

MIND IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON

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# Defence

# JOURNAL

A MONTHLY MIRROR & DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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# DRUGS & NATIONAL SECURITY

## INDIA:

# INDIA'S SECOND SPACE LAUNCH FIZZLES OUT. INDIGENOUS AWACS PROGRAMME ALSO DELAYED

NET PAID CIRCULATION EXCEEDS THAT OF ANY PROFESSIONAL  
ENGLISH LANGUAGE MONTHLY IN PAKISTAN

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MIND IS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON

**Defence  
JOURNAL**

A MONTHLY REVIEW &amp; DIGEST OF GEO-STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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
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## Drugs and National Security

The nuclear threat to security and human existence remains all too real to be either forgotten or trivialized. No effort is being spared therefore, to nip it in the bud; to make sure that it never materialized. What looked like a mere dream a decade ago could not be too far away from fulfillment; and unless gods would drive us all mad, the first quarter of the 21st century might see a nuclear-safe if not quite a nuclear-free world. The question that we might as well put to ourselves is: would it also be a narco-free world or a sort of a *Brave New World* with Somma holidays and zombies?

Although much less spectacular, the mounting narco-threat is infinitely more insidious and could, in the long run, prove to be even more lethal than the nuclear threat. It poses a serious challenge to national security, in fact to the very existence of civilized society. During the past decade or so, it has assumed epidemic proportions to endanger public health, create parallel and mutually-antagonistic governments and economies within the same country; make crime and violence the order of the day, and the strike, at the very root of the established order.

Across the globe, from Latin America to Europe and Asia, is stretched a giant dragnet of *narcotraficantes*, *mafiosos* and thugs engaging in the drug trade in defiance of the established authority, national and international. A frustrated narco-expert compared the drug trade to an inflated balloon which, when grabbed on one end, bulges on the other.

What makes the situation worse is the element of glamour attaching to the whole deadly business. Unlike the nuclear threat that would, at once, conjure up the vision of doomsday disaster the narco peril remains clouded in the pink haze of romance and ecstatic experience. It unfolds the endless vista of a seductive subterranean paradise — far from the madding crowds — a microcosm of beautiful dreams from which there is no awakening.

The very names given to some of the world's most infamous entrepôts and conduits of narco-traffic might as well be emanations of an essentially romantic idea. Three of these are the *Golden Triangle* (covering Burma, Thailand and Burma in South East Asia); the *Golden Crescent* (comprising Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the *Emerald Triangle* (stretching from northern California to New England's woodlands within the US itself). Of course, the world's largest *narcotraficantes* live and operate from South American countries like Mexico, Panama, Bolivia Colombia etc. They are virtually a state within state wielding more authority than established governments.

"With the drug merchants, increasingly brazen, Colombia is slipping into the same kind of lawlessness that may some day risk comparison with Lebanon's". Reported *Time* in its March 7, 1988 issue.

When Mexican federal police inspected a warehouse used by the Colombian traffickers, they found 100 AK-47 assault rifles, 65,000 rounds of ammunition, 92 bayonets and six infra-red night scopes. Said a high-level Mexican official: "If Mexico allows itself to get caught up in the arms-for-drugs cycle that Colombia is in, I think, the entire tissue of society

could be in danger of collapse". In Mexico itself corruption has penetrated all the levels of the Mexican government so deep that in the words of a US enforcement official: "It's vertical, it's horizontal and it's total".

Only last month (July 88) in Rio De Janero pitched battles occurred between drug traffickers and the law-enforcing agencies during a surprise raid. Approximately 40 heavily armed gunmen fought the police at laboratories which were equipped with computers, radio equipment, centrifuges and electric generators. After the shoot-out, the police used dynamite to destroy laboratories with a capacity of producing 80 Kg. of coca paste per day. Military officials said the plantation which they described as an "ocean of marijuana" was run by peasants linked to guerrilla and drug trafficking groups.

The situation is strongly reminiscent of the pitched battles fought in our own Khyber Agency in 1985 between poppy-growing and poppy-processing tribals led by the Wali Khan Kukikhel (just died) and the law-enforcing agencies—including military and para-military forces. The tribals were alleged to have been involved in growing poppy as well as converting it into heroin. In the Gadoon-Amazai, Dir and Buner areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) the poppy cultivation problem created an almost insurgency-like situation. At the high point of trouble with the recalcitrant poppy-growers pitched battles occurred and regular troops had to be pressed into service. By far the most disturbing feature of the crisis had been the support the poppy growers managed to muster from the powerful local political elements including elected members of the provincial assembly. The miscreants were projected as the aggrieved party *vis-a-vis* the government accused of trying to deprive them of their sole means of livelihood.

In the wake of the Afghanistan crisis poppy cultivation and the drug-trafficking problem also acquired a geopolitical dimension. Whereas it would be hardly fair to blame the Afghan Muhajreens (refugees) and Mujahideens (freedom fighters) wholly for the illegal narcotics trade, the link between the two can be hardly denied. The softening of the border following the expanding torrent of Afghan refugees enormously helped and encouraged narcotic traffic through an area traditionally known for the smuggling of all kinds of contraband. The rise in heroin addiction in and trafficking through Pakistan and the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan have had a simultaneity too obvious to miss. To that extent therefore it would not either unfair or conjectural to blame the Afghan crisis for the drug problem Pakistan is facing today.

Let us now take a look at the threat drug barons pose to *status quo* and established authority. Nowhere else in the world the threat has manifested itself more nakedly than in Panama where General Manuel Antonio Noriega, 50, the military strongman, rules supreme in complete defiance of the established authority. General Noriega has virtually run a parallel government in Panama in complete defiance of the established order. His authority flows from his firm hold on the army's top brass his partners and collaborators in the drug racket. When President Eric Arturo Delvalle requested General Noriega to "voluntarily step down" not only that the General himself would not budge but the national assembly, in an emergency session, voted unanimously to dismiss the President and designate one of the cabinet ministers in his place. As for the Army's high command it stood solidly by Noriega; and when Delvalle in his last desperate bid to save himself offered the top job to Colonel Marcos Justines he drew a blank "None of us wants to be the commander. Our commander is staying. The President is going. We will support Noriega". A senior army officer told the President point blank.

The showdown, according to *Time* (March 7, 1988) spotlighted the "drug-related crisis of authority" that rages through Latin America. Gen. Noriega is a "graphic illustration"

of the power of the drug lords to "intimidate and corrupt" the region's governments. He is known for his intimate connection with the cocaine trade that begins in the jungles of South America and ends in US neighbourhoods from Boston to Beverly Hills.

"The tentacles of the *narcotraficantes*," reported *Time* in its above-mentioned issue, "reach up to top officials and down to the lowly policemen.

"With a nod from cooperative judges and prison officials notorious narcotics peddlers have strolled out of jails in Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Customs and immigration officials in Costa Rica and Bahamas look the other way as some of the hemisphere's most wanted men have walked from their private planes to waiting limousines. Police and military officials in Honduras and Panama have tipped off traffickers to impending raids. Efforts to slow the trade, from destroying coca crops to extraditing traffickers, are bumping against the drug barons' bloody blueprint for expansion."

In Pakistan itself after the drug-related violence in Karachi in December 1986, major arms-drugs operators were believed to have been tipped off an impending government swoop on Sohrab Goth — then Karachi's main narcotics district, trade and transit centre. A section of the national press reported some 20 truckloads of arms and large quantity of narcotics were secretly shifted from Sohrab Goth to other areas of Karachi the evening before the government's *Operation Clean-up* was due to be launched. The then chief minister of Sind had earlier on openly blamed the arms-and-drug mafia for fomenting ethnic and communal violence in the city to keep the administration off their trail.

There are many factors at work behind the alarming expansion of the drug trade. At the root of it, however, remains the institutional democratic failure entailing the emergence of pressure groups that become law unto themselves. In the US as well as Latin America officials insist that drug merchants have been so successful at subverting law-and-order that they have superseded leftist insurgents as the main threat to the region's fragile governments.

They have scant respect for authority except their own and would stop at nothing to use and assert it. At best, they are a god-fatherly lot, at worst, a band of thugs whose sole motivation in life is money and brute power at all costs.

*Conquer-or-die* is Gen. Noriega motto: it's the Noriega syndrome. Kill for money, live for money, die for money. The drug thug has no country, no family, the whole world is his parish and the gang is his family. Whoever opposes him, even if he is one of the family itself, is his enemy to be liquidated at the first opportunity. "If your enemy surrenders," says Gen. Noriega, "it's because he could not kill you." So kill him before he goes for you!

Greed and fear, *plomo o plata* (lead or silver meaning money or the bullet) are the tools, the drug lords wield to lure people into their giant spiderweb and leave them there entangled for the rest of their life. There is no escape from the multi-layered entanglements. The Noriega syndrome, besides heights of crime and corruption also illustrates the geopolitical potential of drug-related power. A CIA protege and a paid agent in the initial stages of his career as a soldier of fortune, Gen. Noriega now poses a major threat to US strategic interests in the Panama Canal and nearby military bases. Through a combination of corruption Gen. Noriega transformed the senior command of Panama Defence Forces (PDF) into something more like an organized-crime family. US officials suspect the General, takes 'a cut' of all the illicit cash flowing through Panama. They believed he had shipped

weapons to the Sandinistans and sold US secrets to Fidel Castro. They were sure that thousands of kilos of cocaine arrived in the United States under his protection.

Gen. Noriega's braggadocio also underscores a certain element of hypocrisy on US part in tackling the drug problem. The US would prefer to look to the other side when the choice is restricted between drug abuse and its own interests. Noriega has been to US what Jurnail Singh Bhandaranwala had been to Mrs. Gandhi. Both had enjoyed official patronage and protection before finally falling out of step with their patrons and protectors.

Noriega has been of value to the US military, particularly the US Southern Command, based in the former canal zone. According to Ambler Moss, US Ambassador to Panama from 1978 to 1982, while the Panama Canal Treaties permit American troops in Panama to defend the canal only, in practice the PDF has not questioned how many US soldiers there are or what they are upto. Noriega has understood clearly his value to the United States; congressional investigators say he "bragged" that as long as he helped the Nicaraguan *contras*, he could manipulate the Americans like "monkeys at the end of a chain".

The Americans are also accused of "double morality" by Latin Americans, particularly by the producers of coca. "Cocaine kills but coca is also life". The Americans are "unbending" towards producers but do little about their own ten million addicts or have any scruples about "accommodating" the capital generated by narco-traffic.

Four major drug producing countries of Latin America — Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, also complain of lack of recognition and support of their efforts in the eradication of drug abuse. Venezuela has declared a "war without quarter" against narcotics traffickers seeking to grow drugs in Venezuela and the guerrillas said to be protecting them. Venezuelan officials suspect that cocaine traffickers and leftist rebels have forged an alliance in the countryside.

The link between *narcotraficantes* and freedom fighters is real enough even if not always visible. The International Narcotics Control Board of the UN in a special report took the view that the problem increased due to the changed political situation in Afghanistan and Iran. The traditional narcotics route from this region to the western world via Turkey has been affected and the traffic diverted through India, particularly through Delhi (via Peshawar/Punjab) and Bombay (via Peshawar/Quetta/Karachi).

Another report submitted before the late National Assembly attributed the emergence of heroin in Pakistan (heroinization of Pakistan) to three factors in 1979. These were, (a) the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan disturbing the opium trafficking route to west, and putting an end to the French and the Sicilian connections; (b) the Iranian revolution which led to a closure of borders and penalties of death to traffickers in Iran; and (c) promulgation of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, and subsequent closure of 330 opium vends and sale points for opium, blocking marketing channel for opium produced in the NWFP.

Coming with dramatic suddenness, the drug racket, in no time, became one of Pakistan's major problems. The word heroin, scarcely ever heard of in Pakistan before 1979 gained country-wide currency claiming some 600,000 addicts. Still in a period of flux following the traumatic events of the 70's (e.g. the loss of East Pakistan; violent agitation against the Bhutto regime its overthrow in July 1977 and the introduction of martial law; the influx of the Afghan refugees from 1979 onwards; anti-government movement approaching the fringe of insurgency in Sind in 1983; standing Indian military threat, above all, ethnic and internal provincial tensions etc.) the drug menace appears to have rendered the country all the more vulnerable to sabotage and subversion engineered by agents provocateurs — internal and external.

Dugs and arms are an agent provocateur's favourite implements to lure unsuspecting people, with access to vital state secrets, into their trap. Its potential as a real threat to national security can be hardly emphasised. Mercifully the menace has not yet permeated our defence establishment but they cannot be said to have been insulated against it. Two service officers — Major Zahooruddin Afridi and Flight Lieutenant Khairur Rahman — had already been implicated in the drug racket. They were hauled up and kept under protective custody from where both escaped under mystifying circumstances. The bulk of rank and file, however, consists of good, God-fearing Muslims with an inbred abhorrence for drugs and intoxicants. Yet the chances of their getting themselves involved in drug trafficking, if not in drug-taking, through inducement offered by anti-social, cannot be ruled out.

Soldiers under stress are known to have taken to drugs sooner than others. According to a number of reports, more than half of the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan became drug addicts. "It was no longer frightening to die after smoking hashish", a Soviet soldier was quoted as saying. The reported descriptions of drug-induced sadism and boredom amongst Soviet-Afghan contingents resemble US veterans' experiences of Vietnam war. Drugs were used so widely because they were cheap and easily available while vodka was not.

The poor morale of the Soviet soldiers had also been evident in the number of desertions (about a hundred) and "fragging" (soldiers within a unit killing each other). Corruption and theft were also rampant among Soviet soldier trading ammunition for drugs with the Afghans. The rapidly sagging morale of the Soviet soldier and the erosion of discipline stemming from drug abuse might have had a lot to do with Kremlin's decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.

Besides the impact of drug-abuse as a health hazard, a social menace, a wrecker of families and a source of crime and violence, its potential as a threat to national security will also have to be kept under close scrutiny and thoroughly analysed. For what may appear to be only a minuscule problem today may well develop into a major threat to national security through a period of change of flux Pakistan is in at present, and going to remain for sometime to come.

—Brig. Abdul Rahman Siddiqi (Retd.)

## Hopes for a Drug-Free World

President Ronald Reagan

[Text of his broadcast on June 25, 1983]

*US President Ronald Reagan announced its commitment to June 26, a date established by the United Nations General Assembly to commemorate the struggle against drug abuse, "to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to a drug-free America, and yes, a drug-free world".*

*In his weekly radio address June 25, President Ronald Reagan said that the leaders of the industrial democracies at the recent Toronto economic summit meeting supported an initiative "to improve international cooperation in combating production, trafficking and financing of the drug trade."*

*President Reagan said that the summit meeting produced other important results: agreement on a plan to provide debt relief for some of the poorest countries of the world, movement on important agricultural reform, and rededication "to combating the modern day evils of airplane hijackings, terrorism and illegal drugs."*

"This past week, I travelled to Canada for my eighth economic summit with leaders of the industrialized democracies. The summit produced important results.

"We agreed on a plan to provide debt relief for some of the poorest countries of the world, we moved important agricultural reform negotiations forward, and we rededicated our nations to combating the modern day evils of airplane hijackings, terrorism, and illegal drugs.

"It's this last matter — the fight against illegal drugs — that I'd like to take a moment to discuss with you this afternoon. This past week's meeting in Canada wasn't the first time the drug problem had been discussed among my summit colleagues. At the 1985 summit in Bonn, we established

an expert group to identify areas for enhancing the effectiveness and cooperation in fighting the scourge of illegal drugs. The expert group presented its report at our 1986 summit in Tokyo, and the report proved useful in setting our countries on a path of cooperation in combating drug abuse and illicit drug-trafficking.

"Now, the summit leaders have supported an initiative for a special group launched by Vice President Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney that would extend and promote the work done by the Bonn summit. This group will propose methods to improve international cooperation in combating production, trafficking, and financing of the drug trade. I'm hopeful this group can identify measures for a major coordinated assault on drugs, but

today the battle against drugs extends far beyond the seven industrialized democracies represented in Toronto.

"Just one year ago, 138 nations — members of the United Nations — met in Vienna to participate in the historic International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. This conference proved a resounding success in bringing together representatives from around the globe. Each of the participating governments declared its commitment to vigorous action against drug abuse and illicit drug-trafficking. Perhaps even more important, the 138 nations adopted a comprehensive outline of activities all nations can undertake to fight illegal drugs. These activities include the reduction of demand for illegal drugs, the suppression of illicit drug production and trafficking, and the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-dependent people.

"One suggestion coming out of the UN conference was the recommendation for a commemorative day, an international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking. The UN General Assembly then set aside June 26th to serve as this day of observance. Around the world, nations will join the United Nations commemorating the international fight against drugs, and I'm pleased that the United States will be among them. Attorney General Meese, who headed our delegation to the conference in Vienna, will host a ceremony to draw attention to the international day and to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to a drug-free America, and yes, a drug-free world.

"Here at home this past week, the White House Conference for a Drug-Free America

released its report. This document included more than 100 recommendations for combating drug-abuse and illicit drug-trafficking. We'll be giving these recommendations careful consideration in the days ahead.

"And there's another important anti-drug effort underway here at home — it was on May 18th that I called on, to use my own words, "both Houses of the Congress, both sides of the aisle, to join with my representatives in a special executive legislative task force to advance America's unified response to the problem of illegal drug use.

"My goal is to combine the expertise of the executive and legislative branches to identify the next steps we should take to stop the illegal use, distribution, and production of drugs, and to begin taking these steps on a bipartisan basis. I'm sure you'll agree, the drug problem is a national problem that demands national solutions and is too important for us to permit partisan bickering. I was pleased that the House and Senator Minority Leaders, Bob Dole and Bob Michel, appointed their representatives to the task force, and I urge the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate to appoint their own representatives quickly so we can get to work.

"Next week, my National Drug Policy Board will recommend specific proposals that would be important to any new drug legislation. Today, illegal drug use is down in our high schools, cocaine and heroin seizures are up, and perhaps most important, attitudes about illegal drugs have changed. But, we're working on, working to make our beloved land what we know it ought to be and can be, a truly drug-free America".

## The Drug War: US Not Doing Enough!

Bernd Debusmann

*The drug trade has, among its various other ominous manifestations, also thrown up the crucial question as to who is to blame more for it—the producer or the consumer country. Though somewhat simplistic and not without a touch of irony, it can be hardly denied that if the consumer decides to abstain, once and for all, the coca or the poppy producer will have to look further field for pastures new. In other words, he simply would have no incentive to invest his time and resource, above all, risk his personal safety for a produce that has no market.*

*Coca, says the Latin American farmer, is his means of livelihood; it is his life. He must therefore produce it for as long as it has a customer and fetches him the price he wants. US happens to be his single largest lucrative market. So instead of depriving him of his one and only lucrative source of livelihood, why not the US streamlines its own law enforcement agencies and educate its young against drug abuse.*

*Furthermore, what gives the American denunciation of the Latin American drug trade a strong ring of hypocrisy is that in spite of all its moralistic rage, it has no scruples at all to accommodate in its bank, the vast fund flowing from the black trade.*

*Polemics apart it's time the menace of drug traffic and abuse were checked, controlled and eventually eradicated both at the user's and the supplier's levels.*

In the international war against drugs, Latin American officials say that Latins tend to do the dying while the United States does the criticising.

In the four major drug-producing countries of Latin America—Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia—there are growing complaints that Latins carry an unfair share of the burden and that their efforts are not given proper recognition.

Such views, contributing to strains in U.S.-Latin relations, were bolstered in mid-

April when the U.S. Senate voted to impose sanctions against Mexico for failing to do enough in the drug war.

"In the campaign against the narcotics traffic...numerous Mexican public servants have given their lives but their sacrifice does not appear to interest those who censure an (anti-drug) effort they fail to recognise," an angry statement by the Mexican Attorney General's office said in reaction to the Senate vote on April 14.

Since 1983, according to Mexican figures,

154 soldiers and police have died in shootouts with drug traffickers.

Officials here often contrast scant U.S. government and media attention to Mexican casualties with the outcry that followed the 1985 murder in Mexico of Enrique Camarena, a U.S. citizen who worked undercover for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

"The life of a U.S. national seems to be infinitely more valuable than the life of a Mexican," said a drug enforcement expert. "While we do the dying, the U.S. criticises, criticises, criticises."

### Consumer's Responsibility

Colombian President Virgilio Barco recently voiced a similar complaint: "While we are fighting a battle in which we lost many good men... consumer countries continue to put almost the entire responsibility (for fighting the drug war) on countries like Colombia."

In Colombia, those killed by cocaine traffickers include a justice minister, a supreme court judge, an attorney general, more than 60 judges, and 25 journalists. Peru and Bolivia have also suffered casualties, though not in the Colombian scale.

Mexico is the biggest single supplier of heroin for the United States, the world's richest market for illicit drugs. Colombia, Peru and Bolivia produce almost all the cocaine consumed worldwide. Drugs have emerged as the most important issue between Washington and the Latin drug producers.

The Senate vote on Mexico stemmed from a 1986 law requiring the suspension of U.S. economic and military aid to countries which fail to "cooperate fully" with the United States in curbing drug production, drug trafficking and money laundering.

Mexico receives almost no aid from the United States apart from some 15 million dollars a year in assistance to its "permanent campaign against the narcotics traffic." But the Senate-proposed sanctions could

affect trade concessions granted to Mexico, the largest beneficiary of the U.S. system of trade preferences.

The measure is yet to be approved by the House of Representatives.

According to several drug experts, a main point of contention between the United States and Latin Americans on root causes of the problem is the Latin view that the United States is not doing enough to curb the domestic demand for illicit drugs which is spurring production.

In the United States, even those who oppose sanctions for a country like Mexico have been relentless in their criticism of Latin American corruption in dealing with the drug trade.

In a report to the Senate preceding the vote, President Reagan warned that sanctions would do more harm than good and said Mexico was making efforts to stem the flow of drugs across the border. But he criticised "endemic corruption" in the government and said this was the most important element in undermining U.S.-Mexican cooperation.

Latin Americans respond to such assertions by saying that Latin America does not have a monopoly on corruption.

"They (the United States) accuse us of being corrupt, but perhaps they are more corrupt than we are," said Javier Lozano Barragan, spokesman for a meeting of Mexican bishops who condemned the Senate vote. "There is one frontier (between Mexico and the United States) but there are customs on either side."

They say that our customs (agents) let drugs pass. But they say nothing about the cocaine and marijuana which flows through their customs on the other side of the border."

According to U.S. government figures, marijuana grown in the United States accounts for roughly a fifth of total U.S. consumption. Some expert estimates say that marijuana has become the number

one cash crop of Hawaii, Alaska and Oregon.

"If the U.S., with all its resources, all its money, all its technological sophistication, has not been able to dent marijuana cultivation at home," said a South American diplomat, "how can they expect impoverished Latin nations to be more effective in ending the cultivation of drug crops which produce much higher profits than marijuana?"

### All-Out War

The government has declared a "war without quarter" against narcotics traffickers seeking to grow drugs in Venezuela and the guerrillas it claims are protecting them.

Venezuelan officials are convinced that cocaine traffickers and leftist rebels have forged an alliance in the countryside, but the most active guerrilla group in the region has denied involvement with narcotics.

The government has already lost its first battle when on one occasion the guerrillas from neighbouring Colombia ambushed a 23-man Venezuelan National Guard patrol destroying a marijuana and coca plantation near Venezuela's border with Colombia. Nine soldiers died.

Although tons of pure cocaine regularly pass through Venezuela each year headed for the United States, the attack shocked officials into recognizing Venezuela's new role as a drug producer. The government fears that Colombia's sizeable drug and guerrilla problem is spilling into Venezuela and blames Colombia for not doing enough to stop it.

According to Venezuelan military estimates, 20,000 hectares (48,000 acres) of marijuana and coca — interspersed with food crops — may already be planted in the Sierra de Perija region in western Venezuela. The June 13 ambush took place there.

They suspect more fields may exist in

the southeast Venezuelan jungles near the border with Brazil. The estimates are rough since the National Guard has not thoroughly searched the region's mountainous and perpetually misty tropical terrain.

But the numbers represent a substantial increase above the several hundred hectares first found in Venezuela last year. Officials called those fields "experimental" because of their small size.

But they also served to give the drug rings a chance to see what the Venezuelan military would, or could, do about them.

The patrol had no secure communications with its home base and no logistical support. The survivors had to hike three days to the nearest guard outpost to report the incident.

The guerrillas used that time to walk less than eight miles (13 km.) to the Colombian border.

General Alfredo Sandoval Hernandez, who retired in early June as national guard commander, claimed following the ambush that the patrols are "autonomous" and trained to survive on their own for months.

Opposition politicians claimed the military command was negligent in leaving the troops so exposed.

Meanwhile, 300 National Guard troops sent to comb the area within days of the incident found nothing but empty rifle cartridges.

### Colombian Guerrillas

The National Liberation Army ELN, a prominent Colombian guerrilla movement, took responsibility for the ambush in a message telexed recently to a Colombia radio station. The group said it had nothing to do with drug trafficking, but was attacking the patrol because the government was harassing Colombian peasants on the Venezuelan side of the border.

The group, one of the most active groups in Colombia and known especially for its attacks on oil installations, addressed its

message to Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi.

"We propose that we and the government you (Lusinchi) head agree on a mutual non-aggression pact. But we are making clear that the ELN has nothing to do with narcotrafficking", said the telex sent to Caracol, Colombia's largest radio network.

Lusinchi declared war. "The government will not rest until those guilty of this crime receive the punishment they deserve", he said in a recent televised speech. "We will not give quarter in this war against the implacable common enemy".

In a recent report on drug activity in the Sierra de Perija, Colonel Felix Bravo Mayol, regional commander for the area, was quoted by the newspaper *El Nacional* as saying, "There are no doubts about an alliance between Colombian guerrillas and the narcotraffickers present at the frontier. The one supports the other".

President Lusinchi asked for Colombia's aid in fighting narcotraffickers "and their strange allies", referring to the guerrillas.

The case prompted complaints about Colombia's role in providing a safe heaven for the guerrillas.

The guerrillas control zones where Colombian troops do not enter, and need only cross the border to escape Venezuelan patrols.

Venezuelan officials say putting up permanent border posts would simply give the guerrillas a fixed target to attack.

Intelligence-sharing treaties have existed for several years. But Venezuelan military officials charged in a congressional hearing that the Colombians did not inform them of guerrilla movements on their side of the border in a joint meeting of top commanders just two days before the ambush.

The Colombian Defence Ministry released a communique in early July denying neglect on its part.

"In the joint meeting, Colombia gave the Venezuelan military authorities the

intelligence and operations information available about the area", it said.

Getting the guerrillas is just one part of the problem.

Venezuela does not have the eradication equipment and chemicals needed to eliminate drug crops. The troops pull the plants out by hand, often shaking loose the seeds while the plants are removed.

Troops also lack the basic communications and transport equipment like helicopters needed to protect themselves while they eradicate according to U.S. anti-narcotics officials.

"It is indispensable to provide more financial resources and equipment. The narcotraffickers are armed and conduct a dirty war", said Congressman David Morales Bello, President of the Internal Politics Committee, at the congressional hearing on the ambush.

By one estimate, the price tag to launch a credible offensive could be between 15-20 million dollars a year, or about 5 per cent of the 1986 military budget.

But the government is under budgetary constraints caused by low oil prices and dwindling foreign reserves.

## Bolivia's War

Fourteen American soldiers and a number of US anti-narcotics officers have been moved from Bolivia's main cocaine-producing region after two bomb attacks on US officers. The bombs, and a protest march and road block last week by 10,000 Bolivian peasants, are the first signs of resistance to one of the most ambitious drug eradication schemes ever devised.

The Bolivian government has put forward a plan which it hopes will eliminate the illegal cultivation of coca, the raw material for cocaine, within three years.

Had such a proposition been put forward a few years ago, it would have produced a barely-suppressed horse laugh in the inter-

national community: Bolivia has long held the heavily contested title of most unstable and disorganised Latin American country. Until returning to democracy in 1982, it had had more military coups than years of independence, and at least one of them was funded by drug money.

But so persuasive is the government of President Victor Paz Estenssoro that it has won the firm promise of \$205m (125m pounds) of the estimated £300m the three-year scheme will cost. The bulk of the money so far has come from the US — which is playing the role, as one observer put it, of "god-father and whipper-in" — but as evidence of its commitment, the Bolivian government is finding 20 per cent of the cost. The scheme should get underway in earnest in October.

The cost is huge, but it shrinks beside the scale of the problem, Bolivia produces between 40 and 50 per cent of the world's coca: revenues from the illicit traffick are greater than Bolivia's total legitimate export earnings. Though the illegal trade dates only from the mid 1970s in Bolivia, by 1980 it had become so ingrained that the military dictator, President Garcia Meza, tried, for a brief period of misrule, to run it virtually as a state concern.

Since then, the collapse of the tin industry, which has thrown 20,000 miners out of work, has swelled the coca traffick's labour force. Now it is estimated that 50,000 hectares of land are devoted to coca production and up to one fifth of the population depends to some degree on the coca trade.

Foreign experts who have been impressed by the Bolivian plan talk in near-apocalyptic terms of the need for international support for the Bolivian government. "For years," said one British expert, "rich consumer countries have been telling poor producer countries they must do something, while producer countries have been saying it's up to the consumer countries".

The Bolivian plan, he argued, was a

make-or-break invitation to consumer countries to put their money where their rhetoric is. "If it succeeds, it could be a model for all the other producer countries, but if Bolivia does not get the support it needs for a plan as good and as comprehensive as this, why should any other producer country bother in the future?"

The Bolivians too see the plan in dramatic terms. If action is not taken urgently, they argue, Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, will simply sink under the power of the drug barons. "We have elections coming up in 1989," said one Bolivian official. "If we haven't got this thing under way by then, it is perfectly possible that the traffickers will buy the next election."

Adding to the urgency of the crisis is the new problem of addiction and drug abuse within Bolivia itself. Coca, as the nationalist lobby in Bolivia constantly argues, has been cultivated and consumed for thousands of years and is part of the country's cultural heritage. But coca leaf was traditionally chewed by the population of the altiplano as an antidote to cold and hunger. Today's consumption is increasingly of refined coca, a pattern which has generated widespread addiction amongst young people and even children.

To try to reverse the impending catastrophe, the plan envisages a three-stage process: interdiction, or the forcible suppression of the traffick through the destruction of laboratories, airstrips and factories, with the objective of bringing the purchase price down below 50 cents a kilo, the estimated cost of production; eradication of 50,000 hectares of coca fields, initially through a voluntary programme which for a year will pay farmers for uprooting their bushes, followed by enforced eradication with no compensation, and a programme of rural development aimed at providing producers with an alternative living.

This phase includes the development of rural infrastructure and the relocation of

many peasants who have migrated in recent years into the new coca areas of the tropical Chaparre region. The plan will leave 10,000 hectares in licensed cultivation in the traditional coca areas of the Yungas.

The programme, international experts agree, is impressive, but Bolivia has been confronted with what the Bolivian ambassador to Washington, Fernando Ilianes, calls "a credibility problem." Put less delicately, previous eradication programmes have been bedevilled by a combination of incompetence, corruption and lack of official commitment. This government, its supporters argue, is different.

In his 19 months of office President Paz Estenssoro has succeeded, albeit at high social cost, in stabilising the economy. He has brought inflation down from its 1985 rate of 8,171 per cent — another of Bolivia's unenviable records — to 66 per cent last year and falling. A government which can do that, Mr. Ilianes argues, deserves to be taken seriously.

But sceptics — and there still are many, in spite of the success of fund-raising so far — argue that this has been possible without a major social explosion precisely

because of the cushioning effect of at least part of the £350m annual coca-dollars sluicing back into the economy.

If the government manages to implement its plan, the sceptics argue, there will be real trouble in Bolivia.

The Bolivian government is not immune to such fears, but intrinsic in the plan is the challenge to western governments to acknowledge that as long as countries like Bolivia remain dramatically impoverished, the drug trade will be an overwhelming temptation for large sectors of the population. The long-term success of drug eradication depends on establishing and marketing alternative export crops.

But the history of crop substitution is a depressing one, littered with schemes which have begun, only to run foul of internal protectionist lobbies and massive food subsidies in developed countries. In one famous example, in Mexico in 1978, marijuana producers were persuaded to switch their talents to tomatoes, which they successfully exported to the US until the Florida Tomato Growers Association succeeded in getting a large tariff imposed on their product.

# Drug Control Over the Years: A History

Staff Study

Drugs have been used since civilisation began — for healing and controlling pain, for sacrament, for altering mood and behaviour. But the expansion of trade and communications in the late nineteenth century took the issue of drugs use beyond national borders and cultures, helping to create a new problem — international traffic in narcotic drugs.

International co-operation for drug control began in 1909, with a 13-nation meeting of the Opium Commission in China — considered the first international conference on narcotic drugs. That forum paved the way for the signing in 1912 of the International Opium Convention, known as The Hague Convention — the first drug control treaty. This and subsequent agreements form the legal basis of the present international drug control system.

Following is a brief history of global efforts to control drug production and shipments, halt the flow of illicit drugs and reduce drug abuse.

## Early history

**1909:** Representatives of 13 nations meet at Shanghai to discuss ways to control illegal traffic in drugs.

**1912:** The *International Opium Convention* — the first binding international instrument governing the shipment of narcotic drugs — was signed at The Hague, Netherlands. Entering into force in 1915, it aimed at controlling the transport of drugs deemed necessary for medical use.

**1920:** The first Assembly of the League of Nations established an *Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs*. Under League auspices, three main drug conventions were developed over the next two decades.

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June 26 marked the first annual observance of the 'International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking'. The main purpose of this observance was to raise the level of world-wide awareness of the dangers of drug abuse, and to generate universal action to combat the drug problem in all its forms at the national, regional and international levels. The recommendation for the Day was first made by the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, held in Vienna in June 1987. Later that year, as an expression of its determination to strengthen action and cooperation at all levels in the fight against drug abuse, the United Nations General Assembly decided to observe the International Day each year.

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**1925:** The League set up a Permanent Central Board of experts to supervise the statistical control system introduced by the second *International Opium Convention*. It was signed in 1925 and entered into force in 1928. The Board established a system of import certificates and export authorisations for licit international trade in narcotic drugs. Also, an international

agreement was signed to suppress opium smoking.

**1931:** The *Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs*, signed in 1931, came into force in 1933. It introduced a compulsory estimates system aimed at limiting the amounts of drug-manufacture to those needed for medical and scientific needs. A Drug Supervisory Body was set up by the League of Nations to monitor the operation of the system. A second agreement against opium smoking was signed.

**1936:** The *Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs* was the first international instrument to call for severe punishment for illegal traffickers. It entered into force in 1939.

#### U.N. involvement

**1946:** Under the 1946 *Protocol*, the drug control responsibilities formerly carried out by the League of Nations were transferred to the United Nations. The functions of the Advisory Committee were assigned to the newly-established Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council. The Division of Narcotic Drugs was also created, to act as the secretariat for the Commission and serve as the central repository of United Nations professional and technical expertise in drug control.

**1948:** The 1948 *Protocol* bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of 1931 Convention imposed controls on the new synthetic compounds that emerged after the Second World War. It entered into force on 1 December 1949.

**1953:** The 1953 *Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in and Use of Opium*, which came into force in 1963, limited opium use and trade to medical and scientific needs, and placed controls on opium stocks that countries could legally maintain. Only seven countries—Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, the USSR

and Yugoslavia—were authorised to produce opium for export. The Permanent Central Board was given specific supervisory and enforcement responsibilities.

**1961:** In an effort to simplify and consolidate international drug machinery, the *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs* was adopted on March 31, 1961. The new instrument, which entered into force on December 13, 1964, codified all existing multilateral treaty laws and merged the Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body into the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The cultivation of plants grown as raw material for natural narcotic drugs was placed under control. Existing controls on production of opium and its derivatives—morphine, heroin and codeine—were continued and coca bush and cannabis were placed under international control, obliging Governments to limit production of those drugs to amounts needed for medical and scientific use.

The Convention introduced new obligations related to medical treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. In addition, it prohibited such traditional practices as opium smoking and eating, coca-leaf chewing and hashish (cannabis) smoking and the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes. However, a transition period was established to allow States concerned to overcome difficulties that might arise from abolishing those ancient practices.

The 1961 Convention, hailed as a major achievement in the history of international narcotics control, was further strengthened by the 1972 *Protocol amending the Single convention*, which came into force on August 8, 1975. As of February 1987, there were 76 parties to the 1972 Protocol.

**1971:** Until 1971, only narcotic drugs were subject to international control. The *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*, signed in 1971 and which entered into force on August 16, 1976, extended controls to include a broad range of man-

made behaviour-altering and mood-altering substances that could lead to harmful dependencies. These included: hallucinogens such as LSD and mescaline, stimulants such as amphetamines, and sedative-hypnotics such as barbiturates.

Because of the differences in risks in using the wide variety of substances placed under control by the 1971 Convention, and their widely varying therapeutic values, four separate "Schedules" were developed. Schedule 1, which imposes the strictest controls, lists substances, including hallucinogens, whose use, manufacture, distribution, export/import, or possession is virtually prohibited except for scientific and very limited medical purposes.

Schedules 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention, which include amphetamines, barbiturates and common non-barbiturate sedatives such as Valium and Miltown, dictate that parties must apply specific control measures to limit the manufacture, export, import, distribution, stockpiling, possession, trade in and use of those substances to medical and scientific purposes. Licensing for trade, manufacture, distribution or possession is required. Prescriptions may be written by physicians in line with sound medical practice.

The 1971 Convention, which had 85 States parties as of February 1987, also regulates inspection of stocks, records and laboratory premises, and bans advertising to the general public. Other provisions, relate to ensuring early identification, treatment, education, after care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are addicted. Other articles address illicit traffic in such drugs and penalties.

The World Health Organisation (WHO), was designated to make medical determinations as to whether, a new substance should be covered by the Convention. (For a drug to qualify, it must stimulate or depress the central nervous system, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function, thinking, behaviour, perception or

mood; be capable of producing a state of dependence; and its abuse must produce ill effects similar to those caused by substances already scheduled.)

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, after considering other factors, such as the extent of known abuse and trafficking, makes the final decision on scheduling the drug.

Responsibility for ensuring compliance with the 1961 Single Convention, the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention rests with the Commission and the INCB.

**1981:** The sharp increase in drug problems by the end of the 1970s led to the formulation by the General Assembly in 1981 of an *International Drug Abuse Control Strategy* and a five-year (1982-1986) action programme. The Strategy stated that "all international drug control treaties are designed to guarantee the availability of these substances for valid medical use and at the same time to protect society by preventing their misuse and abuse". It outlined a series of policy measures dealing with various aspects of drug control, traffic and treatment of addicts.

The six-point Strategy called for improving the international drug control system through such measures as wider adherence to existing treaties, and for co-ordinating efforts to ensure a balance between supply and demand of drugs for legitimate use. Steps to eradicate the illicit drug supply and reduce illicit drug traffic were recommended, including finding income-producing alternatives for illicit drug producers and intensifying efforts to find and dismantle clandestine labs and trafficking organisations. Measures to prevent drug abuse and promote treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug abusers were also recommended in the Strategy.

The programme of action set out specific activities for the United Nations and member governments to achieve the objectives of the Strategy. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was asked to monitor

and co-ordinate implementation of those objectives.

1984: In its *Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse* (39/142), adopted in December 1984, the General Assembly characterised drug traffic and abuse as "an international criminal activity" that constituted "a grave threat to the security and development of many countries and peoples and should be combated by all moral, legal and institutional means, as the national, regional and international levels".

The Declaration identified the eradication of such activities as the collective responsibility of all States, and affirmed the willingness of Member States to intensify efforts and co-ordinate their strategies in that area.

Also in 1984, the Commission on

Narcotic Drugs was asked (Assembly resolution 39/141) as a matter of priority to begin preparing a new international *Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* to address areas that seemed to be inadequately covered by existing instruments. Work on the draft is continuing under the auspices of the Commission.

**1987:** The most recent United Nations effort in the area of international drug control was the convening of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, from 17 to 26 June in Vienna. Initiated by the Secretary General in 1985, the ministerial-level conference focussed on developing long-term drug control strategies, policies and activities to attack at the national, regional and international levels drug abuse and illegal trafficking.—U.N. Chronicle.

# Narco-Terrorism: The Indian Connection

Anirudhya Mitra and Aditya Sinha

*Further inquiry revealed that some Sri Lankan guerrillas had worked out a route for drug trafficking as early as in 1983, in which they had planned to use Delhi as the "approach point" and Bombay as the "exit point". They started entering Pakistan through Punjab before reaching the Pakistani exit points of the drug, Karachi and Islamabad. To disguise their origin of travel, they would leave Karachi for Bombay before the drug was taken out to the West from Bombay.*

*While most of these ethnic groups are involved in trafficking of heroin from the Golden Crescent, the north-east insurgents continue to bring in small but increasing amounts of contraband drugs from the Golden Triangle (Burma-Thailand-Laos); hence NCB sources termed the north-east sector equally vulnerable". Heroin, in particular, is crossing the western Burma frontier into Assam, from where, instead of coming to Delhi or Bombay, the Drug is first carried to Chittagong in Bangladesh. At the same time, acetic anhydride is being illicitly transported from India to the clandestine heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle.*

The nexus between narcotic smuggling and terrorism has become so pronounced that law enforcement agencies have coined the word "narco-terrorism" to describe the phenomenon. And nowhere it is more prevalent than in Delhi, which has emerged as the major transit point for heroin originating in the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistani), destined for the West.

Ethnic groups, operating in India, who found their militant cause with drug money include not only Punjab extremists but also Sri Lankan Tamils, Afghans, Nepalese and Nigerians — the most active African drug trafficking group who have enlisted Ghanians, Gambians, Kenyans, Ivoirians and Tanzanians as couriers.

## Interpol Reports

Latest INTERPOL reports suggest that in "view of the voluminous cargo now exported to West and Europe from both air and sea ports on the Indian sub-continent, these groups having their own communities in various parts of the world, have formed a potential drug network". While Punjab extremists undoubtedly play the dominant role, the involvement of the other groups is equally alarming....

Following a major crackdown upon these traffickers by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) last year, 44 Nigerians were arrested in 33 seizures of 44 kgs of heroin, 8 kgs of morphine, 10 kgs

of cocaine and 10 kgs of amphetamines, the majority of which were seized at Delhi and Bombay airports.

Smuggling by Nigerian drug couriers in India, first surfaced in 1984, when several students from that country after obtaining admission in Indian universities, fell prey to Nigerian drug syndicates based in Lagos, and became couriers back to Africa. In 1986, 500 Nigerians were arrested in 22 countries with seizures totalling 150 kgs of heroin, 90 per cent of which was obtained from India.

Nigerians, who made up 65 per cent of the couriers, are known as "stuffers" because of their personal preference of smuggling heroin by stuffing it in their body cavities. In fact, the Nigerian couriers have introduced a new phenomenon to India: cocaine. INTERPOL notes that the spurt in amount of cocaine seized, from 1 kg for both 1984 and 1985, to 14 kgs in 1986, should be carefully considered. "Five years ago in Europe, cocaine was a minor problem too, the report points out, but the cocaine syndrome there has changed completely as the latest report (Feb. 1988) by the same organisation indicates.

### Cocaine in India

Cocaine in India though is popular only among Bombay film industry people and the law enforcement agencies are baffled as to where it is coming from. Part of it is going to Lagos from Bombay via Cameroon. Following a recent seizure of 10 kgs of high quality cocaine in Kathmandu persons involved in the smuggling later revealed during the course of investigation that the drug had originated from Bombay and Delhi in two instalments.

But other ethnic groups operating in the Indian sub-continent are no less active than the Nigerians. Sri Lankan and Nepalese continue to carry heroin successfully to the West despite many arrests and seizures by enforcement agencies since 1985.

Observations by Indian enforcement agencies and INTERPOL reports reveal that Sri Lankan Tamils are easily recruited for this purpose. While some do it because they are penniless refugees, "most do it to support their militant cause in the Sri Lankan strife." In 1986, 150 Sri Lankans were arrested world-wide, with a total of 66 kgs of heroin originating from Pakistan. No doubt that India was used as the "most convenient" transit point in most of these cases according to INTERPOL sources. Similarly, 180 were arrested with 153 kgs in 1985 and 203 with 96 kgs in 1984.

### Sri Lankan Guerrillas

Further inquiry revealed that some Sri Lankan guerrillas had worked out a route for drug trafficking as early as in 1983, in which they had planned to use Delhi as the "approach point" and Bombay as the "exit point". They started entering Pakistan through Punjab before reaching the Pakistani exit points of the drug, Karachi and Islamabad. To disguise their origin of travel, they would leave Karachi for Bombay before the drug was taken out to the West from Bombay.

While most of these ethnic groups are involved in trafficking of heroin from the Golden Crescent, the north-east insurgents continue to bring in small but increasing amounts of contraband drugs from the Golden Triangle (Burma-Thailand-Laos); hence NCB sources termed the north-east sector equally "vulnerable". Heroin, in particular, is crossing the western Burma frontier into Assam, from where, instead of coming to Delhi or Bombay, the drug is first carried to Chittagong in Bangladesh. At the same time, acetic anhydride is being illicitly transported from India to the clandestine heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle.

Taking a cue from the north-east insurgents and other groups, the Punjab extremists took full advantage of the emergence of the Golden Crescent as the major

source of heroin, and India as its major transit point. It became mutually convenient for both the suppliers and the terrorists. As for the former, they found ready couriers on the labyrinthine Indo-Pak border among the terrorists, for whom smuggling became an easy source of funding their militant activities.

When the Delhi police caught the dreaded terrorist Harjinder Singh alias 'Jinda' last August, they did not expect that he would turn out to be a regular smuggler of heroin. Yet they found high grade heroin on him, and CBI investigations later led to the discovery that other terrorist gangs including those of Bairagi and Mathura Singh, under his (Jindal's) control, dominated drug smuggling along the Indo-Pak border in the Punjab sector till the middle of 1987.

INTERPOL reports say that 130 Indians dominated by Punjab extremists, were

arrested with 180 kgs of heroin in 1986, 166 were arrested with 351 kgs in 1985 and in 1984, 171 were arrested with 204 kgs of heroin. Last year's figures have not yet been revealed although enforcement agencies say the volume has definitely increased.

CBI officials dealing with Punjab say that catching the young couriers in Punjab has become difficult since most of them have started taking shelter in the Golden Temple. A truck driver arrested with 50 kgs of high quality of heroin and about 400 kgs of hashish in Ludhiana last month by the Customs Preventive Authority later confessed during interrogation that all those behind the syndicate were hiding inside the Golden Temple.

(Excerpted from  
*The Times of India*, 17-2-88)

# Prevention Strategies for Drug Abuse

Michael S. Goodstadt

*Few drug abuse experts believe that the so-called war on drugs recently launched by Congress and the White House is likely to win any quick victories. Much of the added resources will be used to expand enforcement strategies that have brought disappointing results in the past. There will be new emphasis on efforts to persuade Americans, especially young people, to reject drugs, but experts concede that they know very little about how to prevent drug experimentation and addiction.*

*In this article Michael S. Goodstadt, head of Education Research Programme, Prevention Studies Department, Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation, in Toronto, argues that no single approach to prevention is likely to be effective for all drugs and all stages of drug use. Prevention strategies, he says, must be tailored to the characteristics of the user, the drug, and the use.*

*Available evidence suggests that most previous prevention efforts including school-based programmes have had little or no impact because they have focused on only one element of the problem, Goodstadt writes. Prevention strategies will be ineffective in reducing illicit drug use, he says, if they fail to address the abuse of alcohol, tobacco, and prescription drugs as well.*

*Michael S. Goodstadt received a B.A. from Victoria University, Manchester, England, in 1963 and a Ph.D in Psychology from Stanford University in 1969. Before joining the staff of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation in 1972, he taught at the University of Western Ontario. He has written extensively on strategies for the prevention of alcohol and drug abuse.*

Throughout history many societies have attempted to reduce the problems associated with drug use,<sup>1</sup> yet most appear to have simultaneously tolerated or even promoted the use of drugs. In the United States and Canada recent concern about drug use has at times reached an hysterical pitch, but citizens continue to be encouraged, through manufacturing

and marketing, to use a wide variety of recreational and therapeutic drugs. This schizophrenic attitude toward drug use is most apparent in our love affair with alcohol, tobacco, over-the-counter remedies, and medically prescribed drugs that—despite documented economic, health, and social costs—continue to be subsidized by governments, advertised by manufac-

turers, and overindulged in by consumers.

Individuals, communities, the media, and politicians are analyzing the nature and seriousness of the current drug problem and have proposed a variety of remedial government strategies. These strategies, however, seem more appropriate to wars of liberation and resistance to an outside oppressor than to moderating an historically pervasive human behaviour. The range of such strategies has included crop defoliation, airborne antidrug military units for overseas use, drug screening of job applicants and those in so-called sensitive positions, increased funding for the Coast Guard and drug enforcement agencies, use of illegally obtained evidence in drug-trafficking cases, increasingly severe legal penalties, greater educational efforts, and more treatment programmes and facilities.

What is the likelihood that this variety of strategies will be effective? Are there more effective ways to address the problem of drug use? Answers to these questions require a more complete understanding of the origins and extent of drug use and drug abuse.

The Reagan administration's recent declaration of war on drugs has been accompanied by wide-ranging debate regarding the nature and dimensions of the problem. This is an important debate because it is vital to determine whether drug use and abuse are increasing, whether they have stabilized or even declined, and whether drug abuse occurs in specifiable sub-groups or in the population at large. There are many more precise epidemiological data that can provide valuable information for planning prevention strategies.

Effective prevention requires an understanding that drug use encompasses many substances. In the United States and Canada this broad definition means the use of alcohol; tobacco; over-the-counter medications; medically prescribed drugs; legally available chemicals, including

inhalants and solvents found in adhesives and glues; and other drugs controlled or prohibited by law. Recent evidence suggests that with the exception of cocaine (and its cousin, "crack"), drug use in North America is not epidemic in the epidemiological sense of a sudden rapid spread, growth or development, although it may have reached pandemic—or widespread—and unacceptable proportions.<sup>2</sup>

### Drugs Use/Abuse

In discussions of the drug problem, the terms "drug use" and "drug abuse" are sometimes used interchangeably. In reality, however, drug use is not equivalent to drug abuse. Most people who use alcohol, tobacco, inhalants, solvents, or over-the-counter or prescribed drugs do not abuse these products. Moreover, most people do not use illegal drugs;<sup>3</sup> the overwhelming majority of users of illegal drugs do so on an infrequent basis;<sup>4</sup> a large proportion of those who try illegal drugs do not continue to use the drugs;<sup>5</sup> and the use of so-called gateway drugs (for example, alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana) does not inevitably lead to the use of or addiction to harder drugs.<sup>6</sup>

Strictly speaking, the achievement of a drug-free society is impossible. A reasonable and effective prevention strategy should strive for the prevention of drug abuse and abstinence from drug use where this is appropriate.

There is no cause-and-effect relationship between an individual's use of any drug and his use of a variety of other drugs. However, drug use does not occur in a vacuum. Personal drug use is related to the individual's use of other drugs, to the use of drugs in his immediate social environment (by siblings, parents, and peers) and to drug use in the larger society. It is unlikely that preventive strategies will be effective in reducing illicit drug use if they fail to deal with the abuse, for example, of alcohol and prescription drugs.

Effective prevention strategies also require honesty on the part of those who prescribe them. Too often, societies have focused their efforts on a limited range of substances involving a circumscribed subgroup of the population. Such a focus may be practical, but it is likely to be perceived by the subgroup itself as a form of scapegoating. Young people, especially, have been the victims of such an approach and—not without justification—have represented much that has passed for drug prevention.<sup>7</sup>

### Prevention Strategies

Drug prevention strategies have rarely been based on etiological analysis—that is, on an analysis of the causes of drug abuse and its attendant problems. Recent etiological research suggests several conclusions.<sup>8</sup> First, the evidence regarding drug use tends to be limited to the young and to patients enrolled in treatment programmes. Second, most attention has been given to factors associated either with the initiation of drug use or with addiction and other problematic drug use; little attention has been given to nonuse or to the escalation or the cessation of drug use. Third, no single factor or array of factors (for example, personality or sociodemographic factors) is consistently associated with the many forms of drug use and abuse—nor should one expect this to be the case.

The factors associated with drug use and abuse can be usefully summarized according to (1) drug category (for example, alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, other illicit drugs, over-the-counter medications, and prescription drugs), (2) the stage of drug use (for example, nonuse, initiation, cessation, maintenance, escalation, reinitiation, addiction) and (3) the etiological focus, be it individual (for example, genetic, socio-demographic, personality, attitudinal, behavioural), interpersonal (for example, parental and peer influences), or societal (for example, societal norms, drug avail-

ability, advertising, and agenda setting by the media).

The etiological foundations of drug use suggest that no single approach to prevention is likely to be effective for all drugs and all stages of drug use. Prevention strategies must be tailored to the characteristics of the user, the drug, and the use. Strategies should incorporate an understanding of the personal, social, and societal influences associated with a particular form of drug use. The precise mixture of policies will depend on the relative power of these influences, as suggested by empirical evidence and experience—for example, the influence of social modeling by parents and peers is probably more significant than the influence of personality factors. The choice of strategies will also depend on the feasibility of manipulating alternative etiological factors—for example, genetic factors related to alcohol are less readily influenced than factors related to the availability of alcohol.

Evidence concerning the effectiveness of prevention strategies is scarce, and the evidence that does exist suggests that most previous prevention efforts have had limited or no impact.<sup>9</sup> This discouraging finding is attributable to the fact that most prevention strategies have for understandable reasons focused on only one domain of influence—personal influence through school programmes, social influence through teaching refusal skills, or societal influence through prohibition and law enforcement.<sup>10</sup>

One of the greatest disappointments for those involved with the prevention of drug abuse is the apparent failure of school-based programmes. There is no consistent evidence that these programmes have positive effects, and some evidence indicates that they may even have negative effects, such as more reported drug use or more pro-drug attitudes after a programme than before.<sup>11</sup>

Recent experience with antismoking

programmes<sup>12</sup> has led to renewed optimism that programmes designed to promote personal and social skills, such as those that teach stress management, refusal skills, and communication skills, will be effective in preventing the abuse of alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs.<sup>13</sup> These programmes appear to deal with a range of relevant factors in a sophisticated way. However, early evidence suggests that we cannot presume that such an approach will be effective with drugs other than tobacco. It is not even clear which factors have been most significant in achieving recent changes in smoking habits.<sup>14</sup> Once again, prevention programmes have to be carefully tailored; one cannot generalize from experience with tobacco to other drugs.

### Schools Ar'nt Enough!

Current research suggests that school-based education is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in preventing drug abuse. Schools provide an opportunity for imparting accurate knowledge, systematically examining values, learning and practising decisionmaking, and learning to cope with social forces within a controlled setting. Schools by themselves, however, cannot counter the range of powerful forces that operate outside the walls of the classroom and school. Therefore, school-based programmes require the support of complementary home-based and community-based programmes.

Schools face the challenge of developing and implementing programmes appropriate for the needs of their heterogeneous populations. Most evaluated school programmes have focused on students considered as a homogeneous group, failing to consider differential needs or effects. However, student bodies may be composed of a diversity of subgroups that have never tried drugs, are experimenting with drugs, have quit using drugs, or are using drugs in problematic ways.

Societies have placed their faith in the

deterrent effects of the law as frequently as they have relied on education. The law and related government regulations and policies have received greater attention and financial support than alternative prevention strategies.<sup>15</sup> It is especially disappointing, therefore, that law enforcement efforts have had so little documentable impact on drug abuse.<sup>16</sup>

Law enforcement and related government action is directed exclusively at the supply component of the drug use equation. But human behaviour is the product of both demand and supply factors. Given an almost limitless supply of drugs and the many alternative sources of such supply, it is difficult to reduce drug use through interdiction by law enforcement agencies.

One may even ask what purpose is served by the law in efforts to prevent drug use. This question involves unresolved issues concerning the educational impact of the law and the limited deterrent effectiveness of the law for nonmarginal, or socially conforming, populations. Research suggests, for example, that the law prohibiting marijuana use has little deterrent effect either for those who do not use the drug—they abstain for reasons other than the prohibition—or for the users—since they are not deterred. The law, however, may serve a positive function in defining, establishing, or reinforcing social norms. Thus, tougher drunk driving laws have recently reflected growing societal concern with this issue. On the other hand, laws that do not accurately reflect existing social norms are apt to be ineffective or counter-productive. This is likely to be one of the weaknesses of recent proposals to extend compulsory drug testing.

The proposed widespread use of drug testing to control drug use appears to combine elements that guarantee its eventual failure except in very restricted circumstances, such as in the military. Compulsory drug testing and coercive voluntary

testing seem to place in jeopardy several principles of justice, including protection against self-incrimination. Drug testing involves the additional jeopardy of incrimination on the basis of unreliable methods of detection, given current technology. Only if citizens are prepared to forego normal protections under the law and are personally prepared to pay the price of errors in detection will compulsory testing measures receive long-term popular support.

### Drugs Promotion

In practical terms, policymakers, prevention-Programme planners, and other government officials need to change the way they think about drugs and drug abuse. In turn, changes in their understanding about drugs should result in changes in government-initiated policies and programmes.

Recent statements in the United States and Canada appear to reflect no fundamental shift in attitudes toward drugs on the part of government; rather, they are simply stronger manifestations of already existing attitudes. We must ask whether a broader appreciation of the nature, extent, origins, and consequences of drug use would not better serve our countries. If they were to subsume alcohol, tobacco, medications, and prohibited substances under the rubric of drugs, government officials would then be obliged to examine the relative costs and benefits to society of all these drugs. They would probably conclude that the harm done in all domains—economic, health, social, and so forth—by alcohol and tobacco outstrips the damage done by other drugs. Our governments would be forced to re-examine their priorities in establishing policies. Policymakers would be obliged to question the value of subsidizing the production of beverage alcohol and tobacco. They would have to consider how our societies encourage the use of drugs through advertising and other promotional activities and promote the

use of drugs through integration of drug use into the daily lives of citizens. The more subtle promotion of drug use in the various media, such as in television programming, should be a cause of concern to both policymakers and television producers.

How effectively are governments employing their potential control over the availability of drugs? For example, how are governments using the taxation of alcohol and tobacco to protect and promote health? Are governments as concerned about the availability of alcohol within the immediate vicinity of schools as they are about the availability of illegal substances?

Finally, governments would be obliged to examine the proportionality between the legal consequences associated with various forms of drug use. Are the possible sentences for offences involving alcohol, tobacco, and medications in proportion to the sentences for offences involving other drugs, and are the laws regarding the various drugs administered in equivalent fashion?

A more comprehensive view of drug use would have a direct impact on the planning and implementation of prevention programmes. In what way will new educational programmes, for example, serve more than an agenda-setting function by raising levels of awareness and concern? How will new programmes deal with the need to aim their efforts at well-defined user groups? How will governments ensure that budgets are being effectively and efficiently used? How will governments overcome previous problems of ensuring adequate evaluation of programme impact? How will governments overcome the jurisdictional problems that arise from the U.S. federal system and Canada's confederation of provinces?

Recent prevention programmes have been broadened to include adolescents, parents, and the nonschool community. This positive shift should be extended to mobilize

more of the community, including those responsible for the promotion and distribution of legal drugs, opinion leaders, local policymakers, and law enforcement personnel. More significantly, this multi-pronged approach should be further broadened to include population groups other than the young and to specifically include licit drugs.

Much has been done to modify public and private use of tobacco; federal, state,

and local ordinances have been enacted to bolster and capitalize on the past quarter-century's educational efforts to curb smoking. Similar widely based community efforts have tackled the problem of drunk driving. Although we must be cautious in generalizing about all drugs based on these experiences, they do set an example for the coordinated educational, policy, and legal strategies that have relevance for youthful and adult populations.

#### NOTES

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation.*

1. See, for example, Ernest L. Abel, *Marijuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years* (New York: Plenum Press, 1980); Paul Aacon and David Musto, "Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview," in *Alcohol and Public Policy Beyond the Shadow of Prohibition*, ed. Mark H. Moore and Dean R. Gerstein (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1981). Reginald G. Smart and Alan C. Ogburn, *Northern Spirits: Drinking in Canada Then and Now* (Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, 1986); Patricia G. Erickson et al., *The Steel Drug: Cocaine in Perspective* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987).

2. See, for example, Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and Jerald G. Bachman, *Drug Use Among High School Students, College Students, and Other Young Adults: National Trends through 1985* (Rockville, Md.: National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1986); Reginald G. Smart et al., "Trends in the Prevalence of Alcohol and Other Drug Use Among Ontario Students: 1977-1983," *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 76 (1985): 157-62.

3. Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, *Drug Use*.

4. Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman, *Drug Use*.

5. Michael S. Goodstadt et al., "Factors Association with Cannabis Nonuse and Cessation of Use: Between and Within Survey Replications of Findings," *Addictive Behaviours* 11 (1986), 275-86.

6. For a discussion of the progression in drug use and the causal relationships associated with multiple drug use, see, for example, Diana Baumrind, "Specious Causal Attributions in the Social Sciences: The Reformulated Stepping-Stone Theory of Heroin Use as an Exemplar," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45 (1983): 1289-98; John E. Donovan and Richard Jessor, "Problem Drinking and the Dimension of Involvement with Drugs: A Guttman Scalogram Analysis of Adolescent Drug Use," *American Journal of Public Health* 14 (1984): 543-51; S. W. Sadava, "Concurrent Multiple Drug Use: Review and implications," *Journal of Drug Issues* 14 (1984): 632-36; Kazuo Yamaguchi and Denise B. Kandel, "Patterns of Drug Use from Adolescence to Young Adulthood: II. Sequences of Progression; III. Predictors of Progression," *American Journal of Public Health* 74 (1984): 668-72, 673-81.

7. During periods of extreme reaction against drug use, drug education appears to employ misleading information based, apparently, on a desire to establish or maintain social control. Misinformation also seems to be associated with a concurrent increase in the use of legal threats. This was especially noticeable during the prohibition movement to outlaw alcohol, during the early 1900s, when anti-Mexican and anti-Chinese movements focused on heroin and marijuana use, and in the 1960s, when a new upswing in drug use was associated with political protest against the war in Vietnam. Recent educational efforts have appeared to adopt a more honest approach to the dissemination of information about drugs. However, one may question whether this is an illusion created by the masking of incorrect drug information within an abundance of educational packaging, such as values clarification, decisionmaking, social inoculation, and life-skills educational processes. More sophisticated educational programmes are no guarantee of trustworthiness.

8. See, for example, David M. Murray and Cheryl L. Perry, "The Prevention of Adolescent Drug Abuse: Implications of Etiological, Developmental, Behavioural, and Environmental Models," in *Etiology*

of Drug Abuse: Implications for Prevention, ed. Cory L. Jones and Robert J. Battjes, National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monograph no. 56 (Rockville, Md.: 1985).

9. See, for example, Eric Schaps et al., "A Review of 127 Drug Education Prevention Evaluations," *Journal of Drug Issues* 11 (1981): 17-43; G. Nicholas Braucht and Barbara Braucht, "Prevention of Problem Drinking among Youth: Evaluation of Educational Strategies," in *Prevention of Alcohol Abuse*, ed. Peter M. Miller and Ted D. Nirenberg (New York: Plenum Press, 1984); Russell E. Glasgow and Kevin D. McCaul, "Social and Personal Skills Training Programmes for Smoking Prevention: Critique and Directions for Future Research," in *Prevention Research: Deterring Drug Abuse among Children and Adolescents*, ed. Catherine S. Bell and Robert Battjes, National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monograph no. 63 (Rockville, Md.: 1985).

10. The majority of school-based programmes have been limited to classroom activities. Until recently few have attempted to involve parents or the wider community.

11. See, for example, Michael S. Goodstadt, "Drug Education—A Turn On or a Turn Off?," *Journal of Drug Education* 10 (1980): 89-100; Thomas A. Wills, "Stress, Coping, and Tobacco and Alcohol Use in Early Adolescence," in *Coping and Substance Use*, ed. Saul Shiffman and Thomas A. Wills (New York: Academic Press, 1985).

12. Brian R. Flay, "What We Know About the Social Influence Approach to Smoking Prevention: Review and Recommendations," in *Prevention Research*, ed. Bell and Battjes.

13. See, for example, J. Michael Polich et al., *Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1984); Gilbert J. Botvin and Thomas A. Wills, "Personal and Social Skills Training: Cognitive-Behavioural Approaches to Substance Abuse Prevention," in *Prevention Research*, ed. Bell and Battjes.

14. See, for example, James L. Hamilton, "The Demand for Cigarettes Advertising, the Health Scare, and the Cigarette Advertising Ban," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 54 (1972): 401-11; Kenneth E. Warner and Hillary A. Murt, "Premature Deaths Avoided by the Antismoking Campaign," *American Journal of Public Health* 73 (1983): 672-77; Robert E. Lea, "Anti-Smoking Publicity, Taxation, and the Demand for Cigarettes," *Journal of Health Economics* 3 (1984): 101-16.

15. J. Michael Polich et al., *Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use*, 3. The authors conclude "that the value of resources devoted to treatment and prevention has declined from nearly \$600 million (in 1979) to about \$300 million (in 1983), while resources for law enforcement have moved upward from approximately \$650 million to approximately \$800 million." It is unclear whether the present U.S. administration will redress this imbalance.

16. See, for example, Polich et al., *Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use*, Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley and Jerald G. Bachman, "Marijuana Decriminalization: The Impact on Youth 1975-1980," *Monitoring the Future: Occasional Paper 13* (Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan, 1981); Eric W. Single, "The Impact of Marijuana Decriminalization," in Yedy Israel et al., *Research Advances in Alcohol and Drug Problems*, vol. 6 (New York: Plenum Press, 1981); Robert Solomon et al., "Legal Considerations in Canadian Cannabis Policy," *Canadian Public Policy* 9 (1983): 419-33, see also entire issue of *Contemporary Drug Problems* 10 (1981). Much of the experimental research literature investigating cannabis use within the disciplines of sociology and criminology has failed to find evidence of deterrent effects of the law, see, for example, Raymond Pateroster et al., "Perceived Risk and Social Control. Do Sanctions Really Deter?" *Law and Society Review* 17 (1983): 457-79; Robert F. Meier et al., "Sanctions, Peers, and Deviance: Preliminary Models of a Social Control Process," *The Sociological Quarterly* 24 (1984): 67-82. For a review of the limitations of legal deterrence measures with respect to drunk driving, see H. Laurence Ross, *Deterring the Drinking Driver: Legal Policy and Social Control* (Lexington Books, Mass: Lexington, 1982).

(Courtesy: Issues in Science and Technology)

## International NGOs' Conference on Drug Abuse Prevention

The primary goal of the *International Conference of NGOs for Drug Abuse Prevention* being held at Karachi from 20-26 August 1988, is to expose participants to each others experiences, to exchange expertise in their respective fields, and to formulate strategies aimed at more effective control of drug abuse on a national, regional and international level. All too often, too much reliance is placed on Government agencies for the solution of all drug-related problems. This conference shall attempt to articulate resolutions aimed at the involvement and participation of private individuals and organizations. The interaction with Government, the private sector, and socially motivated charitable organizations shall be the central themes of this conference.

### Objectives

1. To introduce NGOs to successful drug abuse prevention programmes working effectively in other countries.
2. To facilitate technology transfer of prevention programme operations to NGOs.
3. To encourage new private sector involvement in drug abuse prevention.
4. To foster communication, coordination, and cooperation among NGOs to more effectively combat the drug abuse epidemic.

In its sessions, the conference will deal with the following aspects of prevention approaches:

- Community-based Intervention.

- Parents Groups.
- Drug Abuse in Workplaces.
- Involvement of Private Sector.
- Youth Group Organization.
- School Programmes.
- Legal Awareness.
- Treatment and Rehabilitation.
- Media Involvement.

### International Agencies

#### ECC

The Commission of the European Communities and the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, signed a project agreement in December 1987 concerning preventive education for drug abuse. Apart from support for a mass media campaign, an important component of the agreement is support for NGO activities. The rising importance of NGOs, particularly also in the field of drug abuse prevention, is internationally acknowledged and finds its concrete expression in the international support for their activities.

#### SAARC

The *South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation* was founded to promote regional cooperation and collaboration for the betterment of the people of South Asia. Cooperation in the field of narcotics among the SAARC member states was suggested on the first SAARC summit meeting held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in

1985. One year later, on 17-18 September 1986, a Study-group Meeting on Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The meeting was chaired by the unanimously elected Chairman Mr. S.M. Akram, Member of the National Board of Revenue, Bangladesh.

The recommendations of the study group meeting include:

- the condemnation of illicit narcotic production, trafficking, and consumption.
- the high priority of all member states to fight the narcotic menace.
- the importance of cooperation among member states in the fight against narcotics.
- the support to UN programmes in this field.
- the importance of increasing awareness among the people.
- the exchange of information.
- the eradication of all illicit narcotic production.
- the cooperation with international narcotic law enforcement agencies.
- the strengthening of treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts.
- the establishment of a regional committee on Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking.

In December 1986, Mr. Dilshad Najmuddin, Chairman of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, was nominated as Chairman of the Technical Committee on the Prevention of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse for the SAARC countries.

The first meeting of the Technical Committee was held in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 12-15 April 1987 and was attended by representatives of all member states. The Committee recommended an action plan for the following spheres:

- Drug Law Enforcement.
- Legal Framework.
- Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts.

— Education for the Prevention of Drug Abuse.

— Involvement of Non-Government Organizations.

The second meeting of the Technical Committee was held in Islamabad, Pakistan, from 5-7 October 1987, and was chaired by Mr. Dilshad Najmuddin, Chairman Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. The Committee formulated ways and means to strengthen cooperative efforts among the member states through the following steps:

- to identify concrete projects and actions.
- to hold a workshop on ayurvedic and homoeopathic systems of medicines for the treatment of addicts. India was requested to organize the workshop.
- to take into consideration the ILO proposal concerning treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts as suggested by Pakistan.
- To organize the central importance of NGO activities.
- to exchange expertise between member countries.

#### UNFDAC

*Information Letter October-December 1987  
U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs.*

#### Parliamentarian Conference Adopts Declaration

Revision of banking secrecy laws, more flexible extradition procedures, forfeiture of all assets derived from drug trafficking and preventive information programmes aimed at high-risk groups were among the principal recommendations adopted at the first Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in the Western Hemisphere held from 9 to 13 November 1987 in Caracas.

Also adopted was a Declaration recognizing that drug abuse and illicit trafficking today constitute a world-wide problem

which not only causes serious damage to human health but also attacks the socio-economic structures and political stability of many societies.

Dr. Reinaldo Leandro Mora, President of the Congress of Venezuela, served as President of the Conference.

More than 80 parliamentarians from 37 countries and experts from specialized organizations participated in the conference, which was organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in cooperation with the United Nations and with the support of the Latin American Parliament and the World Health Organization.

The Declaration pointed out that solutions include the need to develop sufficiently strong economies in the supplier countries in order to offer an alternative to the economy created by drug trafficking. This implies overcoming the international trade crisis and the external debt problems impeding growth in developing countries.

To strengthen the international community's response to the problem, States in the region were urged to take an active part in formulating the new convention against illicit drug trafficking that is currently being drafted under the auspices of the United Nations.

The United Nations was represented by the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (ICDAIT).

The 108-member Inter-Parliamentary Union was established in Paris in 1889.

#### WHO Meeting Urges Measures on Controlled Substance Analogues

Over 60 participants from 21 States attended a meeting in Rabat from 8 to 11 September 1987 on the Assessment of Issues Relative to Illicit Substances of Abuse and Controlled Substances Analogues (Designer Drugs). It focused on a range of topics such as treaties, laws and enforcement;

programme identification; chemical analysis and research, and health issues.

The meeting adopted a set of recommendations to be followed by the United Nations agencies and bodies as well as by health care professionals and law enforcement officers at the national level.

The meeting was organized by the World Health Organization in collaboration with the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States of America, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and the Government of Morocco.

Attending were representatives of the International Narcotics Control Board, the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the World Health Organization as well as the International Criminal Police Organization, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations and the South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

#### Role of Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB)

The number of drug addicts throughout the world has swelled out of all proportions. Pakistan is facing an equally grave situation in this respect. Every Pakistani irrespective of age, sex and creed is watching the red signal with expressions of horror. He is mentally engrossed with the idea as to how best fight the menace. The Government of Pakistan could not be a passive spectator. All resources of the country have to be mobilized to achieve the goal of a drug free zone. It was with this aim in view that P.N.C.B. was established charged with the duty to eradicate the evil of drug by any conceivable means.

The P.N.C.B. has accepted the challenge and with the help and cooperation of International Agencies has made a respect-

able headway. For this purpose Training Courses have been organized. Law enforcing units have been revitalized to enforce the law on the drug manufacture, addiction and traffic.

Different courses to train teachers, doctors (General Practitioners) and Social workers have been held. Precisely, six courses to train social workers were held at Quetta, Sialkot, Faisalabad, Bahawalpur, Multan and Sukkur. In all 2000 social workers were imparted necessary training enabling them to spread out in the field and combat drug menace.

Two courses one at Lahore and the other at Sialkot were held to train doctors (General Practitioners) adding to their proficiency in the treatment of addicts. By these two courses 120 doctors benefited.

Curriculum wings in all the four provinces of the country were assisted and given financial aid to the tune of Rs. 0.5 million by the PNCB to train teachers to contain and eradicate the evil of drug addiction. Training courses were held in all the provinces at various places and as a result thereof about 2000 teachers were trained who are now doing their best to fight drug addiction. The training courses were held by the Master Trainers.

PNCB Advanced Narcotics Law Enforcement School, Islamabad held one advance course and 13 basic courses to train law enforcement personnel. Trainees were drawn from the various law enforcement agencies of the country like Customs, F.I.A., Coast Guards, Rangers, Police, Frontier Constabulary, Airport Security Force, Air Force etc. These courses were held at Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Azad Kashmir. In all 392 personnel were trained — 35 through advance course and 357 through basic courses.

In various cities of the country detoxification centres have been established where respectable facilities for the treatment of addicts are provided. Almost 12,000

addicts have been taken care of in these 26 detoxification centres.

A three-day Master Trainer Course on "Drug Abuse Prevention Education" was organised from 23rd to 25th Feb: 1988 at Taj Mahal Hotel, Karachi.

120 teachers of both sexes from all over Pakistan and Azad Kashmir attended the course. The scourge of drug addiction has assumed enormous proportion throughout the world and Pakistan is not an exception to it. It is considered that the Government alone cannot tackle this problem and as such *inter alia* the teacher community has to be mobilised to help prevent/minimize drug addiction in the country. With this aim in view they were given extensive training to equip them to impart similar training to the teachers in their respective provinces.

Besides, participation of prominent educationalists, all the Directors of Bureau of Curriculum Wing were also represented. The participants of the course were addressed by Mr. Toaha Qureshi, Director, PNCB who said that the purpose of the programme was to educate the people to keep away from the drugs and keep the drugs away from them. He said that PNCB plans to train 25,000 teachers to help prevent the younger generation from addiction. He was very optimistic about Pakistan becoming a drug free zone in the near future.

Mr. Abdullah Khadim Hussain, Joint Adviser, Bureau of Curriculum, Ministry of Education attended the initial session and addressed the participants. Similarly, Mr. James N. Carl, Assistant Field Adviser, United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse (UNFDAC) also attended the course and addressed the participants.

Dr. Zaheer Khan reputable psychiatrist, Dr. Doris B. Nayyar, International Consultant, PNCB and eminent educationalists like Prof. Maqsood Rizvi, Prof. Sajidin and Ms. Anita Ghulam Ali spoke on the occasion. Some of the participants of the

course also expressed their views. They were Ms. Saeeda (Lahore), Mr. Iftikhar Ahmed (Karachi), Ms. Tanveer Latif (Azad Kashmir). Group discussions were held which were very lively and the participants made useful suggestions and proposals to the effect that drug abuse prevention material as developed by the Committee should be incorporated in the Syllabi for Class VI to Class X in all the provinces as far as possible.

The Vice Chancellor of Karachi University Dr. Manzoor-ud-din Ahmed speaking as Chief Guest at the certificate distribution ceremony underlined the need of total social mobilization to tackle the growing problem of narcotics in the country. He suggested that Drug Abuse Prevention Courses should be included in the curriculum as compulsory subject. Dr. Ahmed congratulated the PNCB for conducting the Drug Prevention Course and was of the view that involvement of teachers could help a lot in tackling this problem.

The Vice Chancellor Karachi University Dr. Manzoor-ud-din Ahmed distributed certificates among the participants of the course who had demonstrated ample interest and enthusiasm while Prof. Sajiddin presented the vote of thanks at the conclusion of the course. Drug Abuse Prevention Course for Female Social Workers was held by the PNCB in collaboration with the APWA (All Pakistan Women Association) on 4th and 5th March, 1988 at Sukkur in APWA Club. Mrs. Suriya Feroze Ahmed, Principal, Government Girls College Sukkur was the Chief Guest of the inaugural session. About 500 women participated. Such a huge gathering of female social workers was a unique occasion in the history of PNCB. Mr. and Mrs. Nur-ud-din Shaikh, Mayor of Sukkur were the Chief Guests for the last day's session.

After the address of welcome by Mrs. Jamal Ahmed Shaikh, a thought-provoking discourse was delivered by Mr. Toaha

Qureshi, Director PNCB, regarding the menace of drug abuse and its prevention in Pakistan. Eminent educationists like Prof. Sajiddin of the University of Karachi, Prof. Maqsood Rizvi from Baluchistan University, Prof. Mrs. Parveen Butt of the Government College for Home Economics, Lahore, Miss Suriya Zafar, Assistant Professor, Islamia College for Women, Lahore and Prof. Sarwar Kharra of the F.C. College Lahore attended the course.

## NARCOTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

Eleven law enforcement agencies are active in the control of narcotics trafficking. These agencies are: Customs, Excise, Frontier Corps, Joint Narcotics Task Force, Police, Police/CIA, PNCB, Levies, Pak Rangers, Coast Guard and ASF (Airport Security Force). The success of these agencies during the last years has shown that increased control over trafficking of narcotics is possible. The narcotic seizures, the cases registered and the persons arrested in Pakistan during 1987 are given below:

Narcotics seizures, cases registered and persons arrested within Pakistan during 1987

Drug	Quantity	No. of	
		Cases Registered	Defendants (Nos.)
Opium	7852 Kgs.	2747	2771
Heroin	5442 Kgs.	11444	11679
Charas (Hashish)	158,402 Kgs.	19470	19568
Mandrax (Tabs)	8,524	82	87
Bhang (Marijuana)	3,136 Kgs.	283	275
Morphine (Tabs)	20,282	23	20
Pethidin (Inj)	1,143 Nos.	3	3
Hashish Oil	0.032 Kg.	1	1

Prof. Maqsood Rizvi, Chairman, Social Work Department, University of Baluchistan, Quetta apprised the gathering of the

aims, objectives and importance of the course. Prof. Mohammad Sajiddin of the Economics Department of the Karachi University spoke on the role of social workers in the prevention of drug abuse. Group discussions were held as a result whereof a number of proposals were put forth by the participants for consideration.

A resolution was passed by the participants calling upon the Government to impose a complete and effective ban on the sale of narcotics and that the traffickers should be punished severely.

#### *Fight Against Drug Abuse*

### Vienna Moot Adopts Plan of Action

Vienna, June 26: Some 138 countries, attending a UN conference on drugs, adopted a declaration on Friday (26th June, 1987), in which they accepted for the first time "the collective responsibility" of States for the drug problem.

At the end of the nine-day conference, the 3,000 delegates, that included more than 80 ministers, also adopted a plan of action for countries to use in their fight against drug abuse and trafficking.

The adoption of the "collective responsibility" motion followed pressure from Latin American countries who wanted Western countries to accept their share of responsibility, as the main drug consumers, for the growing problem.

The plan of action lays down 35 aims in four areas — prevention and reduction of demand for drugs, control of supply, suppression of trafficking and treatment and rehabilitation — which countries should target.

Pakistan was represented at the conference by a three-member delegation headed by Attorney-General, Mr. Ali Ahmad Fazeel. The other members are: Pakistan's Ambassador at Vienna, Dr. Khurshid

Hyder and Mr. Dilshad Najmuddin, Chairman, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board.

The Conference had earlier elected Prime Minister of Malaysia as its President and Pakistan as one of its Vice-Presidents.

Mr. Fazeel told a plenary meeting of the conference on June 22 that the efforts of the Government of Pakistan in reducing production of opium had been rewarded in good measure and in the last eight years, Pakistan had, through a series of crop substitution schemes and other steps, reduced opium production from 800 metric tons to 70 metric tons in 1987. Efforts for the elimination of poppy cultivation continued, he added.

### 'Every Ninth Male Adult a Narcotic Addict'!

Every ninth male adult (15 years and above) in Karachi is afflicted with heroin abuse, the latest national survey on drug abuse reveals.

Terming the overall drug situation as grim, it says that the use of heroin in the country has risen to "epidemic proportions" — by far the worst affected area being Karachi.

The survey conducted by the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board pertains to the period upto 1986 and also compares it with the situation prevalent in the country at the time of the first survey in 1982-83.

For the first time, it also reports heroin abuse among the female population although the number is still on a very low side — "just 1.05 per cent of the respondents being women."

Examining the situation in the country as a whole, it reports that 2.23 per cent of the male adult population (one in 45) had taken to heroin in 1986. This compares with just 0.35 per cent (one in 285) in the 1982-83 survey.

**PROVINCE-WISE:** In Baluchistan one out of 39 male adults had taken to heroin; one in 50 in the NWFP; one in 81 in the Punjab; and one in 40 in Sind excluding Karachi.

Tracing the history of heroin abuse it says that it first spread in Karachi and Baluchistan and then to the other parts of the country. In the rural areas, it came through the urban centres.

On the whole, the survey reports 1.9 million regular drug users in the country compared with 1.3 million in the 1982-83 survey. Heroin addicts totalled 657,000 approximately, compared to a bare 30,000 heroin addicts in 1982 and 65,000 in 1983.

**PATTERN:** The survey has noticed a "definite change" in the drug-use pattern inasmuch as heroin, which ranked 7th in the previous survey, has since jumped to first position — displacing charas to second place.

Five years ago, only 1.8 per cent of all drugs used was heroin. It now represents 31.8 per cent. The following figures give a clearer picture:

Heroin (31.8 per cent): 657,392 male adult abusers or 2.19 per cent. Charas (28.2 per cent): 582,024 abusers (1.94 per cent). Alcohol (14.5 per cent): 299,118 abusers (0.99 per cent). Opium (12.7 per cent): 262,071 abusers (0.87 per cent). Bhang (6.1 per cent): 125,987 abusers (0.42 per cent). Tranquillizers (2.7 per cent): 56,193 abusers (0.19 per cent). Others (4.1 per cent): 8,407 abusers (0.28 per cent). All drugs: 2,066,862 abusers (6.9 per cent).

Analysing the changing pattern of drug abuse in the country, the survey says that in Sind Province heroin had virtually displaced all other drugs. It represented 84 per cent of all the drugs consumed, largely because of the massive consumption in Karachi.

In the NWFP also, heroin abuse was on the increase (31.3 per cent), a close second to charas (34.1 per cent).

**IN BALUCHISTAN,** the number of drug abusers had more than doubled from 51,241 in 1982 to 136,096 in 1986 with heroin consumption going up from 14.7 per cent to 28.5 per cent. On the other hand, consumption of charas had declined appreciably.

**IN THE NWFP,** the number of drug abusers increased by 23.2 per cent in three years but there was more than corresponding increase in the quantity of drug consumed. Whereas in 1982, heroin was abused by 1.5 per cent of the drug abusers, the number had gone up to 27.1 per cent in 1986.

According to the survey, heroin abuse had spread to almost all parts of the province in 1986, although it was largely confined to Peshawar city in 1982.

In fact, charas which represented 71 per cent of all drugs consumed in NWFP in 1982 had slipped to 29.5 per cent in 1986.

**THE PUNJAB** also recorded 47.7 per cent increase in the number of drug abusers — from 736,413 in 1982 to 1,087,775 in 1986. Heroin use was recorded at 25.3 per cent from a negligible 0.8 per cent in 1982 — almost displacing all other drugs except liquor whose consumption remained stable.

The survey also shows that as in the other provinces, heroin use in the Punjab also had spread to almost all the areas "sparing neither the urban nor the rural populations." However, it was less (12.2 per cent) in rural areas and more (29.7 per cent) in the urban areas.

**YOUNG PEOPLE:** The survey found 31.2 per cent of all heroin abusers between 25-30 years of age but 40 per cent even younger — less than 25 years.

In fact, "more than two-thirds of the heroin users are to be found among young people," it said. They are mostly to be found amongst the unskilled workers, workers engaged in agriculture, transport, and such other trades and occupations.

Working on the basis of Rs. 300 per month spent on drug abuse by the addicts,

the survey estimates that the 1.9 regular drug users were, on the aggregate, spending equivalent of Rs. 6,840 million on drugs per year.

It does not anticipate any rapid decline in the number of drug abusers in the country in the coming years unless a series of measures were taken in all directions.

In fact, economic growth and the resultant rise in incomes might help "feed the illicit narcotics trade and consumption," it apprehends.

(*Dawn*, 27-10-87)

## Drugs Claim More Soviet Soldiers than Bullets

Washington, May 24: More than half the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan take drugs, according to a US report which describes the Soviet contingents as wracked with disease, internal conflicts and corruption.

"Disease, often caused by extremely poor hygiene, may have claimed more casualties than the bullets of the Mujahideen resistance fighters, while inadequate living conditions and isolation have also sapped health and morale," says the study from a US army research centre.

At least 100 Soviet soldiers deserted during the Afghan war, it said.

Lack of discipline, cohesion and motivation explain in part the performance—"indifferent in general and, at times, poor"—forced the decision to withdraw the troops, according to the study's author, Alexander Alexiev.

The study was based on interviews with 35 former soviet soldiers, including 25 deserters and prisoners of war, and more than 300 reports in the Soviet Press.

"Almost all of the old-timers smoked narcotics in the unit," the report quoted an unspecified soldier as saying, "but the young ones less so. I would say about half the people smoked 'chars' and 'plan' (opium and hashish)." "It affected you in much the same manner as vodka except that by the next morning you would be okay."

"It was no longer frightening to die," after smoking hashish, a soldier was quoted as saying.

The report's descriptions of drug-taking sadism, and boredom resemble US veteran's descriptions of their Vietnam war experiences.

"Most of the former soldiers believed that drugs were used so widely simply because they were cheap and easily available," according to the report, "while vodka was not," and because of boredom too.

It said traditional antagonism between first-year and second-year soldiers, "stariki"—old men—and "molodiye"—young men—was especially severe in Afghanistan, "undermining unit cohesion and discipline."

Stariki stole from their younger comrades and forced them to perform various cruel stunts—running, wearing gas masks, and scrubbing latrines with tooth-brushes, according to the report.

The poor morale was evident in desertions, according to the US army report, and "fragging"—soldiers within a unit killing each other." "The victims of fragging,"—it said, "are typically other servicemen rather than officers."

Corruption and theft were also rampant, the report said. "My friend and I were heavily involved in the sale of ammunition to the Afghans," it quoted one of its sources as saying. When detected, such

activities were severely punished, with six to 10 years in jail.

(*The Nation*, 25-5-88)

#### SENATE COMMITTEE HEARS

### Marijuana Biggest Cash Crop in US

Washington: The biggest cash crop in the United States—an estimated 14 billion dollars a year in marijuana—according to Congressional investigators, is being illegally grown on Federal lands, and there appears little the government can do about it.

From Northern California's "Emerald Triangle" to the lush New England woodlands, an army of renegade farmers has literally taken over nearly a million remote acres in US national forests, witnesses told a Senate Agriculture Subcommittee.

The farmers pay migrant workers 200 dollars a day—10 times the going farm labour wage—to work the fields, and they protect their illegal crops with lethal booby traps, radio-controlled attack dogs and arsenals that include heavy machine guns, grenade launchers and anti-aircraft missiles, the witnesses said.

Experts said the dogs are conditioned to attack intruders on command by electric shocks issued through a remote controlled radio collar.

"These are sophisticated, heavily armed, well-organized criminal armies, using the most modern techniques in agronomy and irrigation" said Representative Ron Wyden.

Mr. Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, is sponsoring a bill that would stiffen penalties for drug growing on Federal lands and give more enforcement muscle to US Forest Rangers, the only peace officers now mandated to control such activity.

He said the retail value of marijuana in his state north of California had increased "by 500 per cent over 1985 levels."

"With marijuana so valuable, growers are going to frightening lengths to protect their cash crops," he said.

Senator Tom Harkin, an Iowa Democrat who chaired the committee, said the "Economics of marijuana production are staggering."

"In this room there is sufficient space to produce 400,000 dollars worth of marijuana," he said, referring to the hearing room, about.

"The best marijuana that money can buy is grown in the Emerald Triangle of Northern California," said Mr. Harkin.

William Rice, the Forest Service's Deputy Chief for Administration, said marijuana growers have invaded national forests in recent years for essentially two reasons.

"Because of forfeiture and seizure laws, growers moved their operations to Federal lands where they would not risk losing their own land if caught," he said. "And, national forest land generally offers good growing conditions, remote locations and a low law enforcement presence."

Segments from a government-produced video to be aired on public television showed growers in national forests polluting the environment with pesticides and chemical fertilizers, poaching game, harassing campers and hikers, and setting lethal traps to discourage both police and dope pirates.

The video also included interviews with residents near California forests who said the economies of entire towns in the region had grown dependent on the revenue from wealthy marijuana growers.

"The growers have a potential fortune at stake", said Forest Service Special Agent Frank Packwood, "and irrespective of the tactic employed, they are dangerous people."

"When one considers the potential profits,...the rationale for setting a fragmentation grenade....across a hiking trail, wiring the plants with a high order

explosive or setting an armed pipe bomb in a cultivation site... is considered reasonable," he said.

(Morning News, 15-5-88)

## Poppy Production Increasing in NWFP, Says Fazle Haq

Peshawar, May 26: Former NWFP Governor Lt. Gen. (Retd) Fazle Haq has claimed that opium production in the province would rise to over 200 tons this year due to a host of factors including official laxity to enforce ban on poppy cultivation.

In an interview with 'The Muslim', he recalled that opium production had been drastically reduced from 800 tons in 1978 to about 45 ton by December 1985 when his more than seven year term as Governor of NWFP ended. He stressed that these figures were authenticated by both the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board.

The former Governor noted with concern that poppy was now being grown even in areas where its cultivation was eradicated in the past. In this context, he cited the examples of Buner in Swat district, Adenzai in Dir district, Malakand Agency and Bajaur Agency where its cultivation was renewed after a lapse of some years. He maintained that in certain cases the poppy acreage rose beyond previous levels.

Senator Fazle Haq reminded that his martial law government knocked out 25 heroin manufacturing laboratories in Landikotal area of Khyber Agency and also in Darra Adamkhel and destroyed thousands of acres of poppy crop in Mardan, Peshawar and other districts. He claimed Buner was rendered

poppy free in 1983 as a result of the UNFDAO-funded Rs. 300 million project, the poppy growing Utmankhel area in Malakand agency too was denuded of forbidden crop by 1983 when the Rs. 80 million US-Aided project was implemented, while another big project in Dir, financed largely by the Americans, was also executed. He said a pilot project funded by the United States was approved for the Kala Dhaka tribal area in Mansehra district and work on the three phased Gadoon Amazai crop substitution project worth Rs. 600 million provided by the US began in right earnest besides peaceful implementation of the first phase geared towards finding alternative sources of income for the poor poppy cultivators of the area.

The general maintained that not a single plant of poppy was allowed to be grown in the Bajaur Agency where 120 tubewells were installed during his rule but the area was now mushrooming with blossoming poppies. He recalled that no life was lost in Gadoon Amazai in Mardan district despite effective enforcement of ban on poppy cultivation in some areas in the first phase whereas about a dozen persons were killed there in March 1986, when the civilian democratic government had taken charge. He said it was his endeavour as Governor to argue for a better deal for the poppy cultivators in NWFP during overseas trips and discussions with foreign governments and donors with a view to enabling them to grow remunerative crops in place of poppy.

Defending himself against charges of his involvement in the narcotics business, the former Governor maintained that these were levelled by those espousing vested interests. He argued that the allegations were baseless as was vindicated by the fact that opium production was drastically reduced during his governorship, poppy crops were destroyed and heroin laboratories were smashed. Moreover, he refused

to believe that consignments of heroin powder which allegedly were sent by him from NWFP could not be intercepted in Punjab, Baluchistan or Sind from where this had to pass to reach Karachi and beyond. "How come not a single heroin consignment, out of the many reportedly sent by me or my men, was ever caught on the way unlike a few others from the ruling classes who were apprehended", he asked.

Besides, the General wanted to know whether the Americans who were waging a worldwide campaign against drugs could remain oblivious of the situation in NWFP from where bulk of opium and heroin reportedly originated. He reminded that the martial law regime was dubbed a US puppet and DEA agents were romping the country, especially NWFP, aiming to detect narcotics trafficking and help in controlling the illicit trade. He argued that the United States government would surely have known about the doings of a Governor of NWFP where they were investing heavily not only to eradicate poppy cultivation but also due to the huge presence of Afghan refugees.

Senator Fazle Haq also charged a certain lobby jealous of his relationship with President Ziaul Haq with fanning baseless propaganda against him. He said a whispering campaign was started to put him on the defensive by whipping up his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. He argued that liberal grants provided to NWFP as a result of his tireless efforts was mistakenly construed by the said lobby as snatching of Punjab's share of funds. He thought this lobby comprised certain Islamabad bureaucrats, intellectuals and newsmen, based in Lahore.

(Muslim, 27-5-88)

## VAST AREAS UNDER POPPY CULTIVATION

Islamabad, June 2: An American expert on narcotics at the embassy of the United States, stated on Thursday that poppy cultivation in the NWFP had increased from only 8,000 acres in 1985 to 25,000 acres in 1988.

A good crop of opium yields eight kilos per acre. He insisted that last three years (which incidentally coincide with civilian rule in the country) saw an increased trend in poppy cultivation and one of the reasons cited by this expert was that not enough was being done by the Provincial Government which failed to enforce stringent laws.

The poppy crop was also being cultivated in Baluchistan and Sind provinces but the production of these two provinces was very low, he added.

The US narcotics expert, however, appreciated the vigilance and strict checking measures of the law-enforcing agencies of the country and said that during the last five years a number of attempts had been foiled to smuggle five tons of heroin out of the country on various occasions.

He stated that the wholesale price of the crop had also been declined as it was being purchased in New York this year at the rate of \$50,000 to \$80,000 per kg as against of \$100,000 during the last year. The only reason of this decline was the increasing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.


He, however, regretted that six drug traffickers had so far been caught during the six years. Replying to a question, US narcotics expert said that there were a number of laboratories working inside Pakistan especially in frontier part of the country.

—Mariana Baabar  
(The Nation, 3-6-81)



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## **India's Second Space Launch Fizzles Out**

Madras, July 13. The second developmental flight of the augmented satellite launch vehicle, ASLV-D2, today went the way of the maiden ASLV-D1 on March 24, 1987, putting the clock back for India's ambitious space programme.

After a magnificent blast-off from Sriharikota, India's Cape Canaveral 110 km north of here on the Andhra coast, at 2.48 p.m. the 23.5-metre tall five-stage rocket carrying the 150-kg Rohini satellite to be lobbed into a near circular 450-km high orbit, came hurtling down and met with a watery grave in the Bay of Bengal. Mr. U. R. Rao, Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization said that only after analysing data from telemetry tracking and command networks would it be possible to know what went wrong with the mission. Though the strap-on motors and the ignition of the first stage of the rocket functioned perfectly, the vehicle behaved "abnormally," according to him.

The blast-off was delayed by two minor hold-ups lasting a few minutes each due to malfunctioning of a radar. After setting things right, the ASLV lifted off leaving a trail of bright orange flame and smoke. Even as it soared into the clear blue sky, telemetry tracking and control systems

failed to receive any signal from the vehicle, giving the first indication that all was not well.

Unlike the ASLV-D1 launch on March 24 last year witnessed by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, among other VIPs, today's was a low profile affair.

The failure analysis committee set up by the ISRO to inquire into failure of the ASLV-D1 mission came to the conclusion that it could be due to a "random malfunction of the safearm device". Instead of redesigning safearms, which was still in progress, as a temporary measure, the device was done away within ASLV-D2 to speed up its launch date.

Failure of the ASLV-D2 mission had raised doubts about the next two flights in the series called ASLV-C1 and ASLV-C2 scheduled for 1989 and 1990. Mr. Rao said the Launch of the next ASLV flight would be decided only after fully going into the causes of today's failure. The polar satellite launch vehicle programme, capable of putting 1,000-kg remote sensing satellites into a 1,000-km sun-synchronous orbit, however, would not be affected, he added. "Though it is disheartening, we have to accept that highs

risks are involved in space programme," Mr. Rao said.

Over 70 industries and hightech institutions had supported ISRO in the ASLV launch. Indian industry had not only contributed directly to the mission by developing and fabricating various hardware that went into the launch vehicle, but also played an active role in building the ground infrastructure.

ASLV-D2 was designed and developed at the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre in Trivandrum. It involved application of several branches of engineering and technology including aeronautics, avionics, electronics, computer, chemicals and propellants, propulsion, pyrotechnics, control power plants precision fabrication and stringent quality and reliability requirements. Over a thousand scientists and engineers were involved in the mission.

Prof. Rao ruled out any sabotage according to UNI. He said there was no point in salvaging the vehicle lost in the Bay of Bengal as the cost of the salvaging operations would be much more.

Asked whether he could compare the failure to those that occurred abroad, he said he did not see any comparison. But he cited instances of failure of the Delta launch in Ariane.

The former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Chairman of the Council of Indian Institute of Science, Dr. Raja Ramanna said "that's terrible," when informed about the failed mission. "It's a disappointment for all scientists," he added.

The Rs. 20-crore augmented satellite launch vehicle (ASLV) programme seems to be jinxed with two test rockets crashing into the sea within a space of 15 months. The two successive failures have plunged space scientists in grief, and have raised doubts over the soundness of the new technologies introduced into the first generation SLV-3 rocket for augmenting its payload from 50 kg to 150 kg.

ASLV is basically an improved version of SLV-3 with two strap-on boosters for increasing payload capability, an inertial navigation platform and a close loop guidance system for increasing the accuracy of payload injection. ASLV's first test in March last year failed when the rocket fell into the sea due to non-ignition of the first stage motor.

Despite one year of investigations into its failure, scientists failed to pin down the exact fault. According to the ISRO, the modifications introduced into ASLV-2 were based on suspicions.

ASLV is the first Indian launch vehicle using solid fuel boosters strapped on to its waist. The Space Department had earlier denied that the strap-on technology was untested on the ground.

Doubts that acoustic vibrations from the solid boosters might have been responsible for the failure of ASLV-1 were ruled out by the failure investigation committee. The committee had also cleared the close-loop guidance system.

*(Statesman, 14-7-88)*

## Many Theories on ASLV Failure

The Indian Space Research Organization has come in for sharp criticism from experts in the wake of the ASLV-D2 crash in the Bay of Bengal on Wednesday.

The main point of criticism is that ISRO admittedly had launched the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV-D2) without being able to determine the reason for the crash of its predecessor, ASLV-D1 in an almost identical incident on March 24, 1987.

ISRO had decided to hold a full-scale investigation and grounded further ASLV launches until it knew what went wrong—the suspicion of various experts in the Government and

universities fell on the hydrazine fuel used in the "first-stage" rocket during blast-off.

The ASLV is considered to be an improved version of an earlier generation of rockets, the SLV's though the basic theories remained the same according to experts. Two of the four SLV launches by ISRO had ended in crashes. The experts have now called for a complete reappraisal of the SLV theories and a halt to ISRO's proposed launching of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle and the Geo-stationary Satellite Launch Vehicle until this was done.

That ISRO officials estimated, would delay India's space programme by at least three years and wondered if the Ministry of Space, headed by the Prime Minister would accept this. But experts saw no alternative, since the rockets being built to lift the PSLV and the GSLV into their orbits were based on the same principles as the two-stage ASLV rocket booster assembly. The PSLV was earlier scheduled to use six "strap-on" booster rockets for its blast-off, where the ASLV used two.

India's record of satellite launches had even before the last crash been the worst among countries which report both successes and failures. The USSR and China report only successful launches, according to experts.

There were nearly as many theories to explain the ASLV crash as there were experts. But based on the first reports of the crash sequence and the sketchy details given by the ISRO Chairman, Dr. U. R. Rao, most theories seemed to deal with the first stage of the actual cigar shaped rocket rather than the two "strap-on" boosters.

The ASLV has five stages in all, of which only the last two comprise the actual satellite. On top of that, there is what the engineers call the "zeroth" stage, which are the strap-on boosters.

These boosters do not form a part of the actual rocket "cigar tube", which has the satellite on top as its payload. They are "strapped" around the tube's waist. They are the rockets which fire simultaneously during blast-off, and by the ASLV design within 48 seconds both burn themselves out and are supposed to detach from the tube and fall off.

This part of the operation appeared to have gone off smoothly on Wednesday, as it did during the failed ASLV-D1 launch. At that time, there had first been some speculation that the strap-on rockets had failed to detach themselves from the main tube and had caused the crash. But a fact-finding committee later established that they had detached. What had happened on March 24, 1987 was that the "first stage" the rocket at the bottom of the tube which takes over from the strap-on's had failed to ignite. The committee could not find out why this had happened, and its final report talked vaguely of "hardware failure."

According to reports received the boosters fired, ASLV-D2 lifted off, the strap-on's detached themselves and fell into the sea, and the "first stage" rocket ignited perfectly at the stroke of the 48th second.

Disaster struck within five seconds as the lowermost rocket in the tube apparently sputtered and went out. The ASLV took another 97 seconds before finally crashing into the sea.

But experts said the launch was doomed from the moment the first-stage rocket sputtered. And most conjecture on how this could have happened—where part of the fuel inside a rocket cylinder apparently ignites and the rest does not—centred mainly on the quality and nature of the fuel.

The first-stage rocket carried liquid hydrazine fuel under pressure in contrast to the boosters which carried solid fuel. Hydrazine is a complex petroleum derivative, and since the exact mix of

components in it varies in different space programmes, the experts were unable to say what exactly ISRO's hydrazine consisted of.

But, the experts pointed out, if there was any truth in this theory, one did not need to salvage the ASLV-D2 to determine what went wrong. (Dr. Rao had anyway declared that it was not worth salvaging.) There was obviously more of the fuel, wherever it came from, and that needed to be analysed thoroughly.

Most experts assumed that this had been done after the ASLV-D1 crash but some were not sure. All agreed that it had been a "scientifically incorrect" decision to try to launch a second spacecraft of the same genre when the first one had failed, and no one had been able to determine the cause of its failure. According to an official estimate, the ASLV-D2 crash had cost India Rs. 20 crores.

The experts contrasted this with the decision of the European Space Agency to ground their Ariane-3 programme for over a year till they found the exact cause of a launch failure in May 1986—an error in the design of the third-stage motor. The error was rectified and Ariane-3 has made five successful launches after that. The sixth launch, where the payload would be India's INSAT-1C, is scheduled next week.

(*Statesman*, 16-7-88)

## 'A Great Tragedy'

*The Times of India*

The failure of the augmented satellite launch vehicle for the second time is a tragedy of the first order. It has put in doubt our space effort, once a shining example of our ability to operate at the frontiers of advanced technology. Any space programme is, by its very nature,

risk prone; setbacks have occurred in the efforts of the most developed countries. Dr. U.R. Rao, chairman of ISRO, has drawn attention to the history of the Delta rocket programme in the U.S. as also to the setbacks in Europe's Ariane and America's space shuttle programme. But he has not given comparable figures of the ratio of successes to failures in India and other countries. These figures show the Indian space programme in an unfavourable light. And time is not standing still either. Other countries such as Japan and China are forging ahead, leaving us farther and farther behind. It is also not clear how Dr. Rao can claim that the programme for the polar launch vehicle will remain unaffected. After all, from the SLV to the PSLV is a step-by-step progression towards greater sophistication in rocketry, enabling a bigger payload to be put up higher in space. If we get stuck midway, then obviously we will take longer to reach the eventual goal, though we can certainly progress faster later on and make up some of the lost time.

The exact cause of the failure of the ASLV-D2 is not yet known. It has been stated that the basic design is not at fault and the culprit must be some malfunctioning instrument. In that case the failure would really be one of supervision, the inability to perfect construction. This must provoke the question whether all is well with the work atmosphere in ISRO. Are Indian space scientists as motivated and goal-oriented as they used to be? Or are we witnessing the same kind of decline in ISRO after the departure of Dr. Satish Dhawan as has been witnessed in the field of atomic research after the departure of Dr. Bhabha? The record shows that most of ISRO's successes were notched up during Dr. Dhawan's tenure. As the chairman of ISRO is also secretary to the department of space, bureaucratic interference cannot serve as an excuse. Neither can it be lack of resources. Two successive failures

point to problems of motivation and morale among the scientists. We do not wish to be dogmatic. The matter is too serious to permit the luxury of off-the-cuff judgment. But by the same token there is a powerful case for a thorough probe.

## Lack of Funds hits Indian AWACS

Bangalore, July 17: India's prestigious venture to build the Airborne Warning and Control System, the high eye-in-the-sky, has been grounded due to a financial squeeze.

Called the ASWAC or Aerospace Surveillance Warning and Control System, the indigenous version was initially scheduled to be inducted into the Indian Air Force in 1994-95 for that vital "force multiplier" effect. The prototype was slated to roll out of the hangar in 1990-91 for the maiden test flight.

However, with the government sparing only a few crores for this expensive venture, which needs at least Rs. 200 crore, the ASWAC project is way behind schedule, according to the defence research and development organisation (DRDO) sources.

The ASWAC project was launched in 1985-86, but only some preliminary studies have been carried out so far, sources said.

They said about 20 different facilities all over the country were listed for the project. These included Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, to build the "platform" or the aircraft for the system, Bharat Electronics limited the Electronics Radar Development Establishment and others to fabricate the highly sophisticated airborne radar system, the electronic components, the antenna and other sub-systems.

The government wanted to try the HS 748 as the "platform" instead of the massive Boeing 707, the Airbus A-300 or the C-150 transport aircraft being used by other countries. And in the absence of a supercomputer required to measure

some of the operations of the system in microseconds, it was proposed to build one using parallel processing technology, sources added.

The National Aeronautical Laboratory here has conducted some tests in connection with the AWACS.

The annual report for 1987-88 explains various tests carried out by the aerodynamics division, the structural science division and the systems engineering division of NAL.

A scale down model of the HS 748 (1/27th) was built along with the rotodome and subjected to tests in the wind tunnel to study whether the rotodome altered the longitudinal characteristics of the aircraft. Ground resonance tests in the unmodified aircraft, dynamic and kaeroelastic studies on the machine with the rotodome and static analysis of the rotomodified aircraft had been completed.

With Pakistan all set to receive the American E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning System (AEW), the air force would have to look to the Soviet Union for the IL 76 type AWACS. This would cost the exchequer a whopping Rs. 500 crore for four IL 76 AEWs.

The sources said many eyebrows were raised when the country announced that it would indigenously build the highly sophisticated AWACS system. Defence experts were sceptical as the country's R and D had never worked on ultra-hi-tech radars before.

Even an agency like the GEC Aironics that took up Nimrod-AWACS for the U.K. gave up after struggling for nine long years and turned to the U.S. for the E-3A "sentry". So did France, they said.

The E-2C "Hawkeye", which can scan 360 km in all the directions, would be able to warn Pakistan of approaching aircraft while they were still 200 km within India. It also has the battle management or command control (CC) capability which allows the AWACS to simultaneously track

600 air targets and guide some 40 defending aircrafts.

Only a handful of countries possess the AWACS with Saudi Arabia being the only nation outside the U.S. and the NATO alliance to own the E-3A. Israel, Egypt, Singapore and Japan possess the E-2C. The Soviets have replaced their old TU 124s with the advanced IL 76s.

The Saudis paid about Rs. 60 billion at 1981-82 prices for five E-3A AWACS and airborne tankers to refuel the AWACS. They have been operated and maintained by U.S. experts.

Considering the huge costs involved in such systems and certain disadvantages, some manufacturers have come up with substitutes for the AWACS, — a helicopter with advanced electronics being one of them.

The Indian government proposes to buy some new helicopters to enhance the navy's missile platform detection capability. Imports from Britain and some West European countries were being considered, the defence minister, Mr. K. C. Pant, said at a meeting of his ministry's consultative committee recently.

*(The Times of India, 18-7-88)*