meeting which will inform the Secretariat-General of countries which will make voluntary contributions.

In The Cultural And Social Field Supporting The Annual Budget Of the Islamic Solidarity Fund And Its Endowments. The Conference decided to ask all member countries to back this Fund's annual budget by no less than 50 million dollars.

To make contributions, double them and render them public.

To allot additional resources like stamps and others, and to organise annual campaigns to collect contributions in every country.

It also decided to assert allotting endowments in favour of the Fund amounting to 100 million dollars and invited member countries to raise this sum through voluntary contributions.

Creation Of An Islamic Rescue Agency. The Summit decided to carry out further study of this matter. Meanwhile, the Islamic Solidarity Fund will continue covering expenses related to rescue operations.

Participation of Member Countries in Rebuilding Al-Asnam. The Summit expressed its solidarity with the Algerian Government and people and appealed to the member countries to take part in rebuilding

Al-Asnam region and asked the Secretary-General to present a report on this matter to the 12th Foreign Ministers' Conference.

The Guinea-Bissau Islamic Centre, The Ahmad Baba Of Tombuktu And The Two Islamic Universities In Niger And Uganda. The Summit decided that the OIC would be charged with implementing these projects. In this respect, the member countries are called upon to provide direct aid to implement them. The Summit reiterated that the OIC would be charged with building the University of Uganda, and invited the Government of Niger to start building the Islamic University.

Support Of The Islamic Institution For Science And Technology. The summit called upon the member countries to take part in providing the required funds for this institution, the required amount being 50 million dollars for the first stage, and asked the Secretariat General to carry on the procedures concerning the creation of this institution and to brief the member countries on its aims so that they could provide moral and material support to it.

Islamic Educational, Scientific And Cultural Organisation. The Summit decided to urge the member countries to create and take adequate measures for its functioning.

It also invited the member States to adhere to this organisation so that a constitute congress could be convened.

Organisation Of The Islamic Solidarity Games. The Summit decided to endorse the resolution passed by the Foreign Ministers' 11th Conference and invited all the member countries to collaborate to regularly organise these games.

The Secretary-General appealed to submitting the Islamic Sports Union's draft

statute to all member countries so that they would consider it.

The Summit also welcomed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's initiative to host the second round in 1982 and invited the member countries to take part in it.

Organisation Issues. The Summit decided in its closing sitting that the Islamic Foreign Ministers' 12th Conference would be convened in Baghdad, capital of Iraq, in the second half of May, 1981.

The Bureau of the Third Islamic Summit will hold its meetings from time to time to follow up any developments related to the implementation of the Summit's resolutions upon which depend in no small way the future and progress of the Islamic world.

The Summit decided the creation of three permanent committees grouped as follows:

The Scientific and Technological co-operation Committee, the Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee and the Information and Cultural Affairs Committee, whose tasks will consist of following up the implementation of the Summit's resolutions in the concerned fields and of considering ways and means of co-operation between the Muslim States in these fields. It is to be recalled that each of these committees will be chaired by a Muslim Head of State.

Following an invitation of H.M. King Hassan II of Morocco to host the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, the Third Summit has welcomed this invitation and approved it with much esteem and gratitude.

The member countries participating in the Third Islamic Summit reiterated expression of deep gratitude to H.M. King Khaled bin Abdul Aziz, Monarch of Saudi Arabia, to HRH Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Crown Prince, and Deputy Premier and to the Saudi Government and people for their unequalled hospitality and generosity met by Monarchs, Presidents, Princes and all the participating delegations in this Summit, who laud the minute and rational organisation which assured success to the Summit meetings in conformity with the initial agenda.

The participants also laud the spirit of fraternity, understanding and concentration which characterised the debates of these meetings. May God guide our steps along the path of success. *Amen!*

Concerning the Islamic Fiqh (theology) body about which the Kingdom presented a memorandum, the Conference decided to:

1. Create a body labelled "the Islamic Fiqh (theology) Academy" having as members theologians, Ulema and men of thought in all fields of knowledge, theological, cultural, scientific and economic, and coming from all over the Islamic world, to study the problems of modern life and carry original research in it in view of presenting solution stemming from Islamic heritage and open on the development of Islamic thought on these problems.
2. Entrust OIC Secretary-General to consult with the Islamic World League to do what is necessary in order to prepare the Academy's statute and present it to the coming Islamic Foreign Ministers, Conference to study it and take necessary measures towards adopting it.



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SPECIAL FEATURE

Helicopters—I

THE AS 332 "SUPER PUMA"

As the missions entrusted to medium weight helicopters during the 1980-2000 period will demand expanded operational possibilities, AEROSPATIALE has incorporated the latest methods and advanced technology in its twin-engine AS 332 *Super Puma*.

The AS 332 *Super Puma* has been designed for civil and military applications, especially off-shore tasks and tactical transport. It entered production with the financial participation of the French Government. The programme was announced during the 1975 Air Show at Le Bourget, and was considered an export bid for the coming decades, as well as a helicopter for modernizing the *Puma* fleets of ALAT and the RAF. The AS 332 *Super Puma* is propelled by two TURBOMECA *Makila* turbojets featuring low specific consumption, and delivers high performance, especially with regard to range. All operational aspects have been expanded owing to new improvements such as the wide track landing gear with high energy absorption capability and kneel-down possibilities, rotor deicing, etc. Furthermore, in order to cope with new air force requirements, the AS 332 *Super Puma* has been subjected to

intensive survivability testing of a type unique in Europe.

Societe AEROSPATIALE is now using 5 already built *Super Puma* for the test programme: the 001 prototype and production units 2001 (taking part in flights that count towards certification), 2002 for endurance testing, 2003 for military experimentation and 2004, which made its first flight on 10 October 1980, and which is the first long version AS 332 (front of fuselage lengthened 76.5 cm to accommodate 3 or 4 additional seats, according to version).

So far, 400 flight hours have been logged during testing, plus 700 hours of experimentation in flight during which various *Super Puma* components were mounted to the SA 330 *Puma*, production version. The *Makila* jet has completed over 6,000 test hours and certification was issued on 27 February 1980.

The following article describes the work done by the engineers of the AEROSPATIALE Company's Helicopter Division, to make the AS 332 *Super Puma* a helicopter of the new generation.

Main and anti-torque rotors are made of composites. This method, developed by the

Helicopter Division since 1965, offers many advantages: imperviousness to corrosion, the possibility of obtaining optimum profiles for a maximum efficiency, excellent resistance to impact, fail safe construction, unlimited life span, reduced maintenance and reduced operating costs. AEROSPATIALE has accumulated much experience in this field, during 3.5 million hours of "blade flight" in conjunction with its *Gazelle*, *Puma*, *Dauphin*, *Ecureuil* and *Super Puma* helicopters.

The laminated main and rear blades carry heating pads on their leading edges, protected by titanium shielding. They are integral with the blade profile. Other helicopter parts also have deicing protection; air intake screen, fairing of rotor hub stops and rear servo control, central windshield, ice detector, circuits installed for accommodating a meteorological radar. Debugging tests have been executed in conjunction with the *SA 330 Puma 04* and the *ALAT Puma* in Denmark, Canada and France. During these tests, 400 flight hours were logged without any major problem. Three of the *ALAT Puma* have already flown more than 50 hours under icing conditions, without problem, and French certification for all icing aspects was issued in 1979.

A "Hot Weather" test campaign was carried out in Egypt, in July 1980, using the *Super Puma* no 2001, which flew from 2 to 3 hours daily for 10 days with outside temperatures of between 43 and 46° C. All performance prognostics were met.

Reducing Vulnerability. Helicopters are often exposed to enemy fire from the ground. Recent combat experience has shown that helicopter loss was mainly due to the following components being vulnerable: metal blades, engines, reduction gear, fuel tanks and the hydraulic tanks associ-

ated with flight controls. The *AS 332* has been designed around this knowledge. It is less vulnerable, and makes use of armouring only as a last resort, as indicated in the adopted solutions listed below:

1—*General helicopter architecture:*

- engines in front, to protect other mechanical parts in the event of head-on fire.
- hydraulic lines entirely separate: a single hit cannot damage both lines.
- electric circuits specially designed to maintain basic functions if one circuit is damaged.

2—*Choice of materials:*

- blades made of composites impervious to the impact of small projectiles (up to 12.7 mm). Following 12.7 mm impacts against attachment areas of skin or spars, fatigue tests with maximum flight loads were executed for 40 hours without any development of damage, which would be impossible with metal blades.

— reduction gear components (gears, bearings) made of massive high tensile steel, for survival after approximately one hour loss of lubricant, instead of 20 to 30 minutes which is the margin available with conventional reduction gears. Testing involving firing into the main transmission case while in operation showed that seizure only started at the 10th impact.

— self-sealing tanks for up to calibre 12.7 mm which allows at least 40 minutes reserves after impact. Furthermore, anti-combustion foam is automatically injected into the tank if it is hit by an incendiary projectile. Furthermore, the space between tank and structure is packed with rigid anti-fire foam.

— Composite alumine/Kevlar armoring developed by AEROSPATIALE used for

crew protection. This shielding represents the best weight surface/ballistic compromise, and can stop any 12.7 mm perforating projectile fired from 200 m at normal angle.

3—Redundancy:

— of motorization. The *AS 332* can continue its mission throughout the flight envelope on a single engine. A single hat against both engines (which are self-protected) is improbable. Shielded rings protect compressor and turbine areas.

— of flight controls, in which the hydraulic line is fully dual.

— of electric circuits (automatic switch-over of 2 circuits).

Anti-Crash Protection. Crash has been closely studied using full-scale mockups. These studies have led to a fuselage structure in which the lower portion withstands all distortions. During crash tests at 10.5m/sec, the greater portion of energy was absorbed by the bottom of the airframe, cockpit area was not substantially reduced, no heavy component (transmission box, rotor or engines) came loose, tanks were not damaged (although located under the cabin floor), and most significantly, the special anti-crash seats with shock absorbers (crew and troops) functioned as planned: vertical acceleration levels measured using dummies, did not exceed the maximum called for level of 20 g in 0.1 second.

Much study was also devoted to the main landing gear. It has a wide track and can absorb 25% of total impact. The tail beam is protected by a rear strut with shock absorber.

Various structural reinforcements have been added that are not carried by the *SA 330 Puma* airframe: reinforcement of

cabin floor, cockpit floor, attachment frames for main landing gear, engine mooring points and general structure of tail beam.

With a maximum weight of 7.8 tons and a capacity of 20 seats (+3 crew members) in the short version and of 8 tons and 24 seats in the long version, the *AS 332 Super Puma* fills a definite need, already proved by the *Puma*, as over 670 of these helicopters were sold in 8 years. The *AS 332* has the same spacious 11.4 m³ cabin as the *Puma*, in the short version and 13.3 m³ in long version. It can be adapted to many different uses, from troop transport (20 seats) to luxury 9 or 12 seat VIP versions or an 18 seat version which is highly suitable to off-shore tasks. The fact that the *Super Puma* can carry a payload of more than 3.9 tons, cruise faster at 291 km/hr (260 km/hr economy cruise) and has an improved 910 km range (with outboard tanks), is also due to its two 1780 hp TURBOMECA *Makila* turbo engines. Their low specific consumption procures a fuel economy of 18% and this is the basis for the increase in payload and/or range. For off-shore connections, the long version *Super Puma* has a range of 420 km without refuelling, plus IFR reserves (or 520 km with 1 extra internal tank).

ILLEGAL GERMAN ARMS SALES TO III WORLD?

The Dusseldorf-based company Rheinmetall Berlin AG is suspected of having evaded German military weapons export laws in shipments of automatic cannons and facilities for munitions production to, among others, South Africa, Argentina and the Middle East countries. German law forbids the export, by German companies, of weapons into areas of political tension. Any applications for exceptions to this are scrutinized in detail by the German government. In response to the accusations, a Rheinmetall spokesman said that all of his company's military exports have been authorized by the government.

According to the company's annual report, the Rheinmetall Group's turnover increased by DM 136.5 million (+ 17.4%) to DM 922.5 million in 1979. The company's "Defense Technology" division played a major role in this increase even though the "Machine Tool" division had a higher rate of turnover. But the incoming orders for the Defense Technology division were higher than those for the Machine Tool division—approximately DM 100 million greater than the turnover. The order backlog at the end of 1979 amounted to approximately DM 1.6 billion.

Although the overall economic conditions provide no basis for exaggerated optimism, Rheinmetall sees the current business year as positive, and the Defense Technology division business for the first four months of 1980 is reported as good.

Members of Rheinmetall's Defense Technology division include: Rheinmetall GmbH, Düsseldorf; Aviatest GmbH, Düsseldorf; Aviatest-Nieberding GmbH, Neuss; Elan Schalt-elemente Kurt Maecker GmbH, Neuss; Rheinmetall Industrietechnik GmbH, Düsseldorf; Nico-Pyrotechnik H.-J. Diederichs KG, Trittau; Rheinmetall International S.A., Brussels, Belgium; and NWM de Kruithoorn B.V., 's-Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands.

Alpha Jet—Successful Cooperation. Slightly more than 10 years ago, in July 1970, the French and German governments selected the Alpha Jet design following an intensive competition. Avions Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation in France and Dornier GmbH in Germany were commissioned to design, build and test four Alpha Jet prototypes under the terms of a Franco-German Memorandum of Understanding in March 1972. No more than 18 months later, on 26 October 1973, Prototype 01 made its successful first flight from Istres in southern France. With nearly 4,000

hours accumulated during the Alpha Jet test programme, few other aircraft have been so thoroughly tested prior to production and its introduction into air force operations. Production go-ahead was issued on 16 January 1976.

Produced by Dassault/Breguet and Dornier, with the participation of the Belgian industry, approximately 500 units of the advanced trainer and fighter-bomber have been ordered to date by eight countries. A total of 13 aircraft per month is being rolled out at final assembly plants at Oberpfaffenhofen, Toulouse and Charleroi. Aircraft No. 100 was delivered in January, '80 and No. 150 was delivered in May. Completion of No. 200 is scheduled for November. By the year-end, five air forces were equipped with Alpha Jets. Although it is a relatively early date in its service phase, it can be said that the Alpha Jet has passed its "maturity test" in all its design missions.

The overall Franco-German programme has been characterized by excellent cooperation. A true and an extremely efficient partnership and teamwork has developed between the industrial partners, the responsible government agencies, the headquarters, commands, staffs and units of the air forces concerned. The overall target has been to stay within time and cost parameters and to produce a reliable, maintainable and potent aircraft which, as an advanced weapons system, fully meets the requirements of the purchasing air forces well into the 1990s. This objective has been met fully.

Future Vague For New Luftwaffe Equipment? Increasing prices of the current major German military procurement projects—mainly the Luftwaffe's programmes, but including some Navy projects—are putting the squeeze on future programmes. The Luftwaffe sees itself facing the increasing

armament of the Warsaw Pact nations whose capabilities are gaining in both quality and quantity. One example is the proliferation of the so-called "Front Units" of the East German air force which have been equipped with the latest Soviet equipment.

Although the Alpha Jet is being integrated into operational units and the MRCA/Tornado will be introduced soon at the operational level, responsible officials are seriously concerned how their future requirements can be met with the ever-dwindling funding available. The Luftwaffe plans to retire its F-4s in the beginning of the 90s. This will create a gap which, in principle, should be filled by a new aircraft capable of air de-

fense missions, low level penetration missions, a fighter-bomber role and ground attack role. This requirement is reflected in the preliminary studies of the TKF 90—a tactical combat aircraft for the 90s. Under the "pressure" of the idea of mutual procurement of a single aircraft type by France, Germany and the U.K., the TKF is now known, more-or-less, as the ECA—European Combat Aircraft. So far, the programme has not shown much tangible results. Just how to get out of this dilemma—the need to meet mutual defense requirements in the face of a low tide in funding—is being studied by the Armament Section of the Federal Ministry of Defense which plans to initiate measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the new Alpha Jet and Tornado generation.